CHAPTER CXXVII.

MR. TYLER'S SECOND ANNUAL MESSAGE.

The prominent topics of the message were the state of our affairs

with Great Britain and Mexico--with the former in relation to

Oregon, the latter in relation to Texas. In the same breath in

which the President announced the happy results of the Ashburton

treaty, he was forced to go on and show the improvidence of that

treaty on our part, in not exacting a settlement of the questions

which concerned the interests of the United States, while settling

those which lay near to the interests of Great Britain. The Oregon

territorial boundary was one of these omitted American subjects; but

though passed over by the government in the negotiations, it was

forced upon its attention by the people. A stream of emigration was

pouring into that territory, and their presence on the banks of the

Columbia caused the attention of both governments to be drawn to

the question of titles and boundaries; and Mr. Tyler introduced it

accordingly to Congress.

"A question of much importance still remains to be adjusted

between them. The territorial limits of the two countries in

relation to what is commonly known as the Oregon Territory,

still remains in dispute. The United States would be at all

times indisposed to aggrandize themselves at the expense of any

other nation; but while they would be restrained by principles

of honor, which should govern the conduct of nations as well

as that of individuals, from setting up a demand for territory

which does not belong to them, they would as unwillingly consent

to a surrender of their rights. After the most rigid, and, as

far as practicable, unbiassed examination of the subject, the

United States have always contended that their rights appertain

to the entire region of country lying on the Pacific, and

embraced within 42° and 54° 40' of north latitude. This claim

being controverted by Great Britain, those who have preceded

the present Executive--actuated, no doubt, by an earnest

desire to adjust the matter upon terms mutually satisfactory

to both countries--have caused to be submitted to the British

Government propositions for settlement and final adjustment,

which, however, have not proved heretofore acceptable to it.

Our Minister at London has, under instructions, again brought

the subject to the consideration of that Government; and while

nothing will be done to compromit the rights or honor of the

United States, every proper expedient will be resorted to, in

order to bring the negotiation now in the progress of resumption

to a speedy and happy termination."

This passage, while letting it be seen that we were already engaged

in a serious controversy with Great Britain--engaged in it almost

before the ink was dry which had celebrated the peace mission which

was to settle all questions--also committed a serious mistake in

point of fact, and which being taken up as a party watchword, became

a difficult and delicate point of management at home: it was the

line of 54 degrees 40 minutes north for our northern boundary on

the Pacific. The message says that the United States have always

contended for that line. That is an error. From the beginning of

the dispute, the United States government had proposed the parallel

of 49 degrees, as being the continuation of the dividing line on

this side of the Rocky Mountains, and governed by the same law--the

decision of the commissaries appointed by the British and French

under the tenth article of the treaty of Utrecht to establish

boundaries between them on the continent of North America. President

Jefferson offered that line in 1807--which was immediately after the

return of Messrs. Lewis and Clark from their meritorious expedition,

and as soon as it was seen that a question of boundary was to arise

in that quarter with Great Britain. President Monroe made the same

offer in 1818, and also in 1824. Mr. Adams renewed it in 1826: so

that, so far from having always claimed to 54-40, the United States

had always offered the parallel of 49. As to 54-40, no American

statesman had ever thought of originating a title there. It was

a Russian point of demarcation on the coast and islands--not a

continental line at all--first assigned to the Russian Fur Company

by the Emperor Paul, and afterwards yielded to Russia by the United

States and Great Britain, separately, in separating their respective

claims on the north-west of America. She was allowed to come south

to that point on the coast and islands, not penetrating the interior

of the continent--leaving the rest for Great Britain and the United

States to settle as they could. It was proposed at the time that the

three powers should settle together--in a tripartite treaty: but the

Emperor Alexander, like a wise man, contented himself with settling

his own boundary, without mixing himself in the dispute between the

United States and Great Britain. This he did about the year 1820:

and it was long afterwards, and by those who knew but little of this

establishment of a southern limit for the Russian Fur Company, that

this point established in their charter, and afterwards agreed to by

the United States and Great Britain, was taken up as the northern

boundary for the United States. It was a great error in Mr. Tyler to

put this Russian limit in his message for our line; and, being taken

up by party spirit, and put into one of those mushroom political

creeds, called "platforms" (wherewith this latter generation has

been so plentifully cursed), it came near involving the United

States in war.

The prospective war with Mexico on the subject of Texas was thus

shadowed forth:

"I communicate herewith certain despatches received from our

Minister at Mexico, and also a correspondence which has recently

occurred between the envoy from that republic and the Secretary

of State. It must be regarded as not a little extraordinary

that the government of Mexico, in anticipation of a public

discussion, which it has been pleased to infer, from newspaper

publications, as likely to take place in Congress, relating to

the annexation of Texas to the United States, should have so far

anticipated the result of such discussion as to have announced

its determination to visit any such anticipated decision by

a formal declaration of war against the United States. If

designed to prevent Congress from introducing that question as

a fit subject for its calm deliberation and final judgment, the

Executive has no reason to doubt that it will entirely fail of

its object. The representatives of a brave and patriotic people

will suffer no apprehension of future consequences to embarrass

them in the course of their proposed deliberations. Nor will the

Executive Department of the government fail, for any such cause,

to discharge its whole duty to the country."

At the time of communicating this information to Congress, the

President was far advanced in a treaty with Texas for her annexation

to the United States--an event which would be war itself with

Mexico, without any declaration on her part, or our part--she being

then at war with Texas as a revolted province, and endeavoring to

reclaim her to her former subjection. Still prepossessed with his

idea of a national currency of paper money, in preference to gold

and silver, the President recurs to his previous recommendation for

an Exchequer bank--regrets its rejection by Congress,--vaunts its

utility--and thinks that it would still aid, in a modified form, in

restoring the currency to a sound and healthy state.

"In view of the disordered condition of the currency at the

time, and the high rates of exchange between different parts of

the country, I felt it to be incumbent on me to present to the

consideration of your predecessors a proposition conflicting in

no degree with the constitution or the rights of the States,

and having the sanction--not in detail, but in principle--of

some of the eminent men who had preceded me in the executive

office. That proposition contemplated the issuing of treasury

notes of denominations not less than five, nor more than one

hundred dollars, to be employed in payment of the obligations

of the government in lieu of gold and silver, at the option of

the public creditor, and to an amount not exceeding $15,000,000.

It was proposed to make them receivable every where, and to

establish at various points depositories of gold and silver,

to be held in trust for the redemption of such notes, so as

to insure their convertibility into specie. No doubt was

entertained that such notes would have maintained a par value

with gold and silver--thus furnishing a paper currency of equal

value over the Union, thereby meeting the just expectations of

the people, and fulfilling the duties of a parental government.

Whether the depositories should be permitted to sell or purchase

bills under very limited restrictions, together with all its

other details, was submitted to the wisdom of Congress, and was

regarded as of secondary importance. I thought then, and think

now, that such an arrangement would have been attended with the

happiest results. The whole matter of the currency would have

been placed where, by the constitution, it was designed to be

placed--under the immediate supervision and control of Congress.

The action of the government would have been independent of

all corporations; and the same eye which rests unceasingly on

the specie currency, and guards it against adulteration, would

also have rested on the paper currency, to control and regulate

its issues, and protect it against depreciation. Under all the

responsibilities attached to the station which I occupy, and

in redemption of a pledge given to the last Congress, at the

close of its first session, I submitted the suggestion to its

consideration at two consecutive sessions. The recommendation,

however, met with no favor at its hands. While I am free to

admit that the necessities of the times have since become

greatly ameliorated, and that there is good reason to hope that

the country is safely and rapidly emerging from the difficulties

and embarrassments which every where surrounded it in 1841,

yet I cannot but think that its restoration to a sound and

healthy condition would be greatly expedited by a resort to the

expedient in a modified form."

Such were still the sighings and longings of Mr. Tyler for a

national currency of paper money. They were his valedictory to that

delusive cheat. Before he had an opportunity to present another

annual message, the Independent Treasury System, and the revived

gold currency had done their office--had given ease and safety to

the government finances, had restored prosperity and confidence to

the community, and placed the country in a condition to dispense

with all small money paper currency--all under twenty dollars--if it

only had the wisdom to do so.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 128 / 202 章