I. _Æstimes judicia, non numeres_, said Seneca, (Epist. 39). The value
of opinions, should be computed by the weight, not by the number of
votaries. The ignorant, though numerous, are ignorant still; what
benefit then is to be expected from their determinations? It is rather
probable, that the multitude, by increasing the partizans of error,
would increase obstacles to the advancement of truth. If it was a
barbarous superstition in the Molossians, an antient people of Epirus,
to constitute the trunk of an oak for the organ of Apollo; would it be
less so, to concede this privilege to the whole Dodonean Wood? and if
from a stone, unless modelled by the hand of an artist, you could not
produce the image of Minerva, the same impossibility would continue,
although you add to it all the rocks of a mountain. One wise person,
will always discern more than a croud of simpletons, as one eagle can
better see the sun, than an army of owls.
II. Pope John the XXIII. being once asked what was the thing most
distant from truth, answered, the opinion of the vulgar. The severe
Phocion was so firmly of this sentiment, that observing, while he was
once making an oration in Athens, the people with one consent raise
their voices in his applause, asked his friends who were near him,
what mistake he had been guilty of, as he was persuaded, the blind
populace were incapable of applauding any thing but absurdities.
I don’t approve these rigorous decisions, nor can I consider the
populace, as the precise antipodes to the hemisphere of truth; they are
sometimes right, but this generally speaking, is either the result of
chance, or the effect of borrowed reflection. Some wise man, I don’t
remember who, compared the vulgar to the moon, on account of their
inconstancy: the comparison however was just, as they never shine by
the power of their own lights. _Non consilium in vulgo, non ratio, non
discrimen, non diligentia_, said Tully. (Orat. pro Planc.) There is not
in this vast body, any native illumination, wherewith can be discerned
the true from the false; the light is all borrowed, and reflected
superficially; for by reason of its opacity, the rays cannot penetrate
through it.
III. The public is an instrument of various sounds, which (unless it
happens by some rare accident) till adjusted by a skilful hand, is
hardly ever in tune. Epicurus was dreaming, when he imagined, that
infinite atoms impelled by chance, and wandering through the air,
could, without the interposition of a supreme will, form this admirable
system of the globe. Peter Gassendi, and the other modern refiners
upon Epicurus, added to this vulgar confusion, a disposition and
regulation, executed by the divine hand; but even supposing this, it
will be difficult for us to comprehend, by what means, the rudeness
of matter was polished, and the earth rendered capable of producing
the most trifling plant. The vulgar of mankind, differ but little
from the vulgarity of the atoms; and as from the casual concurrence
of our sentiments, there would hardly ever result a regular series of
established truths, it becomes necessary, that the Supreme Being should
superintend the business. But how must this be done? Why by employing
learned and wise men as his subalterns, and using them as a secondary
means, to dispose and organize such material entities.
IV. Those who ascribe so great authority to the common voice, don’t
foresee a dangerous consequence, that treads close on the heels of
their tenet; for if the decision of what is truth, was to be confided
to the plurality of voices, you should look for sound doctrine in the
Alcoran of Mahomed, and not in the Gospel of Christ; it being certain,
that the Alcoran would have more votes in its favour than the Gospel. I
am so far from being of opinion, that such a question should be decided
by numbers, that I think it ought to be determined the reverse, because
in the nature of things, error occupies a much larger field than
truth, and the vulgar of mankind, as the lowest and most humble portion
of the rational world, may be compared to the element of earth, whose
bowels contain little gold, but much iron.