THE CORUNNA CAMPAIGN, AND AFTER.
After the occupation of Lisbon, Sir Arthur Wellesley, deeming it
improbable that the army would resume operations for some months,
went home on leave of absence; and, a little later, Sir John Moore
was given command of the British forces in Portugal. In October he
received despatches from Government wherein he was informed that
it had been decided to send Sir David Baird, with 10,000 men, to
Corunna, and Moore was instructed to take the 20,000 British troops
from Lisbon, and to form a junction with him forthwith, when,
together with the Spanish army, he was to attack the French and drive
them out of Spain.
To carry out his orders Moore had a choice of routes; he could
transport his force by sea to Corunna, or he could march through
Portugal and Spain. The former plan he rejected, as being likely
to cause delay; for, with sailing vessels and at such a season of
the year, it was impossible to estimate the length of time that the
voyage would occupy. He decided, therefore, to adopt the land route,
knowing that, if necessary, he could send his ships up the coast to
some port, which would then become his base, instead of Lisbon.
Accordingly, he desired Baird to march south-east to meet him at a
point to be afterwards named, probably either Valladolid or Burgos,
but the exact spot depending on the movements of the French.
Nearly three months before this the 51st had been warned for
active service, and on the 18th August marched from Chichester
to Portsmouth, where the regiment embarked in three transports,
to join Sir David Baird's force, then assembling at Falmouth for
some undisclosed destination. The regiment, mustering six hundred
bayonets, was in fine fettle, and Captain Sam Rice was in command of
the light infantry company. But eager as he and his brother officers
were to get to business, they were forced to possess their souls in
patience, for they were kept on board their transports for upwards
of two months, with little or nothing to do, except to discuss the
object of the expedition, their knowledge of which was vague in the
extreme. As far as the soldiers were concerned, they were jubilant,
and from a cause which nowadays may seem trivial. The order had gone
forth that their hair was no longer to be "tied," but cut short at
the neck! At length the long weeks of waiting came to an end, and on
the 8th October Baird's fleet of transports sailed from Falmouth,
five days later anchoring off Corunna. But even then further delays
occurred, as the Spanish officials objected to the landing of the
force, and it was another fortnight before the disembarkation was
completed.
To return to Moore. Before the end of October he had set his troops
in motion, but his arrangements were much upset by the reports of the
state of the roads which he wished to utilise for his march. So bad
were they said to be, that he considered it advisable to divide his
force and move by two routes; and before long he had reason to be
anxious about the safety of his detached columns, for the situation
was undergoing a change. At the time of his departure from Lisbon,
Moore had every reason to believe that the Spanish troops, aided
by the British forces under himself and Baird, would be able to
deal a heavy blow to the French invaders, and in this belief he was
supported by the knowledge that King Joseph, fearful of the impending
attack, had withdrawn from Madrid to the neighbourhood of Vittoria,
where he concentrated the French army on the Ebro. But Moore did know
that at this very time Napoleon was pouring reinforcements over the
Pyrenees in such quantities as to bring the strength of the French in
Spain up to some 250,000 men.
Napoleon had determined to secure Spain and Portugal at all costs;
and, placing himself at the head of the reinforcements, early in
November defeated a Spanish force which attempted to bar his way, and
advanced rapidly to Burgos. Thence he pushed a corps to the Carrion
river, to protect his right flank from the British, while he moved on
Madrid. In the meantime, Moore's main body was marching, viâ Ciudad
Rodrigo, on Salamanca; while Hope, with the cavalry, artillery,
and ammunition, had been sent by the circuitous route, Badajoz,
Talavera, Madrid, Escorial Pass, to rejoin Moore at Salamanca,
Valladolid, Burgos, or elsewhere, according to orders to be issued to
him later.
On the 15th November Moore reached Salamanca, and learned that the
French had already occupied Valladolid. Consequently he decided to
wait at Salamanca until Baird and Hope could join him. But the two
latter had met with great difficulties in the matter of transport,
and had been delayed beyond all expectations, so that on the 26th
November the head of Baird's column had got no farther than Astorga,
five marches north-west of Salamanca, and Hope was at the Escorial
Pass, six marches south-east of Salamanca. On that same day Lefebre's
French Corps, of 30,000 men, was approaching Valladolid, barely three
marches north-east of Salamanca, while Napoleon himself, marching on
Madrid, was at Arauda, some sixty miles as the crow flies due east
of Valladolid. Fortunately for the divided British forces, Napoleon
was in ignorance of their whereabouts; neither, on the other hand,
was Moore aware of the exact situation of the French, until two days
later, when both he and Hope were informed of Napoleon's proximity.
Hope realised at once that he must risk everything in the attempt
to take his artillery and ammunition to Moore at Salamanca; while
the latter, after sending orders to Baird to retire on Corunna
or Vigo, decided to wait as long as possible for Hope, and then,
retracing his steps into Portugal, defend the frontier and cover
Lisbon. Fortune favoured Hope, who, making a desperate cross-country
march, successfully formed a junction with Moore at Salamanca,
whereupon Moore changed his plans. He had heard that the Spaniards
intended to defend Madrid to the last, and, in order to assist them
in their endeavour, he determined on a bold stroke. He saw that
Napoleon's vast army was, like some beast of prey, sprawled out over
the provinces of Spain and crawling forward with open jaws within
measurable distance of Madrid; he saw the hopelessness of trying
conclusions with a beast ten times his own strength, but he knew
that if he suddenly dealt a furious blow on the beast's tail the
beast would spring round and attempt to rend him. This, then, was Sir
John Moore's idea when, at the beginning of December, he made up his
mind to strike at Napoleon's line of communications, which stretched
back to the Pyrenees. He calculated that Napoleon would immediately
turn upon him with all his strength, and the Spanish and Portuguese
forces would thus be given time to collect for the defence of their
respective capitals. His own subsequent line of action he had also
worked out carefully: having dealt his blow, and having succeeded in
bringing the bulk of the French army against him, he would draw off
his little force to Corunna or Vigo, and at one or the other place
embark and sail to Lisbon or Cadiz.
Fresh orders were therefore despatched to Baird, who had meanwhile
retired from Astorga, three marches to Villafranca. In these he was
instructed to advance towards Valladolid, and on the 11th December
Moore moved towards the same place, reaching the river Douro on the
13th. Here a French despatch was intercepted, and from it Moore
discovered the true state of affairs. Napoleon had captured Madrid
nine days before, had despatched Lefebre towards Lisbon and his
other corps in various directions, and now ordered Soult to move
his corps from the Carrion river westward into Galicia. It was also
evident, from this French despatch, that Napoleon had no knowledge
of the movements of the British, and that Soult's corps was without
support and of no great strength. So Moore decided to strike at Soult
forthwith, and, with this object, arranged with Baird to join forces
at Mayorga, instead of at Valladolid, at the same time instructing
his ships at Lisbon to proceed up the coast to Vigo, and giving
orders for the establishment of supply depôts along the route by
which he intended eventually to withdraw to the ships.
Upon receipt of these orders Baird advanced again to Astorga and,
on the 20th December, joined Moore at Mayorga. He took with him all
available battalions, but some were still in rear, since the Spanish
authorities had been unable to provide transport or provisions on
the road for any but small bodies of troops moving at intervals of
some days. The 51st Regiment, forming part of Leith's Brigade, was
still far behind, and did not come into the zone of operations until
the eventual retreat was in full swing. Moore, however, now had
sufficient men for his purpose, for he knew that Soult's force was
in numbers inferior to his own; and the operations at once commenced
by a brilliant cavalry action, in which Paget, with 400 British
sabres, routed 600 of the French cavalry at Sahagun. Soult was now
known to be at Saldanha and Carrion, and Moore decided to halt his
force for forty-eight hours in order to allow the rear divisions to
close up, and then to attack at dawn on the 24th December. On the
night of the 23rd-24th the troops set out on the march which was to
bring them at daylight before the bridge of Carrion, but they had not
marched far before they received the unwelcome order to retrace their
steps and return to their bivouacs at Sahagun. Moore had received
information which upset all his calculations; the scheme which he had
devised for drawing Napoleon's armies after him had worked only too
successfully, for he learned that Napoleon was already in full march
upon him, and that within a few hours the situation of the British
army might become critical. He determined, therefore, to abandon the
attack on Soult and endeavour to carry out his original programme by
withdrawing to his ships before Napoleon's masses should fall upon
him. That Christmas day was spent by the disappointed army in making
the second march of the long and arduous retreat to Corunna.
Napoleon, as was his wont when once his mind was made up, came like
a thunderbolt. On the 21st December, at the head of 40,000 men and
150 guns, he left Madrid, and, although he had to negotiate high
mountain passes, often blocked with snow, he marched a hundred miles
in less than five days, reaching Tordesillas, on the Douro, on the
25th December, and having his advanced cavalry well ahead of him on
the way to Benevente. He firmly believed that he and Soult had now
ringed-in Moore's force, which he imagined to be still at Sahagun.
But Moore, leaving only his cavalry and the two light brigades of
infantry at that place, had slipped away in the nick of time and
had crossed the Esla by the 26th without serious molestation. On
the following day the British cavalry fought long and gallantly and
completely checked the pursuit; on the 28th Craufurd's light, or
flank, brigade covered the withdrawal of the cavalry over the Esla by
the bridge of Castro Gonzalo and then blew up the bridge; and on the
29th the cavalry again covered themselves with glory by defeating a
strong body of French horsemen who had succeeded in fording the river.
On that day Moore's columns, which had been marching by two different
routes, re-united at Astorga, and there the soldiers felt convinced
that they would be called upon to halt and fight, since they knew
that Moore had told the Spanish general that he would make a stand
at Astorga, and they saw 10,000 Spaniards come into the place. But
Moore had given up all idea of offering battle until he had reached
the coast and was within sight of his ships. His men had already
suffered from the hard marching in pouring rain and in snow, and
along bad roads ankle-deep in mud; provisions were becoming scanty,
and the General considered it advisable to push on with all speed to
Villafranca and Lugo, where large supply depôts had been formed. On
the 30th December he rested his troops at Astorga, and by the 31st
both British and Spaniards were clear of the place, which was entered
within thirty-six hours by the infantry of Napoleon and Soult, coming
from La Baneza, where they had joined hands in the closing hours of
1808.
The new year opened on 25,000 dispirited, and even sullen, British
soldiers marching through the snow-laden passes, and unable to
understand why they should not turn and fight. Discipline became
lax; the men broke the ranks in search of plunder and drink; and the
stragglers were only kept on the move by the exertions of the cavalry
of the rearguard.
Yet Moore had outwitted Napoleon, who, in sheer disgust at having
failed to cut off his adversary, halted two days at Benevente, handed
over the pursuit to Soult, and himself returned to Paris--not again
to encounter British troops in the field until the eventful day
when his fate was sealed at Waterloo. His deputy, however, took up
the work with zeal and alacrity, and pressed forward to Astorga as
rapidly as possible.
The horrors of the retreat of the British army after leaving Astorga
have been so often described that it is needless to refer to them
further than to say that, with the exception of some dozen regiments,
the troops were completely demoralised and out of hand. Moore's
feelings of bitterness can be well understood, for here, almost at
the first trial, the discipline which he had assiduously preached
throughout his service had completely broken down. But this condition
of affairs existed only among the troops of the main body, for the
regiments forming the rearguard (which included the three which
he had personally trained at Shorncliffe) behaved throughout with
conspicuous gallantry and prevented Soult's pursuing force from
overwhelming the disorganised army.
Passing through Bembibre and Villafranca, Moore reached Lugo after
forced marching from which the men were worn out, and here he
decided to halt in order to enable the stragglers to come up, and,
if necessary, give battle. This, in a measure, raised the spirits of
the army, as the men far preferred the prospects of a fierce fight
to those of an immediate continuance of retreat. But, perhaps, the
greatest check to the demoralisation which had set in was the fact
that, at Lugo, Moore had the satisfaction of finding a most welcome
addition to his force in Leith's Brigade of 1800 fresh men, who had
not been harassed by the arduous marches of the past week, and with
Leith's Brigade, as has been already mentioned, was the 51st Regiment
and Captain Sam Rice.
At Lugo, therefore, on the 6th January 1809, Moore took up a strong
position, and all ranks, full of hopes of being speedily attacked,
fell into their places with evident delight. That same evening
the rearguard came into Lugo, and on the following morning Soult
appeared. But he felt his way with caution, and soon learned that
the force opposed to him was not merely the rearguard, which had
always been keeping him back, but Moore's whole army. Making a feint
attack on the Guards' Brigade on the right of the position, he moved
a division against the left, which was held by Leith's Brigade. The
fight soon began in earnest; Soult's guns opened on the advanced
piquets of the 76th Regiment, which then fell back on the 51st, when
the two regiments began to use their muskets with vigour. At this
moment Moore himself was an eye-witness of what was taking place,
and realising that Leith's men were greatly outnumbered by their
assailants, yet knowing that he could spare no troops to reinforce
them, galloped up to the 51st, and, appealing to his old regiment to
stand firm, placed himself at their head. The response was immediate
and unanimous. With a wild cheer the men emptied their muskets at the
enemy, then, without hesitation, charged home, and drove the French
before them at the point of the bayonet. The day was saved, and the
enemy, with a loss of some three hundred men, drew off.
But this gallant action, which received the well-merited praise of
the General, produced a state of affairs such as Moore least desired;
for Soult feared to attack the position again until he should
receive reinforcements from the rear. Throughout the 8th January the
British army remained in its position, expectant and ready, with its
officers and soldiers prepared to stake everything on the issue of
the hoped-for battle. Yet the day passed without a sign of a French
advance, and towards evening Moore's spirits fell, for he guessed
that Soult was waiting for reinforcements. At first he thought of
turning on his adversary while he was still weak, but he came to the
conclusion that the risk was too great; on the other hand, to remain
where he was until Soult should consider himself strong enough to
renew the attack would be suicidal. Therefore, he saw but one way
open to him--viz., to slip away from the position and continue the
retreat to the coast; and, his mind made up, he issued his orders for
the march. Destroying such stores and horses as would hinder their
progress, and leaving their bivouac fires burning in order to deceive
the enemy, the disheartened troops evacuated the position in the
dead of night. Fortune was against them all through the night; rain
fell in torrents, and the inky darkness made it impossible for them
to see their way, so that, by dawn, instead of having put fifteen
miles between themselves and the enemy, many benighted battalions,
after marching all night, found themselves but five miles from their
starting-point, and yet thoroughly exhausted. But Soult did not
discover that his enemy had gone until late next morning, and even
then he appears to have been unwilling to push the pursuit as rapidly
as he might have done.
Continuing the retreat in wretched weather, Moore's troops suffered
every manner of hardship and privation, but on reaching Betanzos,
on the morning of the 10th January, matters began to improve. The
columns were still well covered by the rearguard, who kept the French
at a distance; the sea was within sight, and the climate and weather
improved considerably. Moreover, provisions had been sent forward
from Corunna to Betanzos, and the half-starved men received ample
food; so that, seeing all their troubles at an end, they made the
last march to Corunna, on the 11th, with light hearts. But Moore had
no such feelings, for he had received the depressing news that his
ships, which he had ordered to come round from Vigo to Corunna, and
which he had expected to find in the harbour, had been delayed by
stress of weather. Doubtful for how long he would have to wait, and
within how short a time Soult would be able to bring overwhelming
force against him, the General prepared for the worst, making all
arrangements to fight, as well as for the immediate embarkation of
his army so soon as the ships should arrive. The bridges outside
Corunna were blown up, and all stores, munitions of war, and horses,
which he would not be able to remove, Moore caused to be destroyed.
On the 14th January the ships entered the harbour, and the
embarkation of the sick and wounded, guns, cavalry horses, and
transport animals was proceeded with as quickly as possible.
Meanwhile Soult began to press in, and Moore, seeing that he could
not expect to embark all his troops without a fight, selected a
defensive position some two miles outside Corunna. The four days'
rest, with good food, had had a wonderful effect on his men; the
stragglers had come in; fresh arms and ammunition had been supplied
from the ample stores at Corunna; the sickly men had been sent to
the ships; and the General found that he still had 15,000 determined
infantry soldiers and nine guns wherewith to withstand Soult's
onslaught. All the morning of the 16th the French were seen to be
massing in front of the position, but Soult apparently still feared
to attack, and Moore, thinking that he would not do so, gave orders
for the embarkation to continue. Yet, an hour later, Soult's guns
suddenly opened, and his columns dashed forward. Moore, overjoyed at
the sight, and sure of victory, saw before him a great and glorious
finale to the painful scenes which he had witnessed during the
previous weeks, and rode from point to point of the field, giving his
orders with calmness, and inspiring confidence in all directions. For
some time the battle raged furiously; the French were as eager for
the fray as were the British; here and there the latter were forced
to give way, but re-forming rapidly, turned again, and recovered
the lost ground. At length, the issue of the fight was no longer
doubtful; the French were driven back on all sides; the order for a
general advance of the victorious British line was given, and was
being carried out, when Moore fell mortally wounded, and Baird was
also struck. Confusion followed, further orders remained unissued,
and when Hope, the next senior, took command, it was too late to
continue the struggle. Prudence demanded that he should withdraw
the army and embark before the French could recover and return to
the attack, and under cover of darkness the whole of the British
force, save only the outposts, were withdrawn from the position,
and embarked. That night and the following day were spent in getting
every one on board, and by the 18th January the last of the troops
covering the embarkation quitted Corunna for England, Soult's guns
opening on the ships as they put to sea.
Thus ended Moore's last campaign, and those who knew nothing of
the General's original plan considered the retreat to have been a
disastrous flight, yet Moore's plan succeeded completely. He drew
Napoleon and 70,000 men away from the south and saved Lisbon from a
French occupation, which was the most that he ever expected to do.
The amount of hardship which his troops would have to endure in the
withdrawal to the coast, perhaps he had not anticipated; but, had he
lived, doubtless he would have claimed that the result was well worth
the sacrifice, and if, moreover, the victory over Soult at Corunna
had been completed, few would have been found to cavil at his plans
and operations.
The part played by the 51st in the battle of Corunna, though
small, was not unimportant. The regiment stood in second line to
the left rear of Elvina, opposite to which village the fiercest of
the fighting took place, and where Moore received his death-wound.
Considering its position, its losses were not heavy, only amounting
to some five-and-twenty men--mostly wounded. Neither did the regiment
suffer to such an extent in casualties during the actual retreat as
did most other regiments of Baird's original force; and if, as has
been maintained, want of discipline was accountable for heavy losses
during the retreat, then the officers of the 51st had good reason
to be proud of the discipline of their corps. Their three months'
absence from England, however, had lowered their numbers by 107 men,
and many gallant officers and soldiers suffered from the effects of
the hardships of this campaign to the end of their days. Sam Rice,
although he came out of it unscathed, was an invalid for some months
afterwards, and was unable to pass the doctors when his regiment was
next sent on active service. Yet, for this he must have remained
ever thankful, for the expedition in which the 51st took part in the
autumn of 1809 was, as will be shown, productive of nothing except
death and disease.
On disembarking in England after Corunna, the regiment was assembled
at Sandown Barracks, and in April marched into Devonshire, being
quartered first at Kingsbridge and then at Berryhead. In May it
received the honour of the title of Light Infantry, probably as a
reward for its good services in the Corunna campaign, and probably
also as a memorial to Sir John Moore, the exponent of everything
pertaining to light infantry, and the former commanding officer of
the regiment. The 71st was made a light infantry regiment about the
same time, but previous to that there had only been four regiments in
the British army so designated, and as light infantry they considered
themselves superior to all other regiments of the line. As such they
wore a distinctive uniform, which was much like that of the old light
infantry company; and their special duties on active service were to
be always in front of the army, gaining and keeping touch with the
enemy, fighting advanced- or rear-guard actions when on the march,
and forming a chain of outposts round the army when halted.
The spring and early summer of 1809 were spent by the 51st in
recruiting the regiment up to fighting strength, for when, in April,
Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to Portugal to continue the war, it
was not sufficiently strong to form part of the expedition. By July,
however, this difficulty had been overcome, for the stories told of
the Corunna campaign had roused the fighting spirit of the country,
and vast numbers of militiamen volunteered into the line. But when,
in this month, the 51st received a fresh call to arms, it was not
for Portugal, but for Holland, an expedition having been fitted out
for the purpose of destroying the French fleet and arsenals in the
Scheldt. Sam Rice, who had just given up the command of his company
on promotion to Major, did not accompany the regiment on this
service, but remained in command of the depôt at Berryhead Barracks.
The Walcheren Expedition, as it was called, proved a complete
failure. Operations commenced satisfactorily, and Flushing was
bombarded and captured in August; but, owing to misunderstanding
between the military and naval commanders (the Earl of Chatham and
Sir Richard Strachan), the enemy was not pursued with energy, and
the troops (some 40,000 in number) were kept idle on the island
of Walcheren, until fever decimated their ranks. In September the
greater part of the misdirected expedition returned to England, and
for several months afterwards the men continued to die from Walcheren
fever. The unfortunate circumstances gave rise to the following
caustic epigram:--
"Lord Chatham, with his sabre drawn,
Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham."
So far the regiment's experiences of European warfare had not been
pleasant. Within a year it had taken part in two campaigns, in
each of which, although it had acquitted itself honourably, it had
sustained weighty losses. Unlike many other regiments, the 51st had
no second battalion upon which to draw to replace casualties, and
consequently it was not fit to proceed on active service in the
Peninsula until the end of 1810.
Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Wellesley, in supreme command of the allied
armies, had been actively engaged with the enemy from month to month,
and had won several hard-fought battles. He successfully frustrated
Soult's invasion of Portugal by defeating him on the Douro, in May
1809, and driving him out of Oporto. He gained a signal victory over
Marshal Victor at Talavera, in July; and thence retreated for the
winter to the banks of the Agueda river, between Almeida and Ciudad
Rodrigo. In 1810 Lord Wellington (as he now was) had for his opponent
Marshal Massena, who had been ordered to invade Portugal (while Soult
directed his attentions to Badajoz), and who, in June, commenced
operations by investing Ciudad Rodrigo, then held by a Spanish
garrison. Capturing that fortress in July, Massena advanced on the
neighbouring Portuguese fortress of Almeida, which also fell into
his hands, Wellington's advanced troops--the Light Division--being
forced back behind the Coa river after a desperate combat. In
September, however, Wellington encountered his adversary at Busaco,
thoroughly defeated him, and then withdrew rapidly to the impregnable
lines of Torres Vedras, which, with great foresight, he had caused
to be thrown up in front of Lisbon. Massena, ignorant of their
existence, and imagining that Wellington was retreating for immediate
embarkation, pressed forward for the capture of the Portugese
capital, but only to find his way barred by a series of strong
fortifications. Behind these defences the British army remained
unmolested throughout the winter, while the French, withdrawing to a
safe distance, sat down to await the coming of spring. This, then,
was the situation in Portugal when the 51st Regiment, quartered at
Steyning Barracks, received orders to join Wellington's army in the
Peninsula; and by this time Major Sam Rice was ready to be up and
doing.