THE ATTACK ON CORSICA.
When Sam Rice joined the 51st, Lieut.-Colonel (afterwards Sir John)
Moore had held the command for three years, but was even then only
in his thirty-second year; for his promotion had been rapid, and he
had reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the thirteenth year of
his service. That Moore was a strong man goes without saying, and
that he was a man of very exceptional talents the world discovered
subsequently. A perfect gentleman, of unblemished character, a
reliable and zealous soldier, he was able to bring a great influence
to bear on those whom he commanded, and he had a special gift for
training young officers. It was in this respect that Sam Rice
benefited by being appointed to a regiment with such a commanding
officer, and he learned under Moore things which he never forgot.
At that time the condition of a regiment depended entirely upon the
commanding officer, for in the last decade of the eighteenth century
the British army was not in a very satisfactory state. Sir Henry
Bunbury,[12] who made a study of such matters, wrote sixty years
afterwards: "Men of the present generation can hardly form an idea
of what the military forces of England really were when the great
war broke out in 1793. Our army was lax in its discipline, entirely
without system, and very weak in numbers. Each colonel of a regiment
managed it according to his own notions, or neglected it altogether.
There was no uniformity of drill or movement, professional pride was
rare, professional knowledge still more so. The regimental officers
in those days were, as well as their men, hard drinkers; and the
latter, under a loose discipline, were much addicted to marauding and
acts of licentious violence, which made them detested by the people
of the country."
It is perhaps unjust to describe the officers as hard drinkers, if
by that is meant that they were all drunkards, or that they drank
harder than did their civilian friends and relatives. The morals of
the army were possibly no worse than the morals of general society at
that period, for it was an age of heavy drinking, when respectable
and respected old gentlemen drank themselves under the table every
evening, and boasted of the number of bottles of port which they
could consume at a sitting. Yet, if the opinions of Bunbury and
other writers holding somewhat similar views of the British army in
pre-Peninsular times are to be accepted, it cannot be maintained
that the tone among the officers of ordinary regiments of the line
was of a high order. Some certainly drank a great deal more than was
good for them; otherwise it would hardly have been necessary to put
in print in the standing orders of a certain regiment the caution
that "the Surgeon and his Mate must always be strictly sober."
Gambling was indulged in to an inordinate extent; and duelling was
not unknown. The fact is that the army was suffering from long years
of inaction, and from the pernicious effects of service in America,
India, and the West Indies, where regiments went to pieces and took
years to recover themselves. To this must be added the further
fact that the regimental officer was promoted not by merit, but by
purchase; so that it was only necessary for a man to bide his time,
and to have sufficient money at his back to buy his steps when they
came, and in due course he commanded his regiment, and continued to
command it until he could be bought out.
But, it may be asked, if such was indeed the state of affairs, how
came it that the British army rapidly emerged from this condition
of darkness to save Europe? How came it that the hard-drinking
British officer was able to pull himself together, and become
transformed into an upright and zealous soldier, capable of enduring
endless hardships and displaying great gallantry? The answer is
that all regiments were not bad; that most regiments--even the bad
ones--possessed some officers of high moral character and endowed
with exceptional talents, and when war came in 1793 these officers,
on the principle of the "survival of the fittest," came to the front,
and gradually established a tone on active service which had been
impossible to uphold in times of peace. Some regiments possessed
more of such officers than others, and some regiments, again, chanced
to have a colonel with sufficient strength of will to give a short
shrift to any of his subordinates who were not likely to be of value
to him. As the war progressed many of the junior, and not a few of
the senior, officers willingly or unwillingly fell out, to make room
for better men; many were found wanting and were removed; and many
had undermined their constitutions to such an extent that in their
first campaign they were carried off by what was commonly described
as "the fever," or the "distemper." While the weeding-out process
was at work during the last few years of the eighteenth century, and
during the opening years of the nineteenth, the annual wastage of
officers was immense; after that, matters righted themselves.
Still, it is an error to suppose that the whole army was in so bad
a state in 1793 as Bunbury would have us believe, for there are
still in existence the printed standing orders of a few regiments of
the line of about this date, and from these there is proof enough
that very great attention was paid to the wellbeing of corps. The
discipline was strict, though of the severe and mechanical order,
and it was maintained solely by the lash; duties in quarters were
performed with the utmost regularity; and if the standing orders
were carried out, the regiments should have been in excellent order.
It may, of course, be possible that such regiments as had standing
orders were, from this very fact, good regiments, and that the
strictures of Bunbury and others applied to the bad regiments, which
were, perhaps, more numerous than the good ones.
It is, however, quite certain that when the 51st regiment went on
service in 1793, its general condition left nothing to be desired,
since Moore had paid attention to such weeding-out of officers as was
necessary when he first took up the command in 1790, and all young
officers who joined afterwards were kept under his ever-watchful eye
until he was sure of them. "He felt that a perfect knowledge and an
exact performance of the humble, but important duties of a subaltern
officer, are the best foundations for subsequent military fame";[13]
and he required from his officers a punctilious attention to duty
and a thorough knowledge of their profession, so that they might be
looked up to and respected by the soldiers whom they were called upon
to command. And, a perfect gentleman himself, he had no place in the
51st for any officer who was not the same. He was not a martinet, and
he did not ride rough-shod over his officers and men, but he knew
exactly when the occasion demanded a right enforcement of discipline,
and when discipline could be relaxed without detriment to the
"machine," which he proudly described, in September 1793, as being in
as good order as he could get it.
So much has been said here of Colonel Moore's characteristics,[14]
because he was Sam Rice's first commanding officer, and because
his teachings left their mark upon the man who served continuously
with Moore's old regiment for thirty-eight years. To return to
affairs in the Mediterranean: Colonel Moore, as senior officer with
the reinforcements which joined Lord Hood's fleet in Hyères Bay,
immediately went on board the _Victory_, and reported his arrival to
the Admiral, who somewhat churlishly remarked that the reinforcements
were meagre and had arrived too late to be of any use. He forgot
that the delay was due to dilatoriness on the part of his own naval
officers, and he forgot also that had the reinforcements arrived a
fortnight earlier, they could not have prevented the evacuation of
Toulon, since, on the 16th December, the enemy had captured the forts
which dominated the anchorage of the British fleet.
The Admiral was now busily engaged in working out a plan for
employing the troops on the transports in some enterprise which,
while redounding to his own credit, would compensate in a measure for
the abandonment of the great French arsenal; for he was aware that
the evacuation of Toulon without destroying all the French ships,
although the only step that, under the circumstances, was possible,
might be regarded in England as a grave failure on his part.
Something, he decided, must be done at once, and that something must
take the form of providing for the British fleet in the Mediterranean
a base deeper in than that afforded by Gibraltar, which was at that
time the only British possession in the Mediterranean, and almost a
thousand miles from Genoa, in the neighbourhood of which port the
French and Austrian armies were operating. Lord Hood realised from
the outset the broad principle that, as Captain Mahan[15] says, "the
policy of Great Britain was to control the sea for the protection
of commerce, and to sustain on shore the continental powers in the
war against France--chiefly by money, but also by naval co-operation
when feasible." Under these circumstances, the Admiral's thoughts
naturally turned to Corsica, which, though still garrisoned by French
troops, was known to be more or less in revolt against the Republican
Government. The exact state of affairs in the island, however, and
the strength of the French defences and garrisons, were things about
which Lord Hood had little information; and though he regretted the
necessity for delaying the capture of Corsica, he wisely accepted,
on this occasion, the advice of the military commanders to send two
military officers to reconnoitre and report on the practicability of
making a descent on the island. Moore and a major of artillery named
Koehler were selected for this duty, and on the 11th January (1794)
left in the _Lowestoffe_ frigate, in which also sailed Sir Gilbert
Elliott, one of the King's Commissioners in the Mediterranean, who
was to endeavour to persuade the Corsican inhabitants to assist the
British force in ridding the island of the French interlopers.
It is unnecessary to dwell on Corsican history further than to say
that from 1559 to 1768 the island was a dependency of Genoa, and
that in the latter year, contrary to the wishes of the people,
was basely sold to France. The Corsicans then made a bid for
independence, but within a few months (1769) their army, under Pascal
(or Pasquale) Paoli, was defeated and crushed by the Count de Vaux.
It was with this Paoli, who, after a period of exile in England, had
returned to Corsica, that Sir Gilbert Elliott opened up negotiations,
and from him, without much difficulty, obtained the promise that the
Corsicans would aid the British in every possible way. Moore and his
companion made a careful reconnaissance of the various French posts
and forts, and on the 25th January the former returned to the Admiral
with his report. The fleet was then on its way from Hyères Bay to the
island of Elba, and in a few days anchored off Porto Ferrajo, where
it was proposed to disembark the Royalist refugees from Toulon and
place them under the protection of Tuscany (to whom Elba belonged),
while arrangements were being made for the leap on Corsica.
The story of the operations which followed, as told by the
chroniclers, is somewhat marred in the telling by constant references
to the bickerings and petty jealousies of the naval and military
commanders, each of whom appears to have been afraid that the rival
service would obtain all the _kudos_. Why, the reader may wonder,
is it necessary to hark back to these regrettable incidents, which
did not greatly affect the result of the operations? Only because
at one time they threatened to destroy the reputation of John
Moore, Colonel of the 51st, and did actually lead to his temporary
downfall. Lord Hood, strongly backed up by Horatio Nelson, then
captain of the _Agamemnon_, despised soldiers, and thought little
of the opinions of military officers. The naval plan was to rush at
everything, without weighing the consequences, and the suggestions
of the General, David Dundas (who had succeeded O'Hara), and other
military officers of experience, who counselled proceeding with
caution, were blown away, as showing weakness and want of enterprise.
Nelson himself said, "Armies go so slow, that seamen think they never
mean to get forward; but I daresay they act on a surer principle,
though we seldom fail." Nelson was, of course, in a measure right,
but he and other naval officers of the period failed to realise the
great difference between the facilities afforded to the respective
services--that whereas seamen always had at their back their ship,
providing them with quarters, food, ammunition, and everything that
they required; soldiers, when once put ashore on an expedition, had
to take everything with them and look after themselves.
The three principal places in Corsica held by the French were St
Fiorenzo (now St Florent) on the north, Bastia on the east, and Calvi
on the west; and in that order Lord Hood decided to attack each place
in succession. St Fiorenzo, the first to be dealt with, was situated
at the head of a deep bay, studded on the western shore with detached
forts, or towers, which, being constructed of solid masonry in a
circular form, deflected the round-shots which struck them. The most
formidable of these advanced works was the tower of Mortella,[16]
and it was impossible to attack St Fiorenzo until these outworks had
been carried. With the object, therefore, of reducing the Mortella
Tower, Moore was ordered to land at a little distance away, and with
the 51st (numbering 350) and a mixed force of soldiers and sailors
(numbering another 350), and with two guns, to march inland and
take the tower in rear, while the ships bombarded it from the sea.
Moore's force landed on the night of the 7th February, and after a
long march among the mountains reached, on the following evening,
a point from which the enemy's fortifications could be clearly
examined. Moore, who had reconnoitred them on his previous visit, was
surprised to find that the French had strengthened their position
considerably, and he came to the conclusion that his handful of men
was quite insufficient to assail all the fortifications in front of
St Fiorenzo. He therefore sent a despatch to General Dundas, and
reported that to attack with any prospect of success would require
all the General's available troops.
That day was spent in getting the guns into position and in a further
reconnaissance, while two ships bombarded the Mortella redoubt,
though without breaching it. The ships, moreover, were set on fire
by the enemy's hot shot, and were forced to sheer off, with a loss of
some sixty men. On the next day more guns were mounted on land, but
although they did little damage to the solid tower, their fire made
it impossible for the enemy to show himself or reply, and the French
officer in command, seeing that he could no nothing, surrendered.
The next outwork to be disposed of was the Convention redoubt, and
this gave a good deal of trouble. Moore, who was still conducting
operations on land, inspected the ground with General Dundas and
Major Koehler, and discovered an excellent artillery position, from
which it would be possible to batter the Convention. The difficulty
was to get the guns up the steep, rocky hill, but, with the aid of
a party of seamen with tackle, two 18-pounders and a howitzer were
mounted within the next few days, and a mortar and some other guns
were placed on a more accessible position, when the enemy's redoubt
was subjected to a heavy cannonade for two days. Moore had now with
him only the 51st, but on the 17th February the General gave him
orders for the assault that night. The Royals were to join the 51st,
and Moore was to assail the front of the redoubt, while the other
British regiments and the Corsicans were to deliver simultaneous
assaults on either flank.
Moore decided to attack in column of companies, the first company
consisting of the grenadiers and light infantry[17] of the Royals,
the second of the grenadiers of the 51st, the third of the light
company of the 51st, then the battalion of the Royals (only
sufficient to make five companies), then three companies of the 51st.
The other five companies of the 51st followed in rear as a support;
and in rear again came 130 sailors, under Captain Cooke, with
entrenching tools.
At 8.30 P.M., by the light of a brilliant moon, Moore led the
advance, which for a quarter of a mile could only be made in file.
After a little he reached a spot open enough to form up the column;
the enemy's piquets fired a few shots, as they realised what was
taking place; and Moore immediately ordered his column to push on.
When within fifty yards of the redoubt, they found themselves in a
slight hollow, unexposed to the enemy's fire, and here Moore halted
them for a few seconds preparatory to the final uphill rush. A moment
later the Royals and the 51st leaped into the head of the work, and
crossed bayonets with the Frenchmen, who stood their ground gallantly
and fought with desperation. Eventually, however, the flank attacks
pushed in and overwhelmed the defenders, though in the darkness it
was difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and, to add to the
confusion, the enemy holding the neighbouring redoubt of Fornali
began to open with grape-shot upon the victorious British. But before
midnight the latter had entrenched themselves, and within an hour it
was learned that the French had abandoned Fornali.
Arrangements were now made for the attack on St Fiorenzo itself, but
before they had been completed the enemy withdrew from the place and
retired to the fortified town of Bastia, situated on the east coast
of Corsica, and barely ten miles across the neck of the peninsula
from St Fiorenzo.
The coast near Bastia was quite open, and the town was not fortified
on that side; elsewhere, however, it was defended by four detached
redoubts and a citadel placed on heights at a little distance inland.
On February 23, Moore and General Dundas went across the mountains
to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and on the following day the
51st and 69th advanced to within a mile and a quarter of the French
piquets, who were heard throughout the night digging entrenchments
for their further security on the ground which it was necessary for
the British to occupy in order to capture Bastia from the land side.
Becoming aware of this, General Dundas, in the morning, ordered Moore
to withdraw his force, and, to the surprise and disappointment of
every one, the withdrawal took place. Moore at first imagined that
the General's idea was to perfect arrangements before delivering
the assault, but after a while he discovered that, in spite of Lord
Hood's constant request for co-operation from the land forces,
General Dundas had refused to attempt the capture of the town with
the small force under his command. This was a bitter discovery for
Moore, who was longing to lead his regiment to the front, but he
concealed his disappointment, as he considered that it would be "a
species of mutiny for a subordinate officer to pass any opinion" on
the action of his General.
Lord Hood, never on good terms with General Dundas, now brought
matters to a head by sending a somewhat extraordinary letter, in
which he said that upon the evacuation of Toulon the General's
command had practically ended, and that he (Lord Hood) was in
supreme command of both the fleet and the army. The General replied
with calmness that, unless the Admiral could produce his commission
from the King, neither he nor his officers would acknowledge his
pretensions to the command of the land forces. But Lord Hood's letter
probably had the result which he desired, for on the following day
General Dundas, on the grounds of ill health, gave up the command,
and having appointed the next senior officer, Colonel D'Aubant, a
brigadier-general, and given him the temporary command of the army,
left for England on the 11th March. D'Aubant proved himself a useless
commander, and being averse to an assault on Bastia, threw cold
water on every plan laid before him. In vain did Lord Hood urge the
necessity for an attempt being made by the land forces; and, after
holding several councils of war, he at length declared that he would
take Bastia with the marines[18] and sailors. Already a month had
been wasted in looking at the place--a month which gave the enemy
leisure to perfect his fortifications and entrenchments. Almost
another month passed before Bastia fell; and its fall was brought
about not by assault or bombardment, but by starvation, resulting
from Lord Hood's careful blockade from the sea and the Corsicans'
watchfulness on land. There had been practically no fighting, and
though Hood and Nelson dignified the operations with the name of
siege, the army was never in position, and all that was undertaken
by the ships was the maintenance of a strict blockade, and the
landing of some guns and a fighting force under Nelson. The guns did
little damage to the enemy or his works, thus wasting much valuable
ammunition, and the force commanded by Nelson (consisting of 1183
soldiers acting as marines on board ship and 250 sailors) made no
advance. On the 19th May Bastia was starved into surrender, and the
3500 men of the garrison gave up their arms to the British combined
forces, which numbered no more than 3000 soldiers and sailors.
Attention was now directed to Calvi (on the west coast of Corsica),
the only place of importance remaining in the possession of
the French. It was known that they had been busy for some time
victualling the place for a siege, and Lord Hood determined to
operate before the garrison of Calvi could be further reinforced.
Brigadier-General D'Aubant had gone home, on being relieved by
General Charles Stuart, who had been sent out from England to succeed
General Dundas, an appointment which met with the approval of every
one and which gave confidence to the troops. The regiments in
Corsica, though seven in number, were miserably weak, as they were
required to furnish detachments for duty as marines on board the
ships, and the climate had begun to tell on the health of the men.
General Stuart's "army," available for operations against Calvi,
consisted, therefore, of no more than 2300 men. These troops were
conveyed in transports from Bastia to Mortella Bay, and, on the 19th
June, after a further voyage, disembarked a few miles from Calvi,
and marched inland to a camp on the high ground some three miles
from the fortress. Colonel Moore was given the command of a special
"corps of reserve," consisting of the "flank companies of the Royal
Irish, 50th, and 51st, and the remains of the 2nd Battalion of the
Royals," so the command of the 51st devolved, for the time being, on
Major Pringle. Two outworks of considerable strength lay in front,
_i.e._, on the land side, of Calvi--viz., the Fort of Mozzello and
the fortified rock of Monteciesco. Batteries were immediately thrown
up on commanding heights, about 500 yards from these outworks, and on
the 7th July the enemy evacuated Monteciesco. The guns now turned on
Mozzello, and for ten days endeavoured to make a practicable breach,
the assailants suffering the whole time from the fire from Calvi
itself and from some minor outworks, and Captain Nelson, who was
present, unfortunately losing an eye, from splinters of stone being
flung into his face by a round-shot striking the ground in front of
him.
Before daylight on the morning of the 19th July, a breach having
been effected in the walls of the Mozzello redoubt, the troops
moved forward to the assault. Colonel Moore led the stormers, some
of whom carried sandbags, and others ladders. Shot, hand-grenades,
and live shells were hurtled down upon them by the defenders, but,
nothing daunted, the grenadiers charged forward, and plying their
bayonets with vigour, drove the Frenchmen out of the redoubt. In this
desperate encounter Moore was wounded in the head by a splinter of
a shell, but though knocked senseless for a moment, he continued to
lead his men until he made certain that the place had been secured,
and that entrenchments had been thrown up to cover the troops from
the fire of the enemy's guns in Calvi.
With the capture of the Mozzello redoubt, however, the enemy's
resistance virtually came to an end, and his guns ceased to fire. Yet
the Frenchmen refused to capitulate, and the British prosecuted the
siege with vigour, pushing forward new batteries and mounting upwards
of thirty pieces of ordnance. Moore wrote at the time: "The men and
officers fall ill daily; considerably more than a third of our force
are in the sick report; perhaps there never was so much work done by
so few men in the same space of time."[19] By the 30th July the enemy
began to consider the matter of terms, as Calvi had been set on fire
in two or three places, and the British guns were doing much damage.
After this General Stuart stopped all firing, while he entered into
negotiations with General Casabianca; and on the 10th August Calvi
surrendered, the defenders laying down their arms and forthwith
embarking on transports.
Young Rice, as a very junior subaltern in the 51st, of course had no
opportunity of distinguishing himself in these operations, and he
does not appear to have been much impressed by his first campaign. On
the 2nd August 1794 he wrote to his father from "Camp before Calvi,"
as follows:--
"A flag of truce having just gone in, or rather hoisted in the town
by the enemy, and being not so much distracted by shot and shell, I
embrace the opportunity (which I may say with truth is almost the
only one I have had since the commencement of the siege) of writing
these few lines. Do not expect now, when I begin, that I am going
to give you minute details of all our operations here. In the first
place, it would not be in my power, and, in the next, they would
be very uninteresting. The papers will in all probability soon
show the fate of Calvi and the operations before it. They are, in
my opinion, better able to provide news of that nature than are
private letters. The most satisfactory news, I imagine, to you will
be that of my health and safety. The flag of truce above mentioned
will in all probability terminate in the capitulation of Calvi,
which I am extremely glad to think likely, not on account of the
danger of shot and shell, but on account of the great sickness from
which both officers and men are suffering. The disease, which is a
fever, not only happens to the most delicate, but seizes in the
most sudden manner on the most robust and healthy. We have now out
of our army upwards of 2000 lying in fevers, and a great number of
officers. It is not very dangerous, but two officers have died of
it. In my opinion, the disease arises from our having to lie in the
trenches exposed to the intense heat of the sun. I am quite tired
of the siege. We have taken all the enemy's outposts and silenced
all his guns, and the town has been in flames for some days. If
they continue stubborn, the General is determined to hearken to
no more flags of truce, as he has so often been humbugged by them
before; but to batter a breach and enter the town by storm, which
will be easily effected, though perhaps not without a few broken
heads. As yet only four officers have been killed, and six or seven
wounded. Colonel Moore was slightly wounded on the head at the
storming of the Mozzello redoubt, but is now, I am happy to say,
quite recovered. An unfortunate shot killed an officer[20] of ours
the day before yesterday in the trenches. He had only just joined,
and was an excellent young fellow, and is much lamented.
"I would thank you to tell Mr Greenwood[21] to write to Colonel
Moore, as is customary, about my promotion; for until that time I
do not take the rank of lieutenant in the regiment.
"I was at the taking of Bastia, though did not reap many laurels
there. All I can say is that we were ready to do anything that
there was to be done. My Lord Hood and his marines claimed the
honour--if there was any--of taking that town. Bastia is a very
good town, and will make very pleasant quarters. Calvi is to
appearance no great things. Ajaccio is much the pleasantest place
in the whole island.
"_August 4th._--My lieutenancy was this day noted to the
regiment--the commission dated 1st April. We have not yet taken
possession of the town, but are pretty certain the business is at
an end. The General has not thought fit to divulge the great secret.
"_August 11th._--The enemy marched out of Calvi yesterday with the
honours of war, and embarked on board transports for conveyance to
Toulon. The town of Calvi is in a deplorable state."
Sir John Moore's Diary bears out this last statement. "It is
inconceivable," he wrote, "the destruction our fire has occasioned;
there is literally not a house which has not been damaged by shot or
shell. The whole is a heap of ruins." Moore also often lamented the
sickness from which the troops suffered, but an entry made in his
Diary of the 16th August shows that Sam Rice's regiment was better
off than most. "The 51st," said Moore, "have fewer sick than any
other regiment, owing undoubtedly to our surgeon, M'Cleish, who is
a diligent and intelligent man; but also, in a great degree, to the
good regulation of our regimental hospital for these three or four
years past. This was one of the first things to which I attended on
getting the command of the regiment. It has remained in good order
ever since then. I am now rewarded by having three times the number
of duty men of _any regiment here_."[22]
The cause of all this sickness among the troops was undoubtedly
exposure, for there appears to have been no epidemic of any kind, and
modern soldiers under similar circumstances would probably suffer
equally. In the daytime the men lay out continuously beneath the
fierce heat of a Mediterranean summer's sun, and their dress was that
worn in England in the winter--viz., tight-fitting cloth clothes,
with their "clubbed" hair beneath a hat which, if anything, made
their heads the hotter. At night they slept out, almost uncovered,
among the mountains, at a temperature sometimes so low as almost to
freeze the very marrow in their bones. That sunstroke and sun fever
should have fallen upon them was little to be wondered at.