330.
It were the thing to begin this criticism in suchwise as to do away
with the word "_Ideal_": a criticism of _desiderata._
331.
Only the fewest amongst us are aware of what is involved, from the
standpoint of _desirability,_ in every "thus should it be, but it
is not," or even "thus it ought to have been": such expressions of
opinion involve a condemnation of the whole course of events. For
there is nothing quite isolated in the world: the smallest thing bears
the largest on its back; on thy small injustice the whole nature of
the future depends; the whole is condemned by every criticism which
is directed at the smallest part of it. Now granting that the moral
norm--even as Kant understood it--is never completely fulfilled, and
remains like a sort of Beyond hanging over reality without ever falling
down to it; then morality would contain in itself a judgment concerning
the whole, which would still, however, allow of the question: _whence
does it get the right thereto?_ How does the part come to acquire this
judicial position relative to the whole? And if, as some have declared,
this moral condemnation of, and dissatisfaction with, reality, is
an ineradicable instinct, is it not possible that this instinct may
perhaps belong to the ineradicable stupidities and immodesties of our
species?--But in saying this, we are doing precisely what we deprecate;
the point of view of desirability and of unauthorised fault-finding
is part and parcel of the whole character of worldly phenomena just
as every injustice and imperfection is--it is our very notion of
"perfection" which is never gratified. Every instinct which desires
to be indulged gives expression to its dissatisfaction with the
present state of things: how? Is the whole perhaps made up of a host
of dissatisfied parts, which all have desiderata in their heads? Is
the "course of things" perhaps "the road hence? the road leading away
from reality "--that is to say, eternal dissatisfaction in itself? Is
the conception of desiderata perhaps the essential motive-power of all
things? Is it--_deus_?
***
It seems to me of the utmost importance that we should rid ourselves
of the notion of _the_ whole, of an entity, and of any kind of power
or form of the unconditioned. For we shall never be able to resist the
temptation of regarding it as the supreme being, and of christening
it "God." The "All" must be subdivided; we must unlearn our respect
for it, and reappropriate that which we have lent the unknown and an
imaginary entity, for the purposes of our neighbour and ourselves.
Whereas, for instance, Kant said: "Two things remain for ever worthy
of honour" (at the close of his _Practical Reason_)--to-day we should
prefer to say: "Digestion is more worthy of honour." The concept,
"the All," will always give rise to the old problems, "How is evil
possible?" etc. Therefore, _there is no "All",_ there _is no_ great
_sensorium_ or _inventarium_ or power-magazine.
332.
A man as he _ought_ to be: this sounds to me in just as bad taste as:
"A tree as it ought to be."
333.
Ethics: or the "philosophy of desirability."--"Things _ought_ to be
otherwise," "things _ought_ to become different": dissatisfaction
would thus seem the heart of ethics.
One could find a way out of it, first, by selecting only those states
in which one is free from emotion; secondly, by grasping the insolence
and stupidity of the attitude of mind: for to desire that something
should be otherwise than it is, means to desire that _everything_
should be different--it involves a damaging criticism of the whole.
_But life itself consists in such desiring!_
To ascertain _what exists, how it exists_ seems an ever so much higher
and more serious matter than every "thus should it be," because the
latter, as a piece of human criticism and arrogance, appears to be
condemned as ludicrous from the start. It expresses a need which would
fain have the organisation of the world correspond with our human
well-being, and which directs the will as much as possible towards the
accomplishment of that relationship.
On the other hand, this desire, "thus it ought to be," has only called
forth that other desire, "_what exists?_" The desire of knowing what
exists, is already a consequence of the question, "how? is it possible?
Why precisely so?" Our wonder at the disagreement between our desires
and the course of the world has led to our learning to know the
course of the world. Perhaps the matter stands differently: maybe the
expression, "thus it ought to be," is merely the utterance of our
desire to overcome the world----
334.
To-day when every attempt at determining how man should be--is
received with some irony, when we adhere to the notion that in spite
of all one only _becomes_ what one _is_(in spite of all--that is to
say, education, instruction, environment, accident, and disaster),
in the matter of morality we have learnt, in a very peculiar way,
how to _reverse_ the relation of cause and effect. Nothing perhaps
distinguishes us more than this from the ancient believers in morality.
We no longer say, for instance, "Vice is the cause of a man's
physical ruin," and we no longer say, "A man prospers with virtue
because it brings a long life and happiness." Our minds to-day are
much more inclined to the belief that vice and virtue are not causes
but only _effects._ A man becomes a respectable member of society
because he _was_ a respectable man from the start--that is to say,
because he was born in possession of good instincts and prosperous
propensities.... Should a man enter the world poor, and the son of
parents who are neither economical nor thrifty, he is insusceptible
of being improved--that is to say, he is only fit for the prison or
the madhouse.... To-day we are no longer able to separate moral from
physical degeneration: the former is merely a complicated symptom of
the latter; a man is necessarily bad just as he is necessarily ill....
Bad: this word here stands for a certain _lack of capacity_ which is
related physiologically with the degenerating type--for instance, a
weak will, an uncertain and many-sided personality, the inability to
resist reacting to a stimulus and to control one's self, and a certain
constraint resulting from every suggestion proceeding from another's
will. Vice is not a cause; it is an _effect._ ... Vice is a somewhat
arbitrary-epitome of certain effects resulting from physiological
degeneracy. A general proposition such as that which Christianity
teaches, namely, "Man is evil," would be justified provided one were
justified in regarding a given type of degenerate man as normal. But
this may be an exaggeration. Of course, wherever Christianity prospers
and prevails, the proposition holds good: for then the existence of an
unhealthy soil--of a degenerate territory--is demonstrated.
335.
It is difficult to have sufficient respect for man, when one sees how
he understands the art of fighting his way, of enduring, of turning
circumstances to his own advantage, and of overthrowing opponents;
but when he is seen in the light of his _desires,_ he is the most
absurd of all animals. It is just as if he required a playground
for his cowardice, his laziness, his feebleness, his sweetness, his
submissiveness, where he recovers from his strong virile virtues. Just
look at man's "_desiderata_" and his "ideals." Man, when he _desires,
_ tries to recover from that which is eternally valuable in him, from
his deeds; and then he rushes into nonentity, absurdity, valuelessness,
childishness. The intellectual indigence and lack of inventive power of
this resourceful and inventive animal is simply terrible. The "ideal"
is at the same time the penalty man pays for the enormous expenditure
which he has to defray in all real and pressing duties.--Should reality
cease to prevail, there follow dreams, fatigue, weakness: an "ideal"
might even be regarded as a form of dream, fatigue, or weakness. The
strongest and the most impotent men become alike when this condition
overtakes them: they _deify_ the cessation of work, of war, of
passions, of suspense, of contrasts, of "reality "--in short, of the
struggle for knowledge and of the _trouble_ of acquiring it.
"Innocence" to them is idealised stultification; "blessedness" is
idealised idleness; "love," the ideal state of the gregarious animal
that will no longer have an enemy. And thus everything that lowers and
belittles man is elevated to an _ideal_.
336.
A desire _magnifies_ the thing desired; and by not being realised it
grows--the _greatest ideas_ are those which have been created by the
strongest and longest desiring. Things grow _ever more valuable_ in our
estimation, the more our desire for them increases: if "moral values"
have become the highest values, it simply shows that the moral ideal
is the one which has been _realised least_ (and thus it _represented
the Beyond to all suffering,_ as a road to _blessedness_). Man,
with ever-increasing ardour, has only been embracing _clouds_: and
ultimately called his desperation and impotence "God."
337.
Think of the _naïveté_ of all ultimate "desiderata"--when the
"wherefore" of man remains unknown.
338.
What is the counterfeit coinage of morality? First of all we should
know what "good and evil" mean. That is as good as wishing to know why
man is here, and what his goal or his destiny is. And that means that
one would fain know that man actually _has_ a goal or a destiny.
The very obscure and arbitrary notion that humanity has a general
duty to perform, and that, as a whole, it is striving towards a
goal, is still in its infancy. Perhaps we shall once more be rid
of it before it becomes a "fixed idea." ... But humanity does not
constitute a whole: it is an indissoluble multiplicity of ascending
and descending organisms--it knows no such thing as a state of youth
followed by _maturity_ and then age. But its strata lie confused and
superimposed--and in a few thousand years there may be even younger
types of men than we can point out to-day. Decadence, on the other
hand, belongs to all periods of human history: everywhere there is
refuse and decaying matter, such things are in themselves vital
processes; for withering and decaying elements must be eliminated.
Under the empire of Christian prejudice _this question was never put
at all_: the purpose of life seemed to lie in the salvation of the
individual soul; the question whether humanity might last for a long or
a short time was not considered. The best Christians longed for the end
to come as soon as possible;--concerning the needs of the individual,
_there seemed to be no doubt whatsoever._ ... The duty of every
individual for the present was identical with what it would be in any
sort of future for the man of the future: the value, the purpose, the
limit of values was for ever fixed, unconditioned, eternal, one with
God.... What deviated from this eternal type was impious, diabolic,
criminal.
The centre of gravity of all values for each soul lay in that soul
itself: salvation or damnation! The salvation of the _immortal_ soul!
The most extreme form of _personalisation...._ For each soul there
was only one kind of perfection; only one ideal, only one road to
salvation.... The most extreme form of the principle of _equal rights,_
associated with an optical magnification of individual importance to
the point of megalomania.... Nothing but insanely important souls,
revolving round their own axes with unspeakable terror....
***
Nobody believes in these assumed airs of importance any longer
to-day: and we have sifted our wisdom through the sieve of contempt.
Nevertheless the _optical habit_ survives, which would fain measure the
value of man by his proximity to a certain _ideal maw._ at bottom the
personalisation view is upheld as firmly as that of the _equality of
rights as regards the ideal._ In short: people _seem to think that they
know_ what _the ultimate desideratum_ is in regard to the ideal man....
But this belief is merely the result of the exceedingly _detrimental
influence_ of the Christian ideal, as anybody can discover for himself
every time he carefully examines the "ideal type." In the first place,
it is believed that the approach to a given "type" is desirable;
_secondly,_ that this particular type is known; _thirdly,_ that every
deviation from this type is a retrograde movement, a stemming of the
spirit of progress, a loss of power and might in man.... To dream of a
state of affairs in which this _perfect_ man will be in the majority:
our friends the Socialists and even Messrs. the Utilitarians have not
reached a higher level than this. In this way an _aim_ seems to have
crept into the _evolution_ of man: at any rate the belief in a certain
_progress towards an ideal_ is the only shape in which an _aim_ is
conceived in the history of mankind to-day. In short: the coming of the
"_Kingdom of God_" has been placed in the future, and has been given an
earthly, a human meaning--but on the whole the faith in the _old_ ideal
is still maintained....
340.
_The more concealed forms of the cult of Christian, moral ideals._--The
_insipid and cowardly notion "Nature"_ invented by Nature-enthusiasts
(without any knowledge whatsoever of the terrible, the implacable,
and the cynical element in even "the most beautiful" aspects), is
only a sort of attempt at _reading_ the moral and Christian notion of
"humanity" into Nature;--Rousseau's concept of Nature, for instance,
which took for granted that "Nature" meant freedom, goodness,
innocence, equity, justice, and _Idylls,_ was nothing more at bottom
than the cult of Christian morality. We should collect passages from
the poets in order to see _what_ they admired, in lofty mountains, for
instance. What Goethe had to do with them--why he admired Spinoza.
Absolute _ignorance_ concerning the reasons of this _cult...._
The _insipid and cowardly concept "Man"_ à la Comte and Stuart
Mill, is at times the subject of a cult.... This is only the
Christian moral ideal again under another name.... Refer also to the
freethinkers--Guyau for example.
The _insipid and cowardly concept "Art"_ which is held to mean sympathy
with all suffering and with everything botched and bungled (the same
thing happens to _history,_ cf. Thierry): again it is the cult of the
Christian moral ideal.
And now, as to the whole _socialistic ideal_: it is nothing but a
blockheaded misunderstanding of the Christian moral ideal.
341.
_The origin of the ideal._ The examination of the soil out of which it
grows.
_A._ Starting out from those "æsthetic" mental states during which the
world seems rounder, fuller, and _more perfect_: we have the pagan
ideal with its dominating spirit of self-affirmation (_people give of
their abundance_). The highest type: the _classical_ ideal--regarded
as an expression of the successful nature of _all_ the more important
instincts. In this classical ideal we find _the grand style_ as the
highest style. An expression of the "will to power" itself. The
instinct which is most feared _dares to acknowledge itself._
_B._ Starting out from the mental states in which the world seemed
emptier, paler, and thinner, when "spiritualisation" and the absence
of sensuality assume the rank of perfection, and when all that is
brutal, animal, direct, and proximate is avoided (_people calculate
and select_): the "sage," "the angel"; priestliness = virginity =
ignorance, are the physiological ideals of such idealists: the _anæmic_
ideal. Under certain circumstances this anæmic ideal may be the ideal
of such natures as _represent_ paganism (thus Goethe sees his "saint"
in Spinoza).
_C._ Starting out from those mental states in which the world seemed
more absurd, more evil, poorer, and more deceptive, an ideal cannot
even be imagined or desired in it (_people deny and annihilate_);
the projection of the ideal into the sphere of the anti-natural,
anti-actual, anti-logical; the state of him who judges thus (the
"impoverishment" of the world as a result of suffering: _people take,
they no longer bestow_): the _anti-natural ideal._
(The _Christian ideal_ is a _transitional form_ between the second
and the third, now inclining more towards the former type, and anon
inclining towards the latter.)
_The three ideals: A._ Either a _strengthening_ of Life (_paganism,_)
or _B._ an _impoverishment_ of Life (_anæmia_), or _C._ a _denial_ of
Life (_anti-naturalism_). The state of beatitude in _A._ is the feeling
of extreme abundance; in _B._ it is reached by the most fastidious
selectiveness; in _C._ it is the contempt and the destruction of Life.
342.
_A._ The _consistent_ type understands that even evil must not be
hated, must not be resisted, and that it is not allowable to make war
against one's self; that it does not suffice merely to accept the pain
which such behaviour brings in its train; that one lives entirely in
positive feelings; that one takes the side of one's opponents in word
and deed; that by means of a superfœtation of peaceful, kindly,
conciliatory, helpful, and loving states, one impoverishes the soil of
the other states, ... that one is in need of unremitting _practice._
What is achieved thereby?--The Buddhistic type, or the _perfect_ cow.
This point of view is possible only where no moral fanaticism
prevails--that is to say, when evil is not hated on its own account,
but because it opens the road to conditions which are painful (unrest,
work, care, complications, dependence).
This is the Buddhistic point of view: there is no hatred of sin, the
concept "sin," in fact, is entirely lacking.
_B._ The _inconsistent_ type. War is waged against evil--there is a
belief that war waged _for Goodness' sake_ does not involve the same
moral results or affect character in the same way as war generally
does (and owing to which tendencies it is detested as _evil)._ As a
matter of fact, a war of this sort carried on against evil is much
more profoundly pernicious than any sort of personal hostility; and
generally, it is "the person" which reassumes, at least in fancy, the
position of opponent (the devil, evil spirits, etc.). The attitude of
hostile observation and spying in regard to everything which may be
bad in us, or hail from a bad source, culminates in a most tormented
and most anxious state of mind: thus "miracles," rewards, ecstasy, and
transcendental solutions of the earth-riddle now became _desirable_.
... The Christian type: or the _perfect bigot_.
_C._ The _stoical_ type. Firmness, self-control, imperturbability,
peace in the form of the rigidity of a will long active--profound
quiet, the defensive state, the fortress, the mistrust of war--firmness
of principles; the unity of _knowledge_ and _will_; great self-respect.
The type of the anchorite. _The perfect blockhead._
343.
An ideal which is striving to prevail or to assert itself endeavours
to further its purpose _(a)_ by laying claim to a _spurious_ origin;
_(b)_ by assuming a relationship between itself and the powerful ideals
already existing; _(c)_ by means of the thrill produced by mystery,
as though an unquestionable power were manifesting itself; _(d)_ by
the slander of its opponents' ideals; _(e)_ by a lying teaching of
the advantages which follow in its wake, for instance: happiness,
spiritual peace, general peace, or even the assistance of a mighty
God, etc.--Contributions to the psychology of the idealists: Carlyle,
Schiller, Michelet.
Supposing all the means of defence and protection, by means of which an
ideal survives, are discovered, is it thereby _refuted_? It has merely
availed itself of the means of which everything lives and grows--they
are all "immoral."
My view: all the forces and instincts which are the source of life
are lying beneath the _ban of morality_: morality is the life-denying
instinct. Morality must be annihilated if life is to be emancipated.
344.
To _avoid_ knowing himself is the prudence of the idealist. The
idealist: a creature who has reasons for remaining in the dark
concerning himself, and who is also clever enough to remain in the dark
concerning these reasons also.
345.
_The tendency of moral evolution._--Every one's desire is that there
should be no other teaching and valuation of things than those by means
of which he himself succeeds. Thus the _fundamental tendency_ of the
_weak_ and _mediocre_ of all times, has been to _enfeeble the strong
and to reduce them to the level of the weak: their chief weapon in this
process_ was the _moral principle._ The attitude of the strong towards
the weak is branded as evil; the highest states of the strong become
bad bywords.
The struggle of the many against the strong, of the ordinary against
the extraordinary, of the weak against the strong: meets with one
of its finest interruptions in the fact that the rare, the refined,
the more exacting, present themselves as the weak, and repudiate the
coarser weapons of power.
346.
(1) The so-called pure instinct for knowledge of all philosophers
is dictated to them by their moral "truths," and is only seemingly
independent.
(2) The "Moral Truths," "thus shall things be done," are mere states
of consciousness of an instinct which has grown tired, "thus and thus
are things done by us." The "ideal" is supposed to re-establish and
strengthen an instinct; it flatters man to feel he can obey when he is
only an automaton.
347.
_Morality as a means of seduction._--"Nature is good; for a wise
and good God is its cause. Who, therefore, is responsible for the
'corruption of man'? Tyrants and seducers and the ruling classes are
responsible--they must be wiped out": this is Rousseau's logic (compare
with _Pascals_ logic, which concludes by an appeal to original sin).
Refer also to _Luther's_ logic, which is similar. In both cases a
pretext is sought for the introduction of an insatiable lust of revenge
as a _moral and religious_ duty. The hatred directed against the ruling
classes tries to _sanctify_ itself ... (the "sinfulness of Israel" is
the basis of the priest's powerful position).
Compare this with _Pauls_ logic, which is similar. It is always under
the cover of God's business that these reactions appear, under the
cover of what is right, or of humanity, etc. In the case of _Christ_
the rejoicings of the people appear as the cause of His crucifixion.
It was an anti-priestly movement from the beginning. Even in the
anti-Semitic movement we find the same trick: the opponent is overcome
with moral condemnations, and those who attack him pose as _retributive
Justice._
348.
_The incidents of the fight_: the fighter tries to transform his
opponent into the _exact opposite_ of himself--imaginatively, of
course. He tries to believe in himself to such an extent that he may
have the courage necessary for the "good Cause" (as if he were the
_good Cause_); as if reason, taste, and virtue were being assailed
by his opponents.... The belief of which he is most in need, as the
strongest means of defence and attack, _is the belief in himself,_
which, however, knows how to misinterpret itself as a belief in
God. He never pictures the advantages and the uses of victory, but
only understands victory for the sake of victory--for God's sake.
Every small community (or individual), finding itself involved in
a struggle, strives to convince itself of this: "_Good taste, good
judgment, and virtue are ours._" War urges people to this _exaggerated
self-esteem_....
349.
Whatever kind of _eccentric ideal_ one may have (whether as
a "Christian," a "free-spirit," an "immoralist," or a German
Imperialist), one should try to avoid insisting upon its being _the_
ideal; for, by so doing, it is deprived of all its privileged nature.
One should have an ideal as a distinction; one should not propagate it,
and thus level one's self down to the rest of mankind.
How is it, that in spite of this obvious fact, the majority of
idealists indulge in propaganda for their ideal, just as if they had
no right to it unless the _majority_ acquiesce therein?--For instance,
all those plucky and insignificant girls behave in this way, who claim
the right to study Latin and mathematics. What is it urges them to do
this? I fear it is the instinct of the herd, and the terror of the
herd: they fight for the "emancipation of woman," because they are best
able to achieve their own private little distinction by fighting for it
under the cover of a _charitable movement,_ under the banner bearing
the device "For others."
The _cleverness_ of idealists consists in their persistently posing
as the missionaries and "representatives" of an ideal: they thus
"beautify" themselves in the eyes of those who still believe in
disinterestedness and heroism. Whereas real heroism consists, _not_
in fighting under the banner of self-sacrifice, submission, and
disinterestedness, but in _not fighting at all_.... "I am thus; I will
be thus--and you can go to the devil!"
350.
_Every_ ideal assumes _love, hate, reverence,_ and _contempt._ Either
positive feeling is the _primum mobile,_ or negative feeling is.
_Hatred_ and _contempt_ are the _primum mobile_ in all the ideals which
proceed from resentment.