All that is ignoble is high (the protest of the "vulgar
man").
All that is contrary to Nature is high (the protest of the
physiologically botched).
All that is of average worth is high (the protest of the
herd, of the "mediocre").
Thus in the _history of morality_ a _will to power_ finds expression,
by means of which, either the slaves, the oppressed, the bungled and
the botched, those that suffer from themselves, or the mediocre,
attempt to make those valuations prevail which favour _their_ existence.
From a biological standpoint, therefore, the phenomenon Morality is of
a highly suspicious nature. Up to the present, morality has developed
at the _cost_ of: the ruling classes and their specific instincts,
the well-constituted and _beautiful_ natures, the independent and
privileged classes in all respects.
Morality, then, is a sort of counter-movement opposing Nature's
endeavours to arrive at a _higher type._ Its effects are: mistrust of
life in general (in so far as its tendencies are felt to be immoral),
--hostility towards the senses (inasmuch as the highest values are
felt to be opposed to the higher instincts),--Degeneration and
self-destruction of "higher natures," because it is precisely in them
that the conflict becomes _conscious._
401.
_Which values have been paramount hitherto?_
Morality as the leading value in all phases of philosophy (even with
the Sceptics). Result: this world is no good, a "true world" must exist
somewhere.
What is it that here determines the highest value? What, in sooth,
is morality? The instinct of decadence; it is the exhausted and
the disinherited who _take their revenge_ in this way and play the
_masters_....
Historical proof: philosophers have always been decadents and always in
the pay of Nihilistic religions.
The instinct of decadence appears as the will to power. The
introduction of its system of means: its means are absolutely immoral.
General aspect: the values that have been highest hitherto have been a
special instance of the will to power; morality itself is a particular
instance of _immorality._
***
Why the Antagonistic Values always succumbed.
1. How was this actually _possible!_ Question: why did life and
physiological well-constitutedness succumb everywhere? Why was there no
affirmative philosophy, no affirmative religion?
The historical signs of such movements: the pagan religion.
Dionysos _versus_ the Christ. The Renaissance. Art.
2. The strong and the weak: the healthy and the sick; the exception and
the rule. There is no doubt as to who is the stronger....
_General view of history_; Is man an _exception_ in the history of life
on this account?--An objection to _Darwinism._ The means wherewith
the weak succeed in ruling have become: instincts, "humanity,"
"institutions." ...
3. The proof of this rule on the part of the weak is to be found in
our political instincts, in our social values, in our arts, and in our
_science._
***
The _instincts of decadence_ have become master of the _instincts of
ascending_ life.... The _will to nonentity_ has prevailed over the
_will to life_!
Is this _true_? is there not perhaps a stronger guarantee of life and
of the species in this victory of the weak and the mediocre?--is it
not perhaps only a means in the collective movement of life, a mere
slackening of the pace, a protective measure against something even
more dangerous?
Suppose the _strong_ were masters in all respects, even in valuing:
let us try and think what their attitude would be towards illness,
suffering, and sacrifice! _Self-contempt on the part of the weak_ would
be the result: they would do their utmost to disappear and to extirpate
their kind. And would this be _desirable_?--should we really like a
world in which the subtlety, the consideration, the intellectuality,
the _plasticity_--in fact, the whole influence of the weak--was
lacking?[9] ...
We have seen two "wills to power" at war _(in this special case we
had a principle_: that of agreeing with the one that has hitherto
succumbed, and of disagreeing with the one that has hitherto
triumphed): we have recognised the "real world" as a "_world of lies_"
and morality as a _form of immorality._ We do _not_ say "the stronger
is wrong."
We have understood _what_ it is that has determined the highest values
hitherto, and _why_ the latter should have prevailed over the opposite
value: it was numerically the _stronger_.
If we now purify _the opposite value_ of the infection, the
half-heartedness, _and the degeneration,_ with which we identify it, we
restore Nature to the throne, free from moralic acid.
[Footnote 9: TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--We realise here the great difference
between Nietzsche and those who draw premature conclusions from
Darwinism. There is no brutal solution of modern problems in
Nietzsche's philosophy. He did not advocate anything so ridiculous as
the total suppression of the weak and the degenerate. What he wished to
resist and to overthrow _was their supremacy, their excessive power._
He felt that there was a desirable and stronger type which was in need
of having its hopes, aspirations, and instincts upheld in defiance of
Christian values.]
402.
_Morality,_ a useful error; or, more clearly still, a necessary and
expedient lie according to the greatest and most impartial of its
supporters.
403.
One ought to be able to acknowledge the truth up to that point where
one is sufficiently elevated no longer to require the _disciplinary
school of moral error._--When one judges life morally, it _disgusts_
one.
Neither should false personalities be invented; one should not say, for
instance, "Nature is cruel." It is precisely when one perceives _that
there is no such central controlling and responsible force that one is
relieved!_
_Evolution of man._ A. He tried to attain to a certain power
over Nature and over himself. (Morality was necessary in
order to make man triumph in his struggle with Nature and
"wild animals.")
B. If power over Nature has been attained, this power can
be used as a help in our development: Will to Power as a
self-enhancing and self-strengthening principle.
404.
Morality may be regarded as the _illusion of a species,_ fostered with
the view of urging the individual to sacrifice himself to the future,
and seemingly granting him such a very great value, that with that
_self-consciousness_ he may tyrannise over, and constrain, other sides
of his nature, and find it difficult to be pleased with himself.
We ought to be most profoundly thankful for what morality has done
hitherto: _but now it is no more than a burden_ which may prove fatal.
_Morality itself_ in the form of honesty urges us to deny morality.
405.
To what extent is the _self-destruction of morality_ still a sign of
its own strength? We Europeans have within us the blood of those who
were ready to die for their faith; we have taken morality frightfully
seriously, and there is nothing which we have not, at one time,
sacrificed to it. On the other hand, our intellectual subtlety has
been reached essentially through the vivisection of our consciences.
We do not yet know the "whither" towards which we are urging our
steps, now that we have departed from the soil of our forebears. But
it was on this very soil that we acquired the strength which is now
driving us from our homes in search of adventure, and it is thanks
to that strength that we are now in mid-sea, surrounded by untried
possibilities and things undiscovered--we can no longer choose, we must
be conquerors, now that we have no land in which we feel at home and
in which we would fain "survive." A concealed "_yea_" is driving us
forward, and it is stronger than all our "nays." Even our _strength_ no
longer bears with us in the old swampy land: we venture out into the
open, we attempt the task. The world is still rich and undiscovered,
and even to perish were better than to be half-men or poisonous men.
Our very strength itself urges us to take to the sea; there where all
suns have hitherto sunk we know of a new world....