362.
Egoism and its problem! The Christian gloominess of La Rochefoucauld,
who saw egoism in everything, and imagined that he had therefore
_reduced_ the worth of things and virtues! In opposition to him,
I first of all tried to show that nothing else _could_ exist save
egoism,--that in those men whose _ego_ is weak and thin, the power to
love also grows weak,--that the greatest lovers are such owing to the
strength of their _ego,_--that love is an expression of egoism, etc.
As a matter of fact, the false valuation aims at the interest of those
who find it useful, whom it helps--in fact, the herd; it fosters a
pessimistic mistrust towards the basis of Life; it would fain undermine
the most glorious and most well-constituted men (out of fear); it would
assist the lowly to have the upper hand of their conquerors; it is the
cause of universal dishonesty, especially in the most useful type of
men.
363.
Man is an indifferent egoist: even the cleverest regards his habits as
more important than his advantage.
364.
Egoism! But no one has yet asked: _what_ is the _ego_ like? Everybody
is rather inclined to see all _egos_ alike. This is the result of the
slave theory, of _universal suffrage,_ and of "equality."
365.
The behaviour of a higher man is the result of a very complex set of
motives: any word such as "pity" _betrays_ nothing of this complexity.
The most important factor is the feeling, "who am I? who is the other
relative to me?"--Thus the valuing spirit is continually active.
366.
To think that the history of all moral phenomena may be simplified, as
Schopenhauer thought,--that is to say, that _pity_ is to be found at
the root of every moral impulse that has ever existed hitherto,--is
to be guilty of a degree of nonsense and ingenuousness worthy only
of a thinker who is devoid of all historical instincts and who has
miraculously succeeded in evading the strong schooling in history which
the Germans, from Herder to Hegel, have undergone.
367.
_My "pity."_--This is a feeling for which I can find no adequate
term: I feel it when I am in the presence of any waste of precious
capabilities, as, for instance, when I contemplate Luther: what power
and what tasteless problems fit for back-woodsmen! (At a time when the
brave and light-hearted scepticism of a Montaigne was already possible
in France!) Or when I see some one standing below where he might have
stood, thanks to the development of a set of perfectly senseless
accidents. Or even when, with the thought of man's destiny in my mind,
I contemplate with horror and contempt the whole system of modern
European politics, which is creating the circumstances and weaving
the fabric of the _whole_ future of mankind. Yes, to what could not
"mankind" attain, if----! This is my "pity"; despite the fact that no
sufferer yet exists with whom I sympathise in this way.
368.
Pity is a waste of feeling, a moral parasite which is injurious to
the health, "it cannot possibly be our duty to increase the evil in
the world." If one does good merely out of pity, it is one's self and
not one's neighbour that one is succouring. Pity does not depend upon
maxims, but upon emotions. The suffering we see infects us; pity is an
infection.
369.
There is no such thing as egoism which keeps within its bounds and
does not exceed them--consequently, the "allowable," the "morally
indifferent" egoism of which some people speak, does not exist at all.
"One is continually promoting the interests of one's '_ego_' at the
cost of other people "; "Living consists in living at the cost of
others"--he who has not grasped this fact, has not taken the first step
towards truth to himself.
370.
The "subject" is a piece of fiction: the _ego_ of which every one
speaks when he blames egoism, does not exist at all.
371.
Our "ego"--which is _not_ one with the unitary controlling force of our
beings!--is really only an imagined synthesis; therefore there can _be_
no "_egoistic_" _actions_.
372.
Since all instincts are unintelligent, utility cannot represent a
standpoint as far as they are concerned. Every instinct, when it is
active, sacrifices strength and other instincts into the bargain: in
the end it is stemmed, otherwise it would be the end of everything
owing to the waste it would bring about. Thus: that which is
"unegoistic," self-sacrificing, and imprudent is nothing in particular
--it is common to all the instincts; they do not consider the welfare
of the whole _ego_ (_because they simply do not think!_), they act
counter to our interests, against the _ego_: and often _for_ the
_ego--_innocent in both cases!
373.
_The origin of moral values._--Selfishness has as much value as the
physiological value of him who possesses it. Each individual represents
the whole course of Evolution, and he is not, as morals teach,
something that begins at his birth. If he represent the _ascent_ of the
line of mankind, his value is, in fact, very great; and the concern
about his maintenance and the promoting of his growth may even be
extreme. (It is the concern about the promise of the future in him
which gives the well-constituted individual such an extraordinary right
to egoism.) If he represent _descending_ development, decay, chronic
sickening, he has little worth: and the greatest fairness would have
him take as little room, strength, and sunshine as possible from the
well-constituted. In this case society's duty is to _suppress egoism_
(for the latter may sometimes manifest itself in an absurd, morbid,
and seditious manner): whether it be a question of the decline and
pining away of single individuals or of whole classes of mankind. A
morality and a religion of "love," the _curbing_ of the self-affirming
spirit, and a doctrine encouraging patience, resignation, helpfulness,
and co-operation in word and deed may be of the highest value within
the confines of such classes, even in the eyes of their rulers:
for it restrains the feelings of rivalry, of resentment, and of
envy,--feelings which are only too natural in the bungled and the
botched,--and it even deifies them under the ideal of humility, of
obedience, of slave-life, of being ruled, of poverty, of illness, and
of lowliness. This explains why the ruling classes (or races) and
individuals of all ages have always upheld the cult of unselfishness,
the gospel of the lowly and of "God on the Cross."
The preponderance of an altruistic way of valuing is the result of
a consciousness of the fact that one is botched and bungled. Upon
examination, this point of view turns out to be: "I am not worth
much," simply a psychological valuation; more plainly still: it is
the feeling of impotence, of the lack of the great self-asserting
impulses of power (in muscles, nerves, and ganglia). This valuation
gets translated, according to the particular culture of these classes,
into a moral or religious principle (the pre-eminence of religious or
moral precepts is always a sign of low culture): it tries to justify
itself in spheres whence, as far as it is concerned, the notion "value"
hails. The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner
tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of
power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner
rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay
when interpretations of this sort are used at all. In some cases the
bungled and the botched do not look for the reason of their unfortunate
condition in their own guilt (as the Christian does), but in society:
when, however, the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are
conscious that their existence is something for which some one must
be _guilty,_ they are very closely related to the Christian, who also
believes that he can more easily endure his ill ease and his wretched
constitution when he has found some one whom he can hold _responsible_
for it. The instinct of _revenge_ and _resentment_ appears in both
cases here as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure,
as is also the favour shown to _altruistic_ theory and practice. The
_hatred of egoism,_ whether it be one's own (as in the case of the
Christian), or another's (as in the case of the Socialists), thus
appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge; and
also as an act of prudence on the part of the preservative instinct
of the suffering, in the form of an increase in their feelings of
co-operation and unity.... At bottom, as I have already suggested,
the discharge of resentment which takes place in the act of judging,
rejecting, and punishing egoism (one's own or that of others) is
still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the
botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of
egoism, which regularly appears under certain definite physiological
circumstances.
When the Socialist, with righteous indignation, cries for "justice,"
"rights," "equal rights," it only shows that he is oppressed by his
inadequate culture, and is unable to understand why he suffers: he
also finds pleasure in crying;--if he were more at ease he would take
jolly good care not to cry in that way: in that case he would seek his
pleasure elsewhere. The same holds good of the Christian: he curses,
condemns, and slanders the "world"--and does not even except himself.
But that is no reason for taking him seriously. In both cases we are
in the presence of invalids who feel better for crying, and who find
relief in slander.
374.
Every society has a tendency to reduce its opponents to
_caricatures,_--at least in its own imagination,--as also to
starve them. As an example of this sort of caricature we have our
"_criminal._" In the midst of the Roman and aristocratic order of
values, the _Jew_ was reduced to a caricature. Among artists, "Mrs.
Grundy and the bourgeois" become caricatures; while among pious
people it is the heretics, and among aristocrats, the plebeian. Among
immoralists it is the moralist. Plato, for instance, in _my_ books
becomes a caricature.
375.
All the instincts and forces which morality praises, seem to me to
be essentially the same as those which it slanders and rejects: for
instance, justice as will to power, will to truth as a means in the
service of the will to power.
376.
The _turning of_ man's _nature inwards._ The process of turning a
nature inwards arises when, owing to the establishment of peace and
society, powerful instincts are prevented from venting themselves
outwardly, and strive to survive harmlessly inside in conjunction with
the imagination. The need of hostility, cruelty, revenge, and violence
is reverted, "it steps backwards"; in the thirst for knowledge there
lurks both the lust of gain and of conquest; in the artist, the powers
of dissimulation and falsehood find their scope; the instincts are thus
transformed into demons with whom a fight takes place, etc.
377.
_Falsity._--Every _sovereign instinct_ makes the others its
instruments, its retainers and its sycophants: it never allows itself
to be called by its more hateful name: and it brooks no terms of praise
in which it cannot _indirectly_ find its share. Around every sovereign
instinct all praise and blame in general crystallises into a rigorous
form of ceremonial and etiquette. This is _one_ of the causes of
falsity.
_Every_ instinct _which aspires to dominion,_ but which finds itself
under a yoke, requisitions all the most beautiful names and the
_most generally accepted_ values to strengthen it and to support its
self-esteem, and this explains why _as a rule_ it dares to come forward
under the name of the "master" it is combating and from whom it would
be free (for instance, under the domination of Christian values, the
desires of the flesh and of power act in this way). This is the _other_
cause of falsity.
In both cases _complete ingenuousness_ reigns: the falseness _never_
even occurs to the mind of those concerned. It is the sign of a
_broken_ instinct when man sees the motive force and its "expression"
("the mask") as separate things--it is a sign of inner contradiction
and is much less formidable. Absolute _innocence_ in bearing, word,
and passion, a "good conscience" in falseness, and the certainty
wherewith all the grandest and most pompous words and attitudes are
appropriated--all these things are necessary for victory.
In the _other case_: that is to say, when _extreme clearsightedness_
is present, the genius of the _actor_ is needful as well as tremendous
discipline in self-control, if victory is to be achieved. That is why
priests are the cleverest and _most conscious_ hypocrites; and then
come princes, in whom their position in life and their antecedents
account for a certain histrionic gift. Society men and diplomatists
come third, and women fourth.
_The fundamental thought_: Falsity seems so deep, so many-sided, and
the _will_ is directed so inexorably against perfect self-knowledge
and accurate self-classification, that one is _very probably right in
supposing that Truth_ and _the will to truth_ are perhaps something
quite different and only _disguises._ (The need of _faith_ is the
greatest obstacle in the way of truthfulness.)
378.
"Thou shalt not tell a falsehood": people insist upon truthfulness. But
the acknowledgment of facts (the refusal to allow one's self to be lied
to) has always been greatest with liars: they actually recognised the
reality of this popular "truthfulness." There is too much or too little
being said continually: to insist upon people's _exposing themselves_
with every word they say, is a piece of naïveté.
People say what they think, they are "truthful"; but _only under
certain circumstances_: that is to say, provided they be _understood_
(_inter pares_), and understood with good will into the bargain (_once
more inter pares_). One conceals one's self in the presence of the
_unfamiliar_: and he who would attain to something, says what he would
fain have people think about him, but _not_ what he thinks. ("The
powerful man is always a liar.")
379.
The great counterfeit coinage of Nihilism concealed beneath an artful
abuse of moral values:--
_(a)_ Love regarded as self-effacement; as also pity.
_(b)_ The _most impersonal intellect_ ("the philosopher") can know the
_truth_, "the true essence and nature of things."
_(c)_ Genius, _great men_ are _great,_ because they do not strive
to further their own interests: the _value_ of man _increases_ in
proportion as he effaces himself.
_(d)_ Art as the work of the "_pure free-willed subject_";
misunderstanding of "objectivity."
_(e)_ Happiness as the object of life: _virtue_ as a means to an end.
The pessimistic condemnation of life by Schopenhauer is a _moral_ one.
Transference of the gregarious standards into the realm of metaphysics.
The "individual" lacks sense, he must therefore have his origin in "the
thing in itself" (and the significance of his existence must be shown
to be "error"); parents are only an "accidental cause."--The mistake
on the part of science in considering the individual as the result of
all past life instead of the epitome of all past life, is now becoming
known.
380.
1. Systematic _falsification of history,_ so that it may present a
proof of the moral valuation:
_(a)_ The decline of a people and corruption. _(b)_ The rise of a
people and virtue. _(c)_ The zenith of a people ("its culture")
regarded as the result of high moral excellence.
2. Systematic falsification of _great men, great creators,_ and _great
periods._ The desire is to make _faith_ that which distinguishes great
men: whereas carelessness in this respect, scepticism, "immorality,"
the right to repudiate a belief, belongs to greatness (Cæsar, Frederick
the Great, Napoleon; but also Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe).
The principal fact--their "free will"--is always suppressed.
381.
A great _lie_ in history; as if the _corruption of the Church were the
cause_ of the Reformation! This was only the pretext and self-deception
of the agitators--very strong needs were making themselves felt, the
brutality of which sorely required a spiritual dressing.
382.
Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the _emancipation_
from the will: he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral
prejudices which is coincident with the emancipation of a great mind;
he refused to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully
contrived to set up the only moral value he honoured--self-effacement,
as the one _condition_ of highest intellectual activity: "objective"
contemplation. "Truth," even in art, only manifests itself after the
withdrawal of the _will_....
Through all moral idiosyncrasies I see a _fundamentally different
valuation._ Such absurd distinctions as "genius" and the world of will,
of morality and immorality, _I know nothing about at all._ The moral is
a lower kind of animal than the immoral, he is also weaker; indeed--he
is a type in regard to morality, but he is not a type of his own. He
is a copy; at the best, a good copy--the standard of his worth lies
_without_ him. I value a man according to the _quantum of power and
fullness of his will_: not according to the enfeeblement and moribund
state thereof. I consider that a philosophy which _teaches_ the denial
of will is both defamatory and slanderous.... I test the _power_ of
a _will_ according to the amount of resistance it can offer and the
amount of pain and torture it can endure and know how to turn to its
own advantage; I do not point to the evil and pain of existence with
the finger of reproach, but rather entertain the hope that life may one
day be more evil and more full of suffering than it has ever been.
The zenith of intellectuality, according to Schopenhauer, was to arrive
at the knowledge that all is to no purpose--in short, to recognise what
the good man already _does_ instinctively.... He denies that there can
be higher states of intellectuality--he regards his view as a _non plus
ultra.._.. Here intellectuality is placed much lower than goodness; its
highest value (as art, for instance) would be to lead up to, and to
advise the adoption of, morality, the absolute predominance of _moral
values._
Next to Schopenhauer I will now characterise _Kant_: there was nothing
Greek in Kant; he was quite anti-historical (cf. his attitude in
regard to the French Revolution) and a moral fanatic (see Goethe's
words concerning the radically evil element in human nature[8]).
_Saintliness_ also lurked somewhere in his soul.... I require a
criticism of the saintly type.