_A._
Nihilism will have to manifest itself as a _psychological condition,
first_ when we have sought in all that has happened a purpose which
is not there: so that the seeker will ultimately lose courage.
Nihilism is therefore the coming into consciousness of the long
_waste_ of strength, the pain of "futility," uncertainty, the lack
of an opportunity to recover in some way, or to attain to a state of
peace concerning anything--shame in one's own presence, as if one
had _cheated_ oneself too long.... The purpose above-mentioned might
have been achieved: in the form of a "realisation" of a most high
canon of morality in all worldly phenomena, the moral order of the
universe; or in the form of the increase of love and harmony in the
traffic of humanity; or in the nearer approach to a general condition
of happiness; or even in the march towards general nonentity--any sort
of goal always constitutes a purpose. The common factor to all these
appearances is that something will be _attained,_ through the process
itself: and now we perceive that Becoming has been aiming at _nothing,_
and has achieved nothing. Hence the disillusionment in regard to a
so-called _purpose in existence,_ as a cause of Nihilism; whether this
be in respect of a very definite purpose, or generalised into the
recognition that all the hypotheses are false which have hitherto been
offered as to the object of life, and which relate to the whole of
"Evolution" (man _no longer_ an assistant in, let alone the culmination
of, the evolutionary process).
Nihilism will manifest itself as a psychological condition, in the
second place, when man has fixed a totality, a systematisation, even an
organisation in and behind all phenomena, so that the soul thirsting
for respect and admiration will wallow in the general idea of a highest
ruling and administrative power (if it be the soul of a logician,
the sequence of consequences and perfect reasoning will suffice to
conciliate everything). A kind of unity, some form of "monism":'
and as a result of this belief man becomes obsessed by a feeling of
profound relativity and dependence in the presence of an All which
is infinitely superior to him, a sort of divinity. "The general good
exacts the surrender of the individual ..." but lo, there is no such
general good! At bottom, man loses the belief in his own worth when no
infinitely precious entity manifests itself through him--that is to
say, he conceived such an All, _in order to be able to believe in his
own worth._
Nihilism, as a psychological condition, has yet a third and last form.
Admitting these two _points of view_: that no purpose can be assigned
to Becoming, and that no great entity rules behind all Becoming, in
which the individual may completely lose himself as in an element of
superior value; there still remains the _subterfuge_ which would
consist in condemning this whole world of Becoming as an illusion,
and in discovering a world which would lie beyond it, and would be a
_real_ world. The moment, however, that man perceives that this world
has been devised only for the purpose of meeting certain psychological
needs, and that he has no right whatsoever to it, the final form of
Nihilism comes into being, which comprises _a denial of a metaphysical
world,_ and which forbids itself all belief in a _real_ world. From
this standpoint, the reality of Becoming is the only reality that
is admitted: all bypaths to back-worlds and false godheads are
abandoned--but _this world is no longer endured, although no one wishes
to disown it._
What has actually happened? The feeling of worthlessness was realised
when it was understood that neither the notion of "_Purpose_" nor
that of "_Unity_" nor that of "_Truth_" could be made to interpret
the general character of existence. Nothing is achieved or obtained
thereby; the unity which intervenes in the multiplicity of events is
entirely lacking: the character of existence is not "true," it is
_false_; there is certainly no longer any reason to believe in a _real_
world. In short, the categories, "Purpose," "Unity," "Being," by means
of which we had lent some worth to life, we have once more divorced
from it--and the world now appears _worthless_ to us....
_B._
Admitting that we have recognised the impossibility of _interpreting_
world by means of these three categories, and that from this
standpoint the world begins to be worthless to us; we must ask
ourselves whence we derived our belief in these three categories.
Let us see if it is possible to refuse to believe in them. If we can
_deprive them of their value,_ the proof that they cannot be applied to
the world, is no longer a sufficient reason for _depriving that world
of its value_.
Result: _The belief_ in the categories of reason[2] is the cause
of Nihilism--we have measured the worth of the world according to
categories _which can only be applied to a purely fictitious world._
Conclusion: All values with which we have tried, hitherto, to lend
the world some worth, from our point of view, and with which we have
therefore _deprived it of all worth_ (once these values have been
shown to be inapplicable)--all these values, are, psychologically,
the results of certain views of utility, established for the purpose
of maintaining and increasing the dominion of certain communities:
but falsely projected into the nature of things. It is always man's
_exaggerated ingenuousness_ to regard himself as the sense and measure
of all things.
[Footnote 2: This probably refers to Kant's celebrated table of
twelve categories. The four classes, quantity, quality, relation, and
modality, are each provided with three categories.--TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.]
13.
Nihilism represents an intermediary pathological condition (the vast
generalisation, the conclusion that there _is no purpose_ in anything,
is pathological): whether it be that the productive forces are not
yet strong enough--or that _decadence_ still hesitates and has not yet
discovered its expedients.
_The conditions of this hypothesis_:--That there is _no truth_; that
there is no absolute state of affairs--no "thing-in-itself." _This
alone is Nihilism, and of the most extreme kind._ It finds that the
value of things consists precisely in the fact that these values are
_not_ real and never have been real, but that they are only a symptom
of strength on the part of the _valuer,_ a simplification serving the
_purposes of existence._
14.
_Values and their modification_ are related to the _growth of power of
the valuer._
The measure of _disbelief_ and of the "freedom of spirit" which is
tolerated, viewed as an _expression of the growth of power._
"Nihilism" viewed as the ideal of the _highest spiritual power,_ of the
over-rich life, partly destructive, partly ironical.
15.
What is _belief_? How is a belief born? All belief assumes that
_something is true._
The extremest form of Nihilism would mean that _all_ belief--all
assumption of truth--is false: because no real world is at hand.
It were therefore: only an _appearance seen in perspective,_ whose
origin must be found in us (seeing that we are constantly in need of a
narrower, a shortened, and simplified world).
This should be realised, that the extent to which we can, in our heart
of hearts, acknowledge appearance, and the necessity of falsehood,
without going to rack and ruin, is the _measure of strength._
In this respect, Nihilism, in that it is the _negation_ of a real world
and of Being, might be _a divine view of the world._
16.
If we are disillusioned, we have not become so in regard to life,
but owing to the fact that our eyes have been opened to all kinds
of "desiderata." With mocking anger we survey that which is called
"_Ideal_": we despise ourselves only because we are unable at every
moment of our lives to quell that absurd emotion which is called
"Idealism." This _pampering_ by means of ideals is stronger than the
anger of the _disillusioned one._
17.
_To what extent does Schopenhauerian Nihilism continue to be the result
of the same ideal as that which gave rise to Christian Theism?_ The
amount of certainty concerning the most exalted desiderata, the highest
values and the greatest degree of perfection, was so great, that the
philosophers started out from it as if it had been an _a priori_ and
_absolute fact_: "God" at the head, as the _given quantity_--Truth. "To
become like God," "to be absorbed into the Divine Being"--these were
for centuries the most ingenuous and most convincing desiderata (but
that which convinces is not necessarily true on that account: it is
_nothing more nor less than convincing._ An observation for donkeys).
The granting of a _personal-reality_ to this accretion of ideals
has been unlearned: people have become atheistic. But has the ideal
actually been abandoned? The latest metaphysicians, as a matter of
fact, still seek their true "reality" in it--the "thing-in-itself"
beside which everything else is merely appearance. Their dogma is, that
because our world of appearance is so obviously _not_ the expression
of that ideal, it therefore cannot be "true"--and at bottom does not
even lead back to that metaphysical world as cause. The unconditioned,
in so far as it stands for that highest degree of perfection, cannot
possibly be the reason of all the conditioned. Schopenhauer, who
desired it otherwise, was obliged to imagine this metaphysical basis as
the antithesis to the ideal, as "an evil, blind will": thus it could
be "that which appears," that which manifests itself in the world of
appearance. But even so, he did not give up that ideal absolute--he
circumvented it....
(Kant seems to have needed the hypothesis of "intelligible freedom,"[3]
in order to relieve the _ens perfectum_ of the responsibility of having
contrived this world as it is, in short, in order to explain evil:
scandalous logic for a philosopher!).
[Footnote 3: See Note on p. 11.]
18.
_The most general sign of modern times_: in his own estimation, man has
lost an infinite amount of _dignity._ For a long time he was the centre
and tragic hero of life in general; then he endeavoured to demonstrate
at least his relationship to the most essential and in itself most
valuable side of life--as all metaphysicians do, who wish to hold fast
to the _dignity of man,_ in their belief that moral values are cardinal
values. He who has let God go, clings all the more strongly to the
belief in morality.
19.
Every purely _moral_ valuation (as, for instance, the Buddhistic)
_terminates in Nihilism_: Europe must expect the same thing! It is
supposed that one can get along with a morality bereft of a religious
background; but in this direction the road to Nihilism is opened. There
is nothing in religion which compels us to regard ourselves as valuing
creatures.
20.
The question which Nihilism puts, namely, "to what purpose?" is the
outcome of a habit, hitherto, to regard the purpose as something fixed,
given and exacted _from outside_--that is to say, by some supernatural
authority. Once the belief in this has been unlearned, the force of an
old habit leads to the search after _another_ authority, which would
_know how to speak unconditionally,_ and could _point to_ goals and
missions. The authority of the _conscience_ now takes the first place
(the more _morality_ is emancipated from theology, the more imperative
does it become) as a compensation for the _personal authority._ Or
the authority of _reason._ Or the _gregarious instinct_ (the herd).
Or history with its _immanent_ spirit, which has its goal in itself,
and to which one can _abandon oneself._ One would like to _evade_ the
_will,_ as also the _willing_ of a goal and the risk of setting oneself
a goal. One would like to get rid of the responsibility (_Fatalism_
would be accepted). Finally: Happiness and with a dash of humbug, the
_happiness of the greatest number._