VIII. I was once of opinion, that in one special instance, the
public voice was infallible, that is to say, in the approbation, or
reprobation, of particular people. It appeared to me, that he of whom
the public at large entertained a good opinion, was certainly a good
man, and that he was certainly wise, who was generally allowed to be
so, and so on the contrary; but upon reflection, I found that in this
instance also, the popular opinion is liable to mistake. Phocion, as
he was once reprehending the people of Athens with some asperity, was
accosted by his enemy Democritus in these words, “Have a care what you
say, for they will murder you for talking to them in this manner:” “And
do you take care, answered Phocion, or they will murder you likewise,
for pretending to pass your judgment.” This sentence shewed, that he
thought the populace hardly ever right in their decisions, with regard
to people’s qualities or characters. The hard fate of Phocion himself,
confirmed in a great measure this sentiment, because he was afterwards
put to death as an enemy to his country, by the furious populace of
Athens, though he was the best man, which at that time could be found
in all Greece.
IX. An ignorant man having passed for a wise one, and a wise one
being reputed a fool, are things which have been frequent in many
places; and applicable to this, is the pleasant event which happened
to Democritus with his countrymen the Abderites. This philosopher,
who had long meditated on the follies and vanities of mankind, was
accustomed, when any occurrence brought these reflections to his mind,
to burst out into immoderate fits of laughter. The Abderites having
remarked this, although they before esteemed him a very wise man,
concluded that he was gone mad; and they wrote to Hippocrates who
flourished at that time, and earnestly intreated that he would come
and cure him. The good old man suspected how the matter stood, to wit,
that the people were disordered, and not Democritus, and concluded,
that what they mistook for madness, was rather a symptom of great
wisdom. In a letter to his friend Dionysius, informing him of his
being sent for by the Abderites, and the account they had given him of
Democritus’s madness, he expresses himself to this effect, _Ego vero
neque morbum ipsum esse puto, sed immodicam doctrinam, quæ revera non
est immodica, sed ab idiotis putatur_; and writing to Philopemnes, he
says, _Cum non insaniam, sed quandam excellente mentis sanitatem vir
ille declaret_. Afterwards, Hippocrates visited Democritus, and from
a long conversation which he had with him, was satisfied, that his
laughter was founded in wise and solid morality, the justness of which,
he was convinced of and admired. Hippocrates, in a letter he wrote to
Damagetus, gives a particular account of this conversation, and there
may be seen his encomiums upon Democritus; among other things, he says,
Democritus so far from being mad, is the wisest man I ever met with; I
was much instructed by his conversation, and rendered more capable of
instructing others: _Hoc erat illud, Damagete, quod conjectabamus. Non
insanit Democritus, sed super omnia sanit, et nos sapientiores effecit,
et per nos omnes homines._
X. These letters are to be found in the works of Hippocrates, and are
well deserving of being read, especially that to Damagetus; and from
them may be inferred, not only how much the public at large are capable
of being mistaken in their opinion of an individual; but also, with how
little reason, many authors paint Democritus as a half-mad ridiculous
person; for nobody disputes the judgment and wisdom of Hippocrates,
who, after treating seriously and at large on the subject, gives so
opposite a testimony in his discussion of the matter; for he declares,
that in his judgment, Democritus was the most learned and wise man in
the world; and in a letter of Hippocrates to Democritus, he recognizes
him for the greatest natural philosopher upon earth: _Optimum naturæ,
ac mundi interpretem te judicavi_. Hippocrates was then grown old, for
in the same letter he says, _Ego enim ad finem medicinæ perveni, etiam
si jam senex sim_; and consequently, capable of forming a good judgment
of the abilities of Democritus.
I am disposed to think, that the accusation which some authors bring
against Aristotle is a probable one, that is, that he did not fairly
lay open to the world the opinions of other philosophers who preceded
him, to the end, that by discrediting all those, he might establish the
sovereignty of his own doctrine, and that he did by them, as the great
Lord Bacon says the Ottoman Emperors do by their brothers, put them all
to death, that they may reign in security.