391.
The standard _according_ to which the value of moral valuations is to
be determined.
The fundamental fact _that has been overlooked_: The contradiction
between "becoming more moral" and the elevation and the strengthening
of the type man.
_Homo natura_: The "will to power."
392.
Moral values regarded as _values of appearance_ and compared with
_physiological_ values.
393.
Reflecting upon generalities is always retrograde: the last of the
"desiderata" concerning men, for instance, have never been regarded as
problems by philosophers. They always postulate the "_improvement_"
of man, quite guilelessly, as though by means of some intuition they
had been helped over the note of interrogation following the question,
_why_ necessarily "_improve!_" To what extent is it _desirable_ that
man should be more _virtuous,_ or more _intelligent,_ or _happier!_
Granting that nobody yet _knows_ the "wherefore?" of mankind, all
such desiderata have no sense whatever; and if one aspires to one
of them--who knows?--perhaps one is frustrating the other. Is an
increase of virtue compatible with an increase of intelligence and
insight? _Dubito_: only too often shall I have occasion to show that
the reverse is true. Has virtue, as an end, in the strict sense of the
word, not always been opposed to happiness hitherto? And again, does it
not require misfortune, abstinence, and self-castigation as a necessary
means? And if the aim were to arrive at the _highest insight,_ would
it not therefore be necessary to renounce all hope of an increase in
happiness, and to choose danger, adventure, mistrust, and seduction as
a road to enlightenment?... And suppose one will have happiness; maybe
one should join the ranks of the "poor in spirit."
394.