PETROLEUM IN THE GREAT WAR
No survey of the place that petroleum holds in the social and
industrial organization of the world would be complete without some
reference of the role it played in the late war. It was inevitable
that in a crisis where all the scientific, mechanical and organizing
genius of the leading nations was concentrated on instrumentalities
to strengthen themselves and weaken or destroy the foe, a product of
so many applications should prove a tremendous factor. It would be
indeed possible to write a lengthy volume on the influence of petroleum
on history, based on actual deductions drawn from the incidents of
that greatest of conflicts. It was an indispensable factor in the new
methods of warfare that were developed; it influenced the military
and diplomatic strategy of all belligerents; it was a stupendous
contributor to the victory of the Allied and Associated powers. Earl
Curzon of Kedleston, a member of the British War Cabinet, stated
the fact tersely when he said, shortly after the signing of the
armistice--“The Allies floated to victory on a sea of oil.”
This was intended as a direct commentary on the assistance rendered by
the United States to that cause and was a just acknowledgment of one
phase of this country’s contribution.
In the preceding chapter the growing maritime importance of petroleum
has been shown, and it was therefore inevitable that in a conflict in
which sea power was so decisive an influence that it should have been
closely related to naval effort. Even if the uses of petroleum had
been confined to one instrument of warfare merely--the submarine--it
would have influenced the course of history and the fate of nations.
Without petroleum the submarine as an effective agent in war could not
have come into existence, and the whole story of the conflict from
the winter of 1915 onward would have been different. Again, without
petroleum no air-craft could have left terra firma, and military
tactics based on the powers of observation provided by these “eyes of
the army” would not have come into existence. It must also be admitted
that the toll of destruction both on land and sea would not have been
so great. It would not have been possible for any country to embark on
a diabolical policy of destroying unarmed ships and unfortified cities,
and wreaking vengeance on helpless non-combatants. But these crimes
cannot be charged against petroleum itself, but rather against the
ingenuity of men bent on destruction.
These were but two instances of the part petroleum played in the war.
It is no exaggeration to say that there was no phase of belligerent
activity in which it was not an active agent. From the very outset of
hostilities in August, 1914, discerning men in Allied countries foresaw
that victory must rest with the side which commanded the greater
reserves of petroleum. Thus from the beginning America, as the chief
source of the world’s supply, was recognized as a factor of inestimable
importance in the ultimate decision. Germany was as fully alive to
this circumstance as her enemies. The high commands of the warring
nations, from the very outset, took into consideration the desirability
of securing possession of the oil fields in other lands. It was one of
the aims of the British navy in driving German ships from the seas to
prevent oil reaching the Central Empires from the Western Hemisphere.
Later, when the blockade of Germany was definitely established and
pressure was brought to bear against countries suspected of enabling
Germany to obtain various classes of supplies by indirect purchase,
petroleum products were regarded as the most important items in the
extended list of contraband of war.
On land, oil constantly influenced the thoughts of generals. The great
and lengthy Russian offensive against Lemberg in Galicia aimed at
cutting off Germany and Austria from recourse to the oil fields of
that region. The long drawn out diplomatic embroglio with regard to
Roumania all centred around the oil fields of that country. Germany
was determined that Roumania should be forced into the war, either as
an ally or an enemy; for in either case it would give her a pretext to
seize the oil fields. In the end a British military mission destroyed
the wells to prevent their utilization by the German invaders. In the
operations of Turkey against Russia the oil wells of Baku were the
objective. The early British operations in Mesopotamia were chiefly
intended as a precautionary measure for the protection of oil fields
of which the Persian Gulf is the outlet. Citations such as these from
the history of the war on all fronts could be multiplied to show how
closely the petroleum question was interlocked with belligerent action.
It is admitted by candid historians that at the outset of the war
the British Government did not appear sufficiently to appreciate the
grave importance of petroleum products in the prosecution of war.
The conflict had not been in progress for more than a few months,
however, when the disruption of the European fields and the obstacles
to obtaining regular supplies from the far East caused grave alarm both
in London and Paris. It was then that the friendship of the American
people for the Allied cause made itself felt in practical form. Had
American oil interests then proved hostile or indifferent; had the
Government of this country yielded to Germanic pressure and placed
an embargo on oil shipments, the cause of the Allies would have been
doomed. In 1917 it was admitted in the British House of Commons that
adequate supplies of petroleum products were quite as essential as men
and munitions. This was almost an understatement, because without the
aid of petroleum the necessary maximum of effort in other respects
would have been impossible.
Apart from naval and aerial needs, a reminiscent picture of the
Western Front during the three or four years of trench warfare reveals
the predominant importance of petroleum. It proved a decisive factor as
early as the Battle of the Marne. It will be recalled that one of the
greatest factors in Marshal Joffre’s victory was the feat of General
Gallieni in transporting a fresh army from the Paris area to the front
by commandeering nearly every motor car and taxicab in Paris. Thus,
petrol transport hastily improvised saved Paris and turned the scale
of the 1914 campaign against the Germans. It will be recalled that the
conflict then settled down to a prolonged era of trench warfare. The
Allies commenced the construction of strategic railways to support
the armies of the line, but between the railheads and the actual
battlefront in the long stretch from the North Sea to the borders of
Switzerland, transport was almost wholly dependent on motor spirit
or gasoline. Innumerable heavy motor lorries carried food, guns and
ammunition to the fighting forces. But the function of petroleum
products on land did not end in its association with commissariat and
supply. It was an aggressive instrument. The greatest new factor in
land fighting that the war developed was the “tank”--a land battle
cruiser, first introduced by the British at the Battle of the Somme
in July, 1916, and afterwards adopted by all armies. This great
instrument of war was wholly dependent on petroleum products for its
power of movement. Without the internal combustion engine operated by
gasoline it would have been an immobile toy. Again, when liquid fire
came into use petroleum was the basis; and in another great destructive
agent--the explosive, known as T. N. T.--toluol, which is found in some
of the heavier grades of petroleum, was a basic constituent.
Though petroleum in the hands of inventors became an agent of terrible
destruction, it had its beneficent uses in battle as well as in periods
of tranquility. Armies organized on so vast a scale could not have been
fed without it. When the battle raged the Red Cross vehicles which
performed the work of transporting the wounded to the dressing stations
and field hospitals were propelled by gasoline. And when darkness had
fallen on the fray the oil lamp and the paraffine candle were lighted
to cheer the tired soldiers. An English writer who visited the front in
1917 wrote of the all-pervading uses of petroleum: “It was to be found
wherever there was a vestige of life in those zones of battle; the
soldiers in their, at times, lonely dug-outs, used oil for cooking as
well as light, and all traffic was guided from disaster along the roads
by the use of oil, which also offered the only source of artificial
light in the Red Cross vehicles. What an immense organization it was
which depended for its ceaseless activities upon the products of
petroleum.”
The British established a petroleum depot at Calais of an immensity
previously unprecedented, where all products required for the
organization of transport were stored; and it must be noted that
lubricants of all kinds were as essential as gasoline itself, to keep
moving the wheels of the innumerable motors that were employed by the
various arms of the service.
If petroleum was the life blood of activity in the battle areas, it was
not less so of the munition factories where the means of offense were
fabricated. Had a real petroleum famine arisen during the days when
factories in Britain and France were straining every effort to keep
their armies supplied with the means of combat it would have been an
incalculable catastrophe. Though the Allies, once they really awakened
to the dangers of the situation, had pursued the policy of piling up
reserves of petroleum products there were times when the failure of a
single tanker to arrive on schedule time from this side of the Atlantic
caused grave apprehension; and when in April, 1917, the United States
entered the war, reserve supplies had fallen dangerously low.
If only because it placed the entire oil resources of America at
the disposal of the Allies, the entry of the United States into the
conflict proved the salvation of their cause; and the story of what
the oil interests of this country did to strengthen the hands of the
fighting men is one of the brightest chapters in the history of the
war. After the armistice, Marshal Foch summarized that achievement in
these words: “No military operation of the Allies on sea, on land,
under sea or in the air was ever interrupted by the lack of petroleum
supplies.”
Unquestionably one of the motives which actuated Germany when, in
February 1917, she decreed unrestricted submarine warfare and ordered
the Stars and Stripes off the seas, was the hope of cutting off the
petroleum supplies of her foes. Even before President Wilson declared
war, several American tankers had been sunk by German U-boats. The
German Government fully understood that a cessation of oil shipments
from American ports would mean an almost immediate paralysis of
belligerent effectiveness in her foes and the “German Peace,” for which
they had long been manoeuvring, would have been accomplished. When
activity was keenest on the Western front eighty per cent. of the oil
and oil fuel used by the Allies came from the United States. After the
war was over it was revealed that forty-eight per cent. of the fighting
force of the British navy was dependent on oil for fuel and any delay
in the supply would have brought the Allies down with a crash.
It is now admitted that in the Spring of 1917 the Allies were closer to
disaster than was known to any, save a few men at the head of affairs.
It was a turning point in the world’s history. Next to man-power and
munitions the resources needed above all others were petroleum and its
products. The French coal fields had been lost. There was a labour
shortage in Great Britain; Russian, Roumanian and Galician sources of
supply were now definitely in the hands of the enemy. The Mediterranean
Sea, through which the Far Eastern supplies must come, was a hot-bed of
submarines; and indeed losses of oil steamers in all dangerous waters
were so great as to show that they had been named as special targets
by the German high command.
An exchange of confidence between the Allies and the United States
naturally followed the decision of this country to defend the freedom
of the seas. Immediately after President Wilson’s declaration of war,
urgent despatches from Great Britain warned our government that reserve
supplies of petroleum in Europe were so low that unless immediate
assistance were rendered, a partial demobilization of the British fleet
must ensue. “We must have oil” said Marshal Foch, whose prescience had
not yet been rewarded by elevation to the Supreme Command, “or we shall
lose the war.” Italy was in no better position, fuel oil, aviation
naphtha, gasoline and lubricants had been so seriously depleted.
When the secret of the situation was confidentially communicated to the
leaders of the American oil industry, there was an instant response.
The National Petroleum War Service Committee was formed, with Mr. A. C.
Bedford, Chairman of the Board of the Standard Oil Company, (N. J.) as
its presiding officer. The organization embraced all the oil companies
of the United States. Those who had been life-long keen business rivals
joined hands to keep the great war machine in Europe in action.
Profits became a minor consideration. Agreements to stabilize prices
and curb speculation were formulated and observed. Production on a
scale previously unprecedented in this land of enormous oil production
was organized. Soon it was recognized that the work of the National
Petroleum War Service Committee, though unostentatiously performed,
was the most efficient and the most fruitful in results for the cause
of democracy of any industrial institution in the war. It achieved the
remarkable feat of meeting every war demand for petroleum products of
all kinds, of conveying these products across the Atlantic, despite
the submarine scourge. When the war came to an end there were larger
stocks on hand in Great Britain and European countries for the use of
the armies and navies of America and her allies than at any previous
time in history. These results were achieved by the voluntary efforts
of thousands of men serving in every phase of the oil industry, crude
production, refining and transportation. After the armistice the
Government of France, in recognition of what had been accomplished,
conferred on Mr. Bedford the Cross of the Legion of Honour.
Co-ordination having been arranged, the problems to be dealt with came
under two heads, (1) Increased production; (2) Sea-transport. The first
constitutes a record of highly organized endeavour never surpassed in
the history of industry; the second one of actual heroism.
Plans for increased production were well under way by the summer
of 1917 and it must be remembered that the entrance of the United
States into the war and our resolve to create an immense and fully
equipped army greatly increased domestic necessities in addition to
the obligation to keep our allies in Europe supplied. The thoughts of
all were fixed on the great blows which were to end the war in 1918.
When the winter of 1917–8 arrived it seemed as though the elements were
fighting on the side of the Hohenzollerns. The extraordinary severity
of that winter, complicated by a coal shortage, all but paralyzed
railroad traffic. Thus, deliveries of the finished products necessary
to war industry and belligerent activity were embarrassed in a degree
that caused the greatest anxiety to the National Petroleum Committee.
Yet somehow or other it performed its task and the refineries trebled
their pre-war output, expanding their capacities like an accordion.
In addition to the vast quantities consumed at home, shipments abroad
arose to stupendous figures. In the year 1918, 2,628,961 tons of
fuel oil alone were shipped from the Eastern seaboard for the use of
allied navies; and in the same year more than one million tons of high
distillates and other petroleum products also crossed the Atlantic,
entailing more than 500 tank steamer loadings.
This was accomplished in the face of a shipping shortage that appalled
those in the secret of its extent and in the face of the submarine
activity virulently directed against oil cargoes. It was in this matter
that the sailors of the American merchant marine showed a heroism
not excelled by soldiers in the field or the seamen of any nation.
The great value to civilization of the fleet of tank steamers built
up by American oil exporters was also demonstrated. When President
Wilson declared war one great company had already lost three big
vessels through submarine attack, and during the war these losses
were augmented by seven more, representing a loss of more than 75,000
deadweight tons and a toll of many lives. To meet its losses this
particular company undertook to build a new ship for each sunk, and
so efficiently was this policy carried out that its fleet, which had
totalled 445,975 tons at the commencement of unrestricted submarine
warfare in February, 1917, had grown to 492,080 tons under the American
flag when the armistice was signed in November, 1918. Nor was the
problem of shipping limited to that of carrying petroleum across the
Atlantic. Much was required for coastwise trade in North and South
America.
The resourcefulness of the oil men of America was not confined to
mastering the seemingly insuperable problems of increased production
and transport. A minor contribution to the efficient prosecution of the
war was the construction of a pipe line across Scotland to supply the
British and American navies in the North Sea and avoid sending tank
steamers through the dangerous sea routes leading to the naval bases on
that body of water. This work was carried out by Mr. Forrest M. Towl,
President of the Southern and other pipe line companies, and was in
full operation shortly before the armistice was signed. In this work
both the American navy and the British Admiralty coöperated.
Even apart from its wonderful assistance to belligerent action on
land, it is clear that petroleum played a vital part in winning the
war at sea. The following succinct statement of what it accomplished
was given by a well-known oil man conversant with all phases of the
subject, shortly after the armistice.
“Oil and internal combustion engine made possible the submarine,
enabling Germany to stave off defeat as long as she did, but oil burned
under boilers gave us the increased efficiency of the destroyer, which
conquered the submarine. It was the ability of the Allies to obtain a
constant, ample supply of oil and the superiority of oil over coal as
fuel for naval operations that finally turned the tide of battle and
proved a decisive factor in the war.
“The destroyers that broke down the morale of Germany’s undersea crews
were oil burners of such remarkable flexibility and speed as to bring
about a sharp change in naval practice. It took some time to bring the
number of destroyers up to the work laid out for them by Germany’s
early advantage, but the fate of the undersea boat was sealed with
the arrival of the first oil-fired destroyer in the waters where the
submarine preyed. The original fleet of war vessels which the United
States despatched to convey merchant vessels and hunt U-boats were all
16,250 horse power, which at top speed could show 32 to 35 knots an
hour. Later on we had destroyers developing 27,000 horse power but the
small boats had already proved the case for oil fuel in war.
“One of the reasons for the success of the destroyer in keeping the
lanes of travel reasonably free from the undersea menace was the
ability of the oil-fired warships to take on fuel in the open sea.
The American flotilla had a tank supply vessel stationed at longitude
36 degrees West, from which oil was taken on by the destroyers at
the rate of 40,000 gallons an hour, without interruption even in the
roughest weather. Indeed, there were times when bunkering was done with
both vessels travelling at six knots an hour. Similarly oil gave the
larger warships increased speed and independence in the matter of fuel
stations.
“The British battle cruisers with which Admiral Sturdee destroyed the
German fleet at the Falkland Islands were oil burners. To-day, modern
war vessels are using liquid fuel almost exclusively, the United States
having definitely abandoned coal-fired boilers in its construction
plans some time ago.”
In addition to other advantages it carried, the use of oil fuel in the
War was of great practical value, for the following principal reasons:
A lesser tonnage of oil replaced the amount of coal required for the
same steaming radius, or an equal tonnage of oil gave the men-of-war a
greatly increased steaming radius.
Boilers fired by oil have a much greater steaming capacity than with
coal, so that the actual speed of a ship converted to use oil fuel is
materially increased without any change in boilers or engines.
In war operations the oil burners can lay down a heavy smoke screen at
will by turning more oil into the burners than can be consumed with
the air supply admitted. This results in a heavy bank of smoke which
destroyers throw out to hide the larger ships from the enemy, or which
merchant ships produce to conceal their whereabouts from submarines.
Petroleum thus proved an indispensable factor in saving the world from
autocratic domination, just as during the previous half century it had
become an incalculable influence in the arts of civilization, and had
effected a beneficent revolution not only in the industrial but the
social life of countless communities. By American methods of business
organization it has been made to yield its highest potentialities
for the good of humanity, both in peace and war. If this little
book brings to any reader a fuller knowledge of the romance and
all-penetrating importance of this great birth-right of the American
people it will have served its purpose.
[Illustration: A tanker being loaded with gasoline and oil at a
refinery dock at Port Arthur, Texas, one of the large Gulf oil ports]
[Illustration: Kansas wells flowing oil into a temporary sump, or
earthen reservoir]