Lord Beaconsfield called the English an enthusiastic people, and there
is some danger that we may hastily infer that if our fit of enthusiasm
for new schemes of Imperial Federation be not at once caught up by the
colonies, a permanent union with them is impossible. It must be “either
a closer union or disintegration,” say some. But let us not be too
hasty in assuming that sudden developments are necessary.
If Mr. Goschen will allow us to say so, “after all” it is no bad
thing that the Federation League should have been formed, although
it may produce just now more “fads” than federation. The formation
of the Society shows that men’s minds are alive to the value of the
colonies. It is to be hoped that there will be less said of drawing
“the bonds between us and our children closer,” and more of confirming
their position where satisfactory, and of securing their commercial
aims. The position of a listening and helpful friend should be ours,
rather than that of a dictatorial parent. Where colonists have spoken
of federation, they have often meant reciprocity in trade. Where
Englishmen have spoken of it, they have often meant only colonial
contribution to common defence. Our long-established trade has taught
us that defence means defence of trade-interests, wherever they lead.
Our sons’ minds have been more set on creating industries at home,
and they have hardly begun to think of wars which come from opening
new markets. Although the different lines of thought lead to the same
conclusion, namely, organised union for common interests, we may be
somewhat premature in laying down plans for Imperial co-operation. They
who have as yet spoken of these plans are, for the most part, British
politicians. It is, however, significant that the Prime Minister of
Canada was present at a meeting of the “Imperial Federation League,”
and gave a general promise of Canadian aid in any “wars of defence.”
It remains to be seen how far Canada would be willing to impose a
permanent charge on her Treasury for other than home defence. As yet
she has had too much to do in developing public works to attain to
more than the maintenance, in a poorly organised and badly officered
condition, of a force of about 20,000, out of a nominal roll of 40,000
militia, whose fine physique and great individual intelligence make
them worth a great deal more than their small numbers imply. She has
shown that she looks to England to do armed marine duty for her,
and she is not desirous to garrison her one important fortress near
her Atlantic coaling stations—namely, Halifax. But she is showing
her knowledge of her inadequate military condition, and is training
officers and is voting larger sums for the annual drilling of the
militia. Her population, expanding over vast surfaces, is being
strengthened both for civil and military cohesion by a thorough railway
system; but she will need all the consciousness her best men have, that
defence means preparation and organisation, if she wishes to inspire
respect for her ever-increasing and ever more vulnerable possessions.
One of her statesmen, formerly her High Commissioner to England, has
suggested that a tonnage duty, levied on all ships sailing under the
British flag, be devoted to fortification of coaling stations. It is to
be feared that the shipowning provinces of the Dominion would object to
this excellent proposal, although it might meet with the approval of
those who are less directly interested in marine property, and would be
an indirect tax which might commend itself to inland provinces and to
some of the Australian colonies.
If Canada, then, has but recently shown striking aptitude to realise
the conditions necessary for adequate defence, how does it stand with
Australia and the Cape? The Cape Government’s past attitude may be
described in few words: “Be always taking what you can, and seeking how
you can get more; our contribution towards necessary expenses being
one corps of Rangers.” With Australia it is different. She has shown
a natural desire to prevent her neighborhood from being garrisoned by
convicts or the forces of warlike States, and she has been quite ready
to pay handsomely for any English assistance she requires. Some of her
colonies have exhibited a most spirited desire to share the expenses of
maritime as well as land defence, and have even offered their vessels
for offensive operations. The excitement attending the outbreak of
war, with the sympathy for the mother-country, may be depended on to
produce offers of assistance whenever England needs them. It is the
permanent contribution for a common policy in the piping times of peace
which presents more difficulty. Her division into several colonies,
often showing a good deal of jealousy of one another, has prevented
any combined scheme of national defence; but she, like Canada, may be
relied upon to slowly improve her opportunities. The spirit is willing,
but the stress is weak. She has not known the pinch of danger. Until
a Customs Union exists throughout her continent, and railways bind
her together, she will not be able to do justice to the patriotism so
conspicuous among her people, or take the place due to herself in the
Imperial union of States.
There is always a minority among all English-speaking peoples who deem
military expenditure so much waste, a mere thing of vanity, of fuss
and feathers. There is in the colonies a certain minority who, as with
us, deem patriotism to mean anxiety for the welfare of those only who
may for the time have identical ideas as to trade, or who may reside
within easy distance of certain centres, geographical or manufacturing.
Their ideas are not to be left out of account, for they embody one of
the most powerful of human sentiments—namely, the imagination (for it
is not the reality) of immediate interest. It is important to show
such parties that anything proposed to be done is devised not only
for Australian, or Canadian, or British purposes, but for mutual and
general good. We adopt free trade because we think it suits us. The
colonies have no direct taxes, and have a high revenue tariff because
they think such arrangements suit them. It does not follow that we
need not care for them because they are not free traders. In giving us
more favored treatment than they give to foreigners, and in taking far
more of our goods than they take of foreign goods, they yield to us
more than we yield to them, for we treat them and foreigners equally.
Our gain from their affections and trade connection far outweighs
the cost of the navy we keep to protect the ships which carry the
commerce. But in asking them to look to their own defence we exercise
a legitimate moral influence, which is not for British interests only,
but for theirs also. We must not ask too much or more than their
legislatures will freely sanction. There has been no sign as yet that
Colonial Parliaments desire to shirk the legitimate expenses of common
defence. They have much to do with their money, but will listen to any
reasonable representation for the general weal. It is probable that
maritime war, except as regards shore-torpedoes, can be best and most
cheaply undertaken by the British Navy, while it may be reasonable to
ask the colony requiring the service of the ships for any special duty
affecting their coasts to contribute to the expense of maintenance
during the time they are so engaged. War is becoming a common danger
for all parts of the empire. It is so in a greater degree, the more
the colonies develop, and possess, or are connected with, great areas
around the original settlements. Any hostile force would in the Pacific
attack at once the Australasian cities and the valuable coaling
stations of Vancouver, thus injuring at once Australia and Canada. It
is the same in case of war with Russia. These colonies have, therefore,
a right to have their wishes consulted, to be informed of all that is
passing that may lead to war, and in case of the non-observance of that
consideration which should be shown by the Imperial Executive, would
acquire a right to refuse supplies and declare neutrality. The only way
to reduce the danger of temptation to such action is to admit them
in some form into Imperial Councils. It should not be possible that a
Secretary of State can settle payment to America for alleged outrages
by New England fishermen, without consulting Canada and Newfoundland,
and then expect these colonies to pay the damage assessed without their
knowledge. It should not be possible for Downing Street to negotiate
with France about the abrogation of her fishing rights in Newfoundland,
without informing Canada of what is contemplated. It should not be
possible for British Ministers to propose that France be given islands
in the Pacific in lieu of rights in Newfoundland, without consulting
Australia. If we take powers of attorney, it should be by express
commission.
In commercial matters we have ceased to assume the power of attorney.
It is a mark of the great change which has been wrought by the growth
of our so-called dependencies that Lord Grey, who twenty years ago
specially claimed for the mother-country the right of directing the
fiscal policy of the colonies, should be the first to propose the
immediate adoption of the suggestion, made at the Colonial Institute in
1884, to have a “council of envoys.” The Board of Advice he proposes is
nothing else. It would be a Committee of Privy Council holding regular
meetings, and able to advise, check, and direct the Secretary of State.
It would advise the consummation of different commercial bargains
made for the advantage of different parts of the Empire with foreign
nations. Made under the auspices of England, these would always give
to England the most favored nation treatment. But they would not be
made on England’s basis of free trade, and hence the dislike of some
among us to the proposal. The council or board would further agree
how best to defend the interests created by such treaties. It cannot
be too strongly stated that the making of such separate treaties is
no new thing. Since the appointment by Canada of a High Commissioner
to represent her in England, she has had the fullest latitude given
to her to send her envoy to make separate bargains with Spain and
France, the English ambassador acting as introducer and coadjutor
in the negotiations undertaken by the Canadian. This was a great and
new departure at the time, but it marked a recognition by England of
actual facts, which will grow clearer and clearer to the eyes of all
men every year. The situation of our Empire is an entirely new one.
Nothing like it has ever existed since the world began. There is no
precedent for it. Our union with our sons must be strengthened, not by
tying them to our commercial programme, but by helping them to realise
that which they desire to adopt. The partners in the Imperial firm
must pursue each his own line to benefit himself, and so raise the
reputation of the partnership as being composed of men of wealth and
enterprise. In affairs affecting the standing and credit of the whole
number, or of several, they may meet the senior in consultation, and,
as each represents important property, a new policy is not likely to
be adopted lightly, nor will any project calculated to enhance profits
lack good backing. The statesmen in Canada, who have been in office
since this new departure has been fully inaugurated, are perfectly
satisfied with the position of their country in this most important
of all matters. The leader of the Opposition, before he knew of this
freedom given to the Canadian envoy, spoke of his countrymen as “the
subjects of subjects,” for that was indeed the position in which the
old British policy placed them, and it was one which could not survive
an increase in their own power. “We want,” said Sir John MacDonald last
month at Montreal—“we want no independence in this country, except the
independence that we have at this moment. What country in the world is
more independent than we are? We have perfect independence; we have
a Sovereign who allows us to do as we please. We have an Imperial
Government that casts on ourselves the responsibilities as well as
the privileges of self-government. We may govern ourselves as we
please; we may misgovern ourselves as we please. We put a tax on the
industries of our fellow subjects in England, Ireland, and Scotland.
If we are attacked, if our shores are assailed, the mighty powers
of England on land and sea are used in our defence.” And under this
so-called “protection” government the tariff against English goods is
one-half less than that imposed against us by the Americans; and the
merchandise bought from us is immense in quantity, Australia taking
even more proportionately than does Canada. Australia, probably owing
to the want of a common tariff, has not as yet shown a wish to have her
representatives put on the same footing as that secured, by Canada’s
desire, to her envoy. The Sydney Convention, indeed, rather gave the
Agents General to understand that they were not sent in any way as
quasi-ambassadors. This alone shows the unreadiness to undertake common
action and to push common interests, for there is no strong central
government having any definite will and policy which it is necessary
to have explained and illustrated and pushed by personal conference
and contact with the Home authority in Downing Street. I fear that the
Cobden Club have more tribulation in store, for it is highly probable
that all Australia will have a common high revenue tariff. Then will
come, as has already come in British North America, the desire to push
a national commercial policy in alliance with England.
The work, then, of any friends of Imperial Union should be first to
ascertain the desires of the colonists. If any special scheme be
thought good here, it should be submitted to the colonial governments
by the Association before it is pressed on the public for acceptance.
We can form, as it has been suggested, a vigilance committee in
Parliament at home to take cognisance of anything affecting the
colonies, and this we can do without consulting anybody but the men
who may desire to serve. But it is difficult to believe that any
Australian or other administration can have been consulted and can have
given a favorable reply to such proposals as the following, namely:—1.
The proportional representation in one unwieldy Parliament of the
colonies. The House of Commons has too much to do now, and hardly
attends to Indian affairs. It is not to be imagined that colonial
M.P.’s would like to be constantly out-voted by a British majority,
nor is it conceivable that, when the colonial population is larger
than ours, England would submit to be out-voted by the colonies. Mere
difficulties of personal attendance would make the scheme hard of
execution, and its unpopularity makes it impossible.
2. Nomination to the House of Lords of prominent politicians from
distant parts of the Empire. It may be sufficient to ask what
politician, having good influence in his native Parliament, would leave
it to sit in a House which has little weight even in England, and less
in deciding Imperial issues? And if any man chose a seat in the House
of Peers in preference to a place in his own Parliament, how could he
be considered a representative of the Government in power in his own
country? If he be not that, he would have no right to speak in the
name of his own country, nor could his vote bind her action. If not a
prominent man, his acceptance of such a nomination would only excite
ridicule. Who would be a Viscount Wagga-Wagga or Marquis of Massa
Wippi? A man elected to sit in the present House of Lords would only be
one voter in an assembly of several hundred, and would have no special
weight.
3. Conference of Trades Unions. This would be useful as indicating
where the unemployed or well-provided emigrants had best direct their
steps. It may be safely assumed that the workmen of towns where high
wages may be had would not invite others to come and thus depress the
standard of the remuneration earned by labor.
4. A council like that of the German “Reich.” This would be more
easily accepted than the sending of a contingent to either House of
Parliament, but it has not been discussed.
Other suggestions might be mentioned which all partake too much of
the fault of looking at Federation as a means of making more powerful
the British vote in a general union, and in not being endorsed by
colonial voices. We should make vocal their desires rather than press
upon them our own. The idea of a Board of Advice, composed of their
representatives, has the merit of giving them opportunity of speech
and of knowledge. It would not “draw closer the bonds” so much as
prevent any strain on those which exist. Do not let us do anything
“behind the backs” of those whom our action in their behalf may touch,
however indirectly. Let no Minister in a colonial Parliament be
able to say, “We are threatened with this or that in consequence of
Imperial action; but it was not until the danger had been incurred
that we knew there was any likelihood that it would arise.” We need
have no misgiving that the colonies would be unreasonable in their
fears, or averse to incur the danger if fully informed, any more than
we apprehend from an English House of Commons repudiation of the
responsibility of the Executive charged with the responsibility of
war or peace. But the danger of repudiation becomes less, the more
those affected by the determination are taken into confidence. The
revival in some form of a Committee of the Privy Council, to advise
“on trade and the plantations,” would be the most certain method of
giving for the present knowledge and voice to the combined colonial
representatives. If the colonial Governments do not care for this,
the “question falls” for the time, and we may patiently await the
demand, taking care in the meantime to fully inform each individual
representative of our rising “auxiliary kingdoms” of what is passing,
and granting them free access to all persons and papers they desire to
see, if these may be shown to Parliament. It has been objected that
delay would be caused by any council. If the council be small, this is
not likely, because telegraphic communication makes Australia as near
to the Colonial Office as is Victoria Street. The time, if there be any
delay, may be well spent in avoiding future misunderstanding. There
is hardly any conjuncture where a Secretary of State must act with
lightning rapidity in colonial affairs; but, if the necessity arose,
the British Government must, as they do now, take the responsibility.
It is also said against the plan that in most cases the members of
the council whose countries are not affected by the business would
only sit twirling their thumbs. This objection applies to all boards,
councils, and Parliaments, and is an argument for autocracy. It is
also alleged that the Indian Council Board is an analogy, and has been
proved a nuisance. But the Indian councillors represent only their own
opinions, and these often formed on past experience, whereas the men
on the Privy Council Board of Advice would represent those whose voices
would be potent factors in deciding questions submitted, because they
are the mouthpieces of living nations and of living policy. A minute
drawn up by Australia, dissenting from a given policy, would not be
looked at so lightly as is a minute by an Indian councillor who may
object to an addition to a salt tax. We should therefore consult with
the colonial cabinets, and ask them if they do not think that we can
obtain, by regular and recognised conference with their envoys, more
intimate knowledge of the desires of their people; further opportunity
for them to bring their wishes directly to the notice of England and of
brother colonists; a better chance for them to combine to further the
views of one of their number, or to declare against any impracticable
project; less danger that any imprudent course shall be entered on by
any one colony without consultation with others and with Britain; a
time of discussion for any schemes for joint defence—in short, less
isolation, and consequently greater strength for any policy taken
up with forethought. The Secretary of State would be supported in
adopting any given line by knowing he had the Empire at his back, or,
by finding himself alone, would know when to advise withdrawal. But
it is a question whether the day for any such plan is yet come. It is
only yesterday that Canada became a Pacific Power. It is only to-day
that the Australians are being united by railroads, and they are still
sundered in fiscal policy. The Cape has not yet become possessed of a
people sufficiently powerful to make themselves felt. In any case let
the colonies speak out, and we can wait, for “all’s well” at present
with the loyal sentiments of our scattered brethren.
During this last fortnight they have again proved that they are heart
and hand with us in time of trouble. Let us, if they desire it, make
their voices be heard in council. They have told us that their cannon
shall speak for us in the field.—_Nineteenth Century._