Just as the German defeat on the Marne and Oise was beginning to be
realized abroad--its losses calculated, its meaning interpreted--the
Austrians, on June 15, suddenly launched an offensive in the mountain
region of Veneto and from the left bank of the Piave. So far the
enemy has been firmly held in the mountains, but has crossed the
river at two places without, however, being able to bring over any
effective artillery--on the middle reaches he has gained the Plateau of
Montello, defended by the intrenchments prepared there by the British
under Plumer last December, and near the mouth he has succeeded in
establishing one or two bridgeheads in the vicinity of Capo Sile.
As a military proposition the offensive has lacked the so far
inevitable successes of a prepared initiative; in the mountains
the first attacks were almost instantly broken up by simultaneous
counterattacks. Along the river, especially in the vicinity of the
crossings, the battle is developing in scope and intensity.
Aside from the military paradox already noted, this offensive possesses
several characteristics, some military, some political, which seem well
worth while dwelling upon.
In the first place, the location of the active front east of the
Lago di Garda, from the Asiago Plateau to the sea, offers a certain
indication of the German military situation in France. Its abortive
character may also indicate the political situation in Austria-Hungary.
With the lines in the mountains held, the operations on the Piave
present no formidable danger to Italy.
It was well known by the Italian General Staff that the Austro-German
High Command intended to make the attempt to confirm the Italian
disaster of Caporetto as soon as the melting of the snows permitted
the transportation of men and supplies through the Alps. In the first
place, the material and man power lost by the Italians in the retreat
to the Piave, which included the actual elimination of the 2d Army,
were replaced. In the second, it was absolutely necessary to rectify,
even in the Winter, the northern mountain line east of the Lago di
Garda. West of the lake up to the Tonale Pass, over the great glacier
of the Adamello, it was practically invulnerable, save through the
Giudicaria Valley.
From west to east there were three doors, as it were, which had only
been partly shut--the Vallarsa south of Rovereto, the path of the
Frenzela Torrent and the angle it forms with the Brenta just above
Valstagna, and the approach down the Piave in the region of Monte
Monfenera from the Calcina Torrent. There were also other minor
openings--the passes of Monte Asolone, between the Brenta and the
Piave, covering the path south along the Val San Lorenzo, the Nos and
Campo Mulo Valleys between Asiago and the Brenta. All these were closed
in December and January, with a total loss to the enemy of over 10,000
men and 100 guns, save the domination of the Vallarsa, that was taken
from the Austrians by the capture of Monte Corno on May 15. Meanwhile,
the British and French armies had been transferred, the former from Il
Montello on the Piave to the Asiago Plateau, and the latter from the
Monfenera region to that of Monte Grappa. Between 200,000 and 300,000
Italian troops had been sent to the aid of France.
Thus the Italian General Staff awaited the inevitable with
confidence--a confidence fully seconded by people and press, for
if the mass of the Italians had fought in ignorance before the
catastrophe of Caporetto, since then they had learned the objects of
the war--national as well as allied.
But the General Staff had also learned something else. This was most
important. If Ludendorff in France should be successful--if he should
succeed in isolating the allied armies north of the Somme, or force
the French back upon the defenses of Paris, or both--then the Austrian
Commander in Chief with his million men would be aided by German
generalship and German divisions, and, together, they would strike down
the Giudicaria to the west of the Lago di Garda, with all strength and
disregarding all sacrifices in order to reach the metallurgic centre
of Italy in Lombardia and Emilia, thereby forcing Italy out of the war
and gaining access to the back door of France. If, however, Ludendorff
should be blocked in France, the offensive must still be made at the
propitious moment, but its plan of attack would be to the east of the
Lago di Garda, from the Astico to the sea. It would be entirely an
Austrian affair, and would naturally be limited by the political and
military situation in the Dual Monarchy.
It is of significance, therefore, that the offensive has been launched
to the east and not to the west of the Lago di Garda. Its locality
reveals Ludendorff's conviction that he is at least blocked in France,
if nothing else, whatever light its development may later throw upon
the parlous internal conditions of the Hapsburg Empire.
This admitted, the Austrian plan of campaign becomes a simple
problem--simple because there could be no other. At the beginning of
the war Italy attempted to neutralize the Trentino and the Carnic
region by sealing the passes and then made her attack across the
Isonzo. But she could never be certain that the passes had been
effectually sealed. A successful Austrian invasion through them would
jeopardize her armies on the Isonzo, isolate them by cutting their
lines of communication. That was the danger which threatened those
armies when the Austrians made their drive upon the Asiago Plateau
in May, 1916, which was ultimately outflanked and forced back. That
was also the disaster when last October the Austro-German armies,
having penetrated the Isonzo line from the north, forced it to retire
westward, forced a withdrawal from the passes in the Carnic and the
Dolomite Alps, and again reached the Asiago Plateau, this time free
from the danger of being flanked.
[Illustration: LEADING GENERALS OF THE AMERICAN ARMY
Major Gen. H. A. Greene
(_Press Illus. Service_)
Major Gen. Leonard Wood
(© _Clinedinst_)