LEGISLATIVE ADMISSION OF TEXAS INTO THE UNION AS A STATE.
A joint resolution was early brought into the House of
Representatives for the admission of Texas as a State of the Union.
It was in these words:
"That Congress doth consent that the territory properly included
within, and rightfully belonging to the republic of Texas, may
be erected into a new State, to be called the State of Texas,
with a republican form of government, to be adopted by the
people of said republic, by deputies in convention assembled,
with the consent of the existing government, in order that
the same may be admitted as one of the States of this Union.
And, that the foregoing consent of Congress is given upon the
following conditions, and with the following guarantees:
"First. Said State to be formed, subject to the adjustment by
this government of all questions of boundary that may arise
with other governments; and the constitution thereof, with the
proper evidence of its adoption by the people of said republic
of Texas, shall be transmitted to the President of the United
States, to be laid before Congress for its final action, on or
before the 1st day of January, 1846.
"Second. Said State, when admitted into the Union, after ceding
to the United States all public edifices, fortifications,
barracks, ports and harbors, navy and navy-yards, docks,
magazines, arms, armaments, and all other property and means
pertaining to the public defence belonging to said republic
of Texas, shall retain all the public funds, debts, taxes,
and dues of every kind which may belong to, or be due and
owing said republic; and shall also retain all the vacant and
unappropriated lands lying within its limits, to be applied to
the payment of the debts and liabilities of said republic of
Texas; and the residue of said lands, after discharging said
debts and liabilities, to be disposed of as said State may
direct; but in no event are said debts and liabilities to become
a charge upon the government of the United States.
"Third. New States, of convenient size, not exceeding four
in number, in addition to said State of Texas, and having
sufficient population, may hereafter by the consent of said
State, be formed out of the territory thereof, which shall
be entitled to admission under the provisions of the federal
constitution. And such States as may be formed out of that
portion of said territory lying south of thirty-six degrees
thirty minutes north latitude, commonly known as the Missouri
compromise line, shall be admitted into the Union, with or
without slavery, as the people of each State asking admission
may desire; and in such State or States as shall be formed
out of said territory north of said Missouri compromise line,
slavery or involuntary servitude (except for crime) shall be
prohibited."
To understand the third, and last clause of this resolve, it must
be recollected that the boundaries of Texas, by the treaty of 1819,
which retroceded that province to Spain, were extended north across
the Red River, and entirely to the Arkansas River; and following
that river up to the 37th, the 38th, and eventually to the 42d
degree of north latitude; so that all this part of the territory
lying north of 36 degrees 30 minutes, came within the terms of the
Missouri compromise line prohibiting slavery north of that line.
Here then was an anomaly--slave territory, and free territory within
the same State; and it became the duty of Congress to provide for
each accordingly: and it was done. The territory lying south of that
compromise line might become free or slave States as the inhabitants
should decide: the States to be formed out of the territory north of
it were to be bound by the compromise: and lest any question should
arise on that point in consequence of Texas having been under a
foreign dominion since the line was established, it was expressly
re-enacted by this clause of the resolution, and in the precise
words of the Missouri compromise act. Thus framed, and made clear in
its provisions in respect to slavery, the resolutions, after ample
discussion, were passed through the House by a good majority--120 to
97. The affirmatives were
"Archibald H. Arrington, John B. Ashe, Archibald Atkinson,
Thomas H. Bayly, James E. Belser, Benjamin A. Bidlack, Edward
J. Black, James Black, James A. Black, Julius W. Blackwell,
Gustavus M. Bower, James B. Bowlin, Linn Boyd, Richard Brodhead,
Aaron V. Brown, Milton Brown, William J. Brown, Edmund Burke,
Armistead Burt, George Alfred Caldwell, John Campbell, Shepherd
Carey, Reuben Chapman, Augustus A. Chapman, Absalom H. Chappell,
Duncan L. Clinch, James G. Clinton, Howell Cobb, Walter Coles,
Edward Cross, Alvan Cullom, John R. J. Daniel, John W. Davis,
John B. Dawson, Ezra Dean, James Dellet, Stephen A. Douglass,
George C. Dromgool, Alexander Duncan, Chesselden Ellis, Isaac
G. Farlee, Orlando B. Ficklin, Henry D. Foster, Richard
French, George Fuller, William H. Hammett, Hugh A. Haralson,
Samuel Hays, Thomas J. Henley, Isaac E. Holmes, Joseph P.
Hoge, George W. Hopkins, George S. Houston, Edmund W. Hubard,
William S. Hubbell, James M. Hughes, Charles J. Ingersoll,
John Jameson, Cave Johnson, Andrew Johnson, George W. Jones.
Andrew Kennedy, Littleton Kirkpatrick, Alcée Labranche, Moses G.
Leonard, William Lucas, John H. Lumpkin, Lucius Lyon, William
C. McCauslen, William B. Maclay, John A. McClernand, Felix G.
McConnel, Joseph J. McDowell, James J. McKay, James Mathews,
Joseph Morris, Isaac E. Morse, Henry C. Murphy, Willoughby
Newton, Moses Norris, jr., Robert Dale Owen, William Parmenter,
William W. Payne, John Pettit, Joseph H. Peyton, Emery D.
Potter, Zadock Pratt, David S. Reid, James H. Relfe, R. Barnwell
Rhett, John Ritter, Robert W. Roberts, Jeremiah Russell, Romulus
M. Saunders, William T. Senter, Thomas H. Seymour, Samuel
Simons, Richard F. Simpson, John Slidell, John T. Smith, Thomas
Smith, Robert Smith, Lewis Steenrod, Alexander H. Stephens, John
Stewart, William H. Styles, James W. Stone, Alfred P. Stone,
Selah B. Strong, George Sykes, William Taylor, Jacob Thomson,
John W. Tibbatts, Tilghman M. Tucker, John B. Weller, John
Wentworth, Joseph A. Woodward, Joseph A. Wright, William L.
Yancey, Jacob S. Yost."
Members from the slave and free States voted for these resolutions,
and thereby asserted the right of Congress to legislate upon slavery
in territories, and to prohibit or prevent it as they pleased,
and also exercised the right each way--forbidding it one side of a
line, and leaving it optional with the State on the other--and not
only acknowledging the validity of the Missouri compromise line, but
enforcing it by a new enactment; and without this enactment every
one saw that the slavery institution would come to the Arkansas
River in latitude 37, and 38, and even 42. The vote was, therefore,
an abolition of the institution legally existing between these two
lines, and done in the formal and sacred manner of a compact with a
foreign State, as a condition of its admission into the Union. One
hundred and twenty members of the House of Representatives voted in
favor of these resolutions, and thereby both asserted, and exercised
the power of Congress to legislate upon slavery in territories, and
to abolish it therein when it pleased: of the 97 voting against the
resolution, not one did so from any objection to that power. The
resolutions came down from the Department of State, and corresponded
with the recommendation in the President's message.
Sent to the Senate for its concurrence, this joint resolution found
a leading friend in the person of Mr. Buchanan, who was delighted
with every part of it, and especially the re-enactment of the
Missouri compromise line in the part where it might otherwise have
been invalidated by the Texian laws and constitution, and which thus
extinguished for ever the slavery question in the United States. In
this sense he said:
"He was pleased with it, again, because it settled the question
of slavery. These resolutions went to re-establish the Missouri
compromise, by fixing a line within which slavery was to be
in future confined. That controversy had nearly shaken this
Union to its centre in an earlier and better period of our
history; but this compromise, should it be now re-established,
would prevent the recurrence of similar dangers hereafter.
Should this question be now left open for one or two years, the
country could be involved in nothing but one perpetual struggle.
We should witness a feverish excitement in the public mind;
parties would divide on the dangerous and exciting question of
abolition; and the irritation might reach such an extreme as to
endanger the existence of the Union itself. But close it now,
and it would be closed for ever.
"Mr. B. said he anticipated no time when the country would ever
desire to stretch its limits beyond the Rio del Norte; and,
such being the case, ought any friend of the Union to desire to
see this question left open any longer? Was it desirable again
to have the Missouri question brought home to the people to goad
them to fury? That question between the two great interests in
our country had been well discussed and well decided; and from
that moment Mr. B. had set down his foot on the solid ground
then established, and there he would let the question stand for
ever. Who could complain of the terms of that compromise?
"It was then settled that north of 36° 30' slavery should
be for ever prohibited. The same line was fixed upon in the
resolutions recently received from the House of Representatives,
now before us. The bill from the House for the establishment of
a territorial government in Oregon excluded slavery altogether
from that vast country. How vain were the fears entertained in
some quarters of the country that the slaveholding States would
ever be able to control the Union! While, on the other hand,
the fears entertained in the south and south-west as to the
ultimate success of the abolitionists, were not less unfounded
and vain. South of the compromise line of 36° 30' the States
within the limits of Texas applying to come into the Union were
left to decide for themselves whether they would permit slavery
within their limits or not. And under this free permission,
he believed, with Mr. Clay (in his letter on the subject of
annexation), that if Texas should be divided into five States,
two only of them would be slaveholding, and three free States.
The descendants of torrid Africa delighted in the meridian rays
of a burning sun; they basked and rejoiced in a degree of heat
which enervated and would destroy the white man. The lowlands of
Texas, therefore, where they raised cotton, tobacco, and rice,
and indigo, was the natural region for the slave. But north of
San Antonio, where the soil and climate were adapted to the
culture of wheat, rye, corn, and cattle, the climate was exactly
adapted to the white man of the North; there he could labor
for himself without risk or injury. It was, therefore, to be
expected that three out of the five new Texian States would be
free States--certainly they would be so, if they but willed it.
Mr. B. was willing to leave that question to themselves, as they
applied for admission into the Union. He had no apprehensions
of the result. With that feature in the bill, as it came from
the House, he was perfectly content; and, whatever bill might
ultimately pass, he trusted this would be made a condition in
it."
It was in the last days of his senatorial service that Mr. Buchanan
crowned his long devotion to the Missouri compromise by celebrating
its re-enactment where it had been abrogated, taking a stand upon
it as the solid ground on which the Union rested, and invoking a
perpetuity of duration for it.
This resolution, thus adopted by the House, would make the admission
a legislative act, but in the opinion of many members of the
Senate that was only a step in the right direction: another in
their opinion required to be taken: and that was to combine the
treaty-making power with it--the Congress taking the initiative in
the question, and the President and Senate finishing it by treaty,
as done in the case of Louisiana and Florida. With this view
Mr. Benton had brought in a bill for commissioners to treat for
annexation, and so worded as to authorize negotiations with Mexico
at the same time, and get her acquiescence to the alienation in the
settlement of boundaries with her. His bill was in these terms:
"That a State, to be formed out of the present republic of
Texas, with suitable extent and boundaries, and with two
representatives in Congress until the next apportionment of
representation, shall be admitted into the Union by virtue of
this act, on an equal footing with the existing States, as soon
as the terms and conditions of such admission, and the cession
of the remaining Texian territory to the United States shall be
agreed upon by the government of Texas and the United States.
"SEC. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That the sum of
one hundred thousand dollars be, and the same is hereby
appropriated, to defray the expenses of missions and
negotiations to agree upon the terms of said admission and
cession, either by treaty, to be submitted to the Senate, or by
articles to be submitted to the two Houses of Congress, as the
President may direct."
In support of this bill, Mr. Benton said:
"It was a copy, substantially, of the bill which he had
previously offered, with the omission of all the terms and
conditions which that bill contained. He had been induced to
omit all these conditions because of the difficulty of agreeing
upon them, and because it was now clear that whatever bill was
passed upon the subject of Texas, the execution of it must
devolve upon the new President, who had been just elected by
the people with a view to this object. He had confidence in
Mr. Polk, and was willing to trust the question of terms and
conditions to his untrammelled discretion, certain that he would
do the best that he could for the success of the object, the
harmony of the Union, and the peace and honor of the country.
"The occasion is an extraordinary one, and requires an
extraordinary mission. The voluntary union of two independent
nations is a rare occurrence, and is worthy to be attended
by every circumstance which lends it dignity, promotes its
success, and makes it satisfactory. When England and Scotland
were united, at the commencement of the last century, no less
than thirty-one commissioners were employed to agree upon the
terms; and the terms they agreed upon received the sanction
of the Parliaments of the two kingdoms, and completed a union
which had been in vain attempted for one hundred years.
Extraordinary missions, nationally constituted, have several
times been resorted to in our own country, and always with
public approbation, whether successful or not. The first
Mr. Adams sent Marshall, Gerry, and Pinckney to the French
directory in 1798: Mr. Jefferson sent Ellsworth, Davie, and
Murray to the French consular government of 1800: Mr. Madison
sent Adams, Bayard, Gallatin, Clay, and Russell to Ghent in
1814. All these missions, and others which might be named, were
nationally constituted--composed of eminent citizens taken from
each political party, and from different sections of the Union;
and, of course, all favorable to the object for which they
were employed. An occasion has occurred which, in my opinion,
requires a mission similarly constituted--as numerous as the
missions to Paris or to Ghent--and composed of citizens from
both political parties, and from the non-slaveholding as well
as the slaveholding States. Such a commission could hardly fail
to be successful, not merely in agreeing upon the terms of the
union, but in agreeing upon terms which would be satisfactory
to the people and the governments of the two countries. And
here, to avoid misapprehension and the appearance of disrespect
where the contrary is felt, I would say that the gentleman now
in Texas as the chargé of the United States, is, in my opinion,
eminently fit and proper to be one of the envoys extraordinary
and ministers plenipotentiary which my bill contemplates.
"In withdrawing from my bill the terms and conditions which had
been proposed as a basis of negotiation, I do not withdraw them
from the consideration of those who may direct the negotiation.
I expect them to be considered, and, as far as judged proper,
to be acted on. The compromise principle between slave and
non-slaveholding territory is sanctioned by the vote of the
House of Representatives, and by the general voice of the
country. In withdrawing it from the bill, I do not withdraw it
from the consideration of the President: I only leave him free
and untrammelled to do the best he can for the harmony of the
Union on a delicate and embarrassing point.
"The assent of Mexico to the annexation is judged to be
unnecessary, but no one judges her assent to a new boundary line
to be unnecessary: no one judges it unnecessary to preserve her
commerce and good will; and, therefore, every consideration of
self-interest and national policy requires a fair effort to
be made to settle this boundary and to preserve this trade and
friendship; and I shall consider all this as remaining just as
fully in the mind of the President as if submitted to him in a
bill.
"The bill which I now offer is the same which I have presented
heretofore, divested of its conditions, and committing the
subject to the discretion of the President to accomplish the
object in the best way that he can, and either negotiate a
treaty to be submitted to the Senate, or to agree upon articles
of union to be submitted to the two Houses of Congress. I deem
this the best way of proceeding under every aspect. It is the
safest way; for it will settle all questions beforehand, and
leave no nest-eggs to hatch future disputes. It is the most
speedy way; for commissioners conferring face to face will
come to conclusions much sooner than two deliberative bodies
sitting in two different countries, at near two thousand miles
apart, and interchanging categorical propositions in the shape
of law. It is the most satisfactory way; for whatever such
a commission should agree upon, would stand the best chance
to be satisfactory to all parts of the Union. It is the most
respectful way to Texas, and the mode for which she has shown a
decided preference. She has twice sent envoys extraordinary and
ministers plenipotentiary here to treat with us; and the actual
President, Mr. Jones, has authentically declared his willingness
to engage in further negotiations. Ministers sent to confer and
agree--to consult and to harmonize--is much more respectful
than the transmission, by mail or messenger, of an inflexible
proposition, in the shape of law, to be accepted or rejected
in the precise words in which we send it. In every point of
view, the mode which I propose seems to me to be the best; and
as its execution will devolve upon a President just elected by
the people with a view to this subject, I have no hesitation in
trusting it to him, armed with full power, and untrammelled with
terms and conditions."
It was soon ascertained in the Senate, that the joint resolution
from the House could not pass--that unless combined with
negotiation, it would be rejected. Mr. Walker, of Mississippi,
then proposed to join the two together--the bill of Mr. Benton
and the resolution from the House--with a clause referring it to
the discretion of the President to act under them as he deemed
best. It being then the end of the session, and the new President
arrived so as to be ready to act immediately; and it being fully
believed that the execution of the bill was to be left to him,
the conjunction was favored by the author of the bill, and his
friends; and the proposal of Mr. Walker was agreed to. The bill
was added as an amendment, and then the whole was passed--although
by a close vote--27 to 25. The yeas were: Messrs. Allen, Ashley,
Atchison, Atherton, Bagby, Benton, Breese, Buchanan, Colquitt,
Dickinson, Dix, Fairfield, Hannegan, Haywood, Henderson, Huger,
Johnson, Lewis, McDuffie, Merrick, Niles, Semple, Sevier, Sturgeon,
Tappan, Walker, Woodbury,--27. The nays were: Messrs. Archer,
Barrow, Bates, Bayard, Berrien, Choate, Clayton, Crittenden, Dayton,
Evans, Foster, Francis, Huntington, Jarnagin, Mangum, Miller,
Morehead, Pearce, Phelps, Porter, Rives, Simmons, Upham, White,
Woodbridge--25. The resolve of the House was thus passed in the
Senate, and the validity of the Missouri compromise was asserted,
and its re-enactment effected in the Senate, as well as in the
House. But the amendment required the bill to go back to the House
for its concurrence in that particular, which was found to increase
the favor of the measure--an addition of thirty-six being added to
the affirmative vote. Carried to Mr. Tyler for his approval, or
disapproval, it was immediately approved by him, with the hearty
concurrence of his Secretary of State (Mr. Calhoun), who even
claimed the passage of the measure as a triumph of his own. And
so the executive government, in the persons of the President and
his cabinet, added their sanction to the validity of the Missouri
compromise line, and the full power of Congress which it exercised,
to permit or abolish slavery in territories. This was the month of
March, 1845--so that a quarter of a century after the establishment
of that compromise line, the dogmas of "squatter sovereignty"--"no
power in Congress to legislate upon slavery in the territories"--and
"the extension of slavery to the territories by the self-expansion
of the constitution," had not been invented. The discovery of these
dogmas was reserved for a later period, and a more heated state of
the public mind.
The bill providing for the admission of Texas had undergone all its
formalities, and became a law on Saturday, the first day of March;
the second was Sunday, and a _dies non_. Congress met on Monday for
the last day of its existence; and great was the astonishment of
members to hear that the actual President had assumed the execution
of the act providing for the admission of Texas--had adopted the
legislative clause--and sent it off by a special messenger for
the adoption of Texas. It was then seen that some senators had
been cheated out of their votes, and that the passage of the act
through the Senate had been procured by a fraud. At least five of
the senators who voted affirmatively would have voted against the
resolutions of the House, if Mr. Benton's bill had not been added,
and if it had not been believed that the execution of the act would
be left to the new President, and that he would adopt Mr. Benton's.
The possibility of a contrary course had been considered, and, as
it was believed, fully guarded against. Several senators and some
citizens conversed with Mr. Polk, then in the city, and received
his assurance that he would act on Mr. Benton's proposition, and
in carrying it into effect would nominate for the negotiation a
national commission, composed of safe and able men of both parties,
such as Mr. Benton had suggested. Among those who thus conversed
with Mr. Polk were two (senator Tappan, of Ohio, and Francis P.
Blair, Esq., of Washington City), who published the result of their
conversations, and the importance of which requires to be stated
in their own words: which is here done. Mr. Tappan, writing to the
editors of the New York Evening Post, says:
"When the joint resolution declaring the terms on which Congress
will admit Texas into the Union as a State, was before the
Senate, it was soon found that a number of the democratic
members who were favorable to the admission of Texas, would
vote against that resolution. I was one of them. In this stage
of the matter it was proposed, that instead of rejecting
the House resolution, we should amend it by adding, as an
alternative proposition, the substance of Mr. Benton's bill to
obtain Texas by negotiation. Mr. Polk was in the city; it was
understood that he was very anxious that Congress should act on
the subject before he came into office; it was also understood
that the proposition to amend the House resolution originated
with Mr. Polk. It had been suggested, that, if we did so amend
the resolution, Mr. Calhoun would send off the House resolution
to Texas, and so endeavor to forestall the action of Mr. Polk;
but Mr. McDuffie, his friend, having met this suggestion by the
declaration that he would not have the 'audacity' to do such
a thing, it was no more thought of. One difficulty remained,
and that was the danger of putting it into the power of Mr.
Polk to submit the House resolution to Texas. We understood,
indeed, that he intended to submit the Senate proposition to
that government; but, without being satisfied that he would do
this, I would not vote for the resolution, and it was well
ascertained that, without my vote, it could not pass. Mr.
Haywood, who had voted with me, and was opposed to the House
resolution, undertook to converse with Mr. Polk on the subject,
and did so. He afterwards told me that he was authorized by Mr.
Polk to say to myself and other senators, that, if we could
pass the resolution with the amendment proposed to be made, he
would not use the House resolution, but would submit the Senate
amendment as the sole proposition to Texas. Upon this assurance
I voted for the amendment moved by Mr. Walker, containing the
substance of Mr. Benton's bill, and voted for the resolution as
it now stands on the statute book."
Mr. Francis P. Blair, in a letter addressed to Mr. Tappan, and
conversing with Mr. Polk at a different time, gives his statement to
the same effect:
"When the resolution passed by the House of Representatives for
the annexation of Texas reached the Senate, it was ascertained
that it would fail in that body. Benton, Bagby, Dix, Haywood,
and as I understood, you also, were opposed to this naked
proposition of annexation, which necessarily brought with
it the war in which Texas was engaged with Mexico. All had
determined to adhere to the bill submitted by Col. Benton,
for the appointment of a commission to arrange the terms of
annexation with Texas, and to make the attempt to render its
accession to our Union as palatable as possible to Mexico
before its consummation. It was hoped that this point might
be effected by giving (as has been done in the late treaty of
peace) a pecuniary consideration, fully equivalent in value for
the territory desired by the United States, and to which Texas
could justly assert any title. The Senate had been polled, and
it was ascertained that any two of the democratic senators who
were opposed to Brown's resolution, which had passed the House,
could defeat it--the whole whig party preferring annexation by
negotiation, upon Col. Benton's plan, to that of Brown. While
the question was thus pending, I met Mr. Brown (late Governor
of Tennessee, then a member or the House), who suggested that
the resolution of the House, and the bill of Col. Benton,
preferred by the Senate, might be blended, making the latter an
alternative, and leaving the President elect (who alone would
have time to consummate the measure), to act under one or the
other at his discretion. I told Mr. Brown that I did not believe
that the democratic senators opposed to the resolution of the
House, and who had its fate in their hands, would consent to
this arrangement, unless they were satisfied in advance by Mr.
Polk that the commission and negotiation contemplated in Col.
Benton's plan would be tried, before that of direct legislative
annexation was resorted to. He desired me to see Colonel Benton
and the friends of his proposition, submit the suggestions he
had made, and then confer with Mr. Polk to know whether he would
meet their views. I complied; and after several interviews with
Messrs. Haywood, Dix, Benton, and others (Mr. Allen, of Ohio,
using his influence in the same direction), finding that the
two plans could be coupled and carried, if it were understood
that the pacific project was first to be tried, I consulted
the _President elect on the subject_. In the conference I had
with him, _he gave me full assurance that he would appoint
a commission, as contemplated in the bill prepared by Col.
Benton, if passed in conjunction with the House resolution as an
alternative_. In the course of my conversation with Mr. Polk,
I told him that the friends of this plan were solicitous that
the commission should be filled by distinguished men of both
parties, and that Colonel Benton had mentioned to me the names
of Crittenden and Wright, as of the class from which it should
be formed. _Mr. Polk responded, by declaring with an emphasis,
'that the first men of the country should fill the commission.'_
I communicated the result of this interview to Messrs. Benton,
Dix, Haywood, &c. The two last met, on appointment, to adapt the
phraseology of Benton's bill, to suit as an alternative for the
resolution of the House, and it was passed, after a very general
understanding of the course which the measure was to take. Both
Messrs. Dix and Haywood told me they had interviews with Mr.
Polk on the subject of the communication I had reported to them
from him, and they were confirmed by his immediate assurance in
pursuing the course which they had resolved on in consequence
of my representation of his purpose in regard to the point on
which their action depended. After the law was passed, and Mr.
Polk inaugurated, he applied to Gen. Dix (as I am informed by
the latter), to urge the Senate to act upon one of the suspended
cabinet appointments, saying that he wished his administration
organized immediately, as he intended the instant recall of the
messenger understood to have been despatched by Mr. Tyler, and
to revoke his orders given in the last moments of his power,
to thwart the design of Congress in affording him (Mr. Polk)
the means of instituting a negotiation, with a view of bringing
Texas peaceably into the Union."
All this was perfectly satisfactory with respect to the President
elect; but there might be some danger from the actual President, or
rather, from Mr. Calhoun, his Secretary of State, and who had over
Mr. Tyler that ascendant which it is the prerogative of genius to
exercise over inferior minds. This danger was suggested in debate
in open Senate. It was repulsed as an impossible infamy. Such a
cheat upon senators and such an encroachment upon the rights of
the new President, were accounted among the impossibilities: and
Mr. McDuffie, a close and generous friend of Mr. Calhoun, speaking
for the administration, and replying to the suggestion that they
might seize upon the act, and execute it without regard to the
Senate's amendment, not only denied it for them, but repulsed it
in terms which implied criminality if they did. He said they would
not have the "_audacity_" to do it. Mr. McDuffie was an honorable
man, standing close to Mr. Calhoun; and although he did not assume
to speak by authority, yet his indignant repulse of the suggestion
was entirely satisfactory, and left the misgiving senators released
from apprehension on account of Mr. Tyler's possible conduct. Mr.
Robert J. Walker also, who had moved the conjunction of the two
measures, and who was confidential both with the coming in and
going out President, assisted in allaying apprehension in the
reason he gave for opposing an amendment offered by Mr. Ephraim H.
Foster, of Tennessee, which, looking to the President's adoption
of the negotiating clause, required that he should make a certain
"_stipulation_" in relation to slavery, and another in relation to
the public debt. Mr. Walker objected to this proposition, saying it
was already in the bill, "_and if the President proceeded properly
in the negotiation he would act upon it_." This seemed to be
authoritative that negotiation was to be the mode, and consequently
that Mr. Benton's plan was to be adopted. Thus quieted in their
apprehensions, five senators voted for the act of admission, who
would not otherwise have done so; and any two of whom voting against
it would have defeated it. Mr. Polk did not despatch a messenger to
recall Mr. Tyler's envoy; and that omission was the only point of
complaint against him. Mr. McDuffie stood exempt from all blame,
known to be an honorable man speaking from a generous impulsion.
Thus was Texas incorporated into the Union--by a deception, and
by deluding five senators out of their votes. It was not a barren
fraud, but one prolific of evil, and pregnant with bloody fruit.
It established, so far as the United States was concerned, the
state of war with Mexico: it only wanted the acceptance of Texas
to make war the complete legal condition of the two countries: and
that temptation to Texas was too great to be resisted. She desired
annexation any way: and the government of the United States having
broken up the armistice, and thwarted the peace prospects, and
brought upon her the danger of a new invasion, she leaped at the
chance of throwing the burden of the war on the United States. The
legislative proposition sent by Mr. Tyler was accepted: Texas became
incorporated with the United States: by that incorporation the state
of war--_the status belli_--was established between the United
States and Mexico: and it only became a question of time and chance,
when hostilities were to begin. Mr. Calhoun, though the master
spirit over Mr. Tyler, and the active power in sending off the
proposition to Texas, was not in favor of war, and still believed,
as he did when he made the treaty, that the weakness of Mexico, and
a _douceur_ of ten millions in money, would make her submit: but
there was another interest all along working with him, and now to
supersede him in influence, which was for war, not as an object, but
as a means--as a means of getting a treaty providing for claims and
indemnities, and territorial acquisitions. This interest, long his
adjunct, now became independent of him, and pushed for the war; but
it was his conduct that enabled this party to act; and this point
became one of earnest debate between himself and Mr. Benton the year
afterwards; in which he was charged as being the real author of the
war; and in which Mr. Benton's speech being entirely historical,
becomes a condensed view of the whole Texas annexation question; and
as such is presented in the next chapter.
ADMINISTRATION OF JAMES K. POLK.