Causes effecting the _rise of Pessimism_:--

(1) The most powerful instincts and those which promised most for the

future have hitherto been _calumniated,_ so that life has a curse upon

it.

(2) The growing bravery and the more daring mistrust on the part of man

have led him to discover the fact that _these instincts cannot be

cut adrift from life,_ and thus he turns to embrace life.

(3) Only the most _mediocre,_ who are not _conscious_ of this conflict,

prosper; the higher species fail, and as an example of degeneration

tend to dispose all hearts against them--on the other hand, there is

some indignation caused by the mediocre positing themselves as the end

and meaning of all things. No one can any longer reply to the question:

"Why?"

(4) Belittlement, susceptibility to pain, unrest, haste, and confusion

are steadily increasing--the materialisation of all these tendencies,

which is called "civilisation," becomes every day more simple, with

the result that, in the face of the monstrous machine, the individual

_despairs_ and _surrenders._

34.

Modern Pessimism is an expression of the uselessness only of the

_modern_ world, not of the world and existence as such.

35.

The "preponderance of _pain over pleasure"_ or the reverse (Hedonism);

both of these doctrines are already signposts to Nihilism....

For here, in both cases, no other final purpose is sought than the

phenomenon pleasure or pain.

But only a man who no longer dares to posit a will, a purpose, and a

final goal can speak in this way--according to every healthy type of

man, the worth of life is certainly not measured by the standard of

these secondary things. And a _preponderance_ of pain would be possible

and, _in spite of it,_ a mighty will, a _saying of yea_ to life, and a

holding of this preponderance for necessary.

"Life is not worth living"; "Resignation"; "what is the good of

tears?"--this is a feeble and sentimental attitude of mind. "_Un

monstre gai vaut mieux qu'un sentimental ennuyeux._"

36.

The philosophie Nihilist is convinced that all phenomena are without

sense and are in vain, and that there ought to be no such thing as

Being without sense and in vain. But whence comes this "There ought

not to be?"--whence this "sense" and _this standard_? At bottom the

Nihilist supposes that the sight of such a desolate, useless Being is

_unsatisfying_ to the philosopher, and fills him with desolation and

despair. This aspect of the case is opposed to our subtle sensibilities

as a philosopher. It leads to the absurd conclusion that the character

of existence _must perforce afford pleasure to the philosopher_ if it

is to have any right to subsist.

Now it is easy to understand that happiness and unhappiness, within

the phenomena of this world, can only serve the purpose of _means_:

the question yet remaining to be answered is, whether it _will

ever be possible_ for us to perceive the "object" and "purpose" of

life--whether the problem of purposelessness or the reverse is not

quite beyond our ken.

37.

The development of _Nihilism out of Pessimism._ The denaturalisation

of _Values._ Scholasticism of values. The values isolated, idealistic,

instead of ruling and leading action, turn _against_ it and condemn it.

Opposites introduced in the place of natural gradations and ranks.

Hatred of the order of rank. Opposites are compatible with a plebeian

age, because they are more easy to grasp.

The _rejected_ world is opposed to an artificially constructed "true

and valuable" one. At last we discover out of what material the "true"

world was built; all that remains, now, is the rejected world, and to

the account of our reasons for _rejecting it we place our greatest

disillusionment._

At this point _Nihilism_ is reached; the directing values have been

retained--nothing more!

The Will to Power: An Attempted Transvaluation of All Values. Book I and II · 第 37 / 89 题