THE ORDER OF BATTLE
I. GALLIENI’S INITIATIVE
It was in the early hours of September 3 that the first definite
evidence of Kluck’s divergence south-eastward was reported to the
Military Government of Paris; but the officers in charge did not
venture to disturb their weary chief, who received the news only
when he rose in the morning.[51] At noon, he issued to the garrison
the following note: “A German army corps, probably the Second, has
passed from Senlis southward, but has not pursued its movement toward
Paris, and seems to have diverged to the south-east. In a general
way, the German forces which were in face of the 6th Army appear
to be oriented toward the south-east. On our side, the 6th Army is
established to the north-east of the entrenched camp on the front
Mareil-en-France–Dammartin–Montgé. The British Army is in the region
south of the Marne and the Petit Morin, from Courtevroult (west) to
beyond La Ferté-sous–Jouarre (east).”
During the day, the news, the importance of which Gallieni immediately
realised, was confirmed; the evening bulletin issued in Bordeaux
announced that “the enveloping march of the enemy seems definitely
conjured.” Perceiving the opportunity of striking a hard, perhaps
a decisive, blow at the enemy’s flank, the Governor appears to have
resolved at once to set Maunoury’s Army in movement,[52] and then
to have proceeded to urge the Commander-in-Chief to make this the
commencement of the general offensive which was to have taken place
some days later, when the armies had re-formed behind the Seine. “If
they do not come to us, we will go to them,” said Gallieni to his Chief
of Staff, General Clergerie;[53] and at about 9 a.m. on September 4,
he issued to the 6th Army the following order: “In consequence of the
movement of the German armies, which appear to be slipping across our
front in a south-easterly direction, I intend to send your army forward
against their flank, that is to say in an eastward direction, in touch
with the British troops. I will indicate your direction of march when
I know that of the British Army; but take forthwith your dispositions
so that your troops may be ready to march this afternoon, and to
launch to-morrow (September 5) a general movement to the east of the
entrenched camp.”
In course of the morning and forenoon of the same day (September 4),
Gallieni had three telephonic conversations with the Generalissimo.
Before the last of these communications, between noon and 1 p.m.,
the Governor, with General Maunoury, went by automobile to British
headquarters at Melun. Sir John French was not there; but, during the
evening, probably after hearing from General Joffre, he replied to
Gallieni that the British Army would turn about on the morrow, with
a view to the resumption of the offensive on September 6.[54] After
reflection, in fact, the Generalissimo had accepted Gallieni’s view of
the opportunity, and had issued during the evening orders to the three
armies of the left to get into positions of attack on the 5th, and to
commence the battle on the morning of the 6th. On the 5th, Sir John
French visited General Joffre, who had now come over to Claye, on the
road from Paris to Meaux, Maunoury’s headquarters. After the interview,
there should have been no misunderstandings.
At the end of August, the French General Staff had moved from
Vitry-le-François 40 miles farther south to Bar-sur-Aube, where, on the
outskirts of the quiet little town, at the large country house called
“Le Jard” (29 Faubourg de Paris), which had sheltered a century before
the Tsar Alexander I and King Frederick William II of Prussia, the
Commander-in-Chief was the guest of M. Tassin, a member of the Paris
bar. Refusing all ceremony, General Joffre occupied a large first-floor
room looking by two windows upon the gateway and the Paris highroad.
But it was in a neighbouring schoolroom where the Staff bureaux
were established, and to which the telegraph wires——nerves of the
battle——were attached, that the historic orders for the great encounter
were composed. On the evening of September 5, another southward move
was made to Chatillon-sur-Seine, where, for three weeks, the Staff
occupied the château of Colonel Maître, once belonging to Marshal
Marmont. It was from the “Chambre de l’Empereur” in this old house, so
called after a visit of Napoleon in 1814, that General Joffre issued
his final summons to the troops on the morning of the battle.
The text of the General Instructions of September 4 and 5 is of great
importance, for they determined at least the first shape of the
ensuing struggle, and we will have to recall them in dealing with one
of its most critical phases. For the moment, it will suffice to point
out this apparent ambiguity, that, while the general offensive was to
commence only on September 6, Maunoury’s Army was to discover itself
on September 5, in a movement that would necessarily provoke strong
resistance.
II. GENERAL OFFENSIVE OF THE ALLIES
General Joffre’s programme was embodied in the following series of army
orders:
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, _September 4_
“1. Advantage must be taken of the adventurous situation of the I
German Army (right wing) to concentrate upon it the efforts of
the Allied armies of the extreme left. All dispositions will be
taken during the 5th of September with a view to commencing the
attack on the 6th.
2. The dispositions to be realised by the evening of September 5
will be:
(_a_) All the available forces of the 6th Army, to the
north-east, ready to cross the Ourcq between Lizy-sur-Ourcq and
May-en-Multien, in the general direction of Château-Thierry
[the last phrase was telephonically corrected at 10 p.m. to the
following: “in a manner to attain the meridian of Meaux”]. The
available elements of the 1st Cavalry Corps that are in the
vicinity will be put under the orders of General Maunoury for
this operation.
(_b_) The British Army, established on the front
Changis–Coulommiers, facing east, ready to attack in the
general direction of Montmirail.
(_c_) The 5th Army, closing up slightly to the
left, will establish itself on the general front
Courtacon–Esternay–Sezanne, ready to attack in the general
direction south to north, the 2nd Cavalry Corps assuring
connection between the British and 5th Armies.
(_d_) The 9th Army will cover the right of the 5th Army,
holding the southern end of the Marshes of St. Gond, and
carrying a part of its forces on to the plateau to the north
of Sezanne.
3. The offensive will be begun by these different armies in the
morning of September 6.”
_September 5_
(_e_) To the 4th Army: To-morrow, September 6, our armies of
the left will attack in front and flank the I and II German
armies. The 4th Army, stopping its southward movement, will
oppose the enemy, combining its movement with that of the 3rd
Army, which, debouching to the north of Revigny, will assume
the offensive, moving westward.
(_f_) To the 3rd Army: The 3rd Army, covering itself on the
north-east, will debouch westward to attack the left flank of
the enemy forces, which are marching west of the Argonne. It
will combine its action with that of the 4th Army, which has
orders to attack the enemy.”
We are now in a position, before entering upon the particulars of
the battle, to measure in its chief elements the very marked change
in the balance and relation of forces which the French High Command
had obtained by and in course of the retreat from Belgium. The most
important of these elements are numbers and positions. Both are shown
in detail in the following tabular pages, setting forth in parallel
columns the dispositions of the opposed armies immediately before the
action commenced.
STRENGTH AND POSITION OF THE ARMIES
(On September 5–6, except where otherwise indicated, in order from West
to East)
ALLIED GERMAN
6th ARMY (General MAUNOURY), (H.Q., I ARMY (General von KLUCK),
Claye). Under the direction of (H.Q., Coulommiers).
General Gallieni till September 10.
_7th Corps_ (General Vautier).
Brought from Lorraine to the Amiens
region, thence to east of Paris.
Consisting of 14th Division _IV Cavalry Division._
Active (General Villaret) and
63rd Division of Reserve (General
Lombard)—— the latter in lieu of
the 13th Division, left in the
Vosges. _IV Corps of Reserve_
(General von Schwerin).
Came into action on September 6, and
then formed the left. Consisting of the VII and
XXII Reserve Divisions.
_5th Group of Reserve Divisions_
(General Lamaze). At the commencement of
the battle, stood, as
Also from Lorraine and Amiens, rearguard on the west of
after hard fighting and heavy the Ourcq, about Marcilly,
losses. Consisting of 55th Barcy, and Penchard, in
Division Reserve (General Leguay), face of the French 6th
56th Division Reserve (General Army. It had nothing
de Dartein), and a brigade of behind to call upon, save
Moroccan Infantry (General Ditte).
This group came into action on the
afternoon of September 5, and
afterwards formed the centre.
_45th Division_ (General Drude).
From Algeria.
_A Cavalry Brigade_ (General
Gillet), much fatigued in the
retreat from Belgium.
The above units were wholly north
of the Marne, save for a thin _A Brigade of Landwehr_,
connection with the British Army.
which was brought to the
They were reinforced during the north of the battlefield
battle by the following: from the Oise on September
8.
_4th Corps_ (General Boëlle).
7th and 8th Divisions, brought
from the 3rd Army (embarked at
Ste. Menehould, September 2).
Some regiments had lost heavily
on the Meuse. The 8th Division
(de Lartigues) was sent across
the Marne on September 6 to The following units were at
link Maunoury’s and the British first all south of the
Armies; the 7th Division (General Marne, facing the British
de Trentinian), on September 8, Expeditionary Force and
to Maunoury’s left, where it was the French 5th Army:
afterwards joined by the 8th
Division.
_6th Group of Reserve Divisions_ _II Corps_ (General von
(General Ebener). Linsingen).
Much reduced by fighting near Of Stettin. III and IV
Cambrai, and exhausted in the Divisions, one north
retreat. Consisting of 61st and one south of the
Reserve Division (General Deprez) Grand Morin, between
and 62nd Reserve Division (General Crécy-en-Brie and
Ganeval). Engaged September 7 and Coulommiers, facing the
9. British. Withdrawn to the
Ourcq on September 6.
_1st Cavalry Corps_ (General Sordet.
Succeeded at 9 a.m. on September 8
by General Bridoux).
1st, 3rd, and 5th Divisions: much
fatigued in the retreat. Ordered
from south of the Seine to
Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, September 7.
2½ Battalions of Zouaves were sent
on September 9 to the aid of the
left wing. A brigade of Spahis,
detrained on September 10, took _IV Corps_ (General von
part in the pursuit to the Armin).
Aisne. Three groups of garrison
batteries were sent, on September Of Magdeburg. VII and
6, to support Lamaze, who had no VIII Divisions; south
corps artillery. 4 divisions of of the Grand Morin from
Territorials (83, 85, 89, and 92) Coulommiers to Chevru,
of the Paris garrison did rear facing the British.
duty, but were not engaged in the Withdrawn to the Ourcq on
battle. Admiral Ronar’ch’s Brigade September 7.
of Marines, afterwards famous at
Dixmude, was not engaged, being
insufficiently trained.
BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (General
Sir John FRENCH), (H.Q., Melun).
_3rd Corps_ (General Pulteney). _III Corps_ (General von
Lochow).
Consisting of the 4th Division
(Major-General Snow, 10th, 11th, Of Berlin. V and VI
12th Brigades, and 5th Cavalry Divisions, across the
Brigade), and the 19th Brigade. highroad from Montmirail
The 4th Division joined before to Provins, midway between
the battle of Le Cateau. This these towns.
formed the British left, south of
Crécy-en-Brie.
_2nd Corps_ (General Sir H.
Smith-Dorrien).
Comprising the 3rd Division
(Hamilton——7th, 8th, and 9th
Brigades, and 2nd Cavalry
Brigade); and 5th Division
(Ferguson——13th, 14th, and
15th Brigades, and 3rd Cavalry _IX Corps_ (General von
Brigade). This corps had borne Quast).
the heaviest fighting in the 150
miles’ retreat from Mons, its Of Altona. Two divisions,
casualties numbering 350 officers one north of Esternay, and
and 9200 men. These losses had one at the right of this,
been partly made good. near Morsains.
_1st Corps_ (General Sir D. Haig). (The III Reserve and IX
Reserve Corps of Von
1st Division (Lomax——1st, Kluck’s Army had been left
2nd, 3rd Brigades, and 1st behind——partly before
Cavalry Brigade); 2nd Division Antwerp, partly before
(Murray——4th, 5th, 6th Brigades, Maubeuge.)
and 4th Cavalry Brigade). This
made the British right, east of
Rozoy.
All these troops consisted of home
regiments of the old regular army.
5th ARMY (General Franchet
D’ESPÉREY), (H.Q.,
Romilly-sur-Seine).
_2nd Cavalry Corps_ (General _Cavalry Corps._
Conneau).
Consisting of the II and IX
Brought from the Lorraine front. Cavalry Divisions (General
von der Marwitz) facing
Comprising the 4th, 8th, and 10th the left and centre of
Divisions (Generals Abonneau, the British Army, and
Baratier, and Gendron). Arriving the V Division and Guard
from the 2nd Army at the beginning Cavalry Division (General
of September, it kept contact with von Richthofen) placed
the British Army on the left, between and before the
north-west of Provins. German IV and III Corps,
south of the Grand Morin,
_18th Corps_ (General de Maud’huy). at La Ferté-Gaucher,
facing the junction of the
35th, 36th, and 38th Divisions French 5th and British
(Generals Marjoulat, Jouannic, Armies. The Guard C.D.
and Muteau). Before and behind was particularly strong,
Provins. There was thus fully 10 having 3 Jäger battalions
miles between it and Sir Douglas and 6 machine-gun
Haig’s Corps. companies attached.
_3rd Corps_ (General Hache).
5th, 6th, and 37th Divisions
(Generals Mangin, Petain, and
Comby), south-west of Esternay.
_1st Corps_ (General Deligny,
succeeding General Franchet
d’Espérey).
1st and 2nd Divisions (Generals
Gallet and Duplessis). Across the
Grand Morin at Esternay.
The above three corps faced the left
of the German I Army.
_10th Corps_ (General Defforges). II ARMY (General von BÜLOW),
(H.Q., Montmirail).
19th and 20th Divisions (Generals
Bonnier and Rogerie) east of _VII Corps Active_ (General
Esternay. Sent to aid of 9th Army von Einem), (XIII and XIV
from September 9 to 11. Divisions).
The above four corps extended This had come on tardily,
over the plateaux from the and was in the rear,
British right to the Paris–Nancy between Château-Thierry
highroad, midway between Esternay and Montmirail, when the
and Sézanne, their right being battle opened. Being
advanced. behind Kluck’s left, it
has sometimes been counted
_4th Group of Reserve Divisions_ as part of the I Army and
(General Valabrègue). the IX as part of Bülow’s.
The VII Reserve Corps was
Consisting of the 51st, 53rd, detained before Maubeuge,
and 69th Divisions of Reserve and only reached the Aisne
(Generals Bouttegourd, Perruchon, on September 13.
and Legros). In support and
reserve: much fatigued after the _X Corps Reserve_ (General
battle of Guise and the retreat. von Hülsen).
_Light Brigade of 2nd Division Consisting of the XIX
Infantry._ In reserve. Reserve Division and
the II Guard Division.
South-east of Montmirail.
9th ARMY (General FOCH), (H.Q., It was engaged on the 5th
Pleurs). in collecting its wounded
and burying its dead.
_42nd Division_ (General Grossetti).
_X Corps Active_ (General
From the 6th Corps of the Army of von Eben).
Verdun. North of Sézanne across
the Epernay road, in touch with Of Hanover. Facing
d’Espérey’s right. Foch’s left, about
Villeneuve-lès-Charleville
_9th Corps_ (General Dubois). and St. Prix, at the west
end of the Marshes of St.
From Nancy; afterwards part of Gond.
the 4th Army. Consisting of the
1st Moroccan Division (General _Guard Corps_ (General von
Humbert), replacing all but one Plattenberg).
battalion of the 18th Division
(see below) and the 17th Division North and north-east of St.
(General Moussy). On both sides Gond Marshes, from Etoges
of Fère Champènoise, with advance to Morains, facing Foch’s
guards north of the St. Gond right-centre. Placed here,
Marshes. without doubt, for the
honour of breaking the
_11th Corps_ (General Eydoux). French centre.
From the 4th Army. The 18th Division _IV Cavalry Corps_ (General
(General Lefebvre), from Lorraine, von Falkenhayn).
came into line on the evening of
September 7 between Connantre After the battle of Guise,
and Normée. The 21st Division Bülow’s Army had come
(General Radiguet) and the 22nd south through Laon,
Division (General Pembet) were, crossing the Marne between
at the beginning of the battle, Dormans and Epernay.
about Lenharrée and the important
cross-roads of Sommesous, facing
the junction of Von Bülow’s and III ARMY (General von
the Saxon Armies, with reserves HAÜSEN).
north of the River Aube.
_XII Corps Active_ (I
_52nd and 60th Reserve Divisions_ Saxon), (General von Elsa).
(Generals Battesti and Joppé).
North of Normée and
From the 4th Army. The former was Lenharrée. It came abreast
affected to the 9th and the latter of the Guard only on the
to the 11th Corps. morning of the 7th.
_9th Cavalry Division_ (General de _XII Corps Reserve_ (General
l’Espée). von Kirchbach).
In the rear at the Camp de Mailly, The XXIV and XXIII
keeping connection with the 4th Divisions; across the
Army across a gap of about 12 Châlons highroad north of
miles. Sommesous. The former,
which had been besieging
Givet, could only join
4th ARMY (General de LANGLE DE on September 7. It was
CARY), (H.Q., Brienne). turned south-west against
Foch, the XXIII south-east
_21st Corps_ (General Legrand). against de Langle.
13th and 43rd Divisions (Generals _XIX Corps_ (General von
Baquet and Lanquetot). From the Laffert).
Vosges. Detrained on the evening
of September 8, and engaged On September 6, was south
September 9 on the left, east of of Châlons, west and
the Camp de Mailly. north-west of Vitry,
facing de Langle’s left.
_17th Corps_ (General J. B. Dumas).
33rd and 34th Divisions (Generals IV ARMY (DUKE Albrecht
Guillaumat and Alby). From of WÜRTEMBERG), (H.Q.,
Courdemanges to Sompuis. Triaucourt).
_12th Corps_ (General Roques). _VIII Corps Active_ (General
Tulffe v. Tscheppe u.
23rd and 24th Divisions (Generals Weidenbach).
Masnon and Descoings), reduced by
previous casualties to about 6 Of Coblenz. North-east of
effective battalions. At Vitry and Vitry.
Courdemange. The 23rd Division was
lent to the 17th Corps till after _VIII Corps Reserve_
the passage of the Marne. (General von Egloffstein).
_Colonial Corps_ (General Lefebvre). About Ponthion.
2nd and 3rd Colonial Divisions _XVIII Corps Active_
(Generals Leblois and Leblond). (General von Tchenk).
Experienced troops, largely
re-enlisted from the general army. Having lost heavily, was
They had suffered heavily in the replaced during the battle
Belgian Ardennes, losing many by the
officers. At Blesmes and Dompremy.
_XVIII Corps Reserve._
_2nd Corps_ (General Gerard).
Both had come down the
3rd and 4th Divisions, less a west side of the
brigade (Generals Cordonnier and Argonne and the Ste.
Rabier). At Maurupt and Sermaize. Menehould highroad. About
Somme–Yevre and Possesse.
A division of each of the last two
corps was shifted from de Langle’s _A Cavalry Division._
right to his left on September 8.
De Langle’s Army extended along
the railway from Sompius, by V ARMY (The Imperial CROWN
Blesmes Junction, to Sermaize. PRINCE).
_VI Corps_ (General von
3rd ARMY (General SARRAIL), (H.Q., Pricttwitz).
Ligny-en-Barrois).
Of Breslau. Had come south
_15th Corps_ (General Espinasse). by Les Islettes, and was
now south of the Argonne,
29th and 30th Divisions (Generals striking toward Revigny.
Carbillet and Colle). From the 2nd
Army; detrained, September 7. A _VI Corps Reserve._
brigade was diverted, September 8,
to the aid of the 4th Army. Near A brigade only on the
Revigny. Part of the corps was front, at Passavant and
afterwards sent east to defend the Charmontois. The rest
passages of the Meuse. west of the Meuse, near
Montfaucon, facing Verdun.
_5th Corps_ (General Micheler).
_Landwehr Division_ of the
9th and 10th Divisions (Generals same, before Verdun.
Martin and Gossart). North of
Revigny, about Laimont and _XIII Corps_ (General von
Villotte. General Gossart replaced Dürach).
General Roques, killed on
September 6. Of Stuttgart. Coming by Ste.
Menehould, it had reached
_7th Cavalry Division_ (General Triaucourt.
d’Urbal).
_XVI Corps_ (General von
About Isle-en-Barrois. Sent on Mudra).
September 11 to the Heights of the
Meuse. Of Metz. Coming down
the east side of the
_6th Corps_ (General Verraux). Argonne, it had reached
Froidos-sur-Aire, aiming
12th and 40th Divisions (General at Bar-le-Duc.
Souchier, succeeded by General
Herr, and General Leconte) and _V Corps Reserve_ (General
107th Brigade of the 54th D.R. Count Solms).
(General Estève). South of the
Argonne, about Beauzée-sur-Aire. Was still on the east
bank of the Meuse about
_3rd Group of Reserve Divisions_ Consenvoye, north of
(General Paul Durand). Verdun.
65th (General Bigot); 67th (General _A Division of the IV
Marabail); 75th (General Vimard). Cavalry Corps._
Behind and extending the 6th Corps
on the Aire.
_72nd Division of Reserve_ (General * * *
Heymann).
_V Active Corps._
Sent from the garrison of Verdun by
the Governor, General Coutanceau, Sent from Metz on
to Souhesme-la-Grande, in support. September 6 to the Meuse
Heights the force which
When the battle was engaged there attacked Fort Troyon and
remained only a few battalions neighbouring points.
in and before Verdun and on the
Heights of the Meuse.
Sarrail’s Army was deployed
south-westward from near Souilly
to Revigny.
The composition of the 1st and 2nd Armies of Generals Dubail and de
Castelnau, and of the German armies facing them, is given in the
chapter dealing with the defence of the eastern frontier (pp. 198–200).
With so much accuracy as is yet possible, the relative strength of the
opposed forces at the maximum was as follows:
SUMMARY OF STRENGTH
ALLIES | GERMANS
|
DIVISIONS. | DIVISIONS.
Infantry. Cavalry. | Infantry. Cavalry.
|
French 6th Army 9½ 3½ | German I Army 11 5
British Army 5½ | ” II ” 8 2
French 5th Army 13½ 3 | ” III ” 6
” 9th ” 8 1 | ” IV ” 8 1
” 4th ” 10 | ” V ” 11 1
” 3rd ” 10½ 1 | From Metz 1
--- -- | -------- --
57 9 | 45 (?48) 9
|
(of which 41 Active) | (of which 31 Active)
|
(The B.E.F. included 5 Cavalry |
Brigades) |
French 2nd and 1st | German VI and VII Armies
Armies (approx.) 22 Divs | (approx.) 24 Divs.
(of which 11 Active) | (till Sept. 7, of which 12 Active)
This comparison of totals is of only limited value, for two main
reasons: (1) As has been explained, the German reserve divisions were
markedly stronger than the French, and the German corps generally were
more homogeneous. (2) The table shows only the maximum development of
each army. Light artillery was probably in about the same proportion
as the infantry, with a marked advantage of quality on the side
of the Allies; it had not been possible to bring the full German
superiority in heavy guns to bear on the new front. It will be safe
to say that between the regions of Paris and Verdun the Allies had
obtained a distinct superiority in active formations, and one more
marked at the height of the battle in the area of decision. Antwerp
and Maubeuge held before them bodies of German troops that might have
turned the balance in the south; the occupation of towns and the
guarding of communications retained others; whether from nervousness or
over-confidence, Berlin had called two corps (11th and Guard R.C.) from
France for the Russian frontier——a “fateful” step for which Ludendorff
disclaims responsibility. On the other hand, two new French armies had
been created, chiefly at the cost of the eastern border; many units
had been re-formed; the upper commands had been strengthened; and the
whole line had been brought near to its bases. “The farther the Germans
advanced, the French and British adroitly evading a decisive action,
the more the initial advantage passed from the former to the latter,”
says a German writer already cited.[55] “The Germans left their bases
farther and farther behind, and exhausted themselves by fatiguing
marches. They consumed munitions and food with a fearful rapidity, and
the least trouble in the supply services might become fatal to masses
so large. Meanwhile, the French were daily receiving fresh troops,
daily approaching their stores of munitions and food.”
This great overturn of material strength was the first advantage the
French Command had worked for and obtained. It is to be noted that on
neither side was any mass held as a general reserve. Joffre had hoped
to keep back the 21st Corps, but even this proved impossible. “The
strategic situation,” he telegraphed to M. Millerand on September
5, “is excellent, and we cannot count on better conditions for our
offensive. The struggle about to begin may have decisive results,
but may also have for the country, in case of check, the gravest
consequences. I have decided to engage our troops to the utmost and
without reserve to obtain a victory.”
III. FEATURES OF THE BATTLEFIELD
The second advantage gained has already been indicated; it consisted
in the attainment of a concave front resting upon the entrenched camps
of Paris and Verdun, and by them guarded against any sudden manœuvre
of envelopment. Intermediately, this front lay across the heights
between the Marne and the Seine, along the chief system of main lines
and highroads running eastward from the capital, those of Paris–Nancy.
This 200-miles stretch of country, so typically French in character and
history, loosely united by the Marne and the tributaries it carries
into the Seine on the threshold of the capital——an agricultural country
whose only large cities, Rheims and Châlons, were in the enemy’s
hands——falls into four natural divisions, corresponding with the Allied
left (west), left-centre, right-centre, and right (east).
The western region, between the suburbs of Paris and the gully holding
the little river Ourcq and its canal, is the Ile-de-France and the
Valois, rolling farmlands of beet and corn, with some parks, bordered
on the north by the forests of Chantilly and Villers-Cotterets, and
on the south by the broad valley of the Marne. A landscape most
intimately French in its rich, spacious quietude, in the old-time
solidity of its villages and their people, in the gracious dignity of
its châteaux and ruined abbeys, with Meaux bells pealing across the
brown slopes to the sister cathedral of Senlis, and both looking east
to the giant donjon of La Ferté-Milon. This is the battlefield of the
Ourcq, where Kluck was rounded up by Maunoury and the British. The
ancient cathedral and market-town of Meaux marks its limit near the
junction of the lesser and greater rivers.
East of the Ourcq this district becomes more crumpled in its rise
towards the Montagne de Rheims; while, south of the Marne, extends
the larger and richer country of Brie, famous for its cheeses, its
_fertés_, erstwhile baronial strongholds, and for the scenes of some
of Napoleon’s greatest victories. In structure, this is a broken
triangular plateau, cut by westward-flowing streams (the Marne, Petit
Morin, and Grand Morin), bounded on the south by the Seine and Aube,
and rising eastward to the Montagne de Reims and the Falaises de
Champagne, where it falls abruptly. Coulommiers, Château-Thierry,
and Provins are substantial market-towns, and La Ferté-sous-Jouarre,
Montmirail, and Sézanne smaller centres of rural life. This wide
plateau of Brie, the Allied left-centre, was the starting-point of the
British recoil, and the field contested by d’Espérey’s Army against Von
Bülow.
Beyond the Rheims–Epernay wine district and the St. Gond Marshes
(source of the Petit Morin), we pass into the great expanse of the
Champagne moorlands, poor and thinly populated, where large tracts of
chalk soil carry nothing but plantations of stunted pines and firs.
Châlons-sur-Marne, its capital, has a large permanent garrison, with
fixed camps and manœuvre grounds hard by. Vitry-le-François, at the
junction of the Saulx and Ornain with the Marne, and of the Paris–Nancy
and Châlons–Rheims railways, is the only other considerable town. On
the west of this region, Foch held against Bülow and the Saxons; on the
east occurred the shock of de Langle’s army with that of the Duke of
Würtemberg.
Finally, beyond Revigny, the forces of General Sarrail and the Imperial
Crown Prince fought across a more composite region, consisting, in the
south, of the Barrois——the district of Bar-le-Duc——and, to the north
of this, the near part of the thickly-wooded Argonne hills, the Verdun
Heights, and the plain between. Verdun was and remained a defensive
position worthy of its ancient renown; and the Argonne, with Valmy on
one flank and Varennes on the other (to cite only two historic names),
has always been a barrier against invasion secondary to the Heights of
the Meuse. These latter are continued with only small breaks by the
Heights of the Moselle, where, especially on the hills near Nancy, took
place the coincident struggle by which the eastern defence line was
preserved. While this must be borne in mind, as an essential part of
the general French victory, it seems legitimate and convenient to treat
it separately; a brief recital of what there occurred is, accordingly,
postponed to the end of our narrative.
The military geographer will have much to add to this note of the lie
of the land. He will be able to show that all the natural features
of the country affected the result; the rivers of the western area
inconveniencing both sides, but especially the invader; the patches
of forest and the direction of highroads limiting their movements; the
French gaining from a virtual monopoly of railway services a power
of rapid transfer of troops that was one of the decisive factors of
the battle. Everywhere, hill positions proved to be of great tactical
value; and this is supremely true of the eastern ranges. The Argonne
block delayed and split the Crown Prince’s columns, and so greatly
helped Sarrail to maintain his line. The Upper Meuse and its earthy
rampart were a still more precious protection. Between Verdun and
Nancy, a distance of 60 miles, only one point was attacked, in the
crisis, and this was held by a single fort, that of Troyon. Yet another
hill range has signally aided the enemy in the end of the battle, when
the victorious Allies were brought up sharp against the Laon Mountains,
north of the Aisne. Throughout the field, superior knowledge of the
ground must be counted among the advantages of the French.
The most important of these natural features, however, is of less
consequence than the strategical gain of a front whereon the French
wings were both safe, while the German wings were both threatened.
Gallieni, in throwing the 6th Army upon Kluck’s flank, did but
anticipate the inevitable by one or two days. What happened arose
necessarily out of the strategy of the retreat, in the direction and
form of which Joffre never lost his initiative. It is possible that,
had he retired farther, the victory might have been more complete.
Actually, the five German armies were drawn within a hemicycle 200
miles wide and 30 miles deep. Their right could not help passing before
Maunoury, or their left before Sarrail, except by refusing battle.
They dare not turn aside; but the penalty of going on was to offer two
cheeks to the smiter. There is, however, no trace of hesitation. The
common soldiers still thought they were advancing “Nach Paris.” At
Headquarters, the tactic of envelopment having failed, everything was
risked on a converging attack upon the French centre.
IV. THE LAST SUMMONS
We can now enter upon the details of the titanic encounter with a clear
impression of its general character. As soon as the relation of forces
was realised, the tactical purposes dictated by the circumstances to
either side were these, and could not be other: for the French, to
attack on the wings, especially the western, where there was a promise
of surprise, while holding firm at the centre till the pressure there
was relieved; for the Germans, to procure a swift decision at the
centre, while sufficiently guarding the threatened flanks. But their
initiative gave the Allies the benefit of the move: precious hours
elapsed ere Kluck could adequately reply. Thus, the disposition of
forces governs the whole story of the battle, and gives it a natural
unity. It began on the west and developed eastward, as it were, by a
series of reverberations, until the shock was returned by Sarrail. In
this direction, therefore, we must follow its successive phases. If we
speak of a battle of the Ourcq, a battle of St. Gond, and so on, it
is only to make what can but be a bird’s-eye view clearer by a just
emphasis. These are so many acts in the battle of the Marne, one and
indivisible.
We have referred above solely to the measurable factors; the moral
of the armies will best be seen in the process and the result. But
there is a prevision of it in the evenness of the alignment reached
on September 5th——much superior to that of the enemy, for some units
of the German centre were crowded together, while the Crown Prince’s
troops were scattered——and in the readiness of these defeated and weary
men for an instant recoil. On the morning of the 6th, the words of the
Generalissimo rang out like a bugle-call along the front:
“G.H.Q. (Chatillon-sur-Seine), September 6, 7.30 a.m. (telegram 3948).
“_At the moment when a battle is engaged on which depends the
salvation of the country, every one must be reminded that the
time has gone for looking backward. All efforts must be employed
to attack and repel the enemy. Any troop which can no longer
advance must at any cost hold the ground won, and be slain rather
than give way. In the present circumstances, no failure can be
tolerated._”
Sir John French struck a more conventionally cheerful note: “I call
upon the British Army in France to show now to the enemy its power, and
to push on vigorously to the attack beside the 6th French Army. I am
sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on the contrary, by
another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which they have shown
in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy’s flank with all
their strength, and in unison with their Allies drive them back.”
No such general orders on the German side have been made public; but
the following summons to the Coblentz Corps of the IV Army, signed by
General Tulffe von Tscheppe u. Weidenbach, was afterward found at
Vitry-le-François:
“The aim of our long and arduous marches has been achieved. The
principal French forces have been compelled to accept battle after
being continuously driven back. The great decision is now at hand. For
the welfare and honour of Germany, I expect every officer and man,
despite the hard and heroic fighting of the last few days, to do his
duty unfailingly and to his last breath. Everything depends upon the
result of to-morrow.”