(1) In respect of the manner of _demonstration,_ if it does not
correspond to the genesis of the thoughts;
(2) In respect of the demands for _methods_ which, at a given period in
science, may be quite impossible;
(3) In respect of the demand for _objectivity_ for cold impersonal
treatment, where, as in the case of all valuations, we describe
ourselves and our intimate experiences in a couple of words. There
are ludicrous forms of vanity, as, for instance, Sainte-Beuve's. He
actually worried himself all his life because he had shown some warmth
or passion either "_pro_" or "con," and he would fein have lied that
fact out of his life.
425.
"Objectivity" in the philosopher: moral indifference in regard to one's
self, blindness in regard to either favourable or fetal circumstances.
Unscrupulousness in the use of dangerous means; perversity and
complexity of character considered as an advantage and exploited.
My profound indifference to myself: I refuse to derive any advantage
from my knowledge, nor do I wish to escape any disadvantages which it
may entail.--I include among these disadvantages that which is called
the _perversion_ of character; this prospect is beside the point: I use
my character, but I try neither to understand it nor to change it--the
personal calculation of virtue has not entered my head once. It strikes
me that one closes the doors of knowledge as soon as one becomes
interested in one's own personal case--or even in the "Salvation of
one's soul"!... One should not take one's morality too seriously, nor
should one forfeit a modest right to the opposite of morality....
A sort of _heritage of morality_ is perhaps presupposed here: one
feels that one can be lavish with it and fling a great deal of it out
of the window without materially reducing one's means. One is never
tempted to admire "beautiful souls," one always knows one's self to be
their superior. The monsters of virtue should be met with inner scorn;
_déniaiser la vertu_--Oh, the joy of it!
One should revolve round one's self, have no desire to be "better" or
"anything else" at all than one is. One should be too interested to
omit throwing the tentacles or meshes of every morality out to things.
426.
Concerning the psychology of _philosophers._ They should be
psychologists--this was possible only from the nineteenth century
onwards--and no longer little Jack Homers, who see three or four
feet in front of them, and are almost satisfied to burrow inside
themselves. We psychologists of the future are not very intent on
self-contemplation: we regard it almost as a sign of degeneration when
an instrument endeavours "to know itself":[10] we are instruments of
knowledge and we would fain possess all the precision and ingenuousness
of an instrument--consequently we may not analyse or "know" ourselves.
The first sign of a great psychologist's self-preservative instinct:
he never goes in search of himself, he has no eye, no interest, no
inquisitiveness where he himself is concerned.... The great egoism
of our dominating will insists on our completely shutting our eyes to
ourselves, and on our appearing "impersonal," "disinterested"!--Oh to
what a ridiculous degree we are the reverse of this!
We are no Pascals, we are not particularly interested in the
"Salvation of the soul," in our own happiness, and in our own
virtue.--We have neither enough time nor enough curiosity to be so
concerned with ourselves. Regarded more deeply, the case is again
different, we thoroughly mistrust all men who thus contemplate their
own navels: because introspection seems to us a degenerate form of
the psychologist's genius, as a note of interrogation affixed to the
psychologist's instinct: just as a painter's eye is degenerate which is
actuated by the _will_ to see for the sake of seeing.
[Footnote 10: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Goethe invariably inveighed against
the "gnoti seauton" of the Socratic school; he was of the opinion that
an animal which tries to see its inner self must be sick.]