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THE BOOK OF WAR
The Military Classic of the Far East
Translated from the Chinese by
CAPTAIN E. F. CALTHROP, R.F.A.
London
John Murray, Albemarle St., W.
1908
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 7
THE ARTICLES OF SUNTZU
I. PRELIMINARY RECKONING 17
II. OPERATIONS OF WAR 20
III. THE ATTACK BY STRATAGEM 24
IV. THE ORDER OF BATTLE 28
V. THE SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS 31
VI. EMPTINESS AND STRENGTH 34
VII. BATTLE TACTICS 40
VIII. THE NINE CHANGES 44
IX. MOVEMENT OF TROOPS 47
X. GROUND 53
XI. NINE GROUNDS 58
XII. ASSAULT BY FIRE 67
XIII. THE EMPLOYMENT OF SPIES 70
THE SAYINGS OF WUTZU
INTRODUCTION 75
I. THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY 77
II. ESTIMATION OF THE ENEMY 85
III. CONTROL OF THE ARMY 93
IV. QUALITIES OF THE GENERAL 101
V. SUITING THE OCCASION 108
VI. ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE TROOPS 116
THE BOOK OF WAR
INTRODUCTION
I
Written in the fifth century B.C., Suntzu and Wutzu still remain the
most celebrated works on war in the literature of China. While the
chariot has gone, and weapons have changed, these ancient masters have
held their own, since they deal chiefly with the fundamental principles
of war, with the influence of politics and human nature on military
operations; and they show in a most striking way how unchanging these
principles are.
When these books were written, China was a conglomerate of
principalities in continual ferment. Personal ambition and intrigue,
and not the wishes of the people, were the main factors in these wars.
Patriotism, or a popular cause, could not, therefore, be relied on
to maintain the _moral_ of the levies. Instead of these, what may be
called the force of despair is pointed out as the most powerful agent
in giving cohesion and energy to an army. The general is urged to
take a vigorous offensive; and to act at a distance from his base,
where defeat means disaster, and where desertion is minimised owing to
the distance from home. He should, in fact, burn his boats before an
action, or, in Chinese phrase, act as one who removes the ladder from
under those mounted upon the roof.
On the other hand, every care must be taken not to render the enemy
desperate; and, as an instance of this, Sun observes that an opponent
should on no account be completely surrounded. A loop-hole of escape
weakens the resolution of the general and the energy of his troops.
It is interesting to notice that _moral_, or the spirit of the troops,
is thus considered a determining factor in war. The Chinese are
perhaps unusually affected by climatic conditions. As is well known,
the umbrella was part of a soldier's equipment; and for the same
reasons, the sunny side of high ground is recommended as most suitable
for defence, tactical considerations permitting.
The large number of bannermen in the Chinese army was out of all
proportion to the service of standards in providing rallying points.
The chief use of banners was to maintain the spirit of the troops.
A forest of banners, held erect, gave a feeling of liveliness and
security to the ranks, in the same way as a military band, and when Sun
remarks that the march of an army should be calm like the forest, he is
using a simile that is not inappropriate.
Probably owing to the fact that the profession of arms has never been
highly regarded in China, we find that the ruler of the state did not
usually take the field, but employed a professional to command the
army--one of the masters of war who wandered from state to state at
that time with the secrets of victory to impart to the highest bidder.
The question of political interference with the general in the field
naturally arises under these conditions. The two sages point out, that
to unite the nation under firm and just government is the business of
the ruler and necessary to victory; but that the general is the best
judge of the questions that arise on a distant field, and that all
interference with him causes delay and disaster.
War meaning ravage, it was essential that the operations should be
conducted in the enemy's territory. Once there, however, a vigorous
offensive is no longer advised. "At first behave with the discretion of
a maiden" is the counsel of Sun. The enemy must be induced to take the
initiative, and when he is worn out by marching, or makes a false move,
"then," says the master, "dart in like a rabbit."
Unlike the tactics of the Japanese, in whom the spirit of attack
burns so strongly, those of Suntzu and Wutzu are essentially of
the offensive-defensive order--manoeuvre before fighting, and
non-committal until the enemy has shown his hand. The business of the
general is to avoid encounter in battle until the enemy is no longer
capable of offering a successful resistance.
The masters do not make, however, the mistake of advocating a passive
defensive. Suntzu lays down that the division of the forces which this
strategy involves, is to be everywhere weak, rendering the army liable
to be taken in detail by the concentrated forces of the enemy. It is
rather the defence which avoids battle by mobility and manoeuvre,
induces the enemy by stratagem to divide his forces, or act in
conformity with our wishes, and then falls upon him.
With regard to the tactics of the battlefield, the pitched battle,
or, in other words, the frontal attack, is considered unworthy of the
skilful general. The plan of attack should consist, broadly speaking,
in the division of the army into two forces. The enemy is "attracted
and engaged by one force, and defeated with the other;" and here we
have the containing or secondary attack, and the main or reserve force
which decides the battle of to-day--a most striking instance of the
continuity of military principles.
Considerable space is devoted to the influence of ground on war. The
passage of defiles and rivers is still conducted in the same way. The
many large rivers of China naturally affected military operations; and,
among other axioms, it is laid down that the passage of a river should
not be disputed, as the enemy will probably give up the attempt, and
make the passage untouched at some other point, but that he should
be attacked when half his force is across the stream. Again, an army
should not encamp on a river below the enemy, as it is thereby liable
to be inundated, or to have its water poisoned; or the enemy may come
down stream and make a sudden attack.
While both writers were professional soldiers, they show a fine
disinterestedness by repeatedly pointing out that even successful
war brings evil in its train. Wu remarks that "few are those who have
gained power on earth by many victories," and he is insistent that war
should not be undertaken until a careful comparison of the two sides
shows that victory is certain; and he adds, "The army which conquers
makes certain of victory and then attacks, while the army that is
defeated fights in the hope of success."
Hence the importance they assign to intelligence of the enemy, and to
the spy; and as the sages dealt with war between members of the same
race, the work of spies was greatly facilitated. The spy was treated
with great honour by his countrymen, and the fact that many of the
national heroes of China were spies, shows that the part that they
played was not forgotten. They frequently toiled for years, and rose
to high rank in the enemy's service; and thus, by wrong counsel and by
spreading mistrust in his ranks, they became a two-edged sword in the
hands of the general. "Wonderful, indeed, is their power," exclaims
Sun; but he also reminds us that their management is the most difficult
and delicate duty of the general.
II
Sun and Wu are perhaps held in even greater reverence in Japan than
in China, where war is looked upon as a troublesome phase in national
life, and victory in battle is not considered the greatest achievement
of a state. Far otherwise is it in Japan; and successive generations
of her soldiers have been brought up on Sun and Wu. Like other arts,
mystery was formerly supposed to surround the art of war, a belief that
was encouraged by the strategist; and for a considerable time, the few
copies of this book, that were brought over from China to Japan, were
jealously guarded by their possessors. Later, as they became known, an
army of Japanese commentators arose--for Chinese literature is thought
compressed, to be unfolded in the mind of the reader.
To-day Sun and Wu have given way to the scientific works of European
writers, but their sayings have become proverbs, and their influence
undoubtedly helped the Japanese to victory in the late war. Belief
in the importance of a knowledge of the enemy and his resources, of
preparation and training, had grown out of a long study of these
ancient masters; and since it was the vital importance of a successful
issue to the Japanese which, after all, fired their resolution and
carried them through, they proved the sage's words that it is the
energy, born of despair, that wins the victory.
III
Little is known of the life of either master. They were in no sense
patriots but professional strategists, continually changing their
employer. Chinese history tells a famous story about Sun. A certain
ruler asked Sun to give a practical demonstration of his principles in
the neighbourhood of the palace, and entrusted him with the women of
the court for this purpose. During the operations, the leader of one of
the sides did not obey the master's instructions, and her execution was
ordered. She happened to be the king's favourite wife, but Sun pointed
out that the king's wish that her life should be spared was a case of
political interference with the general in the field; and the sentence
was carried out.
Wu is represented as a person of low moral character. On two separate
occasions, for fear of giving rise to suspicion, he killed one of his
wives who belonged to a state with which his employer at the time was
at war; and, graver still in the eyes of the Chinese historian, he was
not present at the death-bed of his mother.
E. F. C.
NOTE.
The translator is indebted to Major J. C. Somerville for his kind help
and criticism.
THE ARTICLES OF SUNTZU
I
PRELIMINARY RECKONING
The words of Sun the Master:--
To all nations War is a great matter. Upon the army death or life
depend: it is the means of the existence or destruction _of the State_.
Therefore it must be diligently studied.
Now, in war, besides stratagem and the situation, there are five
indispensable matters. The first is called The Way;[1] the second,
Heaven; the third, Earth; the fourth, the Leader; the fifth, Law.
The _Way_ or the proper conduct of man. If the ruling authority be
upright, the people are united: fearless of danger, their lives are at
the service of their Lord.
_Heaven._ Yin and Yang;[2] heat and cold; time and season.
_Earth._ Distance; nature; extent; strategic position.
The _Leader_. Intelligence; truth; benevolence; courage and strictness.
_Law._ Partition and ordering of troops.
These things must be known by the leader: to know them is to conquer;
to know them not is to be defeated.
Further, with regard to these and the following seven matters, the
condition of the enemy must be compared with our own.
The seven matters are:--
The virtue of the prince; the ability of the general; natural
advantages; the discipline of the armies; the strength of the soldiers;
training of the soldiers; justice both in reward and punishment.
Knowing these things, I can foretell the victor.
If a general under me fight according to my plans, he always conquers,
and I continue to employ him; if he differ from my plans, he will be
defeated and dismissed from my service.
Wherefore, with regard to the foregoing, considering that with us
lies the advantage, and the generals agreeing, we create a situation
which promises victory; but as the moment and method cannot be fixed
beforehand, the plan must be modified according to circumstances.
War is a thing of pretence: therefore, when capable of action, we
pretend disability; when near to the enemy, we pretend to be far; when
far away, we pretend to be near.
Allure the enemy by giving him a small advantage. Confuse and capture
him. If there be defects, give an appearance of perfection, and awe the
enemy. Pretend to be strong, and so cause the enemy to avoid you. Make
him angry, and confuse his plans. Pretend to be inferior, and cause him
to despise you. If he have superabundance of strength, tire him out;
if united, make divisions in his camp. Attack weak points, and appear
in unexpected places.
These are the secrets of the successful strategist, therefore they must
not be made known beforehand.
At the reckoning in the Sanctuary before fighting, victory is to the
side that excels _in the foregoing matters_. They that have many of
these will conquer; they that have few will not conquer; hopeless,
indeed, are they that have none.
If the condition of both sides with regard to these matters be known, I
can foretell the victor.
II
OPERATIONS OF WAR
Sun the Master said:--
Now the requirements of war are such that we need a thousand light
chariots with four horses each; a thousand leather-covered chariots,
and one hundred thousand armoured men; and we must send supplies to
distant fields. Wherefore the cost at home and in the field, the
entertainment of guests, glue and lacquer for repairs, and necessities
for the upkeep of waggons and armour are such that in one day a
thousand pieces of gold are spent. With that amount a force of one
hundred thousand men can be raised:--you have the instruments of
victory.
But, even if victorious, let the operations long continue, and the
soldiers' ardour decreases, the weapons become worn, and, if a siege be
undertaken, strength disappears.
Again, if the war last long, the country's means do not suffice.
Then, when the soldiers are worn out, weapons blunted, strength gone
and funds spent, neighbouring princes arise and attack that weakened
country. At such a time the wisest man cannot mend the matter.
For, while quick accomplishment has been known to give the victory to
the unskilful, the skilful general has never gained advantage from
lengthy operations.
In fact, there never has been a country which has benefited from a
prolonged war.
He who does not know the evils of war will not reap advantage thereby.
He who is skilful in war does not make a second levy, does not load his
supply waggons thrice.
War material and arms we obtain from home, but food sufficient for the
army's needs can be taken from the enemy.
The cost of supplying the army in distant fields is the chief drain
on the resources of a state: if the war be distant, the citizens are
impoverished.
In the neighbourhood of an army prices are high, and so the money
of the soldiers and followers is used up. Likewise the state funds
are exhausted, and frequent levies must be made; the strength of the
army is dissipated, money is spent, the citizen's home swept bare: in
all, seven-tenths of his income is forfeited. Again, as regards State
property, chariots are broken, horses worn out, armour and helmet,
arrow and bow, spear, shield, pike and fighting tower, waggon and oxen
used and gone, so that six-tenths of the Government's income is spent.
Therefore the intelligent general strives to feed on the enemy; one
bale of the enemy's rice counts as twenty from our own waggons; one
bundle of the enemy's forage is better than twenty of our own.
Incitement must be given to vanquish the enemy.
They who take advantage of the enemy should be rewarded.
They who are the first to lay their hands on more than ten of the
enemy's chariots should be rewarded; the enemy's standard on the
chariots exchanged for our own; the captured chariots mixed with our
own chariots and taken into use.
The accompanying warriors must be treated well, so that, while the
enemy is beaten, our side increases in strength.
Now the object of war is victory; not lengthy operations, even
skilfully conducted.
The good general is the lord of the people's lives, the guardian of the
country's welfare.
III
THE ATTACK BY STRATAGEM
Sun the Master said:--
Now by the laws of war, better than defeating a country by fire and the
sword, is to take it without strife.
Better to capture the enemy's army intact than to overcome it after
fierce resistance.
Better to capture the "Lu,"[3] the "Tsu" or the "Wu" whole, than to
destroy them in battle.
To fight and conquer one hundred times is not the perfection of
attainment, for the supreme art is to subdue the enemy without fighting.
Wherefore the most skilful warrior outwits the enemy by superior
stratagem; the next in merit prevents the enemy from uniting his
forces; next to him is he who engages the enemy's army; while to
besiege his citadel is the worst expedient.
A siege should not be undertaken if it can possibly be avoided. For,
before a siege can be commenced, three months are required for the
construction of stages, battering-rams and siege engines; then a
further three months are required in front of the citadel, in order to
make the "Chuyin."[4] Wherefore the general is angered, his patience
exhausted, his men surge like ants against the ramparts _before the
time is ripe_, and one-third of them are killed to no purpose. Such are
the misfortunes that sieges entail.
Therefore the master of war causes the enemy's forces to yield, but
without fighting; he captures his fortress, but without besieging
it; and without lengthy fighting takes the enemy's kingdom. Without
tarnishing his weapons he gains the complete advantage.
This is the assault by stratagem.
By the rules of war, if ten times as strong as the enemy, surround him;
with five times his strength, attack; with double his numbers, divide.
If equal in strength, exert to the utmost, and fight; if inferior in
numbers, manoeuvre _and await the opportunity_; if altogether inferior,
offer no chance of battle. A determined stand by inferior numbers does
but lead to their capture.
The warrior is the country's support. If his aid be entire, the country
is of necessity strong; if it be at all deficient, then is the country
weak.
Now a prince may embarrass his army in three ways, namely:--
Ignorant that the army in the field should not advance, to order it to
go forward; or, ignorant that the army should not retreat, order it to
retire.
This is to tie the army as with a string.
Ignorant of military affairs, to rule the armies in the same way as the
state.
This is to perplex the soldiers.
Ignorant of the situation of the army, to settle its dispositions.
This is to fill the soldiers with distrust.
If the army be perplexed and distrustful, then dangers from neighbouring
princes arise. The army is confounded, and offered up to the enemy.
There are five occasions when victory can be foretold:--
When the general knows the time to fight and when not to fight; or
understands when to employ large or small numbers; when government
and people are of one mind; when the state is prepared, and chooses
the enemy's unguarded moment for attack; when the general possesses
ability, and is not interfered with by his prince.
These five things are the heralds of victory.
It has been said aforetime that he who knows both sides has nothing
to fear in a hundred fights; he who is ignorant of the enemy, and
fixes his eyes only on his own side, conquers, and the next time is
defeated; he who not only is ignorant of the enemy, but also of his own
resources, is invariably defeated.
IV
THE ORDER OF BATTLE
Sun the Master said:--
The ancient masters of war first made their armies invincible, then
waited until the adversary could with certainty be defeated.
The causes of defeat come from within; victory is born in the enemy's
camp.
Skilful soldiers make defeat impossible, and further render the enemy
incapable of victory.
But, as it is written, the conditions necessary for victory may be
present, but they cannot always be obtained.
If victory be unattainable, we stand on the defensive; if victory be
sure, we attack.
Deficiency compels defence; super-abundance permits attack.
The skilful in defence crouch, hidden in the deepest shades; the
skilful in attack push to the topmost heaven.[5]
If these precepts be observed, victory is certain.
A victory, even if popularly proclaimed as such by the common folk, may
not be a true success. To win in fight, and for the kingdom to say,
"Well done," does not mark the summit of attainment. To lift an autumn
fleece[6] is no proof of strength; the eyes that only see the sun and
moon are not the eagle's; to hear the thunder is no great thing.
As has been said aforetime, the able warrior gains the victory without
desperate and bloody engagements, and wins thereby no reputation for
wisdom or brave deeds. To fight is to win, for he attacks only when the
enemy has sown the seeds of defeat.
Moreover, the skilful soldier in a secure position does not let pass
the moment when the enemy should be attacked.
The army that conquers makes certain of victory, and then seeks battle.
The army destined to defeat, fights, trusting that chance may bring
success to its arms.
The skilful leader is steadfast in the "Way"; upholds the Law, and
thereby controls the issue.
Touching the laws of war, it is said: first, the rule; second, the
measure; third, the tables; fourth, the scales; fifth, the foretelling
of victory.
For the rule is the survey of land; the measure tells the amount of
that land's produce; the tables its population; from the scales their
weight or quality is made known; and then can we calculate victory or
defeat.
The army that conquers as against the army destined to defeat, is as a
beam against a feather in the scales. The attack of conquering forces
is as the outburst of long-pent-up waters into sunken valleys.
Such are the orders of battle.
V
THE SPIRIT OF THE TROOPS
Sun the Master said:--
The control of large numbers is possible, and like unto that of small
numbers, if we subdivide them.
By means of drum, bell and flag,[7] the direction of large forces in
battle is possible, and like unto the direction of small forces.
By the skilful interchange of normal and abnormal manoeuvres are the
armies certainly preserved from defeat.
The enemy is crushed, like the fall of a grindstone upon an egg, by
knowledge of his strength and weakness, and by the employment of truth
and artifice.
Moreover, in battle the enemy is engaged with the normal and defeated
by the abnormal force.[8]
The abnormal force, skilfully handled, is like the heaven and earth,
eternal; as the tides and the flow of rivers, unceasing; like the sun
and moon, for ever interchanging; coming and passing, as the seasons.
There are five notes; but by combinations, innumerable harmonies are
produced. There are but five colours; but if we mix them, the shades
are infinite. There are five tastes, but if we mix them there are more
flavours than the palate can distinguish.[9]
In war there are but two forces, the normal and the abnormal; but they
are capable of infinite variation. Their mutual interchange is like a
wheel, having neither beginning or end. They are a mystery that none
can penetrate.
As the rush of rock-shouldering torrents, so is the spirit of the
troops.
Like the well-judged flight of the falcon, in a flash crushing its
quarry, so should the stroke be timed.
Wherefore the spirit of the good fighter is terrifying, his occasions
sudden; like the stretched cross-bow, whose string is released at the
touch of the trigger.
In the maze and tumult of the battle, there is no confusion; in the
thick of action the battle array is impenetrable.
If discipline be perfect, disorder can be simulated; if truly bold, we
can feign fear; if really strong, we can feign weakness.
We simulate disorder by subdivision; fear, by spirit; weakness, by
battle formation.
We set the enemy in motion by adopting different formations to which he
must conform.
If we offer the enemy a point of advantage, he will certainly take it:
we give him an advantage, set him in motion and then fall upon him.
Wherefore the good fighter seeks victory from spirit, and does not
depend entirely upon the skill of his men. He is careful in his choice,
and leaves the rest to battle force; yet, when an opening or advantage
shows, he pushes it to its limits.
As a log or rock which, motionless on flat ground, yet moves with
ever-increasing force when set on an incline, so await the opportunity,
and so act when the opportunity arrives.
If the general be skilful, the spirit of his troops is as the impetus
of a round stone rolled from the top of a high mountain.
VI
EMPTINESS AND STRENGTH
Sun the Master said:--
To be the first in the field, and there to await the enemy, is to
husband strength.
To be late, and hurrying to advance to meet the foe, is exhausting.
The good fighter contrives to make the enemy approach; he does not
allow himself to be beguiled by the enemy.
By offering an apparent advantage, he induces the enemy to take up a
position that will cause his defeat; he plants obstructions to dissuade
him from acting in such a way as to threaten his own dispositions.
If the enemy be at rest in comfortable quarters, harass him; if he be
living in plenty, cut off his supplies; if sitting composedly awaiting
attack, cause him to move.
This may be done by appearing where the enemy is not, and assaulting
unexpected points.
If we go where the enemy is not, we may go a thousand leagues without
exhaustion.
If we attack those positions which the enemy has not defended, we
invariably take them: but on the defence we must be strong, even where
we are not likely to be attacked.
Against those skilful in attack, the enemy does not know where to
defend: against those skilful in defence, the enemy does not know where
to attack.
Now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be easily apprehended,
as a certain shape or noise can be understood, of the senses; but when
these secrets are once learnt, the enemy is mastered.
We attack, and the enemy cannot resist, because we attack his
insufficiency; we retire, and the enemy cannot pursue, because we
retire too quickly.
Again, when we are anxious to fight, but the enemy is serenely secure
behind high walls and deep moats; we attack some such other place that
he must certainly come out to relieve.
When we do not want to fight, we occupy an unfortified line; and
prevent the enemy from attacking by keeping him in suspense.
By making feints, and causing the enemy to be uncertain as to our
movements, we unite, whilst he must divide.
We become one body; the enemy being separated into ten parts. We
attack the divided ten with the united one. We are many, the enemy is
few, and in superiority of numbers there is economy of strength.
The place selected for attack must be kept secret. If the enemy know
not where he will be attacked, he must prepare in every quarter, and so
be everywhere weak.
If the enemy strengthen his front, he must weaken his rear; if he
strengthen his right, his left is weakened; and if he strengthen his
left, his right is weakened.
Everywhere to make preparations, is to be everywhere weak. The enemy is
weakened by his extended preparations, and we gain in strength.
Having decided on the place and day of attack, though the enemy be a
hundred leagues away, we can defeat him.
If the ground and occasion be not known, the front cannot help the
rear; the left cannot support the right, nor the right the left, nor
the rear the front. For on occasion, the parts of the army are two
score leagues apart, while a distance of four or five leagues is
comparatively close.
The soldiers of Wu[10] are less than the soldiers of Yueh; but as
superiority in numbers does not of necessity bring victory, I say,
then, that we may obtain the victory.
If the enemy be many in number, prevent him from taking advantage of
his superiority, and ascertain his plan of operations. Provoke the
enemy and discover the state of his troops; feint and discover the
strength of his position. Flap the wings, and unmask his sufficiency or
insufficiency. By constant feints and excursions, we may produce on the
enemy an impression of intangibility, which neither spies nor art can
dispel.
The general makes his plans in accordance with the dispositions of
the enemy, and puts his hosts in motion; but the multitude cannot
appreciate the general's intention; they see the signs of victory, but
they cannot discover the means.
If a victory be gained by a certain stratagem, do not repeat it. Vary
the stratagem according to circumstances.
An army may be likened to water.
Water leaves dry the high places, and seeks the hollows. An army turns
from strength and attacks emptiness.
The flow of water is regulated by the shape of the ground; victory is
gained by acting in accordance with the state of the enemy.
The shape of water is indeterminate; likewise the spirit of war is not
fixed.
The leader who changes his tactics in accordance with his adversary,
and thereby controls the issue, may be called the God of war.
Among the five elements[11] there is no settled precedence; the four
seasons come and go; the days are long and short; and the moon waxes
and wanes. _So in war there is no fixity._
VII
BATTLE TACTICS
Sun the Master said:--
For the most part, military procedure is as follows:--
The general receives orders from his lord; assembles and settles
harmony among the forces, and takes the field.
There is nothing more difficult than Battle Tactics. Their difficulty
lies in the calculation of time and distance, and the reversal of
misfortune.
To make the enemy take a circuitous route by a show of gain, and then,
whilst starting after him, to arrive before him, is to be a master of
the art of manoeuvre.
The operations of an army may reap advantage; the wrangles of a
multitude are fraught with peril.
Employing our whole force at one time in order to gain advantage over
the enemy, we may not have time enough to gain our object. If we push
on with a portion of the force only, the transport is lost. Discarding
helmet and armour; stopping neither day nor night; marching double
distance; doing double work; and finally contending with the enemy at
a distance of a hundred leagues: results in the loss of the general.
Since the strong men arrive first, and the tired drop in rear, only
one-tenth of the forces is available.
A forced march of fifty leagues to secure an advantage may result in
failure to the leader of the vanguard, for only half his men will
arrive.
After a forced march of thirty leagues to secure an advantage, only
two-thirds of the army will be available.
Further, a lack of ammunition, of supplies, or of stores, may lead to
disaster.
The ruler who is ignorant of the designs of neighbouring princes,
cannot treat with them.
He who is ignorant of mountain and forest, defile and marsh, cannot
lead an army.
He who does not employ a guide, cannot gain advantage from the ground.
Disguise your movements; await a favourable opportunity; divide or
unite according to circumstance.
Let your attack be swift as the wind; your march calm like the
forest;[12] your occupation devastating as fire. In defence, as a
mountain rest firm; like darkness impenetrable to the enemy. Let your
movements be swift as the lightning.
Let as many as possible take part in the plunder: distribute the profit
from the captured territory.
So he who understands the crooked and the straight way conquers.
These are the methods of Battle Tactics.
According to the ancient books on war, the drum and bell are used,
because the voice does not carry; the flag is used to assist the
sight. The use of bell, drum, banner and flag is to attract the united
attention of eye and ear.
When all are united, the strong are not left to go forward alone,
the cowardly are not free to retreat unrestricted. In this way can a
multitude be used.
Therefore in night fighting, beacons and drums are largely used; in day
fighting, a great number of banners and flags and the enemy's eyes and
ears are confounded.
We thus awe his army, and defeat his general's ambition.
In the morning the spirits are keen; at midday there is a laziness; in
the evening a desire to return. Wherefore, he who uses his soldiers
well, avoids the time when the spirits are keen; but attacks the enemy
when he is languid or seeking his camp.
Thus should the nature of energy be turned to account.
To oppose confusion with order, clamour with quiet, is to have the
heart under control.
To await an enemy from a distance, to oppose hunger with satiety, rest
with fatigue, is the way to husband strength.
Do not attack where lines of banners wave, nor the serried ranks of
battle spread, but patiently await your time.
Do not attack an enemy on high ground, nor one who has high ground at
his back. Do not pursue an enemy who is imitating flight; do not attack
a spirited enemy.
If the enemy offer an allurement, do not take it.
Do not interfere with an enemy who has struck camp, and is about to
retire. When surrounding an enemy, allow him an outlet. Do not press a
desperate enemy.
These are the methods of employing troops.
VIII
THE NINE CHANGES
Sun the Master said:--
In general, the procedure of war is:--the Leader, having received
orders from his lord, assembles the armies.
Do not camp on marshy or low-lying ground; enter into friendly
relations with neighbouring states; do not linger in a far country;
use stratagem in mountainous and wooded country; on death ground, fight.
There are always roads that must be avoided; forces that must not be
attacked; castles that must not be besieged; ground that must not be
chosen for encounter; orders from the lord that must not be obeyed.
The general who knows the Nine Changes understands the use of troops;
on the contrary, he who does not understand them, can make no use of
his topographical knowledge.
In the management of armies, if the art of the Nine Changes be
understood, a knowledge of the Five Advantages is of no avail.
The wise man considers well both advantage and disadvantage. He sees a
way out of adversity, and on the day of victory to danger is not blind.
In reducing an enemy to submission, inflict all possible damage upon
him; make him undertake useless adventures; also make neighbouring
rulers move as you would desire them by tempting them with gain.
Wherefore in the conduct of war do not depend on the enemy's not
coming, but rely on your own preparations; do not count on the enemy
not attacking your fortress, but leave nothing undefended.
Generals must be on their guard against these five dangerous faults:--
Blind impetuosity, which leads to death.
Over-cautiousness, which leads to capture.
Quick temper, which brings insult.
A too rigid propriety, which invites disgrace.
Over-regard for the troops, which causes inconvenience.
These five faults in the leader are disastrous in war. The overthrow of
the army and the slaughter of the general arise from them. Therefore
they must be carefully considered.
IX
MOVEMENT OF TROOPS
Sun the Master said:--
Touching the disposal of troops and observation of the enemy in
relation to mountain warfare:--
Cross mountains and camp in valleys, selecting positions of safety.
Place the army on high ground, and avoid an enemy in high places.
In relation to water:--
After crossing waters, pass on immediately to a distance. When the
enemy is crossing a stream, do not meet and engage him in the waters,
but strike when half his force has passed over. Do not advance on an
enemy near water, but place the army on high ground, and in safety.
Do not fight when the enemy is between the army and the source of the
river.
With regard to marshes:--
Cross salty marshes quickly; do not linger near them.
If by chance compelled to fight in the neighbourhood of a marsh, seek a
place where there is water and grass, and trees in plenty in the rear.
In open country place the army in a convenient place with rising ground
in the right rear; so that while in front lies death, behind there is
safety.
Such is war in flat country.
Huangti, by observing these things, gained the victory over four
Princes.
As a rule, the soldiers prefer high ground to low. They prefer sunny
places to those the sun does not reach.
If the health of the troops be considered, and they are encamped on
high and sunny ground, diseases will be avoided, and victory made
certain.
If there be rising ground, encamp on its sunny side and in front of
it; for thereby the soldiers are benefited, and the ground used to our
advantage.
If, owing to rains in the upper reaches, the river become turbulent, do
not cross until the waters have quieted.
Steep and impassable valleys; well-like places; confined places;
tangled impenetrable ground; swamps and bogs; narrow passages with
pitfalls:--quickly pass from these, and approach them not. Cause the
enemy to approach near to them, but keep yourself from these places;
face them, so that the enemy has them in his rear.
If there be near to the army, precipices, ponds, meres, reeds and
rushes, or thick forests and trees, search them thoroughly. These are
places where the enemy is likely to be in ambush.
When the enemy is close, but quiet, he is strong in reliance on natural
defences.
If the enemy challenge to fight from afar, he wishes you to advance.
If the enemy be encamped in open country, it is with some special
object in view.
Movement among the trees shows that the enemy is advancing. Broken
branches and trodden grass, as of the passing of a large host, must be
regarded with suspicion.
The rising of birds shows an ambush.
Startled beasts show that the enemy is stealthily approaching from
several sides.
High, straight spurts of dust betoken that chariots are coming.
Long, low masses of dust show the coming of infantry.
Here and there, thin and high columns of dust are signs that firewood
and fodder are being collected.
Small clouds of dust moving to and fro are signs that the enemy is
preparing to encamp for a short time.
Busy preparations and smooth words show that the enemy is about to
advance to attack.
Big words, and the spurring forward of horsemen, are signs that the
enemy is about to retire.
An advance of the light chariots to the flanks of the camp is a sign
that the enemy is coming forth to fight.
Without consultation, suddenly to desire an armistice, is a mark of
ulterior design.
The passing to and fro of messengers, and the forming up of troops,
show that the enemy has some movement on foot.
An advance, followed by sudden retirement, is a lure to attack.
When the enemy use their weapons to rest upon, they are hungry.
If the drawers of water drink at the river, the enemy is suffering from
thirst.
Disregard of booty that lies ready at hand is a sign of exhaustion.
The clustering of birds round a position shows that it is unoccupied.
Voices calling in the night betoken alarm.
Disorder in the army is a sign that the general is disregarded.
A changing about of flags and banners is a sign that the army is
unsettled.
If the officers be angry, it is because the soldiers are tired, _and
slow to obey_.
The killing of horses for food shows that the enemy is short of
provisions.
When the cooking-pots are hung up on the wall and the soldiers turn
not in again, the enemy is at an end of his resources.
Exceeding graciousness and familiarity on the part of the general show
that he has lost the confidence of the soldiers.
Frequent rewards show that discipline is at an end.
Frequent punishments are a sign that the general is in difficulties.
The general who first blusters, and then is obsequious, is without
perception.
He who offers apologies and hostages is anxious for a truce.
When both sides, eager for a fight, face each other for a considerable
time, neither advancing nor retiring, the occasion requires the utmost
vigilance and circumspection.
Numbers are no certain mark of strength.
Even if incapable of a headlong assault, if the forces be united, and
the enemy's condition ascertained, victory is possible.
He who without taking thought makes light of the enemy is certain to be
captured.
If a general who is strange to the troops punish them, they cease to
obey him. If they are not obedient, they cannot be usefully employed.
If the troops know the general, but are not affected by his punishments,
they are useless.
By humane treatment we obtain obedience; authority brings uniformity.
Thus we obtain victory.
If the people have been trained in obedience from the beginning, they
respect their leader's commands.
If the people be not early trained to obedience, they do not respect
their leader's commands.
Orders are always obeyed, if general and soldiers are in sympathy.
X
GROUND
Sun the Master said:--
With regard to the different natures of ground there are:--
Open ground; broken ground; suspended ground; defiles; precipices; far
countries.
Open ground is that where either side has liberty of movement: be
quick to occupy any high ground in the neighbourhood and consider well
the line of supplies.
Broken ground. Advance is easy, but retreat from it is difficult. Here,
if the enemy be not prepared, we may win: but should he be prepared,
and defeat us, and retreat be impossible, then there is disaster.
Suspended ground. The side that takes the initiative is under a
disadvantage. Here, if the enemy offer some allurement, we should not
advance: but rather, by feigning retreat, wait until he has put forth
half his force. Then we may attack him with advantage.
Defiles, make haste to occupy; garrison strongly and await the enemy.
Should the enemy be before you, and in strength, do not engage him; but
if there be unoccupied points, attack him.
In precipitous ground quickly occupy a position on a sunny height, and
await the enemy. If the enemy be before you, withdraw and do not attack
him.
If distant from the enemy, and the forces be equal, to take the
initiative is disadvantageous.
Now, these are the six kinds of ground. It is the duty of generals to
study them.
Again, there are six calamities among the troops, arising, not from
defect of ground, or lack of opportunity, but from the general's
incapacity.
These are: repulse, relaxation, distress, disorganisation, confusion
and rout.
If troops be sent to attack an enemy of equal quality, but ten times
their number, they retire discomfited.
Strong soldiers with weak officers cause relaxation.
Able officers with feeble soldiers cause distress.
Enraged senior officers, who fall upon the enemy without orders, and
obey not the general because he does not recognise their abilities,
produce disorganisation.
Weak and amiable generals, whose directions and leadership are vague,
whose officers' and men's duties are not fixed, and whose dispositions
are contradictory, produce confusion.
Generals, who are unable to estimate the enemy, who oppose small
numbers to large, weakness to strength, and who do not put picked men
in the van of the army, cause it to be routed.
These six things lead to defeat. It is the duty of the general to study
them carefully.
Ground is the handmaid of victory.
Ability to estimate the enemy, and plan the victory; an eye for
steepness, command and distances: these are the qualities of the good
general.
Whosoever knows these things, conquers; he who understands them not, is
defeated.
If victory be certain from the military standpoint, fight, even if the
lord forbid.
If defeat be certain from the military standpoint, do not fight, even
though the lord commands it.
The general who advances, from no thought of his own glory, or retires,
regardless of punishment; but only strives for the people's welfare,
and his lord's advantage, is a treasure to the state.
The good general cares for his soldiers, and lovingly treats them as
his children; as a consequence they follow him through deep valleys,
and are beside him in death.
Nevertheless, over-care for the soldiers may cause disobedience;
over-attention may make them unserviceable; over-indulgence may produce
disorder: they become like spoilt children, and cannot be used.
He who is confident of his own men, but is ignorant that the enemy
should not be attacked, has no certainty of victory.
He who knows that the enemy may be attacked with advantage, but knows
not his own men, has no certainty of victory.
Confidence in the troops, right judgment when to attack the enemy, but
ignorance of the ground, bring uncertain victory.
The wise soldier, once in motion, does not waver, and is never at a
loss.
As has been said: "Know thyself; know the enemy; fear not for victory."
Also, if the season and the opportunity be realised, and the ground
known, complete victory is certain.
XI
THE NINE GROUNDS
Sun the Master said:--
In respect to the conduct of war there are:--
Distracting ground; disturbing ground; ground of contention;
intersecting ground; path-ridden ground; deeply-involved ground;
difficult ground; enclosed ground; death ground.
At all times, when the prince fights in his own territory, it is called
distracting[13] ground.
That ground a short way inside the enemy's border is called disturbing
ground.
Ground giving advantage to whichever side is in possession, is called
ground of contention.
Ground to which either side has access, is called intersecting ground.
Ground between three provinces first possession of which enables the
peoples of the earth to be controlled, is called path-ridden ground.
The interior of the enemy's country with many of his fortified towns in
rear, is called deeply-involved ground.
Mountain and forest, precipices, ravines, marsh and swamp, all places
where passage is hard, are called difficult ground.
A narrow entrance and winding outlet, where a small number can oppose a
large force, is called enclosed ground.
That ground where delay means disaster, is called death ground.
Wherefore, do not fight on distracting ground; do not linger on
disturbing ground.
If the enemy be in possession of disputed ground, do not attack.
In intersecting ground, do not interrupt the highways.
At the crossing of highways, cultivate intercourse.
When deeply involved, levy and store up the enemy's property.
Quickly depart from difficult ground.
On enclosed ground, use stratagem.
On death ground, fight.
The skilful fighters of old were at pains to disconnect the enemy's
front and rear; they cut asunder small and large forces of the enemy;
prevented mutual help between his officers and men; spread mistrust
between high and low. They scattered the enemy, and prevented him from
concentrating; if his soldiers were assembled, they were without unity.
If there be a chance of victory, move; if there be no chance of
success, stand fast.
If I were asked how a powerful and united force of the enemy should be
met, I would say: lay hands on what the enemy cherishes and he will
conform to our desires.
In war, above all, speed sustains the spirit of the troops. Strike
before the enemy is ready; and attack his unpreparedness from an
unexpected quarter.
With regard to war in foreign lands. When strangers in a far country
the soldiers are united and are proof against defeat. Plunder fertile
plains so that the army is fed; be careful of the health of the
soldiers; do not tire them uselessly; unite their minds; store up
strength; plan well and secretly. If there be no refuge the soldiers
will not fly from death.
If there be no alternative but death, the soldiers exert themselves to
the utmost.
In desperate places, soldiers lose the sense of fear.
If there be no place of refuge, there will be no wavering.
If deeply involved in the enemy's country, there is unity.
If it be unavoidable, the soldiers will fight their hardest. Even
without warnings they are vigilant; they comply without insistence;
without stipulations they are tractable; without explicit instructions
they will trust the general and obey him.
Prohibit the discussion of signs and omens, and remove the soldiers'
doubts; then to the moment of death they will be undistracted.
Riches are denied the soldiers, not because money is a bad thing; old
age is forbidden them, but not because long life is evil. Hardships
and danger are the proper lot of the soldier.