non tantum admiratio habet, sed eliam stupor, I do not only admire, but
stand amazed to read, that Plato and Socrates both should expel Homer
from their city, because he writ of such light and wanton subjects,
Quod Junonem cum Jove in Ida concumbentes inducit, ab immortali nube
contectos, Vulcan's net. Mars and Venus' fopperies before all the gods,
because Apollo fled, when he was persecuted by Achilles, the [4424]gods
were wounded and ran whining away, as Mars that roared louder than
Stentor, and covered nine acres of ground with his fall; Vulcan was a
summer's day falling down from heaven, and in Lemnos Isle brake his
leg, &c., with such ridiculous passages; when, as both Socrates and
Plato, by his testimony, writ lighter themselves: quid enim tam distat
(as he follows it) quam amans a temperante, formarum admirator a
demente, what can be more absurd than for grave philosophers to treat
of such fooleries, to admire Autiloquus, Alcibiades, for their beauties
as they did, to run after, to gaze, to dote on fair Phaedrus, delicate
Agatho, young Lysis, fine Charmides, haeccine Philosophum decent? Doth
this become grave philosophers? Thus peradventure Callias,
Thrasimachus, Polus, Aristophanes, or some of his adversaries and
emulators might object; but neither they nor [4425]Anytus and Melitus
his bitter enemies, that condemned him for teaching Critias to
tyrannise, his impiety for swearing by dogs and plain trees, for his
juggling sophistry, &c., never so much as upbraided him with impure
love, writing or speaking of that subject; and therefore without
question, as he concludes, both Socrates and Plato in this are justly
to be excused. But suppose they had been a little overseen, should
divine Plato be defamed? no, rather as he said of Cato's drunkenness,
if Cato were drunk, it should be no vice at all to be drunk. They
reprove Plato then, but without cause (as [4426]Ficinus pleads) for all
love is honest and good, and they are worthy to be loved that speak
well of love. Being to speak of this admirable affection of love (saith
[4427]Valleriola) there lies open a vast and philosophical field to my
discourse, by which many lovers become mad; let me leave my more
serious meditations, wander in these philosophical fields, and look
into those pleasant groves of the Muses, where with unspeakable variety
of flowers, we may make garlands to ourselves, not to adorn us only,
but with their pleasant smell and juice to nourish our souls, and fill
our minds desirous of knowledge, &c. After a harsh and unpleasing
discourse of melancholy, which hath hitherto molested your patience,
and tired the author, give him leave with [4428]Godefridus the lawyer,
and Laurentius (cap. 5.) to recreate himself in this kind after his
laborious studies, since so many grave divines and worthy men have
without offence to manners, to help themselves and others, voluntarily
written of it. Heliodorus, a bishop, penned a love story of Theagines
and Chariclea, and when some Catos of his time reprehended him for it,
chose rather, saith [4429]Nicephorus, to leave his bishopric than his
book. Aeneas Sylvius, an ancient divine, and past forty years of age,
(as [4430]he confesseth himself, after Pope Pius Secundus) indited that
wanton history of Euryalus and Lucretia. And how many superintendents
of learning could I reckon up that have written of light fantastical
subjects? Beroaldus, Erasmus, Alpheratius, twenty-four times printed in
Spanish, &c. Give me leave then to refresh my muse a little, and my
weary readers, to expatiate in this delightsome field, hoc deliciarum
campo, as Fonseca terms it, to [4431] season a surly discourse with a
more pleasing aspersion of love matters: Edulcare vitam convenit, as
the poet invites us, curas nugis, &c., 'tis good to sweeten our life
with some pleasing toys to relish it, and as Pliny tells us, magna pars
studiosorum amaenitates quaerimus, most of our students love such
pleasant [4432]subjects. Though Macrobius teach us otherwise,
[4433]that those old sages banished all such light tracts from their
studies, to nurse's cradles, to please only the ear; yet out of
Apuleius I will oppose as honourable patrons, Solon, Plato, [4434]
Xenophon, Adrian, &c. that as highly approve of these treatises. On the
other side methinks they are not to be disliked, they are not so unfit.
I will not peremptorily say as one did [4435]tam suavia dicam facinora,
ut male sit ei qui talibus non delectetur, I will tell you such pretty
stories, that foul befall him that is not pleased with them; Neque
dicam ea quae vobis usui sit audivisse, et voluptati meminisse, with
that confidence, as Beroaldus doth his enarrations on Propertius. I
will not expert or hope for that approbation, which Lipsius gives to
his Epictetus; pluris facio quum relego; semper ut novum, et quum
repetivi, repetendum, the more I read, the more shall I covet to read.
I will not press you with my pamphlets, or beg attention, but if you
like them you may. Pliny holds it expedient, and most fit, severitatem
jucunditate etiam in scriptis condire, to season our works with some
pleasant discourse; Synesius approves it, licet in ludicris ludere, the
[4436]poet admires it, Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci; and
there be those, without question, that are more willing to read such
toys, than [4437]I am to write: Let me not live, saith Aretine's
Antonia, If I had not rather hear thy discourse, [4438]than see a play?
No doubt but there be more of her mind, ever have been, ever will be,
as [4439]Hierome bears me witness. A far greater part had rather read
Apuleius than Plato: Tully himself confesseth he could not understand
Plato's Timaeus, and therefore cared less for it: but every schoolboy
hath that famous testament of Grunnius Corocotta Porcellus at his
fingers' ends. The comical poet,
[4440]———Id sibi negoti credidit solum dari,
Populo ut placrent, quas fecissit fabulas,
made this his only care and sole study to please the people, tickle the
ear, and to delight; but mine earnest intent is as much to profit as to
please; non tam ut populo placerem, quam ut populum juvarem, and these
my writings, I hope, shall take like gilded pills, which are so
composed as well to tempt the appetite, and deceive the palate, as to
help and medicinally work upon the whole body; my lines shall not only
recreate, but rectify the mind. I think I have said enough; if not, let
him that is otherwise minded, remember that of [4441]Maudarensis, he
was in his life a philosopher (as Ausonius apologiseth for him), in his
epigrams a lover, in his precepts most severe; in his epistle to
Caerellia, a wanton. Annianus, Sulpicius, Evemus, Menander, and many
old poets besides, did in scriptis prurire, write Fescennines,
Atellans, and lascivious songs; laetam materiam; yet they had in
moribus censuram, et severitatem, they were chaste, severe, and upright
livers.
[4442]Castum esse decet pium poetam
Ipsum, versiculos nihil necesse est,
Qui tum denique habent salem et leporem.
I am of Catullus' opinion, and make the same apology in mine own
behalf; Hoc etiam quod scribo, pendet plerumque ex aliorum sententia et
auctoritate; nec ipse forsan insanio, sed insanientes sequor. Atqui
detur hoc insanire me; Semel insanivimus omnes, et tute ipse opinor
insanis aliquando, et is, et ille, et ego, scilicet.[4443] Homo sum,
humani a me nihil alienum puto:[4444] And which he urgeth for himself,
accused of the like fault, I as justly plead, [4445]lasciva est nobis
pagina, vita proba est. Howsoever my lines err, my life is honest,
[4446]vita verecunda est, musa jocosa mihi. But I presume I need no
such apologies, I need not, as Socrates in Plato, cover his face when
he spake of love, or blush and hide mine eyes, as Pallas did in her
hood, when she was consulted by Jupiter about Mercury's marriage, quod,
super nuptiis virgo consulitur, it is no such lascivious, obscene, or
wanton discourse; I have not offended your chaster ears with anything
that is here written, as many French and Italian authors in their
modern language of late have done, nay some of our Latin pontificial
writers, Zanches, Asorius, Abulensis, Burchardus, &c., whom [4447]Rivet
accuseth to be more lascivious than Virgil in Priapeiis, Petronius in
Catalectis, Aristophanes in Lycistratae, Martialis, or any other pagan
profane writer, qui tam atrociter ([4448]one notes) hoc genere
peccarunt ut multa ingeniosissime scripta obscaenitatum gratia castae
mentes abhorreant. 'Tis not scurrile this, but chaste, honest, most
part serious, and even of religion itself. [4449]Incensed (as he said)
with the love of finding love, we have sought it, and found it. More
yet, I have augmented and added something to this light treatise (if
light) which was not in the former editions, I am not ashamed to
confess it, with a good [4450]author, quod extendi et locupletari hoc
subjectum plerique postulabant, et eorum importunitate victus, animum
utcunque renitentem eo adegi, ut jam sexta vice calamum in manum
sumerem, scriptionique longe et a studiis et professione mea alienae,
me accingerem, horas aliquas a seriis meis occupationibus interim
suffuratus, easque veluti ludo cuidam ac recreationi destinans;
[4451]Cogor———retrorsum
Vela dare, atque literare cursus
Olim relictos———
etsi non ignorarem novos fortasse detractores novis hisce
interpolationibus meis minime defuturos. [4452]
And thus much I have thought good to say by way of preface, lest any
man (which [4453]Godefridus feared in his book) should blame in me
lightness, wantonness, rashness, in speaking of love's causes,
enticements, symptoms, remedies, lawful and unlawful loves, and lust
itself, [4454]I speak it only to tax and deter others from it, not to
teach, but to show the vanities and fopperies of this heroical or
Herculean love,[4455]and to apply remedies unto it. I will treat of
this with like liberty as of the rest.
[4456]Sed dicam vobis, vos porro dicite multis
Millibus, et facite haec charta loquatur anus.
Condemn me not good reader then, or censure me hardly, if some part of
this treatise to thy thinking as yet be too light; but consider better
of it; Omnia munda mundis, [4457]a naked man to a modest woman is no
otherwise than a picture, as Augusta Livia truly said, and [4458]mala
mens, malus animus, 'tis as 'tis taken. If in thy censure it be too
light, I advise thee as Lipsius did his reader for some places of
Plautus, istos quasi Sirenum scopulos praetervehare, if they like thee
not, let them pass; or oppose that which is good to that which is bad,
and reject not therefore all. For to invert that verse of Martial, and
with Hierom Wolfius to apply it to my present purpose, sunt mala, sunt
quaedam mediocria, sunt bona plura; some is good, some bad, some is
indifferent. I say further with him yet, I have inserted
([4459]levicula quaedam et ridicula ascribere non sum gravatus,
circumforanea quaedam e theatris, e plateis, etiam e popinis) some
things more homely, light, or comical, litans gratiis, &c. which I
would request every man to interpret to the best, and as Julius Caesar
Scaliger besought Cardan (si quid urbaniuscule lusum a nobis, per deos
immortales te oro Hieronyme Cardane ne me male capias). I beseech thee,
good reader, not to mistake me, or misconstrue what is here written;
Per Musas et Charites, et omnia Poetarum numina, benigne lector, oro te
ne me male capias. 'Tis a comical subject; in sober sadness I crave
pardon of what is amiss, and desire thee to suspend thy judgment, wink
at small faults, or to be silent at least; but if thou likest, speak
well of it, and wish me good success. Extremum hunc Arethusa mihi
concede laborem.[4460]
I am resolved howsoever, velis, nolis, audacter stadium intrare, in the
Olympics, with those Aeliensian wrestlers in Philostratus, boldly to
show myself in this common stage, and in this tragicomedy of love, to
act several parts, some satirically, some comically, some in a mixed
tone, as the subject I have in hand gives occasion, and present scene
shall require, or offer itself.
SUBSECT. II.—_Love's Beginning, Object, Definition, Division_.
Love's limits are ample and great, and a spacious walk it hath, beset
with thorns, and for that cause, which [4461]Scaliger reprehends in
Cardan, not lightly to be passed over. Lest I incur the same censure, 1
will examine all the kinds of love, his nature, beginning, difference,
objects, how it is honest or dishonest, a virtue or vice, a natural
passion, or a disease, his power and effects, how far it extends: of
which, although something has been said in the first partition, in
those sections of perturbations ([4462] for love and hatred are the
first and most common passions, from which all the rest arise, and are
attendant, as Picolomineus holds, or as Nich. Caussinus, the primum
mobile of all other affections, which carry them all about them) I will
now more copiously dilate, through all his parts and several branches,
that so it may better appear what love is, and how it varies with the
objects, how in defect, or (which is most ordinary and common)
immoderate, and in excess, causeth melancholy.
Love universally taken, is defined to be a desire, as a word of more
ample signification: and though Leon Hebreus, the most copious writer
of this subject, in his third dialogue make no difference, yet in his
first he distinguisheth them again, and defines love by desire.
[4463]Love is a voluntary affection, and desire to enjoy that which is
good. [4464]Desire wisheth, love enjoys; the end of the one is the
beginning of the other; that which we love is present; that which we
desire is absent. [4465]It is worth the labour, saith Plotinus, to
consider well of love, whether it be a god or a devil, or passion of
the mind, or partly god, partly devil, partly passion. He concludes
love to participate of all three, to arise from desire of that which is
beautiful and fair, and defines it to be an action of the mind desiring
that which is good. [4466]Plato calls it the great devil, for its
vehemency, and sovereignty over all other passions, and defines it an
appetite, [4467]by which we desire some good to be present. Ficinus in
his comment adds the word fair to this definition. Love is a desire of
enjoying that which is good and fair. Austin dilates this common
definition, and will have love to be a delectation of the heart,
[4468]for something which we seek to win, or joy to have, coveting by
desire, resting in joy. [4469]Scaliger exerc. 301. taxeth these former
definitions, and will not have love to be defined by desire or
appetite; for when we enjoy the things we desire, there remains no more
appetite: as he defines it, Love is an affection by which we are either
united to the thing we love, or perpetuate our union; which agrees in
part with Leon Hebreus.
Now this love varies as its object varies, which is always good,
amiable, fair, gracious, and pleasant. [4470]All things desire that
which is good, as we are taught in the Ethics, or at least that which
to them seems to be good; quid enim vis mali (as Austin well infers)
dic mihi? puto nihil in omnibus actionibus; thou wilt wish no harm, I
suppose, no ill in all thine actions, thoughts or desires, nihil mali
vis; [4471]thou wilt not have bad corn, bad soil, a naughty tree, but
all good; a good servant, a good horse, a good son, a good friend, a
good neighbour, a good wife. From this goodness comes beauty; from
beauty, grace, and comeliness, which result as so many rays from their
good parts, make us to love, and so to covet it: for were it not
pleasing and gracious in our eyes, we should not seek. [4472]No man
loves (saith Aristotle 9. mor. cap. 5.) but he that was first delighted
with comeliness and beauty. As this fair object varies, so doth our
love; for as Proclus holds, Omne pulchrum amabile, every fair thing is
amiable, and what we love is fair and gracious in our eyes, or at least
we do so apprehend and still esteem of it. [4473] Amiableness is the
object of love, the scope and end is to obtain it, for whose sake we
love, and which our mind covets to enjoy. And it seems to us especially
fair and good; for good, fair, and unity, cannot be separated. Beauty
shines, Plato saith, and by reason of its splendour and shining causeth
admiration; and the fairer the object is, the more eagerly it is
sought. For as the same Plato defines it, [4474]Beauty is a lively,
shining or glittering brightness, resulting from effused good, by
ideas, seeds, reasons, shadows, stirring up our minds, that by this
good they may be united and made one. Others will have beauty to be the
perfection of the whole composition, [4475]caused out of the congruous
symmetry, measure, order and manner of parts, and that comeliness which
proceeds from this beauty is called grace, and from thence all fair
things are gracious. For grace and beauty are so wonderfully annexed,
[4476]so sweetly and gently win our souls, and strongly allure, that
they confound our judgment and cannot be distinguished. Beauty and
grace are like those beams and shinings that come from the glorious and
divine sun, which are diverse, as they proceed from the diverse
objects, to please and affect our several senses. [4477]As the species
of beauty are taken at our eyes, ears, or conceived in our inner soul,
as Plato disputes at large in his Dialogue de pulchro, Phaedro,
Hyppias, and after many sophistical errors confuted, concludes that
beauty is a grace in all things, delighting the eyes, ears, and soul
itself; so that, as Valesius infers hence, whatsoever pleaseth our
ears, eyes, and soul, must needs be beautiful, fair, and delightsome to
us. [4478]And nothing can more please our ears than music, or pacify
our minds. Fair houses, pictures, orchards, gardens, fields, a fair
hawk, a fair horse is most acceptable unto us; whatsoever pleaseth our
eyes and ears, we call beautiful and fair; [4479]Pleasure belongeth to
the rest of the senses, but grace and beauty to these two alone. As the
objects vary and are diverse, so they diversely affect our eyes, ears,
and soul itself. Which gives occasion to some to make so many several
kinds of love as there be objects. One beauty ariseth from God, of
which and divine love S. Dionysius, [4480]with many fathers and
neoterics, have written just volumes, De amore Dei, as they term it,
many paraenetical discourses; another from his creatures; there is a
beauty of the body, a beauty of the soul, a beauty from virtue, formam
martyrum, Austin calls it, quam videmus oculis animi, which we see with
the eyes of our mind; which beauty, as Tully saith, if we could discern
with these corporeal eyes, admirabili sui amores excitaret, would cause
admirable affections, and ravish our souls. This other beauty which
ariseth from those extreme parts, and graces which proceed from
gestures, speeches, several motions, and proportions of creatures, men
and women (especially from women, which made those old poets put the
three graces still in Venus' company, as attending on her, and holding
up her train) are infinite almost, and vary their names with their
objects, as love of money, covetousness, love of beauty, lust,
immoderate desire of any pleasure, concupiscence, friendship, love,
goodwill, &c. and is either virtue or vice, honest, dishonest, in
excess, defect, as shall be showed in his place. Heroical love,
religious love, &c. which may be reduced to a twofold division,
according to the principal parts which are affected, the brain and
liver. Amor et amicitia, which Scaliger exercitat. 301. Valesius and
Melancthon warrant out of Plato Φιλεῖν and ἐρᾶν from that speech of
Pausanias belike, that makes two Veneres and two loves. [4481]One Venus
is ancient without a mother, and descended from heaven, whom we call
celestial; the younger, begotten of Jupiter and Dione, whom commonly we
call Venus. Ficinus, in his comment upon this place, cap. 8. following
Plato, calls these two loves, two devils, [4482]or good and bad angels
according to us, which are still hovering about our souls. [4483]The
one rears to heaven, the other depresseth us to hell; the one good,
which stirs us up to the contemplation of that divine beauty for whose
sake we perform justice and all godly offices, study philosophy, &c.;
the other base, and though bad yet to be respected; for indeed both are
good in their own natures: procreation of children is as necessary as
that finding out of truth, but therefore called bad, because it is
abused, and withdraws our souls from the speculation of that other to
viler objects, so far Ficinus. S. Austin, lib. 15. de civ. Dei et sup.
Psal. lxiv., hath delivered as much in effect. [4484]Every creature is
good, and may be loved well or ill: and [4485]Two cities make two
loves, Jerusalem and Babylon, the love of God the one, the love of the
world the other; of these two cities we all are citizens, as by
examination of ourselves we may soon find, and of which. The one love
is the root of all mischief, the other of all good. So, in his 15. cap.
lib. de amor. Ecclesiae, he will have those four cardinal virtues to be
nought else but love rightly composed; in his 15. book de civ. Dei,
cap. 22. he calls virtue the order of love, whom Thomas following 1.
part. 2. quaest. 55. art. 1. and quaest. 56. 3. quaest. 62. art. 2.
confirms as much, and amplifies in many words. [4486]Lucian, to the
same purpose, hath a division of his own, One love was born in the sea,
which is as various and raging in young men's breasts as the sea
itself, and causeth burning lust: the other is that golden chain which
was let down from heaven, and with a divine fury ravisheth our souls,
made to the image of God, and stirs us up to comprehend the innate and
incorruptible beauty to which we were once created. Beroaldus hath
expressed all this in an epigram of his:
Dogmata divini memorant si vera Platonis,
Sunt geminae Veneres, et geminatus amor.
Coelestis Venus est nullo generata parente,
Quae casto sanctos nectit amore viros.
Altera sed Venus est totum vulgata per orbem,
Quae divum mentes alligat, atque hominum;
Improba, seductrix, petulans, &c.
If divine Plato's tenets they be true,
Two Veneres, two loves there be,
The one from heaven, unbegotten still,
Which knits our souls in unity.
The other famous over all the world,
Binding the hearts of gods and men;
Dishonest, wanton, and seducing she,
Rules whom she will, both where and when.