XXII. But we should not conclude that this was all done by main force,
without the intervention of art or stratagem. The same contrivances,
the same artifices, which we read of in Machiavel, and which have been
practised by the most crafty tyrants of these latter ages, were exerted
in the early ones. Cast your eyes on Romulus, seeking for a specious
pretence of justice for taking away the life of his brother, in order
to remove this obstacle to his reigning without the danger of a rival,
and in security: view his successor, Numa Pompilius also, who was a
most consummate hypocrite, affecting exteriorly to appear religious
and devout, and to pay a great respect to rites and ceremonies. He
pretended to receive visions and revelations from the goddess Egeria,
in order that the Roman people, looking upon him as a man favoured in
an especial manner by heaven, should not only not dare to entertain
thoughts of dethroning him, but permit him to aggrandize himself at
his discretion; we have another example of the same sort of policy, in
Tullius Hostilius, who succeeded Numa, and introduced with great art,
those ostentatious outside appearances, which dazzle the eyes of the
world, and are the most efficacious means to make majesty formidable
and respectable; for he likewise sought out deceitful pretences, for
making war on the neighbouring states: we see Tarquin the Proud also,
availing himself of the stratagem of his son Sextus, who, under the
pretence of being a fugitive from his father’s cruelty, fled to, and
entreated refuge among the Gabians, on whom, after their receiving him
kindly, he artfully prevailed to make him their generalissimo, veiled
with an absolute power; in consequence of which, he was enabled to fell
and betray them. He did so, and they became an easy prey to the Romans.
XXIII. Is not that famous precept of Machiavel’s, that with an enemy
reduced to great straits or difficulties, you should take no middle
course, but, according as you find it most for your interest, should
either ruin him totally, or give him your hand to extricate him out
of his danger; punctually conformable to the advice which Herennius
gave to his son Pontius, who was general of the Samnites? When this
general had shut up the Roman army within the Caudine Forks, he sent
information of it to his father, and at the same time desired to have
his advice, respecting how he should act by them. The old man answered,
that he should generously open the pass, and let them go free, without
any condition or limitation whatever, that might be injurious to, or
affect either their lives, their liberty, or their honour. Pontius,
and all the principal people of the republic who were with the army,
believed, that Herennius had not well understood or considered the
information that had been sent him, nor apprehended, that the whole
Roman army were entirely at their mercy. They therefore sent other
messengers or deputies, with instructions to inform him minutely, of
the unhappy situation and state of the Roman army, whose lives, without
remedy, were at their discretion and disposal. To this he answered,
that they should cut all their throats, and not spare a single man of
them. Two answers so diametrically opposite, made some of them suspect
that the old man was not in his right senses; but notwithstanding this
suspicion, as they had for many years respected him as the oracle and
soul of the republic, the major part of them began to conjecture, and
not without reason, that there was some mystery contained in these
contradictory replies, which they did not comprehend, or were not aware
of; and they therefore desired, that he would come to the camp and
explain himself. He came accordingly, and told them his sentiments;
which were, that they should adopt one or other of the extremes,
and either gain their affections by an heroic act of generosity, or
extirpate them totally, to prevent their ever being able to revenge
themselves for whatever indignity they should impose on them. Pontius
did not follow the advice of the old man, but took a middle way, which
was, to spare their lives, but dismiss them with the loss of their
honour, by obliging consuls, officers, and soldiers, to submit to the
signal disgrace of _passing under the yoke_. The result of this was,
what might easily have been foreseen and expected, the Romans, stung
with the ignominy they had undergone, could not divert their thoughts
from meditating revenge, which they after a while determined to take;
and breaking through the stipulated conditions, they renewed the war
with stronger army, and totally routed and overthrew the Samnites.
XXIV. We must allow, that the determination Pontius took was imprudent;
but it does not follow from thence, that we should approve the advice
of Herennius; for although the first was insecure, the other was cruel
in extreme. He might have fallen upon other expedients, better suited
and proportioned to the nature of the case; such as taking hostages,
and before permitting the army to depart, obliging them to deliver
into their possession, certain towns and districts as pledges, for
the faithful performance of their engagements; but the supposing that
the faith of stipulations or compacts, would have more influence upon
a vain, proud, warlike people, than the indignation conceived for a
gross affront offered to their honour, was very idle, and very silly
confidence.
XXV. Neither, as I have already said, do I think there was any security
in the extreme benign advice of Herennius; for with the Romans,
ambition was more powerful than public faith, or the obligations of
gratitude. A good testimony to this truth, was their behaviour to the
Numantians, which was a true sample of the politics of those times.