FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN TO CEYLON.
The island of Elba, where the troops had taken refuge, belonged to
Tuscany, which, with other Austrian and Italian states, was allied
with Great Britain against the French Revolutionists. Tuscany,
however, was too weak to withstand the French invasion, and had
already lost Leghorn. For a time, therefore, it became doubtful
whether the British force in Elba would be able to obtain sufficient
provisions from the mainland close to the island, as there was always
the danger of the French cutting off the supplies, and Elba itself
had few resources. To make certain that the troops should not starve,
it was decided to despatch a small expedition to the mainland, to
dislodge the French from Piombino and the neighbourhood, and keep the
communications open. This was satisfactorily carried out in November
(1796) by Colonel Wemyss and a column consisting principally of the
Royal Irish Regiment, and Piombino was held by the British for the
next three months without being troubled by the French. Pure good
fortune saved the troops, both on the mainland and in Elba, at this
time, for before the end of the year the British fleet was withdrawn
from the Mediterranean, and, had the French chosen, they could have
captured the force left behind without much difficulty.
Sam Rice's letters during this eventful period were few, probably
because there was no possibility of sending them home, but in the
spring of 1797 he succeeded in getting a letter through. He wrote as
follows:--
"PORTO FERRAJO, ISLE OF ELBA,
_March 22, 1797_.
"The _Fox_ cutter, which arrived here the other day from Sir John
Jervis, with the famous and glorious news of the Spanish fleet
being defeated,[34] sails to-morrow for Gibraltar. There is no
news whatever to tell you from this quarter. The French, so near
neighbours, are very peaceably inclined towards us, for they have
not even paid us a visit, which they might very easily have done,
and to our great annoyance. The most unfriendly thing that they
have done since we have been here was to stop about two hundred fat
bullocks, which were coming for the use of the army. Our troops
being withdrawn from the cantonment[35] was the cause of that. The
French have resumed their old posts,[36] and if we stay here much
longer, we must take them a second time.
"We are all heartily tired of this place; there is not an
amusement of any kind; it is badly supplied with provisions, and
everything at an exorbitant price. We unfortunate subalterns can
scarce live. Our pay barely finds a good breakfast. These are the
pleasures incident to a military life. We are as much in the dark
as ever about our destination. Various are the reports. Some are of
opinion that we are to go back to Corsica; others that we shall go
to Portugal. The latter, I hope."
It seemed as if the authorities had forgotten the existence of the
small force at Elba. "But neither Jervis nor Nelson forgot that a
detachment of the British army was marooned in a little island off
the coast of Tuscany, in imminent danger of capture by the French,
and soon after the great naval victory off Cape St Vincent, Nelson
dashed back into the Mediterranean, ascertained that de Burgh and
his troops were safe, and conveyed them safely to Gibraltar."[37]
So, within a few weeks of the date of Sam Rice's last letter from
Elba, he and his regiment were on the way back to the Rock, and the
evacuation of the Mediterranean was complete. That any one should
have thought that there was a possibility of the troops from Elba
reoccupying Corsica at this juncture shows how little was known of
the situation and of the intentions of the British Government. The
idea of going to Portugal had more in it, and Sam Rice's hopes were
shortly to be realised.
What Captain Mahan calls the "Warfare against Commerce" had now set
in with a vengeance. To put the matter briefly: Napoleon, already
practically master of Continental Europe, aimed at being master of
the world, but found himself held in check by Great Britain and her
fleet. To destroy the power of Great Britain, therefore, became his
immediate object, and he knew that the only means of bringing this
about was by the destruction of her commerce with the world. From
England, he swore, the commerce of the world should pass to France;
but England was prepared not only to hold her own, but also to
wrest from France her little all. The English nation was determined
that even if the resources of the country were drained to the last
dregs, the despot of Europe should be held in check, and as time
went on many a financial crisis threatened, so that only by the most
strenuous efforts was it found possible to provide the sinews of
war. Fortunately, at this time the people of England were patriotic
to the core, and they raised large sums of money as "Voluntary
Contributions," which they presented to Government for the purpose
of carrying on the war, only ceasing to subscribe voluntarily when,
in 1798, the Government introduced the Income Tax, and declined free
gifts of money.
Napoleon began by ordering the maritime powers of Europe to close
their ports to British trading vessels; and England at once replied
that she would cut off all trade between the Continent and the
outside world; that only through England should there be any trade
at all. Such was the condition of affairs when the troops from Elba
arrived at Gibraltar in the spring of 1797. Spain had now become
the mere catspaw of France, who dictated to her on all occasions,
and the two powers set to work to coerce Portugal into joining
them, threatening the occupation of Lisbon by a French force if
Portugal should refuse to close her ports to English ships. Portugal,
observing the heavy combination against her, and the removal of
the buffer between herself and France, almost forgot her ancient
alliance with England; but, remembering it before she had committed
herself, she rejected the Franco-Spanish overtures, declared herself
for England, and armed to resist invasion. To support her in her
brave resolve England sent Sir Charles Stuart and a body of troops
to Lisbon, and, in June 1797, the 51st proceeded from Gibraltar to
join that force. But although Napoleon, smarting under the insult
offered to the Republic of France, desired above all things to bring
Portugal to her knees, he was too deeply involved in other parts of
Europe to be able to spare troops sufficient to carry out his threat
of marching on Lisbon. The British force in occupation, therefore,
was not called upon, during the next fifteen months, to do anything
more than ordinary garrison duty, which, according to Sam Rice, was
uninteresting to a degree, though the Portuguese did their best to
show hospitality to their allies, and though Rice's younger brother,
Henry, came into Lisbon in his ship on more than one occasion, and
helped Sam to make merry.
In June 1798, Rice, with less than six years' service, was promoted
captain in the 51st, and given the command of the light infantry
company--a much coveted post. But, as he had been for some years
a light infantry lieutenant, it was natural that he should have
the command of the company, which happened to become vacant at the
opportune moment. As we have already said, the grenadier and light
companies of regiments were composed of picked officers and men,
who wore uniforms different from the rest of the regiment. In the
case of the light infantry company the hair was not "clubbed," and
the head-dress consisted of a leather cap--almost a skull-cap, with
a large round peak straight up in front. The red jacket worn was
quite short, and the gaiters were much shorter than those of other
companies. The officers and sergeants were armed with fusils, and
wore pouches; so light infantry officers had silver epaulettes on
both shoulders, the sword-belt being held in place by the one and the
pouch-belt by the other. And upon the epaulettes, as well as upon
the cross-belt plate, was worn the light infantry badge--a silver
bugle-horn. A distinctive uniform of any kind always carries great
weight, and doubtless the light company officers held their heads
high, though they had some reason for doing so, since they knew
that on active service their place was with the vanguard--in the
forefront of the fight. But their daily pay was no higher than that
of their brother officers of the battalion companies--viz., captain,
9s. 5d., and lieutenant, 5s. 8d. And they could not complain, for a
lieutenant-colonel received no more than 15s. 11d., and a major 14s.
1d.--cheap enough food for powder!
While the 51st were eating out their hearts in inaction at Lisbon,
the British Navy was doing splendid work, sweeping the seas in every
direction, capturing French merchant vessels, and protecting British
commerce. Then Napoleon, seeking new fields for conquest, suddenly
bethought him of Egypt, and forthwith transported thirty thousand men
across the Mediterranean for the enterprise; but Nelson, following
him, utterly destroyed the French fleet in those seas at the battle
of the Nile, on the 1st August 1798. After this serious defeat, there
appeared to be little prospect of Napoleon being able to carry out
his threat of marching on Lisbon, and the 51st began to speculate
about their future movements, having little doubt that they would be
sent either to the West Indies or to the East Indies. In each quarter
there was every prospect of fighting, for the West India Islands had
been the scene of much conflict of recent years, their commercial
value being considerable, and their possession being, consequently,
of great importance. In the East Indies, also, much was doing; the
East India Company was still struggling for supremacy over the
native rulers; the great Mahratta war was being waged with vigour;
and operations in the Carnatic were not yet at an end. To develop
the trade of the East Indies was at this time of vital consequence
to England, and since the insignificant French possessions in India
(Chandernagore and Pondicherry) had already been captured, British
trade had no competitors in that part of the world. It was necessary,
however, to strengthen British rule in the country by reinforcing
the land forces; and it was necessary also to keep open the long
trade route between India and England by means of the Navy. The
convoy system was by this time in excellent working order, and all
British merchant vessels sailed under escort of men-of-war. It will
be remembered that as far back as 1793 Sam Rice described in some of
his earlier letters how large numbers of merchant ships assembled at
Portsmouth to be convoyed to their destinations, and how the ship
in which he sailed to Gibraltar was one of a fleet of two hundred.
But besides these convoys, the various trading routes were patrolled
by frigates and sloops-of-war, ever on the look-out for the enemy's
cruisers or merchantmen. So by the one means or the other British
ships were given a possibility of security, though occasionally a
venturesome merchant, to whom time meant money, refused to wait for
a convoy, and sent his ship to sea without one, as often as not to
be captured. In 1798 Government decided to put a stop to these risky
proceedings, and passed an Act making a convoy compulsory for every
British merchantman. The East India Company at this time possessed
a fleet of magnificent merchant vessels, and armed with guns; but
they always sailed in a body with a convoy of men-of-war, and,
considering the time taken in collecting a sufficient number of ships
for a convoy, the service was fairly regular. As a rule, the convoy
was relieved at St Helena, men-of-war from the Indian station being
responsible for the eastern half of the voyage, and the meeting of
the outward and homeward bound fleets at the little island was, from
all accounts, a fine sight.
It was to the East Indies that the 51st eventually received orders
to move, because news had reached England that some of the native
rulers were leaguing themselves with the French to oust the British,
and in October 1798 the regiment embarked at Lisbon, joined the fleet
of East Indiamen, and sailed for St Helena. In January they put in
at the Cape of Good Hope, and the following letter, written by Sam
Rice, from that place, shows that the voyage had not been without
incident:--
"CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA,
_January 26, 1799_.
"Had not our water failed, I should not have had the pleasure
of sending you these few lines, it being the positive order for
the Commodore not to touch anywhere, except _en cas de besoin_.
We arrived here three weeks ago after a passage of twelve weeks.
Nothing material happened, only that one of the large Indiamen
ran foul of us in the night and carried away part of our stern. I
never was so frightened in my life. I thought that it was certainly
all over with us. You can form no idea of the shock. Seamen think
nothing of these things, but as for me, who am not a seaman and
have no wish to be, I am in constant fear. Soon after our arrival
we received orders to disembark, and to remain until such time as
a reinforcement should arrive. I am happy to say that yesterday
orders were issued for a re-embarkation. Our heavy baggage goes
on board to-morrow; I imagine we shall do so the day after. The
General, whose name is Dundas, reviewed us the other morning, and
was highly pleased with our appearance, and not without reason. We
no doubt are, for our numbers, _the prettiest and best-disciplined
regiment in the Service_. You will excuse my mentioning it."
Here we see the true regimental officer's pride in his corps. The
spirit which Moore had created in his officers still lived--to the
51st officer no regiment was equal to the 51st,--and without such a
feeling, which was by no means universal in those days, a regiment
was of little real value. That the 51st was in as good order as
the officers thought is vouched for by General Dundas's Inspection
Report, which is still in existence.
The presence of a British general and British troops at Capetown in
1799 is worthy of comment, because no part of South Africa belonged
to Great Britain at that time, and Capetown was not actually captured
by the British, to hold for their own, until 1806,[38] and not
acknowledged as a British possession until 1814. The reason was
this: In 1794 the Cape had been for many years in the possession
of the Dutch East India Company, whose rights no other Europeans
disputed, and at the end of that year the French overran the
Netherlands, the Hereditary Stadtholder, the Prince of Orange, taking
refuge in England. Fearing that the French would proceed against the
Dutch colonies, the Prince thought of his alliance with Great Britain
and Prussia, and forthwith (February 1795) sent to the Dutch Governor
of the Cape a despatch, ordering him to admit into the colony any
British troops which might be sent, in order that they might protect
the Dutch possession from a French invasion. This despatch was
conveyed to the Cape by a British fleet, carrying British troops,
but the Governor, knowing that the Netherlands had become a Republic
and had joined France, refused to accept the orders of the exiled
Stadtholder. The British General's position was a peculiar one; he
had been ordered by his Government to occupy Capetown as a friendly
measure, but this the Dutch Governor declined to allow him to do. A
month was spent in negotiations, and when these failed, General Craig
took matters into his own hand, occupying Simonstown, and declaring
his intention of carrying out his orders. The Dutch flew to arms, and
expressed their determination to resist the unwarrantable intrusion,
but in August were driven out of the position which they had taken
up. In the following month a reinforcement of three thousand British
soldiers joined General Craig, and against these heavy odds the
Dutch could do little, so that the occupation of Capetown on the
16th September became an easy matter. From that time until 1803 the
British held the Cape, nominally for the Dutch, but in reality for
Great Britain; but by the Peace of Amiens, signed in March 1802, it
was restored to the Dutch, with the proviso that the English East
India Company could use it as a place of call.
In April 1799 the 51st disembarked at Madras, and took up quarters
in Fort St George. Southern India (or the Carnatic, as it was then
usually called), which, for some years past, had been in a state of
unrest, owing to the tyranny of the notorious Tippoo of Mysore, was
still the scene of military operations, but the 51st arrived just too
late to take part in the great victory at Seringapatam, where, on the
4th May, the British force stormed and captured Tippoo's stronghold,
annihilated the Mysore army, and killed the infamous ruler himself.
After that the country gradually settled down to comparative quiet,
and the British troops, no longer required for keeping order, were
free for employment elsewhere, the 51st receiving orders for Ceylon.
"The homeward-bound fleet leaves the Roads to-morrow," wrote Sam
Rice, from Fort St George, Madras, on the 9th August 1799. "The
mail is ordered to be made up this evening. Only one ship has left
this coast for England since our arrival, which was with the news
of the capture of Seringapatam. I was then with a detachment up
the country, and did not know of her sailing, which accounts for my
not having written before.
"I am sorry to say that we were not fortunate enough to share the
honours with the conquerors of Mysore and divide with them the
immense treasure of the tyrant in his capital. It is at least
two thousand pounds out of my pocket, besides the chance of
plunder--and being a flank company officer would have assisted me.
It cannot be helped; better fortune another time. By the last news
from Europe, this part of the world is likely to be the quietest
for some time to come. The war seems only to be just begun; the
fate of England and of Europe in general must soon be determined.
We embarked for Colombo, in Ceylon, soon after our arrival here.
After cruising in the Bay for three weeks, and beating against the
monsoon in vain, we were at length compelled to put back, with half
our men sick. Our loss has been very great, and the Regiment is
still very sickly. It is yet thought that, when the monsoon shifts,
we shall again attempt Colombo. I cannot give you a favourable
account of India; the climate is so hot that, in my opinion, no
real pleasure can be enjoyed; but this is always the cry of a
newcomer; time and necessity may reconcile me to it."
Sam Rice's occasional references to prize-money and plunder sound
nowadays very mercenary in a British officer, but a century ago such
things added zest to the soldier's life, for, it must be remembered,
rewards were for the few, and medals only for the most senior of the
officers. Though plunder was not regarded as legitimate, prize-money
was quite in order and regulated by Government. Everything taken
from the enemy was sold by Government, and the amount realised was
divided among the troops engaged, according to rank, so that, in
the case of big captures, even a private soldier often received as
much as £100; at Seringapatam, for instance, more than a million of
money was divided amongst the troops, who, moreover, pillaged freely
on their own account. Eventually, but not until after the middle of
the nineteenth century, prize-money came to be considered degrading
to the spirit of the British soldier, who, it was thought, should
have higher motives for doing his duty. Moreover, the distribution
of prize-money to a part of the army, because that part happened to
make a fortunate capture, was certainly unjust to the remainder of
the army who might have had an equally hard time, though with less
luck. Consequently, it was decided to substitute for prize-money
a regulated rate of field-service allowance to all officers and
men engaged in a campaign, and captures from the enemy became the
property of Government. Private plunder, as a relic of barbarism, was
generally denounced, and was often dealt with as a crime for which
the punishment was death, yet, even in the Peninsular War, it went
on to a great extent, and was at times openly winked at. And the
Peninsular War cannot be said to have seen the last of open plunder,
as witness the sacking of the Summer Palace in 1860, and somewhat
similar, though perhaps less open, incidents up to forty years later.
Apart from the moral aspect of the question, plundering by an army
is, of course, subversive of all discipline, as men once given over
to plunder become irreclaimably out of hand. It has to be dealt
with drastically--no other means can check it; for it is a curious
psychological fact that, even in this present age of civilisation,
men whose morals are above suspicion, and who under ordinary
circumstances would not dream of misappropriating the smallest
portion of another man's property, regard the property of the absent
enemy as fair loot. The man's arguments are simple ones: if he did
not take the thing, some one else would do so; when the enemy fled he
abandoned all his possessions; and findings are keepings. All said
and done, nations themselves have not always set the best example;
and some of the art treasures of Europe have changed hands more than
once as a result of conquest.
It was not until February 1800 that the 51st again embarked for the
voyage to Ceylon, having in the meanwhile returned to garrison duty
at St Thomas' Mount and at Fort St George, and on its departure the
Governor-General of Madras, Lord Clive, issued a special valedictory
order, in which he remarked on the splendid state of the regiment and
its excellent discipline. Landing at Trincomalee three days after
leaving Madras, the regiment encamped there for a week, and then went
on again, by sea, to Colombo, at which place it eked out, for nearly
two years, an extremely dull garrison existence, as may be gathered
from the following extract from a letter written by Captain Rice at
Colombo, on the 26th July 1800:--
"Our stay at Trincomalee was not long. This is by far the best
place in the island, but, although it is surrounded by cinnamon
gardens and many other fine things, I cannot say much in its
favour. It is something cooler than the coast of India; existence
may be endured; but there is no society whatever. It is most
probable that our Regiment will remain some time on this island,--I
am afraid longer than we wish. Everything here is very expensive,
owing to the difficulty of getting supplies from the coast (India),
which can only be done in the particular seasons. A secret
expedition has lately been fitted out at Madras. Part has already
sailed with H.M.'s 10th Regiment. We are always left out; better
luck, I hope, for the future. Little is stirring in the country
since the fall of the Mysorean tyrant, nor do I think there will be
for some time to come. A Mahratta war was talked of, but I believe
they are too wise."
Ceylon, when the 51st went there, had two principal British
settlements on the coast--Trincomalee and Colombo, which had been
captured from the Dutch as recently as 1796.[39] The British were
also in possession of, or at any rate had control over, such a depth
of coast-line all round the island as could be dominated by ships'
guns. The remainder of the island was ruled over by an independent
chief, with whom the Dutch had attempted to form treaties of
friendship, and whom likewise the British approached. This chief, the
King of Kandy, however, disliked, and had the strongest suspicions
of the motives of, all Europeans, and was, moreover, inflated with a
sense of his own importance, so the overtures of the British Governor
came to naught. On the death of the King of Kandy in 1798, trouble
arose concerning the succession to the throne, which was usurped by a
stranger without any pretensions. Plots and counterplots ensued among
the Kandians, and after a while one of the parties endeavoured to
enlist the services of the British, to establish order. The Governor
refused to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kandians, and
nothing of particular importance occurred until 1802, when some
native traders from British territory were ill-treated and robbed by
the Kandians, and redress for the outrage being refused, Governor
North decided to march on Kandy.
Although Kandy was no great distance from Colombo, it lay high up in
the mountains, and was most difficult of approach, the roads being
bad, the jungle dense, and the passes dangerous. On the 31st January
1803, the 51st, forming part of General Macdowall's column, commenced
the march, and after surmounting many difficulties, on the 19th
February stormed and carried two strong posts, and put the enemy to
flight. Hardships and sickness told considerably on the men, but
within a week of the first brush with the enemy, the 19th and 51st
Regiments marched into Kandy, which the enemy had evacuated and set
on fire. The capture of the capital had been tolerably simple, but
little good came of it, for the General soon found that sickness had
reduced his force to less than two thousand men, barely one half
of whom were Europeans, that supplies were running short, and that
his communications with Colombo were cut by the enemy, who began to
assume a threatening attitude on all sides of Kandy. A few skirmishes
took place during March; when, learning that no reinforcements would
be sent to him, Macdowall patched up a truce with the Kandians, and
leaving a thousand men, two-thirds of whom were natives, to garrison
Kandy, withdrew the remainder of his force, including the 51st, in
safety to Colombo, which was reached on the 9th April.
During the rest of the year small detachments of the regiment were
employed in repelling aggressions on the part of the Kandians, who
raided British territory in many directions. Several officers and a
considerable number of men died of disease, and the 51st was reduced
to a mere skeleton. Nor was the health of the other troops at Colombo
any better; and when it became known, in June 1803, that the garrison
at Kandy, now a handful of weaklings, was being besieged by the
infuriated Kandians, it was found to be impossible to send a force to
its relief; and India could not spare a single man for Ceylon, as all
available troops were required for the Mahratta War. In the end, the
Kandians recaptured their capital, and murdered the remnant of the
British garrison in cold blood, though preserving the life of Major
Davie, the commandant, whom they cast into prison, doubtless under
the impression that he might be useful to them some day. The war
died out in 1805, without any attempt on the part of the British to
revenge their murdered compatriots, for the reason that no sufficient
reinforcements were ever available, and the fate of Major Davie is
pitiful to think of. For nearly nine years he languished in a dungeon
in Kandy, and died there, worn out by disease, not to be revenged
until 1815, when the power of the Kandian kings was broken for ever,
and the whole island taken over by the British.
The 51st continued to garrison Colombo until 1807, and suffered
much from the enervating climate, losing a great many officers
and men, and having a number of officers invalided home--amongst
them Samuel Rice, whose constitution was undermined, and who never
really recovered from the effects of service in Ceylon, although he
managed to fight through many subsequent campaigns. In September
the remnant of the regiment landed in England, after an absence of
fifteen years, the last nine of which had been passed in absolute
exile. Home news lost most of its interest during the six or eight
months which it took to drift through to Ceylon, and what was going
on in Europe affected the exiles little, for their own petty war and
its attendant hardships gave them sufficient to think about. Yet,
in Europe stirring events had been in progress, and the 51st, in
going to the East, were denied the satisfaction of taking part in the
reoccupation of the Mediterranean, which commenced with the capture
of Minorca by a force under Sir Charles Stuart, only a month after
the regiment sailed from Lisbon. They missed also the subsequent
capture of Malta in 1800, and the chance of sharing in Abercromby's
great victories over the French in Egypt in 1801. But they did not
miss much else, for the Peace of Amiens (March 1802) brought the war
to a close, and though France again declared war against England
fourteen months later, no actual fighting took place on shore. The
British navy, however, continued to be actively employed, more
especially in frustrating Napoleon's designs for an invasion of
England, and this grand scheme was finally wrecked in October 1805,
when the mighty Nelson, at the cost of his life, almost annihilated
the French fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar. Napoleon being thus
deprived of the means of transporting his "Army of England" across
the Channel, turned and vented his wrath on Continental Europe,
carried his conquests far and wide, and proclaimed one of his
brothers King of Naples, and another King of Holland.
That there was plenty of fighting in prospect for the army was
apparent to the officers of the 51st when they reached England, but
for the moment they had no men, and the next few months were devoted
to bringing the regiment up to strength, as well as to gaining an
insight into the vast changes which had taken place in the army and
in military methods during the past decade; for the officers, who had
been absent from England for so long, soon realised that they were
considerably behind the times. In Ceylon they had heard little or
nothing of the great reforms in progress at home--reforms initiated
by none other than their old commanding officer, Major-General John
Moore, and, as will be shown in the next chapter, far-reaching in
their ultimate results.