in dignity, as a beast is preferred to a plant, having those vegetal
powers included in it. 'Tis defined an Act of an organical body by
which it lives, hath sense, appetite, judgment, breath, and motion. His
object in general is a sensible or passible quality, because the sense
is affected with it. The general organ is the brain, from which
principally the sensible operations are derived. This sensible soul is
divided into two parts, apprehending or moving. By the apprehensive
power we perceive the species of sensible things present, or absent,
and retain them as wax doth the print of a seal. By the moving, the
body is outwardly carried from one place to another; or inwardly moved
by spirits and pulse. The apprehensive faculty is subdivided into two
parts, inward or outward. Outward, as the five senses, of touching,
hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, to which you may add Scaliger's
sixth sense of titillation, if you please; or that of speech, which is
the sixth external sense, according to Lullius. Inward are three—common
sense, phantasy, memory. Those five outward senses have their object in
outward things only, and such as are present, as the eye sees no colour
except it be at hand, the ear sound. Three of these senses are of
commodity, hearing, sight, and smell; two of necessity, touch, and
taste, without which we cannot live. Besides, the sensitive power is
active or passive. Active in sight, the eye sees the colour; passive
when it is hurt by his object, as the eye by the sunbeams. According to
that axiom, visibile forte destruit sensum. [982]Or if the object be
not pleasing, as a bad sound to the ear, a stinking smell to the nose,
&c.
_Sight_.] Of these five senses, sight is held to be most precious, and
the best, and that by reason of his object, it sees the whole body at
once. By it we learn, and discern all things, a sense most excellent
for use: to the sight three things are required; the object, the organ,
and the medium. The object in general is visible, or that which is to
be seen, as colours, and all shining bodies. The medium is the
illumination of the air, which comes from [983]light, commonly called
diaphanum; for in dark we cannot see. The organ is the eye, and chiefly
the apple of it, which by those optic nerves, concurring both in one,
conveys the sight to the common sense. Between the organ and object a
true distance is required, that it be not too near, or too far off!
Many excellent questions appertain to this sense, discussed by
philosophers: as whether this sight be caused intra mittendo, vel extra
mittendo, &c., by receiving in the visible species, or sending of them
out, which [984]Plato, [985]Plutarch, [986]Macrobius, [987]Lactantius
and others dispute. And, besides, it is the subject of the
perspectives, of which Alhazen the Arabian, Vitellio, Roger Bacon,
Baptista Porta, Guidus Ubaldus, Aquilonius, &c., have written whole
volumes.
_Hearing_.] Hearing, a most excellent outward sense, by which we learn
and get knowledge. His object is sound, or that which is heard; the
medium, air; organ, the ear. To the sound, which is a collision of the
air, three things are required; a body to strike, as the hand of a
musician; the body struck, which must be solid and able to resist; as a
bell, lute-string, not wool, or sponge; the medium, the air; which is
inward, or outward; the outward being struck or collided by a solid
body, still strikes the next air, until it come to that inward natural
air, which as an exquisite organ is contained in a little skin formed
like a drum-head, and struck upon by certain small instruments like
drum-sticks, conveys the sound by a pair of nerves, appropriated to
that use, to the common sense, as to a judge of sounds. There is great
variety and much delight in them; for the knowledge of which, consult
with Boethius and other musicians.
_Smelling_.] Smelling is an outward sense, which apprehends by the
nostrils drawing in air; and of all the rest it is the weakest sense in
men. The organ in the nose, or two small hollow pieces of flesh a
little above it: the medium the air to men, as water to fish: the
object, smell, arising from a mixed body resolved, which, whether it be
a quality, fume, vapour, or exhalation, I will not now dispute, or of
their differences, and how they are caused. This sense is an organ of
health, as sight and hearing, saith [988]Agellius, are of discipline;
and that by avoiding bad smells, as by choosing good, which do as much
alter and affect the body many times, as diet itself.
_Taste_.] Taste, a necessary sense, which perceives all savours by the
tongue and palate, and that by means of a thin spittle, or watery
juice. His organ is the tongue with his tasting nerves; the medium, a
watery juice; the object, taste, or savour, which is a quality in the
juice, arising from the mixture of things tasted. Some make eight
species or kinds of savour, bitter, sweet, sharp, salt, &c., all which
sick men (as in an ague) cannot discern, by reason of their organs
misaffected.
_Touching_.] Touch, the last of the senses, and most ignoble, yet of as
great necessity as the other, and of as much pleasure. This sense is
exquisite in men, and by his nerves dispersed all over the body,
perceives any tactile quality. His organ the nerves; his object those
first qualities, hot, dry, moist, cold; and those that follow them,
hard, soft, thick, thin, &c. Many delightsome questions are moved by
philosophers about these five senses; their organs, objects, mediums,
which for brevity I omit.
SUBSECT. VII.—_Of the Inward Senses._
_Common Sense_.] Inner senses are three in number, so called, because
they be within the brainpan, as common sense, phantasy, memory. Their
objects are not only things present, but they perceive the sensible
species of things to come, past, absent, such as were before in the
sense. This common sense is the judge or moderator of the rest, by whom
we discern all differences of objects; for by mine eye I do not know
that I see, or by mine ear that I hear, but by my common sense, who
judgeth of sounds and colours: they are but the organs to bring the
species to be censured; so that all their objects are his, and all
their offices are his. The fore part of the brain is his organ or seat.
_Phantasy_.] Phantasy, or imagination, which some call estimative, or
cogitative, (confirmed, saith [989]Fernelius, by frequent meditation,)
is an inner sense which doth more fully examine the species perceived
by common sense, of things present or absent, and keeps them longer,
recalling them to mind again, or making new of his own. In time of
sleep this faculty is free, and many times conceive strange, stupend,
absurd shapes, as in sick men we commonly observe. His organ is the
middle cell of the brain; his objects all the species communicated to
him by the common sense, by comparison of which he feigns infinite
other unto himself. In melancholy men this faculty is most powerful and
strong, and often hurts, producing many monstrous and prodigious
things, especially if it be stirred up by some terrible object,
presented to it from common sense or memory. In poets and painters
imagination forcibly works, as appears by their several fictions,
antics, images: as Ovid's house of sleep, Psyche's palace in Apuleius,
&c. In men it is subject and governed by reason, or at least should be;
but in brutes it hath no superior, and is ratio brutorum, all the
reason they have.
_Memory_.] Memory lays up all the species which the senses have brought
in, and records them as a good register, that they may be forthcoming
when they are called for by phantasy and reason. His object is the same
with phantasy, his seat and organ the back part of the brain.
_Affections of the Senses, sleep and waking._] The affections of these
senses are sleep and waking, common to all sensible creatures. Sleep is
a rest or binding of the outward senses, and of the common sense, for
the preservation of body and soul (as Scaliger [990]defines it); for
when the common sense resteth, the outward senses rest also. The
phantasy alone is free, and his commander reason: as appears by those
imaginary dreams, which are of divers kinds, natural, divine,
demoniacal, &c., which vary according to humours, diet, actions,
objects, &c., of which Artemidorus, Cardanus, and Sambucus, with their
several interpretators, have written great volumes. This litigation of
senses proceeds from an inhibition of spirits, the way being stopped by
which they should come; this stopping is caused of vapours arising out
of the stomach, filling the nerves, by which the spirits should be
conveyed. When these vapours are spent, the passage is open, and the
spirits perform their accustomed duties: so that waking is the action
and motion of the senses, which the spirits dispersed over all parts
cause.
SUBSECT. VIII.—_Of the Moving Faculty_.
_Appetite_] This moving faculty is the other power of the sensitive
soul, which causeth all those inward and outward animal motions in the
body. It is divided into two faculties, the power of appetite, and of
moving from place to place. This of appetite is threefold, so some will
have it; natural, as it signifies any such inclination, as of a stone
to fall downward, and such actions as retention, expulsion, which
depend not on sense, but are vegetal, as the appetite of meat and
drink; hunger and thirst. Sensitive is common to men and brutes.
Voluntary, the third, or intellective, which commands the other two in
men, and is a curb unto them, or at least should be, but for the most
part is captivated and overruled by them; and men are led like beasts
by sense, giving reins to their concupiscence and several lusts. For by
this appetite the soul is led or inclined to follow that good which the
senses shall approve, or avoid that which they hold evil: his object
being good or evil, the one he embraceth, the other he rejecteth;
according to that aphorism, Omnia appetunt bonum, all things seek their
own good, or at least seeming good. This power is inseparable from
sense, for where sense is, there are likewise pleasure and pain. His
organ is the same with the common sense, and is divided into two
powers, or inclinations, concupiscible or irascible: or (as one [991]
translates it) coveting, anger invading, or impugning. Concupiscible
covets always pleasant and delightsome things, and abhors that which is
distasteful, harsh, and unpleasant. Irascible, quasi [992] aversans per
iram et odium, as avoiding it with anger and indignation. All
affections and perturbations arise out of these two fountains, which,
although the stoics make light of, we hold natural, and not to be
resisted. The good affections are caused by some object of the same
nature; and if present, they procure joy, which dilates the heart, and
preserves the body: if absent, they cause hope, love, desire, and
concupiscence. The bad are simple or mixed: simple for some bad object
present, as sorrow, which contracts the heart, macerates the soul,
subverts the good estate of the body, hindering all the operations of
it, causing melancholy, and many times death itself; or future, as
fear. Out of these two arise those mixed affections and passions of
anger, which is a desire of revenge; hatred, which is inveterate anger;
zeal, which is offended with him who hurts that he loves; and
ἐπικαιρεκακία, a compound affection of joy and hate, when we rejoice at
other men's mischief, and are grieved at their prosperity; pride,
self-love, emulation, envy, shame, &c., of which elsewhere.
_Moving from place to place_, is a faculty necessarily following the
other. For in vain were it otherwise to desire and to abhor, if we had
not likewise power to prosecute or eschew, by moving the body from
place to place: by this faculty therefore we locally move the body, or
any part of it, and go from one place to another. To the better
performance of which, three things are requisite: that which moves; by
what it moves; that which is moved. That which moves, is either the
efficient cause, or end. The end is the object, which is desired or
eschewed; as in a dog to catch a hare, &c. The efficient cause in man
is reason, or his subordinate phantasy, which apprehends good or bad
objects: in brutes imagination alone, which moves the appetite, the
appetite this faculty, which by an admirable league of nature, and by
meditation of the spirit, commands the organ by which it moves: and
that consists of nerves, muscles, cords, dispersed through the whole
body, contracted and relaxed as the spirits will, which move the
muscles, or [993]nerves in the midst of them, and draw the cord, and so
per consequens the joint, to the place intended. That which is moved,
is the body or some member apt to move. The motion of the body is
divers, as going, running, leaping, dancing, sitting, and such like,
referred to the predicament of situs. Worms creep, birds fly, fishes
swim; and so of parts, the chief of which is respiration or breathing,
and is thus performed. The outward air is drawn in by the vocal artery,
and sent by mediation of the midriff to the lungs, which, dilating
themselves as a pair of bellows, reciprocally fetch it in, and send it
out to the heart to cool it; and from thence now being hot, convey it
again, still taking in fresh. Such a like motion is that of the pulse,
of which, because many have written whole books, I will say nothing.
SUBSECT. IX.—_Of the Rational Soul._
In the precedent subsections I have anatomised those inferior faculties
of the soul; the rational remaineth, a pleasant, but a doubtful subject
(as [994]one terms it), and with the like brevity to be discussed. Many
erroneous opinions are about the essence and original of it; whether it
be fire, as Zeno held; harmony, as Aristoxenus; number, as Xenocrates;
whether it be organical, or inorganical; seated in the brain, heart or
blood; mortal or immortal; how it comes into the body. Some hold that
it is ex traduce, as Phil. 1. de Anima, Tertullian, Lactantius de
opific. Dei, cap. 19. Hugo, lib. de Spiritu et Anima, Vincentius
Bellavic. spec. natural. lib. 23. cap. 2. et 11. Hippocrates, Avicenna,
and many [995] late writers; that one man begets another, body and
soul; or as a candle from a candle, to be produced from the seed:
otherwise, say they, a man begets but half a man, and is worse than a
beast that begets both matter and form; and, besides, the three
faculties of the soul must be together infused, which is most absurd as
they hold, because in beasts they are begot, the two inferior I mean,
and may not be well separated in men. [996] Galen supposeth the soul
crasin esse, to be the temperature itself; Trismegistus, Musaeus,
Orpheus, Homer, Pindarus, Phaerecides Syrus, Epictetus, with the
Chaldees and Egyptians, affirmed the soul to be immortal, as did those
British [997]Druids of old. The [998]Pythagoreans defend
Metempsychosis; and Palingenesia, that souls go from one body to
another, epota prius Lethes unda, as men into wolves, bears, dogs,
hogs, as they were inclined in their lives, or participated in
conditions:
[999]———inque ferinas
Possumus ire domus, pecudumque in corpora condi.
[1000]Lucian's cock was first Euphorbus, a captain:
Ille ego (nam memini) Trojani tempore belli,
Panthoides Euphorbus eram,
a horse, a man, a sponge. [1001]Julian the Apostate thought Alexander's
soul was descended into his body: Plato in Timaeo, and in his Phaedon,
(for aught I can perceive,) differs not much from this opinion, that it
was from God at first, and knew all, but being enclosed in the body, it
forgets, and learns anew, which he calls reminiscentia, or recalling,
and that it was put into the body for a punishment; and thence it goes
into a beast's, or man's, as appears by his pleasant fiction de
sortitione animarum, lib. 10. de rep. and after [1002]ten thousand
years is to return into the former body again,
[1003]———post varios annos, per mille figuras,
Rursus ad humanae fertur primordia vitae.
Others deny the immortality of it, which Pomponatus of Padua decided
out of Aristotle not long since, Plinias Avunculus, cap. 1. lib. 2, et
lib. 7. cap. 55; Seneca, lib. 7. epist. ad Lucilium, epist. 55;
Dicearchus in Tull. Tusc. Epicurus, Aratus, Hippocrates, Galen,
Lucretius, lib. 1.
(Praeterea gigni pariter cum corpore, et una
Cresere sentimus, pariterque senescere mentem.)[1004]
Averroes, and I know not how many Neoterics. [1005]This question of the
immortality of the soul, is diversely and wonderfully impugned and
disputed, especially among the Italians of late, saith Jab. Colerus,
lib. de immort. animae, cap. 1. The popes themselves have doubted of
it: Leo Decimus, that Epicurean pope, as [1006]some record of him,
caused this question to be discussed pro and con before him, and
concluded at last, as a profane and atheistical moderator, with that
verse of Cornelius Gallus, Et redit in nihilum, quod fuit ante nihil.
It began of nothing, and in nothing it ends. Zeno and his Stoics, as
[1007]Austin quotes him, supposed the soul so long to continue, till
the body was fully putrified, and resolved into materia prima: but
after that, in fumos evanescere, to be extinguished and vanished; and
in the meantime, whilst the body was consuming, it wandered all abroad,
et e longinquo multa annunciare, and (as that Clazomenian Hermotimus
averred) saw pretty visions, and suffered I know not what. [1008]Errant
exangues sine corpore et ossibus umbrae.
Others grant the immortality thereof, but they make many fabulous
fictions in the meantime of it, after the departure from the body: like
Plato's Elysian fields, and that Turkey paradise. The souls of good men
they deified; the bad (saith [1009]Austin) became devils, as they
supposed; with many such absurd tenets, which he hath confuted.
Hierome, Austin, and other Fathers of the church, hold that the soul is
immortal, created of nothing, and so infused into the child or embryo
in his mother's womb, six months after the [1010]conception; not as
those of brutes, which are ex traduce, and dying with them vanish into
nothing. To whose divine treatises, and to the Scriptures themselves, I
rejourn all such atheistical spirits, as Tully did Atticus, doubting of
this point, to Plato's Phaedon. Or if they desire philosophical proofs
and demonstrations, I refer them to Niphus, Nic. Faventinus' tracts of
this subject. To Fran. and John Picus in digress: sup. 3. de Anima,
Tholosanus, Eugubinus, To. Soto, Canas, Thomas, Peresius, Dandinus,
Colerus, to that elaborate tract in Zanchius, to Tolet's Sixty Reasons,
and Lessius' Twenty-two Arguments, to prove the immortality of the
soul. Campanella, lib. de sensu rerum, is large in the same discourse,
Albertinus the Schoolman, Jacob. Nactantus, tom. 2. op. handleth it in
four questions, Antony Brunus, Aonius Palearius, Marinus Marcennus,
with many others. This reasonable soul, which Austin calls a spiritual
substance moving itself, is defined by philosophers to be the first
substantial act of a natural, humane, organical body, by which a man
lives, perceives, and understands, freely doing all things, and with
election. Out of which definition we may gather, that this rational
soul includes the powers, and performs the duties of the two other,
which are contained in it, and all three faculties make one soul, which
is inorganical of itself, although it be in all parts, and incorporeal,
using their organs, and working by them. It is divided into two chief
parts, differing in office only, not in essence. The understanding,
which is the rational power apprehending; the will, which is the
rational power moving: to which two, all the other rational powers are
subject and reduced.
SUBSECT. X.—_Of the Understanding_.
Understanding is a power of the soul, [1011]by which we perceive, know,
remember, and judge as well singulars, as universals, having certain
innate notices or beginnings of arts, a reflecting action, by which it
judgeth of his own doings, and examines them. Out of this definition
(besides his chief office, which is to apprehend, judge all that he
performs, without the help of any instruments or organs) three
differences appear betwixt a man and a beast. As first, the sense only
comprehends singularities, the understanding universalities. Secondly,
the sense hath no innate notions. Thirdly, brutes cannot reflect upon
themselves. Bees indeed make neat and curious works, and many other
creatures besides; but when they have done, they cannot judge of them.
His object is God, ens, all nature, and whatsoever is to be understood:
which successively it apprehends. The object first moving the
understanding, is some sensible thing; after by discoursing, the mind
finds out the corporeal substance, and from thence the spiritual. His
actions (some say) are apprehension, composition, division,
discoursing, reasoning, memory, which some include in invention, and
judgment. The common divisions are of the understanding, agent, and
patient; speculative, and practical; in habit, or in act; simple, or
compound. The agent is that which is called the wit of man, acumen or
subtlety, sharpness of invention, when he doth invent of himself
without a teacher, or learns anew, which abstracts those intelligible
species from the phantasy, and transfers them to the passive
understanding, [1012] because there is nothing in the understanding,
which was not first in the sense. That which the imagination hath taken
from the sense, this agent judgeth of, whether it be true or false; and
being so judged he commits it to the passible to be kept. The agent is
a doctor or teacher, the passive a scholar; and his office is to keep
and further judge of such things as are committed to his charge; as a
bare and rased table at first, capable of all forms and notions. Now
these notions are twofold, actions or habits: actions, by which we take
notions of, and perceive things; habits, which are durable lights and
notions, which we may use when we will. Some reckon up eight kinds of
them, sense, experience, intelligence, faith, suspicion, error,
opinion, science; to which are added art, prudency, wisdom: as also
[1013]synteresis, dictamen rationis, conscience; so that in all there
be fourteen species of the understanding, of which some are innate, as
the three last mentioned; the other are gotten by doctrine, learning,
and use. Plato will have all to be innate: Aristotle reckons up but
five intellectual habits; two practical, as prudency, whose end is to
practise; to fabricate; wisdom to comprehend the use and experiments of
all notions and habits whatsoever. Which division of Aristotle (if it
be considered aright) is all one with the precedent; for three being
innate, and five acquisite, the rest are improper, imperfect, and in a
more strict examination excluded. Of all these I should more amply
dilate, but my subject will not permit. Three of them I will only point
at, as more necessary to my following discourse.
Synteresis, or the purer part of the conscience, is an innate habit,
and doth signify a conversation of the knowledge of the law of God and
Nature, to know good or evil. And (as our divines hold) it is rather in
the understanding than in the will. This makes the major proposition in
a practical syllogism. The dictamen rationis is that which doth
admonish us to do good or evil, and is the minor in the syllogism. The
conscience is that which approves good or evil, justifying or
condemning our actions, and is the conclusion of the syllogism: as in
that familiar example of Regulus the Roman, taken prisoner by the
Carthaginians, and suffered to go to Rome, on that condition he should
return again, or pay so much for his ransom. The synteresis proposeth
the question; his word, oath, promise, is to be religiously kept,
although to his enemy, and that by the law of nature. [1014]Do not that
to another which thou wouldst not have done to thyself. Dictamen
applies it to him, and dictates this or the like: Regulus, thou wouldst
not another man should falsify his oath, or break promise with thee:
conscience concludes, therefore, Regulus, thou dost well to perform thy
promise, and oughtest to keep thine oath. More of this in Religious
Melancholy.
SUBSECT. XI.—_Of the Will_.
Will is the other power of the rational soul, [1015]which covets or
avoids such things as have been before judged and apprehended by the
understanding. If good, it approves; if evil, it abhors it: so that his
object is either good or evil. Aristotle calls this our rational
appetite; for as, in the sensitive, we are moved to good or bad by our
appetite, ruled and directed by sense; so in this we are carried by
reason. Besides, the sensitive appetite hath a particular object, good
or bad; this an universal, immaterial: that respects only things
delectable and pleasant; this honest. Again, they differ in liberty.
The sensual appetite seeing an object, if it be a convenient good,
cannot but desire it; if evil, avoid it: but this is free in his
essence, [1016]much now depraved, obscured, and fallen from his first
perfection; yet in some of his operations still free, as to go, walk,
move at his pleasure, and to choose whether it will do or not do, steal
or not steal. Otherwise, in vain were laws, deliberations,
exhortations, counsels, precepts, rewards, promises, threats and
punishments: and God should be the author of sin. But in [1017]
spiritual things we will no good, prone to evil (except we be
regenerate, and led by the Spirit), we are egged on by our natural
concupiscence, and there is ἀταξία, a confusion in our powers,
[1018]our whole will is averse from God and his law, not in natural
things only, as to eat and drink, lust, to which we are led headlong by
our temperature and inordinate appetite,
[1019]Nec nos obniti contra, nec tendere tantum
Sufficimus,—
we cannot resist, our concupiscence is originally bad, our heart evil,
the seat of our affections captivates and enforceth our will. So that
in voluntary things we are averse from God and goodness, bad by nature,
by [1020]ignorance worse, by art, discipline, custom, we get many bad
habits: suffering them to domineer and tyrannise over us; and the devil
is still ready at hand with his evil suggestions, to tempt our depraved
will to some ill-disposed action, to precipitate us to destruction,
except our will be swayed and counterpoised again with some divine
precepts, and good motions of the spirit, which many times restrain,
hinder and check us, when we are in the full career of our dissolute
courses. So David corrected himself, when he had Saul at a vantage.
Revenge and malice were as two violent oppugners on the one side; but
honesty, religion, fear of God, withheld him on the other.
The actions of the will are velle and nolle, to will and nill: which
two words comprehend all, and they are good or bad, accordingly as they
are directed, and some of them freely performed by himself; although
the stoics absolutely deny it, and will have all things inevitably done
by destiny, imposing a fatal necessity upon us, which we may not
resist; yet we say that our will is free in respect of us, and things
contingent, howsoever in respect of God's determinate counsel, they are
inevitable and necessary. Some other actions of the will are performed
by the inferior powers, which obey him, as the sensitive and moving
appetite; as to open our eyes, to go hither and thither, not to touch a
book, to speak fair or foul: but this appetite is many times rebellious
in us, and will not be contained within the lists of sobriety and
temperance. It was (as I said) once well agreeing with reason, and
there was an excellent consent and harmony between them, but that is
now dissolved, they often jar, reason is overborne by passion: Fertur
equis auriga, nec audit currus habenas, as so many wild horses run away
with a chariot, and will not be curbed. We know many times what is
good, but will not do it, as she said,
[1021]Trahit invitum nova vis, aliudque cupido,
Mens aliud suadet,———
Lust counsels one thing, reason another, there is a new reluctancy in
men. [1022]Odi, nec possum, cupiens non esse, quod odi. We cannot
resist, but as Phaedra confessed to her nurse, [1023]quae loqueris,
vera sunt, sed furor suggerit sequi pejora: she said well and true, she
did acknowledge it, but headstrong passion and fury made her to do that
which was opposite. So David knew the filthiness of his fact, what a
loathsome, foul, crying sin adultery was, yet notwithstanding he would
commit murder, and take away another man's wife, enforced against
reason, religion, to follow his appetite.
Those natural and vegetal powers are not commanded by will at all; for
who can add one cubit to his stature? These other may, but are not: and
thence come all those headstrong passions, violent perturbations of the
mind; and many times vicious habits, customs, feral diseases; because
we give so much way to our appetite, and follow our inclination, like
so many beasts. The principal habits are two in number, virtue and
vice, whose peculiar definitions, descriptions, differences, and kinds,
are handled at large in the ethics, and are, indeed, the subject of
moral philosophy.
MEMB. III.