PRESIDENTIAL: DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION: MR. CALHOUN'S REFUSAL
TO SUBMIT HIS NAME TO IT: HIS REASONS.
Before the meeting of this convention Mr. Calhoun, in a public
address to his political friends, made known his determination not
to suffer his name to go before that assemblage as a candidate for
the presidency, and stated his reasons for that determination.
Many of those reasons were of a nature to rise above personal
considerations--to look deep into the nature and working of our
government--and to show objections to the convention system (as
practised), which have grown stronger with time. His first objection
was as to the mode of choosing delegates, and the manner of their
giving in their votes--he contending for district elections, and the
delegates to vote individually, and condemning all other modes of
electing and voting:
"I hold, then, that the convention should be so constituted,
as to utter fully and clearly the voice of the people, and
not that of political managers, or office holders and office
seekers, and for that purpose, I hold it indispensable that
the delegates should be appointed directly by the people, or
to use the language of General Jackson, should be 'fresh from
the people.' I also hold, that the only possible mode to effect
this, is for the people to choose the delegates by districts,
and that they should vote _per capita_. Every other mode of
appointing would be controlled by political machinery, and place
the appointments in the hands of the few, who work it."
This was written ten years ago: there have been three of these
conventions since that time by each political party: and each have
verified the character here given of them. Veteran office holders,
and undaunted office seekers, collusively or furtively appointed,
have had the control of these nominations--the office holders all
being forbid by the constitution to be even electors, and the office
seekers forbid by shame and honor (if amenable to such sensations),
to take part in nominating a President from whom they would demand
pay for their vote. Mr. Calhoun continues:
"I object, then, to the proposed convention, because it will
not be constituted in conformity with the fundamental articles
of the republican creed. The delegates to it will be appointed
from some of the States, not by the people in districts, but,
as has been stated, by State conventions en masse, composed
of delegates appointed in all cases, as far as I am informed,
by county or district conventions, and in some cases, if not
misinformed, these again composed of delegates appointed by
still smaller divisions, or a few interested individuals.
Instead then of being directly, or fresh from the people, the
delegates to the Baltimore convention will be the delegates of
delegates; and of course removed, in all cases, at least three,
if not four degrees from the people. At each successive remove,
the voice of the people will become less full and distinct,
until, at last, it will be so faint and imperfect, as not to
be audible. To drop metaphor, I hold it impossible to form a
scheme more perfectly calculated to annihilate the control of
the people over the presidential election, and vest it in those
who make politics a trade, and who live or expect to live on the
government."
Mr. Calhoun proceeds to take a view of the working of the
constitution in a fair election by the people and by the States,
and considered the plan adopted as a compromise between the large
and the small States. In the popular election through electors, the
large States had the advantage, as presenting masses of population
which would govern the choice: in the election by States in the
House of Representatives, the small States had the advantage, as the
whole voted equally. This, then, was considered a compromise. The
large States making the election when they were united: when not
united, making the nomination of three (five as the constitution
first stood), out of which the States chose one. This was a
compromise; and all compromises should be kept when founded in the
structure of the government, and made by its founders. Total defeat
of the will of the people, and total frustration of the intent of
the constitution, both in the electoral nomination and the House
choice of a President, was seen in the exercise of this power
over presidential nominations by Congress caucuses, before their
corruption required a resort to conventions, intended to be the
absolute reflex of the popular will. Of this Mr. Calhoun says:
"The danger was early foreseen, and to avoid it, some of the
wisest and most experienced statesmen of former days so strongly
objected to congressional caucuses to nominate candidates for
the presidency, that they never could be induced to attend
them; among these it will be sufficient to name Mr. Macon and
Mr. Lowndes. Others, believing that this provision of the
constitution was too refined for practice, were solicitous to
amend it, but without impairing the influence of the smaller
States in the election. Among these, I rank myself. With that
object, resolutions were introduced, in 1828, in the Senate by
Colonel Benton, and in the House by Mr. McDuffie, providing
for districting the State, and for referring the election back
to the people, in case there should be no choice, to elect one
from the two highest candidates. The principle which governed
in the amendment proposed, was to give a fair compensation to
the smaller States for the surrender of their advantage in the
eventual choice, by the House, and at the same time to make
the mode of electing the President more strictly in conformity
with the principles of our popular institutions, and to be less
liable to corruption, than the existing. They (the resolutions
of McDuffie and Benton) received the general support of the
party, but were objected to by a few, as not being a full
equivalent to the smaller States."
The Congress presidential caucuses were put down by the will of the
people, and in both parties at the same time. They were put down
for not conforming to the will of the people, for incompatibility
between the legislative and the elective functions, for being in
office at the same time, for following their own will, instead of
representing that of their constituents. Mr. Calhoun concurred in
putting them down, but preferred them a hundred times over to the
intriguing, juggling, corrupt and packed machinery into which the
conventions had so rapidly degenerated.
"And here let me add, that as objectionable as I think a
congressional caucus for nominating a President, it is, in
my opinion, far less so than a convention constituted as is
proposed. The former had indeed many things to recommend it.
Its members consisting of senators and representatives, were
the immediate organs of the State legislatures, or the people;
were responsible to them, respectively, and were for the most
part, of higher character, standing, and talents. They voted
per capita, and what is very important, they represented fairly
the relative strength of the party in their respective States.
In all these important particulars, it was all that could be
desired for a nominating body, and formed a striking contrast
to the proposed convention; and yet, it could not be borne by
the people in the then purer days of the republic. I, acting
with General Jackson and most of the leaders of the party at
that time, contributed to put it down, because we believed it
to be liable to be acted on and influenced by the patronage of
the government--an objection far more applicable to a convention
constituted as the one proposed, than to a congressional caucus.
Far however was it from my intention, in aiding to put that
down, to substitute in its place what I regard as a hundred
times more objectionable in every point of view. Indeed, if
there must be an intermediate body between the people and the
election, unknown to the constitution, it may be well questioned
whether a better than the old plan of a congressional caucus can
be devised."
Mr. Calhoun considered the convention system, degenerated to
the point it was in 1844, to have been a hundred times more
objectionable than the Congress caucuses which had been repudiated
by the people: measured by the same scale, and they are a thousand
times worse at present--having succeeded to every objection that
was made against the Congress caucuses, and superadded a multitude
of others going directly to scandalous corruption, open intrigue,
direct bargain and sale, and flagrant disregard of the popular
will. One respect in which they had degenerated from the Congress
caucus was in admitting a State to give its full vote in nominating
a President, which could either give no vote at all, or a divided
one, to the nominated candidate. In the Congress caucus that anomaly
could not happen. The members of the party only voted: and if there
were no members of a party from a State, there was no vote from
that State in the caucus: if a divided representation, then a vote
according to the division. This was fair, and prevented a nomination
being made by those who could do nothing in the election. This
objection to the convention system, and a grievous one it is as
practised, he sets forth in a clear and forcible point of view. He
says:
"I have laid down the principle, on which I rest the objection
in question, with the limitation, that the relative weight of
the States should be maintained, making due allowance for their
relative party strength. The propriety of the limitation is
so apparent, that but a few words, in illustration, will be
required. The convention is a party convention, and professedly
intended to take the sense of the party, which cannot be done
fairly, if States having but little party strength, are put on
equality with those which have much. If that were done, the
result might be, that a small portion of the party from States
the least sound, politically, and which could give but little
support in Congress, might select the candidate, and make the
President, against a great majority of the soundest, and on
which the President and his administration would have to rely
for support. All this is clearly too unfair and improper to be
denied. There may be a great difficulty in applying a remedy in
a convention, but I do not feel myself called upon to say how
it can be done, or by what standard the relative party strength
of the respective States should be determined; perhaps the best
would be their relative strength in Congress at the time. In
laying down the principle, I added the limitation for the sake
of accuracy, and to show how imperfectly the party must be
represented, when it is overlooked. I see no provision in the
proposed convention to meet it."
The objection is clearly and irresistibly shown: the remedy is
not so clear. The Congress representation for the time being is
suggested for the rule of the convention: it is not always the
true rule. A safer one is, the general character of the State--its
general party vote--and its probable present party strength. Even
that rule may not attain exact precision; but, between a rule
which may admit of a slight error, and no rule at all to keep out
notorious unfounded votes--votes representing no constituency,
unable to choose an elector, having no existence when the election
comes on, yet potential at the nomination, and perhaps governing
it: between these two extremes there is no room for hesitation, or
choice: the adoption of some rule which would exclude notoriously
impotent votes, becomes essential to the rights and safety of the
party, and is peremptorily demanded by the principle of popular
representation. The danger of centralizing the nomination--(which,
so far as the party is concerned, is the election)--in the hands of
a few States, by the present convention mode of nomination, is next
shown by Mr. Calhoun.
"But, in order to realize how the convention will operate,
it will be necessary to view the combined effects of the
objections which I have made. Thus viewed, it will be
found, that a convention so constituted, tends irresistibly
to centralization--centralization of the control over the
presidential election in the hands of a few of the central,
large States, at first, and finally, in political managers,
office-holders, and office-seekers; or to express it
differently, in that portion of the community, who live, or
expect to live on the government, in contradistinction to
the great mass, who expect to live on their own means or
their honest industry; and who maintain the government; and
politically speaking, emphatically the people. That such would
be the case, may be inferred from the fact, that it would afford
the means to some six or seven States lying contiguous and not
far from the centre of the Union, to control the nomination,
and through that the election, by concentrating their united
votes in the convention. Give them the power of doing so, and
it would not long lie dormant. What may be done by combination,
where the temptation is so great, will be sure ere long to be
done. To combine and conquer, is not less true as a maxim, where
power is concerned, than 'divide and conquer.' Nothing is better
established, than that the desire for power can bring together
and unite the most discordant materials."
After showing the danger of centralizing the nomination in the
hands of a few great contiguous States, Mr. Calhoun goes on to show
the danger of a still more fatal and corrupt centralization--that
of throwing the nomination into the meshes of a train-band of
office-holders and office-seekers--professional President-makers,
who live by the trade, having no object but their own reward,
preferring a weak to a strong man because they can manage him
easiest: and accomplishing their purposes by corrupt combinations,
fraudulent contrivances, and direct bribery. Of these train-bands,
Mr. Calhoun says:
"But the tendency to centralization will not stop there. The
appointment of delegates en masse by State convention, would
tend at the same time, and even with great force, to neutralize
the control in the hands of the few, who make politics a
trade. The farther the convention is removed from the people,
the more certainly the control over it will be placed in the
hands of the interested few, and when removed three or four
degrees, as has been shown it will be, where the appointment
is by State conventions, the power of the people will cease,
and the seekers of Executive favor will become supreme. At that
stage, an active, trained and combined corps will be formed in
the party, whose whole time and attention will be directed to
politics. Into their hands the appointments of delegates in all
the stages will fall, and they will take special care that none
but themselves or their humble and obedient dependents shall
be appointed. The central and State conventions will be filled
by the most experienced and cunning, and after nominating the
President, they will take good care to divide the patronage
and offices, both of the general and State governments, among
themselves and their dependents. But why say _will_? Is it not
_already the case_? Have there not been many instances of State
conventions being filled by office holders and office seekers,
who, after making the nomination, have divided the offices in
the State among themselves and their partisans, and joined in
recommending to the candidate whom they have just nominated to
appoint them to the offices to which they have been respectively
allotted? If such be the case in the infancy of the system, it
must end, if such conventions should become the established
usage, in the President nominating his successor. When it comes
to that, it will not be long before the sword will take the
place of the constitution."
And it has come to that. Mr. Tyler set the example in
1844--immediately after this address of Mr. Calhoun was written--and
had a presidential convention of his own, composed of office
holders and office seekers. Since then the example has been pretty
well followed; and now any President that pleases may nominate his
successor by having the convention filled with the mercenaries in
office, or trying to get in. The evil has now reached a pass that
must be corrected, or the elective franchise abandoned. Conventions
must be reformed--that is to say, purged of office holders and
office seekers--purged of impotent votes--purged of all delegates
forbid by the constitution to be electors--purged of intrigue,
corruption and jugglery--and brought to reflect the will of the
people; or, they must suffer the fate of the Congress caucuses,
and be put down. Far better--a thousand times better--to let the
constitution work its course; as many candidates offer for President
as please; and if no one gets a majority of the whole, then the
House of Representatives to choose one from the three highest on the
list. In that event, the people would be the nominating body: they
would present the three, out of which their representatives would be
obliged to take one. This would be a nomination by the _People_, and
an election by the States.
One other objection to these degenerate conventions Mr. Calhoun did
not mention, but it became since he made his address a prominent
one, and an abuse in itself, which insures success to the train-band
mercenaries whose profligate practices he so well describes. This
is the two-thirds rule, as it is called; the rule that requires a
vote of two-thirds of the convention to make a nomination. This
puts it in the power of the minority to govern the majority, and
enables a few veteran intriguers to manage as they please. And
when it is remembered that many are allowed--even the delegates of
whole States--to vote in the convention, which can give no vote to
the party at the election, it might actually happen that the whole
nomination might be contrived and made by straw-delegates, whose
constituency could not give a single electoral vote.