conceived, it would have saved hundreds of thousands of our compatriots
from the tortures of the invasion and occupation” (_La Revue_, Dec. 1,
1917).
“The unknown quantity on the side of Belgium,” says Lt.-Col. de
Thomasson, “condemned us at the outset to a waiting strategy. The
idea of at once taking the offensive madly overpassed the boldest
conceptions of Napoleon” (p. 54). “A well-advised command would have
understood that it was folly to launch at once all its army to attack
troops of the value of the Germans; that the offensive should have been
made only on certain points of the front, with a sufficient numerical
superiority, and for this purpose the forces must be economised;
that, in brief, the beginning of hostilities could only be favourable
to us on condition of a superior strategy such as was shown in the
preparation for the battle of the Marne, but not in the initial plan or
in the first three weeks of the war” (177–8).
[17] See Hanotaux, _Histoire Generale de la Guerre_; Engerand,
“Lorraine–Ardennes” (_Le Correspondant_, April 25, 1918); Paul H.
Courrière, “La Bataille de Sarre-et-Seille” (_La Revue_, Jan. 1, 1917);
Gerald Campbell, _Verdun to the Vosges_ (London: Arnold)——the author
was correspondent of _The Times_ on the Eastern frontier; Thomasson,
_loc. cit._
[18] See Hanotaux, “La Bataille des Ardennes, Etude Tactique et
Strategique” (_Revue des Deux Mondes_, Feb. 15, 1917); Engerand, as
above; Ernest Renauld, “Charleroi–Dinant–Neufchâteau–Virton” (_La
Revue_, Oct. 1916——inaccurate as regards the British Army); Malleterre,
_Un Peu de Lumière sur les Batailles d’Août—Septembre 1914_ (Paris:
Tallandier).
[19] See _L’Illustration_, March 16, 1918: _La Défense de Longwy_, by
P. Nicou.
THE ABANDONMENT OF LILLE
[20] The military history of Lille, is curious. See _Lille_, by
General Percin (Paris: Grasset). M. Engerand, in his chapter on “The
Abandonment of Lille,” says that a third of the cannon had been removed
earlier in the year, but that on August 21, when General Herment took
command, there remained 446 pieces with enough ammunition and 25,000
men, not counting the neighbouring Territorial divisions of General
d’Amade. Though Lille had been virtually declassed on the eve of the
war, General Percin, the Governor (afterwards cruelly traduced on the
subject) and General Herment were anxious, and had begun preparations,
to defend it. The municipal and other local authorities protested to
the Government against any such effort being made; and at the last
moment, on the afternoon of August 24, when the retreat from the Sambre
had begun, the Minister of War ordered the abandonment of the town and
the evacuation of the region. German patrols entered the city two days
later, but it was only occupied at the beginning of October. It has
been argued that, with Lille and Maubeuge held on their flanks, and the
Scarpe, Scheldt, and Rhonelle valleys flooded, the Allied forces might
have delayed the enemy long enough to permit of a definite stand on the
line Amiens——La Fère-–Laon-–Rheims. General Berthaut rejects any such
idea, and says that inundations would have required forty days.
[21] French’s _1914_.
[22] See _La Grande Guerre sur le Front Occidental_, especially vol.
iv., by General Palat (Paris: Chapelot, 1918–19).
M. HANOTAUX AND THE B.E.F.
[23] For details, see Hanotaux, _Histoire General_ and _L’Enigme de
Charleroi_ (Paris, 1917); Maurice, Thomasson, Engerand, _loc. cit._;
Sir John French’s _Dispatches_ and _1914_; Lord Ernest Hamilton,
_The First Seven Divisions_; _La Campagne de l’Armée Belge_, from
official documents (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1915); _L’Action de l’Armée
Belge_, also official; Van der Essen, _L’Invasion Allemande_. For some
information in this chapter and the subsequent note with regard to the
British Army, I am indebted to the military authorities.
[24] Speaking of the attack of the 20th Division (10th Corps) at
Tamines, M. Hanotaux (_Histoire_, vol. v. p. 278) says it advanced with
feverish ardour only to fall upon solidly held defences. “Our officers
had always been told that, on condition of attacking resolutely and
without hesitation, they would surprise the enemy and easily dispose of
them. But the Germans everywhere awaited them firmly on solid positions
flanked with innumerable machine-guns, before which most of our men
fell.” Of the “insensate immolation” of the 3rd Corps at Chatelet, M.
Engerand says: “Without artillery preparation, and knowing that they
were going to a certain death, these picked troops threw themselves on
the enemy infantry, solidly entrenched on the edge of the town; in a
quarter of an hour a half of their effectives had fallen.” He adds that
the upper command of the Corps was relieved the same evening.
[25] “It was expected that the British Army would take its place on
the 20th, but it arrived only on the 22nd. On the 20th, it was still
far behind in the region of Le Nouvion–Wassigny–Le Cateau. If it had
been in place on the 20th, the Allied Army would have found itself
constituted at the very moment when the Germans entered Brussels.”
This last phrase is at least singularly ambiguous: Von Bülow was not
in Brussels, but only a day’s march from the Sambre, on the 20th. But,
if the British had then been at Mons, the Allied Army would not have
been “constituted,” for Lanrezac’s forces were far from being all in
place on that day. “It is true,” said M. Hanotaux a little later,
“that the French Army was not all in place _on the 22nd_, and that the
Territorial divisions were in rather mediocre conditions as to armament
and _encadrement_” (_L’Enigme de Charleroi_, p. 52). It is Bülow’s
appearance on the Sambre a day before Lanrezac was ready that makes the
French historian credit the enemy with “the principal advantage, the
initiative.”
After the reference to Brussels, M. Hanotaux continues: “The rôle
reserved to the British Army was to execute a turning movement of the
left wing, advancing north of the Sambre toward Mons, in the direction
of Soignies–Nivelles; it was thought it would be there before Kluck,”
It was there a day before Kluck. “Unfortunately, as the _Exposé de
Six Mois de Guerre_ recognises, it did not arrive on the 20th, as the
French Command expected.... In fact, it was only in line on the 23rd”
(pp. 49–50). M. Hanotaux repeats himself with variations. The Allied
Armies suffered, he says, not only from lateness and fatigue, but from
lack of co-ordination in the High Command. “It is permissible to-day to
say that the Belgian Command, in deciding to withdraw its army into the
entrenched camp of Antwerp, obeyed a political and military conception
which no longer conformed to the necessities of the moment. Again,
the British Army appeared in the region only on the 23rd, although
the battle had been engaged for two days and was already compromised
between Namur and Charleroi. The rôle of turning wing which the British
Army was to fulfil thus failed at the decisive hour” (pp. 53–4). M.
Hanotaux mentions (p. 77) the receipt by Sir John French, at 5 p.m.
on August 23, of “a telegraphic message qualified as ‘unexpected,’”
announcing the weight of Kluck’s force and the French retirement, but
omits to say that this message came from the French Generalissimo. He
adds that the British commander gave the order to retreat at 5 p.m.,
Lanrezac only at 9 p.m., omitting to explain that the French retreat
was, in fact, in operation at the former hour, while the British
retreat only began at dawn on the 24th, after a night of fighting.
“By 5 p.m., on Sunday the 23rd, when Joffre’s message was received
at British Headquarters”——says Captain Gordon, on the authority of
the British War Office (_Mons and the Retreat_)——“the French had been
retiring for ten or twelve hours. The British Army was isolated.
Standing forward a day’s march from the French on its right, faced by
three German Corps with a fourth on its left, it seemed marked out for
destruction.”
In strong contrast with M. Hanotaux’s comments——repeated, despite
public correction, in his article of March 1919 cited above——are M.
Engerand’s references to the part played by the British Expeditionary
Force. First, to its “calm and tenacious defensive about Mons, a truly
admirable defence that has not been made known among us, and that
has perhaps not been understood as it should be. It was the first
manifestation of the form the war was to take; the English, having
nothing to unlearn, and instructed by their experiences in the South
African war, had from the outset seized its character.... It shows us
Frenchmen, to our grief, how we might have stopped the enemy if we had
practised, instead of the infatuated offensive, this British defensive
‘borrowed from Brother Boer.’” Then as to the retreat: “The retreat
of the British followed ours, and did not precede it. It is a duty of
loyalty to say so, as also to recognise that, in these battles beyond
the frontiers, the British Army, put by its chief on the defensive, was
the only one, with the 1st French Army, which could contain the enemy.”
M. Engerand, who is evidently well informed, and who strongly defends
General Lanrezac, says that Sir John French told this officer on August
17, at Rethel, that he could hardly be ready to take part in the battle
till August 24.
Lt.-Col. de Thomasson, while regretting that the British did not try
to help Lanrezac on the 23rd, admits that an offensive from Mons would
have been fruitless and might have been disastrous (pp. 216–8).
M. Hanotaux’ faulty account of the matter appears to be inspired by
a desire to redistribute responsibilities, and to prove that, if the
British had attacked Bülow’s right flank, the whole battle would have
been won. This idea will not bear serious examination. The French
Command cannot have entertained this design on August 20, for it must
have known that the British force was two days behind the necessary
positions. When it came into line before Mons, on the evening of the
22nd, it was certainly too late for so small a body of troops to make
an offensive movement north-eastward with any prospect of success. Had
it been possible at either date, the manœuvre which M. Hanotaux favours
might conceivably have helped Lanrezac against Bülow; but it would have
left Kluck free to encircle the Allies on the west, and so prejudiced,
at least, the withdrawal and the subsequent successful reaction. It
might well have created a second and greater Sedan.
In dealing with these events, M. Hanotaux, by adding the strength of
Lanrezac’s Army, d’Amade’s Territorial divisions, the British Army, and
the garrisons of Namur (General Michel, 25,000 men), Maubeuge (General
Fournier, 35,000 men), and Lille (General Herment, 18,000 men), arrives
at the remarkable conclusion that “the Allied armies, between August
22 and 25, opposed to the 545,000 men of the German armies a total
figure of 536,000 men.” This figure is deceptive, and useless except
to emphasise the elements of Allied weakness other than numbers. So
far as the later date is intended, it has no relation to the battle of
Charleroi–Mons. At both these dates, and later, when the Allies were
in full retreat, and both sides had suffered heavy losses, the Allied
units named were so widely scattered and so disparate in quality that
it is impossible to regard them as a single force “opposed” to the
three compact masses of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen. The deduction that
General Joffre had on the Sambre “Allied forces sufficient to keep the
mastery of the operations” is, therefore, most questionable.
The actual opposition of forces on the morning of August 23 was as
follows: Lanrezac’s Army and the Namur garrison, amounting to an
equivalent of five army corps, or about 200,000 men, had upon their
front and flank six corps of Bülow and two corps of Hausen, about
320,000 men. The little British Army, of 2½ corps, had immediately
before it three of Kluck’s corps, with two more behind these.
General Lanrezac published in the _New York Herald_ (Paris edition)
of May 17 and 18, and in _L’Oeuvre_ of May 18 and 22, 1919, dignified
replies to certain statements of Field-Marshal French. To the latter’s
remark that the B.E.F. at Mons found itself in “an advanced position,”
he answers that the battle shifted from east to west, and “on the
evening of the 23rd, the 5th Army had been fighting for forty-eight
hours, while the British were scarcely engaged.” Doubtless owing to
Lord Kitchener’s original instruction that it would not be reinforced,
the B.E.F. kept, during the later part of the retreat, “two days’
march ahead of the 5th Army, and obstinately maintained this distance,
stopping only on the Seine.” “It was rather French who uncovered my
left than I who uncovered his right.” General Lanrezac disowns any
critical intent in saying this: “In my opinion, in the tragic period
from August 22 to September 4, 1914, the British did all they could,
and showed a magnificent heroism. It was not their fault if the
strategic situation forbade our doing more.”
In regard to the original French plan of campaign, General Lanrezac
refused to put himself in the position of being both judge and party,
but added: “The Commander-in-Chief had a plan; he had elaborated it
with the collaboration of officers of his Staff, men incontestibly
intelligent and instructed, General Berthelot among others.
Nevertheless, this plan, as I came to know it in course of events,
appeared to me to present a fundamental error. It counted too much on
the French centre, 3rd and 4th Armies, launched into Belgian Luxembourg
and Ardennes, scoring a prompt and decisive victory which would make
us masters of the situation on the rest of the front.” “So it was that
General Berthelot, on August 19, told M. Messimy that, if the Germans
went in large numbers west of the Meuse, it was so much the better, as
it would be easier to beat them on the east.”
THE FALL OF MAUBEUGE
[26] Four years passed ere a detailed account of the defence and fall
of Maubeuge was published (_La Verité sur le Siège de Maubeuge_, by
Commandant Paul Cassou, of the 4th Zouaves. Paris: Berger-Levrault).
There are, in the case of this fortress, points of likeness to and of
difference from that of Lille. In June 1910 the Ministry of War had
decided that Maubeuge should be regarded as only a position of arrest,
not capable of sustaining a long siege; and in 1913 the Superior War
Council decreed that it should be considered only as a support to
a neighbouring field army. It then consisted of an enceinte dating
from Vauban, dominated by an outer belt of six main forts and six
intermediate works about twenty years old, furnished with 335 cannon,
none of which carried more than 6 miles. The garrison consisted of an
infantry regiment, three reserve and six Territorial regiments. In the
three weeks before the siege began, 30,000 men were engaged in digging
trenches, laying down barbed wire, and making other defences.
The siege was begun by the VII Reserve Corps, a cavalry brigade, and
a division from another corps, about 60,000 men, on August 25. On
that and two following days effective sorties were made. On the 29th
the bombardment began. One by one the forts were smashed by heavy
guns and mortars, including 420 mm. pieces throwing shells of nearly
a ton weight, firing from the safe distance of 9 or 10 miles. On
September 1, all the troops available made a sortie, and a regular
battle was fought. Some detachments reached within 250 yards of the
German batteries, only to be mown down by machine-gun fire. After
this two German attacks were repulsed. On September 5, however, the
enemy got within the French lines, and on the 7th the place had
become indefensible. At 6 p.m. the capitulation was signified, and
on September 8, at noon, the garrison surrendered, General von Zwehl
saying to General Fournier: “You have defended the place with a rare
vigour and much resolution, but the war has turned against you.” The
German Command afterward claimed to have taken at Maubeuge 40,000
prisoners, 400 guns, and a large quantity of war material.
[27] Statement of M. Messimy before the Commission of Inquiry on
Metallurgy, May 30, 1919, reported in the Paris Press the following
day. In his evidence, M. Messimy blamed Joffre for not having been
willing, in August 1914, to recognise the danger on the side of
Belgium. Undoubtedly, he added, it was a fault of the French Command
in 1912 and 1913 not to contemplate the prompt use of reserves, and
to fall back on the Three Years’ Service law, “which no one would
defend to-day.” M. Messimy argued that the doctrine of the offensive _à
outrance_ was common to the French and German Armies, and was at that
time universal in military circles.
_Joffre, Première Crise du Commandement_, by Mermeix (Paris:
Ollendorff. 1919), is a careful and unprejudiced study of the changes,
ideas, and personal antagonisms in the French Army Commands during the
first period of the war. It concludes with a section in which “Attacks
upon Joffre” and “Explanations collected at the G.Q.G.,” are set forth
on opposite pages.
[28] See note at top of p. 249.
[29] G. Blanchon, _Le General Joffre_, Pages Actuelles, 1914–5, No. 11
(Paris: Bloud et Gay).
[30] M. Arthur Huc, editor of the _Dépêche de Toulouse_, in which
journal the interview was printed, March 1915.
[31] Statement by General Messimy at the Commission of Inquiry on
Metallurgy, April 28, 1919.
[32] For details, see Hanotaux, “La Bataille de la Trouée de Charmes,”
_Rev. des Deux Mondes_, November 15, 1916; Engerand, _loc. cit._; a
vindication of General Dubail, by “Cdt. G. V.”: “La 1re Armée et la
Bataille de la Trouée de Charmes,” _La Revue_, January 1, 1917; Barrés:
“Comment la Lorraine fut Sauvée,” _Echo de Paris_, September 1917.
[33] See p. 34. The mismanagement of this battle was the subject of
evidence at the Metallurgical Commission of Inquiry on May 15, 1919.
[34] Miles, _Le General Maunoury_, Pages Actuelles, No. 49.
[35] French, _1914_, ch. iv. The Hon. J. W. Fortescue (_Quarterly
Review_, Oct. 1919), defending Smith-Dorrien, charges Lord French with
“clumsy and ludicrous misstatements,” and questions the figures in the
text.
[36] _Meine Bericht zur Marneschlacht_ (Berlin: Scherl), notes, written
in December 1914, on the operations of the II Army to the end of the
battle of the Aisne. Bülow charges Kluck with not having informed
German G.H.Q. of the gathering of Maunoury’s forces and the action of
Proyart.
For the battle of Guise, see Hanotaux, “La Bataille de Guise–St.
Quentin,” _Rev. des Deux Mondes_, September 1, 1918.
[37] For his report of a stormy interview with Lord Kitchener at the
Embassy in Paris on September 1, see _1914_, ch. v. This account has,
however, been strongly questioned by Mr. Asquith (speech at Newcastle,
May 16, 1919), who says that Lord Kitchener did but convey the
conclusions of the Cabinet, which had been “seriously disquieted” by
Sir John French’s communications.
[38] See _Foch_, by Réné Puaux, and, above all, Foch’s own works,
_De la Conduite de la Guerre_ (3rd ed., 1915), _Les Principes de la
Guerre_, 4th ed., 1917 (Paris: Berger-Levrault).
[39] “I see no inconvenience,” Joffre replied, “in your turning back
to-morrow, 28th, in order to affirm your success, and to show that
the retreat is purely strategic; but on the 29th every one must be in
retreat.”
[40] For details of the last stages of the retreat and pursuit, see
_La Marche sur Paris de l’Aile Droite Allemande_, by Count de Caix de
Saint Aymour (Paris: Charles Lavauzelle); Gordon and Hamilton, _op.
cit._; and _La Retraite de l’Armée Anglaise du 23 Août 1914_, by Ernest
Renauld, _Renaissance_, November 25, 1916.
On September 3, General Lanrezac was removed from the command of the
French 5th Army——“because his views were contrary to a complete liaison
with the British Army,” says M. Hanotaux (_Rev. des Deux Mondes_, March
1919); but this is a partial and inadequate statement. As we have
seen, Lanrezac had been at issue with G.Q.G. from the beginning of the
campaign.
M. Hanotaux quotes a note sent to the Minister of War, M. Millerand,
on September 3, by General Joffre, who, “finding that the rapid recoil
of the British Army, effected too soon and too quickly, had prevented
Maunoury’s Army from coming into action in good conditions, and had
compromised Lanrezac’s left flank,” described his intention thus:
“To prepare a new offensive in liaison with the British and with
the garrison of Paris, and to choose the battlefield in such a way
that, by utilising on certain parts of the front prepared defensive
organisations, a numerical superiority could be assured in the zone
chosen for the principal effort.”
[41] An anonymous writer, “ZZZ,” in the _Revue de Paris_, September
15, 1917, says that Field-Marshal French’s communication was made on
September 1 to the French Government——probably it was a result of the
Kitchener interview——and was transmitted to Joffre by the Minister
of War, who, subject to the full liberty and responsibility of the
Generalissimo, favoured the idea of resistance on the north and
north-east of Paris.
[42] _Petit Parisien_, June 16, 1916.
[43] _Le Livre du Souvenir_, by Paul Ginisty and Arsène Alexandre, pp.
75–6.
PARIS AND THE GERMAN PLAN
[44] Major-General Sir F. Maurice, in his brilliant study, _Forty
Days in 1914_ (London: Constable. 1919), speaks, however, of the
German Staff assuming “that Paris had only a moral and not a military
value.” General Maurice refers to the city as being “at the mercy of
the enemy,” and emphatically condemns Kluck for failing to occupy
it, and so “sacrificing substantial gains in favour of a grandiose
and ambitious scheme which, as events proved, could not be realised”
(p. 139). Despite General Maurice’s great authority, I see no reason
to change the conclusions in the text with regard to the points here
discussed. There are several important factors which he does not
mention, particularly the influence of the appearance of the new 9th
Army, under Foch, at the French centre, and the equalisation at this
time of the German and Allied forces. Kluck was the victim of necessity
rather than of any grandiose ambition; and as for the Staffs, it was
more Joffre’s strategy than “Prussian conceit and self-sufficiency”
that “marred the execution of a well-laid plan.”
Says Mr. Joseph Reinach (_La Guerre sur le Front Occidental, 1914–15_,
ch. v. sec. 7): “Bernhardi has classed the capitals of Europe in
two categories: those whose capture has a decisive importance from
the military point of view, like Paris and Vienna, and those whose
importance is much smaller. To take Paris, what glory! to enter Paris,
what a gage! But the same Bernhardi, the master of all the German
generals, and before him all the greatest captains, all the oracles
of the military art, Moltke, Jomini, insist that the aim of war must
be fixed as high as possible, and this aim is the complete ruin of
the enemy State by the destruction, the putting out of action, of its
armies. Only an enemy completely disarmed will bow to the will of the
conqueror.... The opinion that prevailed with the German Staff is that
to attack Paris before having finished with the Allied Armies would
be a fault entailing very serious consequences.... The event does not
prove that this opinion was mistaken.”
[45] This message, first published by _Le Matin_, February 27, 1918,
was dispatched by Mr. Gerard, United States Ambassador in Berlin,
on the morning of September 8, to his colleague in Paris, Mr. Myron
Herrick, who received it late on the same evening. It read as follows:
“Extremely urgent. September 8. The German General Staff recommends
that all Americans leave Paris via Rouen and Le Havre. They will have
to leave soon if they wish to go.——GERARD.” It is added that the
message was sent on the pressing wish of the German Staff, and that it
was doubled, one copy going via Switzerland, and the other via Rome.
When this document was penned, the struggle had been proceeding on
the Ourcq for two days and a half; Kluck had withdrawn nearly all
his forces from the Marne; and the British and d’Espérey’s Armies
were advancing rapidly northward. How, in these circumstances, could
the German General Staff imagine that they could arrange “soon” a
triumphant entry into Paris? There is one, and only one, fact in the
military situation that they could build upon. At 5 a.m. on September
8, the right wing of Foch’s Army had broken down, and was in full
retreat toward Fère Champènoise. If they really accepted this as such a
promise of victory as to justify the warning to the Americans of Paris,
the German Staff must have been in an infatuated state of mind.
It is possible, however, that the message was only a reckless piece of
propaganda on their part, intended, at a critical moment, to awe the
neutrals of America, Switzerland, and Italy, and to frighten some good
Americans out of Paris. In no case can a warning conveyed on September
8 countenance the idea that the entry into Paris was originally
intended to occur before a decisive victory had been won.
[46] In the _Gaulois_, “Une Cause de la Defaite Allemande sur la Marne.”
[47] M. Reinach states this, adding: “There was, it seems, an exchange
of messages between the Staff and Kluck. Finally, theory prevailed”
(_La Guerre_, p. 145; _Commentaires de Polybe_, vol. iv. p. 198).
According to an article in the _Renaissance_, September 2, 1916,
Kluck had previously favoured the advance on Paris, quoting a reply
of Blücher to Schwartzenberg in 1814: “It is better to go to Paris;
when one has Paris, one has France.” At a council held at German
Headquarters after the battle of Guise and St. Quentin, says the
writer, Kluck went over to the advice of Moltke.
[48] M. Hanotaux (_Histoire Illustrée_, especially ch. xxxvii., and in
the _Rev. des Deux Mondes_, March 1919) has his own picturesque theory
of these events, supported by rather frail evidence. It is, briefly,
that there was an antagonism between Kluck, who wished to complete
his enveloping movement, and Bülow, who after Guise had persuaded the
Grand Staff to renounce it in favour of a frontal action against the
French centre in which he would be the chief actor. After Charleroi and
after Guise, Bülow had had to call Kluck to his aid. They were natural
antagonists, the junker and the popular soldier. Moltke and the Staff
hesitated between them, and then decided for Bülow. Bülow was to lead
the attack; Kluck was ordered to remain between the Oise and the Marne
to watch the region of Paris. But he refused to be thus thwarted of his
victory, and rode impetuously on toward Provins, overrunning Bülow’s
slower approach. Maunoury’s attack caught him _in flagrante delicto_.
All this is plausible enough except the statement that Kluck was
ordered to remain north of the Marne. Had he done so, the same result
would have been produced two or three days sooner.
M. Hanotaux also states that Marwitz’s three cavalry divisions had
been ordered on September 1 to carry out a raid to the gates of Paris,
destroying railways as they went, but that “Kluck had other views” (_La
Manœuvre de la Marne_).
[49] The author of _Die Schlachten an der Marne_ says: “Kluck knew
there were troops to the left of the British, but did not know their
exact strength.”
In his book _Comment fut sauvé Paris_, M. P. H. Courrière cites the
following order issued by General von Schwerin at dawn on September
5, and afterwards found on the battlefield: “The IV Reserve Corps
continues to-day the forward march, and charges itself, north of the
Marne, with the covering of the north front of Paris; the IV Cavalry
Division will be added to it. The II Corps advances by the Grand Morin
valley below Coulommiers, and directs itself against the east front of
Paris.”
[50] General von Freytag-Loringhoven says: “It was proved on the Marne
that the age of armies numbering millions, with their improved armament
and widely extended fronts, engenders very special conditions.... The
envelopment of the whole host of the enemy is a very difficult matter”
(_Deductions_, pp. 79–80).
[51] M. Maurice Barrés, _Echo de Paris_, June 1, 1916. But General
Maunoury had telegraphed at midnight on August 31 to General Joffre
reporting that Kluck seemed to be leaving the direction of Paris.
[52] General Cherfils describes the extent of Gallieni’s authority
as being in a state; of “nebulous imprecision.” The position appears
to have been this: The entrenched camp of Paris, under the old
regulations, was under the control of the Minister of War, not the
Generalissimo, who could claim the services of a part of the garrison
if he left enough men to assure the safety of the city, subject to a
protest by the Governor, but could not touch its munitions or supplies.
On his appointment as Military Governor of Paris (August 26), Gallieni
had asked that the garrison, then consisting of four divisions of
Territorials, should be reinforced. The 6th Army was accordingly placed
under his orders. On the same day, the entrenched camp was placed,
by the Minister, M. Millerand, under the superior orders of General
Joffre. There was thus a threefold command, Maunoury being under
Gallieni, and Gallieni under Joffre.
General Bonnal (_Les Conditions de la Guerre Moderne_, p. 56) says
that it was “in virtue of his own initiative, based on the powers
of the Governor of a place left to its own forces,” that Gallieni
ordered Maunoury, on the morning of September 4, to prepare to take the
offensive.
For particulars of Gallieni’s communications with General Joffre and
Sir John French, see the work named, the same author’s long article in
the _Renaissance_, September 4, 1915, and an article in that review on
September 2, 1916. According to the last named, it was at 2.50 p.m.
on September 4 that the Commander-in-Chief authorised the advance of
Maunoury’s Army; and Gallieni’s orders were that it was to bring its
front up to Meaux on the next day, and to “attack” on the morning of
the 6th.
Gallieni’s control over Maunoury’s Army ceased when, by the development
of the battle of the Ourcq, it passed out of the region of the
entrenched camp of Paris. In August 1915, the old rules on the
“Service de Place” were altered to give the French Commander-in-Chief
absolute authority over fortresses and their governors, and full power
to dispose of their resources.
[53] “La Bataille de l’Ourcq”; Paul H. Courrière, in the _Renaissance_,
September 1, 1917.
[54] In his dispatch of September 17, 1914, Sir John French does not
mention any visit or message from General Gallieni, and only speaks
of receiving General Joffre’s request to turn about, made during
their interview on Saturday, September 5. In his volume _1914_, he
does mention the visit, but attributes to Gallieni the statement that
Maunoury would move east toward the Ourcq “on Sunday the 6th.” This
suggests that the move actually made on the 5th was not at the time
known at British Headquarters.
[55] _Die Schlachten an der Marne_ (p. 107 of French edition).
SOME BOOKS ON THE BATTLE
Chaps. VI.-X. For further details of the actions traced in these
chapters, see the works of Marshal French, Von Bülow, M. Hanotaux,
Generals Mallaterre, Canonge, and Palat, M, Victor Giraud, Lord Ernest
Hamilton, Mr. G. Campbell, and others named above, and the following:
“Guides Michelin pour la visite des Champs de Bataille” (Paris:
Berger-Levrault. 1917–18).
Vol. I. _L’Ourcq_ (_Meaux–Senlis–Chantilly_).
Vol. II. _Les Marais de Saint Gond_ (_Coulommiers–Provins–Sézanne_).
Vol. III. _La Trouée de Revigny_ (_Chalôns–Vitry-Bar-le-Duc_).
Excellent guides, containing good chronological summaries of the
fighting on the left, centre, and right, with maps and other
illustrations.
_La Bataille de la Marne._ By Gustave Babin (Paris: Plon. 1915). With 9
plans. One of the first day by day narratives of the battle, based on
Staff information.
_La Victoire de la Marne._ By Louis Madelin, with 2 plans. A
well-written sketch by a historian who was on the Staff at Verdun
(Paris: Plon. 1916).
_Avant-propos Stratégiques._ By Col. F. Feyler, the well-known Swiss
military writer (Paris: Payot. 1916).
_Les Campagnes de 1914._ By Champaubert (General Malleterre).
Collections of the French official bulletins published by Payot, and
reports of the French Devastation Commission by Hachette.
_Les Champs de l’Ourcq._ By José Roussel-Lepine (Paris: Plon. 1919).
Especially good in its descriptions of the Ourcq countryside.
_La Rôle de la Cavalerie Française_ à l’aile gauche de la première
bataille de la Marne. By J. Hethay (Paris. 1919). Includes an account
of the strange raid of the 5th Division, 1st Cavalry Corps, into
Villers-Cotterets Forest and region of La Fertê-Milon, ordered by
General Bridoux on the morning of September 8. It was driven hither and
thither for several days, at last escaping in fragments to the west;
but it created some little alarm and disturbance on Von Kluck’s lines
of communication.
_Les Marais de Saint Gond._ By Charles le Goffic (Paris: Plon. 1916). A
standard work on this part of the battle.
“Mondemont.” Article by “Asker,” in _L’Illustration_, July 3, 1915.
Many valuable articles will be found in the files of this weekly
journal.
_La Victoire de Lorraine._ By A. Bertrand (Paris: Berger-Levrault.
1917).
_Morhange et les Marsouins de Lorraine._ By R. Christian-Frogé
(Berger-Levrault. 1917).
_Sous Verdun._ By M. Genevois (R. Hachette. 1916).
_Die Schlacht an der Marne._ By Major E. Bircher, of the Swiss General
Staff. Contains a bibliography of 150 works and a number of useful maps
and plans (Berne: Paul Haupt).
[56] _Avec Charles Péguy de la Lorraine à la Marne_, by Victor Boudon
(Paris: Hachette). Péguy, a sort of mystical Tory-Socialist, or, as M.
Lavisse says, “Catholic-Anarchist,” was author-editor of _Les Cahiers
de la Quinzaine_.
[57] M. Hanotaux (p. 126) says that Gallieni’s order of September 4 was
“an order for deployment, not for the offensive,” and he adds that the
Governor intended that the cavalry should feel the way. There is no
evidence of cavalry activity on the 5th; and it is manifest that the
encounter before St. Soupplets was a complete surprise for the 6th Army.
[58] Sir John French, in his dispatch, says: “I should conceive it to
have been about noon on the 6th September, after the British Forces
had changed their front to the right, and occupied the line Jouy le
Chatel–Faremoutiers–Villeneuve le Comte, ... that the enemy realised
the powerful threat that was being made against the flank of his
columns moving south-east, and began the great retreat which opened the
battle.” This is a significant mistake. We now know that Bülow sent
a first warning of an Allied concentration towards the west on the
afternoon of September 5 to Kluck, who by then had his own information
from the IV Reserve Corps. A few hours later Kluck was fully aware of
his danger; and, as he has since stated to an interviewer, decided “in
five minutes” how to meet it.
Field-Marshal French (_1914_, ch. 5), wrongly, I think, considers that
Kluck “manifested considerable hesitation and want of energy.”
GENERAL BONNAL AND THE BRITISH ARMY
[59] Several French volumes hint the first criticism, and it is
expressed very definitely by General Bonnal in the article already
referred to on the battle of the Ourcq in _La Renaissance_ of September
4, 1915. The substance of General Bonnal’s charge is as follows:
“Unfortunately, the British Army, rather hesitant after its checks
at Le Cateau, Landrecies, and Compiègne, lost time in displacements
dictated by prudence, and did not give the 6th Army in time all the
help desirable.” Maunoury had asked for it at noon on Sept. 4; and
the Generalissimo’s directions of that night anticipated the British
being at Coulommiers and Changis on the evening of the 5th. But, on the
afternoon of the 4th, the head of Sir John French’s Staff had announced
to Gallieni for that night “an order of movement the result of which
was to distance the British Army at once from the 6th and the 5th
Armies.” (If this movement was not the further retirement asked for by
General Joffre, we do not know what is meant.) “Marshal French occupied
during the 5th positions north and south of Rozoy, facing east. But
this disposition placed the British Army much to the rear, to the west,
of the line first fixed, and permitted the German II Corps, reported
in the morning at Coulommiers, to repass the Marne and escape to the
north-west. Fearing its appearance on the Ourcq, General Gallieni
wrote on the 6th to Marshal French praying him at once to advance in
accordance with the orders of General Joffre. On his side, the latter
telegraphed to General Maunoury, on the 6th, asking him constantly to
support the British left. In consequence, the chief of the 6th Army
sent to Meaux the same evening the 8th Division (4th Corps), which
had just detrained at Paris.” (This division actually came in on the
morning of the 6th.) “If the presence of the 8th Division on his left
did not determine Marshal French immediately to take the offensive”
(what this means we do not know, for the British offensive had
commenced on the morning of the 6th), “it was because at this moment he
was much concerned as to the pretty considerable interval between his
right and the left of the 5th Army. Yet this interval was watched by
the Cavalry Corps of General Conneau.”
“On the evening of the 6th, the British Army reached the line of the
Grand Morin, in contact on its right with the 5th Army. Unfortunately
this contact was so close that the British Army thought it necessary
to march level with and on the same lines as the 5th, which had great
difficulty in assuring its route, having to drive before it four corps
of Von Bülow’s Army.”
General Bonnal concludes his criticism with a not very amiable
homily on the insufficient training of the old British Army, and the
inadequacy of its Staff work. Generals not trained as in France and
Germany had, he says, a tendency “to practise the linear order,” to
move their troops in deployed formation, supporting their flanks on
neighbouring bodies, and taking a thousand precautions that lead to
delay. That is why “the British Army, composed of officers and men full
of strength, vigour, and energy, took more than two days to cover the
20 kilometres between the Grand Morin and the Marne, when, on the 6th,
they ought to have marched on the nearest enemy.”
For similar comments, see “La Bataille de la Marne, Recit Succinct,”
by General Canonge (_Le Correspondant_, September 25 and October 10,
1917), with details of the battle.
One sentence of M. Hanotaux is more to the point than all these
criticisms and suppositions: “No doubt, if the encounter had not
been produced, a little prematurely perhaps, in the region of St.
Soupplets–Penchard, at noon on the 5th, the whole army of Von Kluck
would have been south of the Marne in the evening; while Maunoury would
have taken it in reverse on the north bank. Kluck would then have been
closed in” (_Histoire_, ch. 38, p. 184).
An interesting attempt to justify Gallieni against Joffre, and to
challenge the latter’s strategy at this time, will be found in _La
Genèse de la Bataille de la Marne_, by General H. Le Gros (Paris:
Payot). He quotes Joffre as complaining to the Government (on Sept. 4)
that Gallieni was seeking to “push him into a premature offensive.”
SCENES AT FARTHEST SOUTH
[60] Four days later, in the village inn at Pezarches, Madame, an
upstanding woman of about thirty, told me of the following incident:
“On Sunday morning my mother had gone to church, and I remained at
home with my father and my little boy. My father left us to get some
tobacco. Going out for a moment with the child, I saw a group of
horsemen in the street, and said to myself: ‘We are saved. It is the
Belgians!’ When I returned, to my surprise, they were in the house,
sitting in my room and in the café. An officer asked me to cook him a
couple of eggs. I noticed that one of the men was wounded, and asked
whether it was painful. He nodded, and I went to the kitchen. There I
saw, on the window-sill, a spiked helmet. I nearly fainted! So they
were Germans! I managed to take in the eggs. Then the officer asked
me, very politely, to show him my left hand, and, pointing to the
wedding-ring, said: ‘You are married?’ ‘Yes,’ I replied, trembling.
‘Your husband is a soldier?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘You have a child?’ ‘No, I have no
children,’ I said, ‘But I saw him. You are hiding him because you have
heard that the Germans cut off the hands of French children. That is
false. We never hurt women or children. Bring your little boy.’ But,
as I persisted that it was not my child, he said no more. He and the
others paid in German money for what they had, and left. A quarter of
an hour later the firing began.”
[61] _1914_, ch. 4.
[62] _Le Petit Journal_, September 9, 1917.
[63] In Courtacon, I found eighteen of the two dozen small brick houses
completely destroyed by fire, after having been sacked. The pretext
given was that villagers had betrayed the German troops——part of the
Guard Cavalry Division——to the Allies. The single room of the village
school presented an unforgettable exhibition of malice. Dirty straw,
remnants of meals, torn books, and broken cartridge cases littered the
floor. Piles of half-burnt straw showed that a hurried attempt had
been made to destroy the building; there were two such piles under
the bookcase and the tiny school museum, which consisted of a few
bottles of metal and chemical specimens. Amid this filthy chaos, the
low forms, the master’s desk, and wall-charts inculcating “temperance,
kindness, justice, and truth,” stood as they had done on the day before
the summer holidays. As I turned to leave, I saw, written across the
blackboard in bold, fine writing, evidently as the lesson of that day,
the words: “_À chaque jour suffit sa peine_”——“Sufficient unto the
day is the evil thereof,” as our English version has it. Under this
motto, all unconscious of it, these brutes had slept and wakened to
their incendiary work——men of a nation that boasted itself the pioneer
in Europe of elementary schooling. Could any recording angel have
conceived a more biting irony?
[64] M. Madelin says that 7000 German corpses were found. The figure
may be doubted.
[65] Le Goffic, _Les Marais de St. Gond_.
[66] _Au Centre de la Bataille de la Marne_, by the Abbé Neret, Curé of
Vertus, who gives the hours named.
[67] I rely upon the article by M. le Goffic, “La Defense du Mont
Août,” in _La Liberte_, September 7, 1918, embodying the narrative of
an eye-witness, who mentions the following curious details: “A black
cow, maddened by the bombardment, charged the trenches, leaped aside
when a shell burst, sniffed the smoke, and stamped in the shell-holes.
Slowly, a shepherd, a big, careless ruffian, climbed the slope with his
five white sheep. For a moment he stopped level with us, 500 yards to
the right. As though by accident, his five sheep were on his left, on
our side; and immediately shells began to arrive in fours, the range
lengthening each time by a hundred yards. But we were not in range.”
This perhaps rather imaginative correspondent thinks that the Germans
mistook dead for living Frenchmen on the slopes of Mont Août, and that
that is why they did not seek to occupy it.
THE MYTH OF THE 42ND DIVISION
[68] General Canonge, in his historical sketch, confirms my own
inquiries. The embryo of the myth is to be found in the “Official
Résumé,” published on June 8, 1915, in the _Bulletin des Armées_,
according to which, on the evening of September 9, Foch’s Army,
“moving from west to east toward Fère Champènoise, took in flank the
Prussian Guard and the Saxon Corps which were attacking south-east of
this locality. This audacious manœuvre decided the success.” This was
presently elaborated, with various romantic decorations.
[69] Canonge, after two inquiries on the spot, and with written
evidence in addition, says that the 42nd Division left Broyes between
2 and 3 pm., reached Linthelles about 5 p.m., stopped there, and then
bivouacked in the zone Linthes–Linthelles–Ognes–Pleurs, passing the
night there “in general reserve,” and moving away only about 5 a.m. on
September 10. Fère Champènoise, he adds, was evacuated by the Germans,
after an orgie of 24 hours, at about 5.30 p.m. on the 9th, but was
traversed during the greater part of the night by German troops coming
from Connantre and Gourgancon. Connage thinks that, “on sight of the
troops of the 42nd Division, those of General Dubois, certain now of
support, advanced, and the Division then stopped and turned back to
night-quarters.” Bülow, he believes, had ordered his retreat at 3.30
p.m. The first French detachment entered Fère Champènoise at 7 a.m.
next day.
[70] Giraud (_Histoire_, p. 166) gives a rather different report of
this dialogue. I rely upon an article in _L’Illustration_ of Jan. 9,
1915, containing a long passage from the diary of “an officer who was
the soul of the defence”——doubtless, Captain Heym himself.
[71] Colonel Feyler’s _Avant-Propos Stratégiques_ (Paris: Payot.
1915) are particularly valuable for a pitiless analysis of the “moral
manœuvre” represented in early German accounts of the first part of the
campaign.
[72] Major-General Maurice says: “I am convinced that history will
decide that it was the crossing of the Marne in the early hours of
the 9th by the British Army which turned the scale against Kluck and
saved Maunoury at a time of crisis.... That an army which on August
23 had been all but surrounded by an enemy who outnumbered it by two
to one should have fought its way out, retreated 170 miles, and then
immediately turned about and taken a decisive part in the battle
which changed the course of the campaign of 1914, is as wonderful an
achievement as is to be found in the history of war” (_Forty Days_, pp.
183–4).
[73] Hanotaux, _Histoire Illustrée_, vol. vii. pp. 132–8.
[74] _Idem_, pp. 172–5.
[75] Foch, _Des Principes de la Guerre_.
[76] M. Hanotaux (p. 76) regards this last part of the plan as “pure
folly,” as “a few thousand resolute men holding the defiles, crests,
and cliffs would break whole armies before Nancy was attained.”
This appears to be an exaggeration; but it is highly probable that
before Nancy, as before Mons and on other occasions at the beginning
of the war, the German Armies lost, through the traditional belief
in envelopment, what they might have gained by concentration on the
central attack.
[77] “Choses Vues à Metz,” _Revue Hebdomadaire_, December 18, 1915.
Colonel Feyler quotes from the _Lokal Anzeiger_ of Berlin the following
commentary on one of the Kaiser’s earlier appearances at the Front:
“The presence of the Emperor demonstrates clearly what a development
events have taken.... The Emperor would never have gone into France
if those responsible had envisaged the possibility of the German Army
being thrown back beyond the frontier. His presence among his troops in
enemy country will not fail to produce a deep impression in Germany as
well as abroad.”
[78] Quoted in _Un Village Lorrain en Août—Septembre 1914.
Réméréville_, by C. Berlet.
[79] Lt.-Col. Thomasson, _Le Revers_, introduction.
[80] Professor Friedrich Meinecke, of Freiburg University, in the
_Frankfürter Zeitung_, December 31, 1916.
INDEX
Air Forces, German and Allied, 18, 27, 126, 140, 141, 167, 241–2
Aisne, German stand on the, 187–8, 192–3
Alsace, French advance and withdrawal in, 2, 29, 56, 212
Amade, General d’, 28, 35, 65, 66, 72
Americans urged to leave Paris, 82, 260
Amiens occupied by Von Kluck, 72, 80
Antwerp, 40, 44, 88, 105
Ardennes, Belgian, French offensive into, 24, 31–3, 36
Armaments, German and Allied compared, 14, 215
Artillery, German and French, 17, 18, 215;
at Namur and Maubeuge, 40, 257;
in the battle of the Marne, 104, 126, 128, 146, 180, 201, 210
Battlefield described, 106–9, 113–4, 143–4, 170–1, 203–7
Bavarian Corps, Prince Ruprecht and, 30, 56, 61–3, 87, 197–213
Belgium, the surprise in, 12–13, 21, 26–7, 34, 36, 38, 41, 45, 49,
54, 215, 247–51
Belgium’s contribution, 15, 27, 32, 37–41, 43–4
Berthaut, General, defends the French Staff, 245–6
Bloch, Jean de, forecasts of, 19, 242–4
Briey coalfield, 33, 248, 249
British Expeditionary Force, 34–44, 65–9, 80–1, 99, 118–26;
advance to the Marne begun, 123;
the Marne crossed, 131, 140–1;
a determining factor, 185, 188–9, 224–5;
M. Hanotaux’ criticisms, 253–5, 259;
General Bonnal’s criticism, 265–6
Bülow, General von, 32, 36–43, 66, 68–9, 81, 85, 100;
compromised by Von Kluck’s retreat, 129, 134, 135–7;
attack upon the French centre, 135, 142, 146–64;
disorder and retreat, 165–8, 190–3
Castelnau, General de, 27, 29–31, 62–3, 71, 104, 197–213, 248
Cateau, Le, battle of, 1, 65–6, 68
Cavalry, rôle of the, 16, 27, 66, 67, 104, 125, 134, 192–3, 264
Châlons reoccupied, 193
Charleroi, battle of, 37–43
Charmes, Gap of, defence of, 31, 56, 61–3
Château-Thierry reoccupied, 141
Command, unity of, 25, 40, 216
Concentration, first French, and re-grouping, 27–8, 251
Coulommiers occupied by the British, 124
Couronné, Grand, of Nancy, defence of, 63, 199, 205–12, 228–9, 269
Crown Prince, the Imperial, 32–3, 63–4, 70–1, 89, 103, 169–72,
178–82, 195
Dubail, General, 27, 29, 30–1, 62–3, 104, 197–8, 200, 203
Eastern defences, French, 12, 31, 44, 56, 61–4, 89–90, 170, 197, 229
Emperor, the German, 84, 205, 209, 269
Espérey, General Franchet d’, 37, 40–1, 100, 122;
advance to the Marne begun, 137;
Marne crossed, 141–2;
helps Foch, 139, 142, 156;
a determining factor in the victory, 189–91;
on the Aisne, 193
Fère Champènoise lost, 157;
reoccupied, 167
Foch, General, his teaching, 22, 24, 50, 160, 202;
at head of 20th Corps, 30, 62;
of 9th Army, 61, 69–70, 101, 138;
battle of St. Gond, 142–54;
the centre broken, 155–64;
projected manœuvre and German retreat, 161–2, 165–8, 190, 193, 268
Forces, German and Allied, compared, 15–16, 30, 32–3, 41, 65;
on eve of the battle of the Marne, 97–105, 137, 144–5, 169, 171–2,
176, 177–8, 198–201, 215–6, 240–1, 255
Fortifications, modern, function of, 21, 229, 245
French, Sir John, 18, 32, 35, 36, 39–43, 66–7, 69, 72, 73;
communications with Gallieni and Joffre, 93–4, 121–3;
battle order, 111;
farthest south, 119, 121;
the pursuit, 188;
criticisms of, 253–6, 258, 265–6
Gallieni, General, 47, 49, 77–9, 81, 83, 90, 133;
order to 6th Army on September 4, 92–3;
communications with Joffre and French, 93–4;
battle of the Ourcq;
his precipitancy, 116–7, 121–3, 134, 224;
Generals Cherfils and Bonnal on, 262
Gaps in German and Allied lines, 69, 85, 111, 136–7, 145, 166, 189,
192–3, 225–6
Generals removed, French, 20, 49, 52, 245;
German, 83, 233
Gond, St., marshes of, 143 _et seq._, 191, 226
Guise, battle of, 68–9
Haig, General Sir D., 37, 64, 66, 99, 141, 193
Hanotaux, M., controverted, 41–3, 252–5
Hausen, General von, and the Saxon Corps, 32–3, 35, 38–41, 69, 71,
101, 135, 145, 155–9, 165–6, 171, 172, 175, 191, 193
Heeringen, General von, 30, 61–3, 192, 197, 199, 200, 203–4
Humbert, General, at Mondemont, 149, 152–4
Italian Frontier, 15, 25, 28
Joffre, General, moves 5th Army and B.E.F. to Sambre (August 16),
35–6, 42;
“most unexpected” news, 41;
career and character, 46–53;
second new plan of campaign, 54–61;
tactical lessons, 58;
watches eastern frontier, 62, 64, 197;
forms 6th Army, 65;
helps the B.E.F., 65–8;
forms 9th Army, 70;
extends the retreat, 73–5;
orders for general offensive, 74–5, 93–7, 111, 121;
M. Millerand on, 77;
gains and superiority of forces, 104–5;
and Gallieni’s precipitancy, 116, 119, 121–3;
and the decisive movement between Kluck and Bülow, 135, 189;
on the victory, 195–6;
the author of the victory, 218–29, 233;
before Commission of Inquiry, 249;
General Lanrezac on, 256;
M. Messimy on, 257
Kitchener, Lord, and Field-Marshal French, 69, 258, 259
Kluck, General von, 32, 38–44, 66–9, 72–3, 79 _et seq._, 97;
withdraws Corps across Marne against Maunoury, 118, 122–4;
his farthest south positions, 119–120;
results of retreat, 135–7, 141, 185;
reaches the Aisne, 187;
his two fatal movements, 220–2;
Kluck and Bülow, 261
Landwehr and Ersatz employed on front, 15–16, 128, 199
Langle de Cary, General de, 28, 32–3, 48, 70, 102, 169–75, 193
Lanrezac, General, 27, 32, 35–43, 49, 67–8, 250, 255–6, 258
Launois, battle of, 70
Lille, fortress of, 34, 249, 252
Longwy, siege of, 33–4, 44
Lorraine, first French offensive in, 29–31
Machine guns, 18, 58, 115, 117, 253
Maud’huy, General, 30, 100, 138, 140, 193
Mangin, General, 37, 100, 138
Maps, German, evidence of the, 240
Maubeuge, 34, 44, 87, 105, 252, 256–7
Maunoury, General, 32, 63–5, 72–3, 77, 80–1, 85, 93, 97, 116, 122,
124, 126–30, 132–4, 184–8, 248
Michel, General, and the French Staff, 47, 49, 248
Mondemont, 143–4, 148–54
Mons, battle of, 37–43, 253–6
Montmirail reoccupied, 140
Morhange–Sarrebourg, battle of, 30–1
Namur, siege and fall of, 27, 38, 40
Nancy bombarded, 211
Nivelle, Colonel, 127
Offences, German, against rules of war, 80, 117, 124, 192, 194–5,
211, 212–3, 267
Offensive, French doctrine of the, 21–24, 58, 201–2, 216, 218,
245–7, 251
—— from the Somme–Laon–Craonne, proposed, 58–60, 65, 71
Ourcq, battle of the, 114–8, 126–35, 184–7
Paris, the defence of, 55, 73, 76–9, 259–60;
the German dilemma, 82–8, 109, 221
Pau, General, 29, 47, 48, 198, 248
Percin, General, 248, 252
Petain, General, 100, 138
Plans of campaign:
the German, 10–14;
disturbed after Guise, 68–9;
the dilemma of Paris–Verdun, 84–91, 109–10, 214 _et seq._, 239–40;
the French, 28–9, 31, 36, 49–50, 54–61, 73–5, 88–9, 105, 110,
216 _et seq._
Proyart, action at, 68
Railways, efficiency of French, 15, 57, 241
Reserves, German and Allied, 16, 21, 198–9, 245
Retreat, the long, scenes on, 1–9, 72–3, 78, 237–8;
necessity of, 54–5;
advantages of, 57;
prolonged, 72–4;
end of, 81, 109, 119;
general German, ordered September 9, 185
Revigny lost, 179;
recovered, 194
Rheims reoccupied and bombarded, 192
Russian victories, influence of, 44, 75, 87
Sambre, German victory on the, 36–43
Sarrail, General, 48, 89, 103, 169–72, 175–82, 195
Sermaize, destruction of, 194
Smith-Dorrien, General, 38, 64, 66, 99, 141
Taxi-cabs and the battle of the Ourcq, 130–1
Toul, German advance toward, 208
Trenches:
German superiority, 18, 31, 33, 35, 58, 114, 217, 253;
Field-Marshal French on, 18, 244;
Castelnau’s defences, 201–2
Troyon, Fort, defence of, 180–3
Verdun, 32, 56, 71, 74, 89, 108, 169–71, 176–82, 195, 221
Vosges, fighting in the, 203–4
War Council, French Higher, 47–51
“Wireless,” German, picked up, 134
Würtemberg, Duke Albrecht of, 32, 70, 102, 169–75, 193
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Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant
preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
quotation marks retained.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences of
inconsistent hyphenation have not been changed.
In this version of this eBook, dashes between multiple locations and
within numeric ranges are shown as en-dashes (–), which are longer than
hyphens (-) but shorter than double-em-dashes (——), which are used
for visual clarity where the original book used single em-dashes as
delimiters.
Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.
Page 99: “Ronar’ch’s” is a misprint for “Ronarc’h’s”.
Page 272: The Index reference to General Gallieni and the battle of the
Ourcq did not include a page number.
End of Project Gutenberg's The Battle of the Marne, by George Herbert Perris