CHINESE MISSION: MR. CUSHING'S APPOINTMENT AND NEGOTIATION.
Ten days before the end of the session 1842-'3, there was taken up
in the House of Representatives a bill reported from the Committee
of Foreign Relations, to provide the means of opening future
intercourse between the United States and China. The bill was
unusually worded, and gave rise to criticism and objection. It ran
thus:
"That the sum of forty thousand dollars be, and the same is
hereby, appropriated and placed at the disposal of the President
of the United States, to enable him to establish the future
commercial relations between the United States and the Chinese
Empire on terms of national equal reciprocity; the said sum to
be accounted for by the President, under the restrictions and in
the manner prescribed by the act of first of July, one thousand
seven hundred and ninety, entitled 'An act providing the means
of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.'"
This bill was unusual, and objectionable in all its features. It
appropriated a gross sum to be disposed of for its object as the
President pleased, being the first instance in a public act of
a departure from the rule of specific appropriations which Mr.
Jefferson introduced as one of the great reforms of the republican
or democratic party. It withdrew the settlement of the expenditure
of this money from the Treasury officers, governed by law, to
the President himself, governed by his discretion. It was copied
from the act of July 1st, 1790, but under circumstances wholly
dissimilar, and in violation of the rule which condemned gross,
and required specific, appropriations. That act was made in the
infancy of our government, and when preliminary, informal, and
private steps were necessary to be taken before public negotiations
could be ventured. It was under that act that Mr. Gouverneur Morris
was privately authorized by President Washington to have the
unofficial interviews with the British ministry which opened the
way for the public mission which ended in the commercial treaty
of 1794. Private advances were necessary with several powers, in
order to avoid rebuff in a public refusal to treat with us. Great
latitude of discretion was, therefore, entrusted to the President;
and that President was Washington. A gross sum was put into his
hands, to be disposed of as he should deem proper for its object,
that of intercourse between the United States and foreign nations,
and to account for such part of the expenditure of the sum as,
in his judgment, might be made public, and he was limited in the
sums he might allow to $9,000 outfit, and $9,000 salary to a full
minister--to $4,500 per annum to a chargé de affaires--and to $1,350
to a secretary of legation. This bill for the Chinese mission was
framed upon that early act of 1790, and even adopted its mode of
accounting for the money by leaving it to the President to suppress
the items of the expenditure, when he should judge it proper. The
bill was loose and latitudinous enough to shock the democratic
side of the House; but not enough so to satisfy its friends; and
accordingly the first movement was to enlarge the President's
discretion, by striking from the bill the word "restrictions" which
applied to his application of the money. Mr. Adams made the motion,
and as he informed the House in the course of the discussion, at the
instance and according to the wish of the Secretary of State (Mr.
Webster). This motion gave rise to much objection. Mr. Meriwether,
a member of the committee which had reported the bill, spoke first;
and said:
"He opposed the amendment. If he understood its effect, it would
be to leave the mission without any restriction. The bill, as it
came from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, placed this mission
on the same footing as other missions. The Secretary of State,
however, wished the whole sum placed at his own disposal and
control--wished it left to him to pay as much as he pleased. He
(Mr. M.) did not consider this mission to China as a matter of
so much importance as had been claimed for it. He thought it
would be difficult to persuade the people of that country to
change their polity, give up their aversion to foreigners, and
enter into commercial intercourse with other nations. He wished,
at any rate, to have this mission placed on the same footing as
other missions. He knew not how the whole of this sum of $40,000
was to be expended, although he was a member of the Committee
on Foreign Affairs. Our ministers generally receive $9,000 a
year salary, and $9,000 outfit. Now, if the amendment of the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ADAMS] should be adopted, it
would be in the power of the President to pay the minister who
might be sent to China $20,000 outfit, and $20,000 more salary.
The minister would be subject to no expense, would go out in
a national vessel, and would not be compelled to land until
it suited his pleasure. Why make a difference in the case of
China? Was that mission of greater importance than the French?
Look at Turkey--a semi-barbarous country--where our minister
received $6,000 a year. He thought if $6,000 was enough for the
services of Commodore Porter at Constantinople, that sum would
be sufficient for any minister that might be sent out to China.
When the amendment now before the committee should have been
disposed of, he should move to place the mission to China upon
the same footing with that to Turkey."
In these remarks Mr. Meriwether shows it was the sense of the
committee to make the appropriation in the usual specific form,
leaving the accountability to the usual Treasury settlement; but
that the bill was changed to its present shape at the instance of
the Secretary of State. Some members placed their objections on the
ground of no confidence in the administration that was to expend the
money: thus, Mr. J. C. Clark, of New York:
"In the British Parliament, it is a legitimate ground of
objection to a supply bill, that the objector has no confidence
in the ministry. This bill proposes to vest in the President
and Secretary of State a large discretion in the expenditure
of forty thousand dollars; and I agree with my friend from
Georgia [Mr. MERIWETHER], that there is good reason to doubt
the propriety of giving to these men the disbursement of any
money not imperiously called for by the exigencies of the public
service. I place my opposition to this bill solely on the ground
of an utter want of confidence in the political integrity of the
President and some of his official advisers."
Mr. Adams replied to these objections:
"He did not think it necessary to waste the time of the House in
arguing the propriety of a mission to China. The message of the
President was sufficient on that point.
"He then replied to the objections urged against the bill,
on the ground that it placed too much confidence in the
President, and that the appropriation was to be made without
restriction. The motion which he had submitted, to strike
out the restrictions of law, which were applicable to other
diplomatic appropriations, was made after a consultation with
the Secretary of State, who thought that to impose restrictions
might embarrass the progress of the negotiations."
Mr. McKeon, of New York, opposed the whole scheme of the mission to
China, believing it to be unnecessary, and to be conducted with too
much pomp and expense, and to lay the foundation for a permanent
mission. He said:
"There was nothing so very peculiar in the case of China, that
Congress should depart from the usual restrictions of law, which
applied to diplomatic appropriations generally. He thought it
would be better to take the matter quietly, and go about it in
a quiet business manner. Should the bill pass as reported by
the committee, it would authorize a minister at a salary of
$9,000 and $9,000 outfit. Pass it according to the amendment
of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ADAMS], and $40,000
would thereby be placed at the disposal of the Executive--more
than he (Mr. McK.) was willing to see placed in the hands of
any President. He should be as liberal as any man in fixing the
salaries of the minister and secretary. But the appropriation
was only a beginning. The largest ship in this country (the
Pennsylvania) would no doubt be selected to carry out whomsoever
should be selected as minister, in order to give as much _eclat_
as possible to our country. Then other vessels would have to be
sent to accompany this ship, and to sail where her size would
not allow her to go. These, and other paraphernalia, would have
to be provided for the minister; and this $40,000 would be but a
beginning of the expense. He concluded by expressing the hope
that the motion to strike out the restrictions contained in the
bill, and thereby place the whole appropriation at the disposal
of the President, would not prevail."
Mr. Bronson, of Maine, expressed it as his conviction, that we
should possess more information before such a measure as that of
sending a minister plenipotentiary to China should be adopted.
He should prefer having a commercial agent for the present. The
question was then taken on Mr. Adams's proposed amendment, and
resulted in its adoption--80 votes for it; 55 against it. The
previous question being called, the bill was then passed without
further debate or amendment--yeas 96: nays 59. The nays were:
"Messrs.--Thomas D. Arnold, Archibald H. Arrington, Charles G.
Atherton, Benjamin A. Bidlack, John M. Botts, David Bronson,
Milton Brown, Charles Brown, Edmund Burke, William O. Butler,
Patrick C. Caldwell, William B. Campbell, Zadock Casey, John C.
Clark, Nathan Clifford, Walter Coles, Benjamin S. Cowen, James
H. Cravens, George W. Crawford, Garrett Davis, Andrew W. Doig,
William P. Fessenden, Charles A. Floyd, A. Lawrence Foster,
Roger L. Gamble, James Gerry, William L. Goggin, William O.
Goode, Willis Green, William A. Harris, John Hastings, Samuel
L. Hays, Jacob Houck, jr., Robert M. T. Hunter, John W. Jones,
George M. Keim, Nathaniel S. Littlefield, Abraham McClellan,
James J. McKay, John McKeon, Albert G. Marchand, Alfred
Marshall, John Maynard, James A. Meriwether, John Moore, Bryan
Y. Owsley, Kenneth Rayner, John R. Reding, John Reynolds, R.
Barnwell Rhett, James Rogers, William Smith, John Snyder, James
C. Sprigg, Edward Stanley, Lewis Steenrod, Charles C. Stratton,
John T. Stuart, Samuel W. Trotti."
It was observed that Mr. Cushing, though a member of the committee
which reported the bill, and a close friend to the administration,
took no part in the proceedings upon this bill--neither speaking
nor voting for or against it: a circumstance which strengthened the
belief that he was to be the beneficiary of it.
It was midnight on the last day of the session when the bill was
called up in the Senate. Mr. Wright of New York, desired to know the
reason for so large an appropriation in this case. He was answered
by Mr. Archer, the senatorial reporter of the bill, who said it was
not intended that the salary of the minister, or agent, together
with his outfit, should exceed $18,000 per annum--the amount
usually appropriated for such missions. Supposing the mission to
occupy two years, and the sum is not too much, and the remoteness of
the country to be negotiated with, justifies the full appropriation
in advance. Mr. Wright replied that the explanation was not at all
satisfactory to him: the compensation to an agent in China could be
voted annually, and applied annually, as conveniently as any other.
Mr. Benton objected to any mission at all, and especially to such a
one as the bill provided for. He argued that--
"There was no necessity for a treaty with China, was proved by
the fact that our trade with that country had been going on
well without one for a century or two, and was now growing and
increasing constantly. It was a trade conducted on the simple
and elementary principle of '_here is one_,' and '_there is the
other_'--all ready-money, and hard money, or good products--no
credit system, no paper money. For a long time this trade took
nothing but silver dollars. At present it is taking some other
articles, and especially a goodly quantity of Missouri lead.
This has taken place without a treaty, and without an agent at
$40,000 expense. All things are going on well between us and the
Chinese. Our relations are purely commercial, conducted on the
simplest principles of trade, and unconnected with political
views. China has no political connection with us. She is not
within the system, or circle, of American policy. She can have
no designs upon us, or views in relation to us; and we have no
need of a minister to watch and observe her conduct. Politically
and commercially the mission is useless. By the Constitution,
all the ministers are to be appointed by the Senate; but this
minister to China is to be called an agent, and sent out by
the President without the consent of the Senate; and thus, by
imposing a false name upon the minister, defraud the Senate of
their control over the appointment. The enormity of the sum
shows that the mission is to be more expensive than any one ever
sent from the United States; and that it is to be one of the
first grade, or of a higher grade than any known in our country.
Nine thousand dollars per annum, and the same for an outfit, is
the highest compensation known to our service; yet this $40,000
mission may double that amount, and still the minister be only
called an agent, for the purpose of cheating the Senate out of
its control over the appointment. The bill is fraudulent in
relation to the compensation to be given to this ambassadorial
agent. No sum is fixed, but he is to take what he pleases for
himself and his suite. He and they are to help themselves; and,
from the amount allowed, they may help themselves liberally. In
all other cases, salaries and compensations are fixed by law,
and graduated by time; here there is no limit of either money or
time. This mission goes by the job--$40,000 for the job--without
regard to time or cost. A summer's work, or a year's work, it
is all the same thing: it is a job, and is evidently intended
to enable a gentleman, who loves to travel in Europe and Asia,
to extend his travels to the Celestial Empire at the expense of
the United States, and to write a book. The settlement of the
accounts is a fraud upon the Treasury. In all cases of foreign
missions, except where secret services are to be performed,
and spies and informers to be dealt with, the accounts are
settled at the Treasury Department, by the proper accounting
officers; when secret services are to be covered, the fund out
of which they are paid is then called the contingent foreign
intercourse fund; and are settled at the State Department, upon
a simple certificate from the President, that the money has been
applied according to its intention. It was in this way that the
notorious John Henry obtained his $50,000 during the late war;
and that various other sums have been paid out to secret agents
at different times. To this I do not object. Every government,
in its foreign intercourse, must have recourse to agents, and
have the benefit of some services, which would be defeated if
made public; and which must, therefore, be veiled in secrecy,
and paid for privately. This must happen in all governments; but
not so in this case of the Chinese mission. Here, secrecy is
intended for what our own minister, his secretary, and his whole
suite, are to receive. Not only what they may give in bribes
to Chinese, but what they may take in pay to themselves, is to
be a secret. All is secret and irresponsible! And it will not
do to assimilate this mission to the oldest government in the
world, to the anomalous and anonymous missions to revolutionary
countries. Such an analogy has been attempted in defence of
this mission, and South American examples cited; but the cases
are not analogous. Informal agencies, with secret objects, are
proper to revolutionary governments; but here is to be a public
mission, and an imposing one--the grandest ever sent out from
the United States.--To attempt to assimilate such a mission to
a John Henry case, or to a South American agency, is absurd and
impudent; and is a fraud upon the system of accountability to
which all our missions are subjected.
"The sum proposed is the same that is in the act of 1790, upon
which the bill is framed. That act appropriated $40,000: but
for what? For one mission? one man? one agent? one by himself,
one? No. Not at all. That appropriation of 1790 was for all
the missions of the year--all of every kind--public as well as
secret: the forty thousand dollars in this bill is for one man.
The whole diplomatic appropriation in the time of Washington is
now to be given to one man: and it is known pretty well who it
is to be. Forty thousand dollars to enable one of our citizens
to get to Peking, and to bump his head nineteen times on the
ground, to get the privilege of standing up in the presence of
his majesty of the celestial empire. And this is our work in the
last night of this Congress. It is now midnight: and, like the
midnight which preceded the departure of the elder Adams from
the government, the whole time is spent in making and filling
offices. Providing for favorites, and feeding out of the public
crib, is the only work of those whose brief reign is drawing to
a close, and who have been already compelled by public sentiment
to undo a part of their work. The bankrupt act is repealed by
the Congress that made it; the distribution act has shared the
same fate; and if they had another session to sit, the mandamus
act against the States, the habeas corpus against the States,
this Chinese mission, and all the other acts, would be undone.
It would be the true realization of the story of the queen
who unravelled at night the web that she wove during the day.
As it is, enough has been done, and undone, to characterize
this Congress--to entitle it to the name of Ulysses' wife--not
because (like the virtuous Penelope) it resisted seduction--but
because, like her, its own hands unravelled its own work."
Mr. Archer replied that the ignominious prostrations heretofore
required of foreign ministers in the Imperial Chinese presence, were
all abolished by the treaty with Great Britain, and that the Chinese
government had expressed a desire to extend to the United States
all the benefits of that treaty, and this mission was to conclude
the treaty which she wished to make. Mr. Benton replied, so much
the less reason for sending this expensive mission. We now have the
benefits of the British treaty, and we have traded for generations
with China without a treaty, and without a quarrel, and can continue
to do so. She extends to us and to all nations the benefits of the
British treaty: the consul at Canton, Dr. Parker, or any respectable
merchant there, can have that treaty copied, and sign it for the
United States; and deem himself well paid to receive the fortieth
part of this appropriation. Mr. Woodbury wished to see a limitation
placed upon the amount of the annual compensation, and moved an
amendment, that not more than nine thousand dollars, exclusive of
outfit, be allowed to any one person for his annual compensation.
Mr. Archer concurred in the limitation, and it was adopted. Mr.
Benton then returned to one of his original objections--the
design of the bill to cheat the Senate out of its constitutional
control over the appointment. He said the language of the bill was
studiously ambiguous. Whether the person was to be a minister, a
chargé, or an agent, was not expressed. He now desired to know
whether it was to be understood that the person intended for this
mission was to be appointed by the President alone, without asking
the advice and consent of the Senate? Mr. Archer replied that he
had no information on the subject. Mr. Conrad of Louisiana, said
that he would move an amendment that might obviate the difficulty;
he would move that no agent be appointed without the consent of the
Senate. This amendment was proposed, and adopted--31 yeas; 9 nays.
These amendments were agreed to by the House; and, thus limited and
qualified, the bill became a law.
The expected name did not come. The Senate adjourned, and no
appointment could be made until the next session. It was not a
vacancy happening in the recess which the President could fill by a
temporary appointment, to continue to the end of the next session.
It was an original office created during the session, and must be
filled at the session, or wait until the next one. The President
did neither. There were two constitutional ways open to him--and he
took neither. There was one unconstitutional way--and he took it.
In brief, he made the appointment in the recess; and not only so
made it, but sent off the appointee (Mr. Caleb Cushing) also in the
recess. Scarcely had the Senate adjourned when it was known that Mr.
Cushing was to go upon this mission as soon as the ships could be
got ready to convey him: and in the month of May he departed. This
was palpably to avoid the action of the Senate, where the nomination
of Mr. Cushing would have been certain of rejection. He had already
been three times rejected in one day upon a nomination for Secretary
of the Treasury--receiving but two votes on the last trial. All the
objections which applied to him for the Treasury appointment, were
equally in force for the Chinese mission; and others besides. It
was an original vacancy, and could not be filled during the recess
by a temporary appointment. It was not a vacancy "happening" in the
recess of the Senate, and therefore to be temporarily filled without
the Senate's previous consent, lest the public interest in the
meanwhile should suffer. It was an office created, and the emolument
fixed, during the time that Mr. Cushing was a member of Congress:
consequently he was constitutionally interdicted from receiving it
during the continuance of that term. His term expired on the third
of March: he was constitutionally ineligible up to the end of that
day: and this upon the words of the constitution. Upon the reasons
and motives of the constitution, he was ineligible for ever. The
reason was, to prevent corrupt and subservient legislation--to
prevent members of Congress from conniving or assisting at the
enactment of laws for their own benefit, and to prevent Presidents
from rewarding legislative subservience. Tested upon these reasons
Mr. Cushing was ineligible after, as well as before, the expiration
of his congressional term: and such had been the practice of all
the previous Presidents. Even in the most innocent cases, and where
no connivance could possibly be supposed of the member, would any
previous President appoint a member to a place after his term
expired, which he could not receive before it: as shown in Chapter
XXX of the first volume of this View. In the case of Mr. Cushing
all the reasons, founded in the motives of the constitutional
prohibition, existed to forbid his appointment. He had deserted his
party to join Mr. Tyler. He worked for him in and out of the House,
and even deserted himself to support him--as in the two tariff bills
of the current session; for both of which he voted, and then voted
against them when vetoed: for which he was taunted by Mr. Granger,
of New York.[7] There was besides a special provision in the law
under which he was appointed to prevent the appointment from being
made without the concurrence of the Senate. (The notice of the
proceedings in the Senate when the bill which ripened into that
law, have shown the terms of that provision, and the reasons of its
adoption.) It is no answer to that pregnant amendment to say that
the nomination would be sent in at the next session. That session
would not come until six months after Mr. Cushing had sailed! not
until he had arrived at his post! not until he had placed the entire
diameter of the terraqueous globe between himself and the Senate!
and a still greater distance between the Treasury and the $40,000
which he had drawn out of it!
[7] "Mr. Granger observed that he had a few words to say to the
gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. CUSHING]. When he reflected that
that gentleman had voted for every bill that the President had
vetoed, and had then defended every veto which the President had
sent them, he had been not a little puzzled to know how to defend
his position. The gentleman was like a man he saw a short time since
in the circus, who came forward ready dressed and equipped to ride
any horse that might be brought out for him. First the gentleman
from Massachusetts rode the bank pony; and that having run to death,
he mounted the veto charger. The second bank roadster, then the
tariff palfrey, and lastly, the stout-limbed tariff hunter, were
mounted in their turn; and the veto animals were as complacently
mounted, and were seated with as much self-satisfaction. The
gentleman had voted for every bill, and then had justified every
veto, and every act of executive encroachment on this House."
Two squadrons of ships-of-war were put in requisition to attend
this minister. The Pacific squadron, then on the coast of South
America, was directed to proceed to China, to meet him: a squadron
was collected at Norfolk to convey him. This squadron consisted
of the new steam frigate, Missouri--the frigate Brandywine,
the sloop-of-war Saint Louis, and the brig Perry--carrying
altogether near two hundred guns; a formidable accompaniment for
a peace mission, seeking a commercial treaty. Mr. Cushing had a
craving to embark at Washington, under a national salute, and
the administration gratified him: the magnificent steam frigate,
Missouri, was ordered up to receive him. Threading the narrow
and crooked channel of the Potomac River, the noble ship ran on
an oyster bank, and fifteen of her crew, with a promising young
officer, were drowned in getting her off. The minister had a
desire to sail down the Mediterranean, seeing its coasts, and
landing in the ancient kingdom of the Pharaohs: the administration
deferred to his wishes. The Missouri was ordered to proceed to
the Mediterranean, which the ill-fated vessel was destined never
to enter; for, arriving at Gibraltar, she took fire and burned
up--baptizing the anomalous mission in fire and blood, as well as
in enormous expense. The minister proceeded in a British steamer to
Egypt, and then by British conveyance to Bombay, where the Norfolk
squadron had been ordered to meet him. The Brandywine alone was
there, but the minister entered her, and proceeded to the nearest
port to Canton, where, reporting his arrival and object, a series
of diplomatic contentions immediately commenced between himself
and "Ching, of the celestial dynasty, Governor-general of that
part of the Central Flowery Kingdom." Mr. Cushing informed this
governor that he was on his way to Peking, to deliver a letter from
the President of the United States to the Emperor, and to negotiate
a treaty of commerce; and, in the mean time, to take the earliest
opportunity to inquire after the health of the august Emperor. To
this inquiry Ching answered readily that, "At the present moment
the great Emperor is in the enjoyment of happy old age and quiet
health, and is at peace with all, both far and near:" but with
respect to the intended progress to Peking, he demurs, and informs
the minister that the imperial permission must first be obtained. "I
have examined," he says, "and find that every nation's envoy which
has come to the Central Flowery Kingdom with a view of proceeding
to Peking, there to be presented to the august Emperor, has ever
been required to wait outside of the nearest port on the frontier
till the chief magistrate of the province clearly memorialize
the Emperor, and request the imperial will, pointing out whether
the interview may be permitted." With respect to the treaty of
friendship and commerce, the governor declares there is no necessity
for it--that China and America have traded together two hundred
years in peace and friendship without a treaty--that all nations
now had the benefit of the treaty made with Great Britain, which
treaty was necessary to establish relations after a war; and that
the United States, having had no war with China, had no need for
a treaty. He supposes that, having heard of the British treaty,
the United States began to want one also, and admits the idea is
excellent, but unnecessary, and urges against it:
"As to what is stated, of publicly deliberating upon the
particulars of perpetual peace, inasmuch as it relates to
discoursing of good faith, peace, and harmony, the idea is
excellent; and it may seem right, because he has heard that
England has settled all the particulars of a treaty with China,
he may desire to do and manage in the same manner. But the
circumstances of the two nations are not the same, for England
had taken up arms against China for several years, and, in
beginning to deliberate upon a treaty, these two nations could
not avoid suspicion; therefore, they settled the details of
a treaty, in order to confirm their good faith; but since
your honorable nation, from the commencement of commercial
intercourse with China, during a period of two hundred years,
all the merchants who have come to Canton, on the one hand, have
observed the laws of China without any disagreement, and on the
other, there has been no failure of treating them with courtesy,
so that there has not been the slightest room for discord;
and, since the two nations are at peace, what is the necessity
of negotiating a treaty? In the commencement, England was not
at peace with China; and when afterwards these two nations
began to revert to a state of peace, it was indispensable to
establish and settle details of a treaty, in order to oppose
a barrier to future difficulties. I have now discussed this
subject, and desire the honorable plenipotentiary maturely to
consider it. Your honorable nation, with France and England,
are the three great foreign nations that come to the south of
China to trade. But the trade of America and England with China
is very great. Now, the law regulating the tariff has changed
the old established duties, many of which have been essentially
diminished, and the customary expenditures (exactions?) have
been abolished. Your honorable nation is treated in the same
manner as England; and, from the time of this change in the
tariff, all kinds of merchandise have flowed through the
channels of free trade, among the people, and already has
your nation been bedewed with its advantages. The honorable
plenipotentiary ought certainly to look at and consider that
the Great Emperor, in his leniency to men from afar, has issued
edicts commanding the merchants and people peaceably to trade,
which cannot but be beneficial to the nations. It is useless,
with lofty, polished, and empty words, to alter these unlimited
advantages."
In all this alleged extension of the benefits of the British treaty
to all nations, Ching was right in what he said. The Emperor had
already done it, and the British government had so determined it
from the beginning. It was a treaty for the commercial world as
well as for themselves, and had been so declared by the young Queen
Victoria in her speech communicating the treaty to Parliament.
"Throughout the whole course of my negotiations with the government
of China, I have uniformly disclaimed the wish for any exclusive
advantages. It has been my desire that equal favor should be shown
to the industry and commercial enterprise of all nations." There was
really no necessity for a treaty, which as often begets dissensions
as prevents them; and if one was desirable, it might have been had
through Dr. Parker, long a resident of China, and now commissioner
there, and who was Secretary of Legation and interpreter in Mr.
Cushing's mission, and the medium of his communications with the
Chinese; and actually the man of business who did the business in
conducting the negotiations. But Mr. Cushing perseveres in his
design to go to Peking, alleging that, "He deems himself bound by
the instructions of his government to do so." Ching replies that he
has received the imperial order "to stop and soothe him." Ching also
informs him that the treaty with Great Britain was negotiated, not
at Peking but at Canton, and also its duplicate with Portugal, and
that a copy of it was in the hands of the American consul at Canton,
for the information and benefit of American merchants. In his
anxiety to prevent a foreign ship-of-war from approaching Peking,
the Chinese governor intimated that, if a treaty was indispensable,
a commissioner might come to Canton for that purpose; and on inquiry
from Mr. Cushing how long it would take to send to Peking and get a
return, Ching answered, three months--the distance being so great.
Mr. Cushing objects to that delay--declares he cannot wait so long,
as the season for favorable navigation to approach Peking may
elapse; and announces his determination to proceed at once in the
Brandywine, without waiting for any permission; and declares that a
refusal to receive him would be a national insult, and a just cause
of war. Here is the extract from his letter:
"Under these circumstances, inasmuch as your Excellency does not
propose to open to me the inland road to Peking, in the event
of my waiting here until the favorable monsoon for proceeding
to the north by sea shall have passed away, and as I cannot,
without disregard of the commands of my government, permit the
season to elapse without pursuing the objects of my mission,
I shall immediately leave Macao in the Brandywine. I feel the
less hesitation in pursuing this course, in consideration of
the tenor of the several communications which I have received
from your Excellency. It is obvious, that if the court had
entertained any very particular desire that I should remain
here, it would have caused an imperial commissioner to be on
the spot, ready to receive me on my arrival, or, at any rate,
instructions would have been forwarded to your Excellency for
the reception of the legation; since, in order that no proper
act of courtesy towards the Chinese government should be left
unobserved, notice was duly given last autumn, by the consul of
the United States, that my government had appointed a minister
to China. The omission of the court to take either of these
steps seems to indicate expectation, on its part, that I should
probably land at some port in the north."
That is to say, at some port in the Yellow Sea, or its river nearest
to Peking. This must have been a mode of reasoning new to Governor
Ching, that an omission to provide for Mr. Cushing at the port where
foreigners were received, should imply a license for him to land
where they were not, except on express, imperial permission. Much as
Ching must have been astonished at this American logic, he must have
been still more so at the penalty announced for disregarding it!
nothing less than "national insult," and "just cause of war." For
the letter continues:
"Besides which, your Excellency is well aware, that it is
neither the custom in China, nor consistent with the high
character of its Sovereign, to decline to receive the embassies
of friendly states. To do so, indeed, would among Western States
be considered an act of national insult, and a just cause of
war."
This sentence, as all that relates to Mr. Cushing's Chinese mission,
is copied from his own official despatches; so that, what would be
incredible on the relation of others, becomes undeniable on his own.
National insult and just cause of war, for not allowing him to go to
Peking!
Mr. Cushing justifies his refusal to negotiate at Canton as the
British envoy had done, and not being governed by the ceremony
observed in his case, on the ground that the circumstances were not
analogous--that Great Britain had chastised the Chinese, and taken
possession of one of their islands--and that it would be necessary
for the United States to do the same to bring him within the rules
which were observed with Sir Henry Pottinger, the British minister.
This intimation, as impertinent as unfeeling, and as offensive as
unfounded, was thus expressed:
"In regard to the mode and place of deliberating upon all things
relative to the perpetual peace and friendship of China and the
United States, your Excellency refers to the precedent of the
late negotiations with the plenipotentiary of Great Britain.
The rules of politeness and ceremony observed by Sir Henry
Pottinger, were doubtless just and proper in the particular
circumstances of the case. But, to render them fully applicable
to the United States, it would be necessary for my government,
in the first instance, to subject the people of China to all
the calamities of war, and especially to take possession of
some island on the coast of China as a place of residence for
its minister. I cannot suppose that the imperial government
wishes the United States to do this. Certainly no such wish is
entertained at present by the United States, which, animated
with the most amicable sentiments towards China, feels assured
of being met with corresponding deportment on the part of China."
The Brandywine during this time was still at Macao, the port outside
of the harbor, where foreign men-of-war are only allowed to come;
but Mr. Cushing, following up the course he had marked out for
himself, directed that vessel to enter the inner port, and sail up
to Whampoa; and also to require a salute of twenty-one guns to be
fired. Against this entrance the Chinese government remonstrated, as
being against the laws and customs of the empire, contrary to what
the British had done when they negotiated their treaty, and contrary
to an article in that treaty which only permitted that entrance
to a small vessel with few men and one petty officer: and if the
Brandywine had not entered, he forbids her to come; and if she had,
requires her to depart: and as for the salute, he declares he has
no means of firing it; and, besides, it was against their laws.
The governor expressed himself with animation and feeling on this
subject, at the indignity of violating their laws, and under the
pretext of paying him a compliment--for that was the only alleged
cause of the intrusive entrance of the Brandywine. He wrote:
"But it is highly necessary that I should also remark,
concerning the man-of-war Brandywine coming up to Whampoa. The
Bogue makes an outer portal of Kwang Tung, where an admiral is
stationed to control and guard. Heretofore, the men-of-war of
foreign nations have only been allowed to cast anchor in the
seas without the mouth of the river, and have not been permitted
to enter within. This is a settled law of the land, made a long
time past. Whampoa is the place where merchant ships collect
together, not one where men-of-war can anchor. Now, since the
whole design of merchantmen is to trade, and men-of-war are
prepared to fight, if they enter the river, fright and suspicion
will easily arise among the populace, thus causing an obstacle
in the way of trade. Furthermore, the two countries are just
about deliberating upon peace and good will, and suddenly to
have a man-of-war enter the river, while we are speaking of good
faith and cultivating good feeling, has not a little the aspect
of distrust. Among the articles of the commercial regulations
it is provided, that an English government vessel shall be
allowed to remain at anchor at Whampoa, and that a deputy shall
be appointed to control the seamen. The design of this, it was
evident, was to put an end to strife, and quell disputes. But
this vessel is a small one, containing but few troops, and
moreover brings a petty officer, so that it is a matter of
but little consequence, one way or another. If your country's
man-of-war Brandywine contains five hundred and more troops,
she has also a proportionately large number of guns in her, and
brings a commodore in her; she is in truth far different from
the government vessel of the British, and it is inexpedient for
her to enter the river; and there are, in the aspect of the
affair, many things not agreeable."
Nevertheless Mr. Cushing required the ship to enter the inner port,
to demand a return-salute of twenty-one guns, and permission to
the American commodore to make his compliments in person to the
Chinese governor. This governor then addressed a remonstrance to the
American commodore, which runs thus:
"When your Excellency first arrived in the Central Flowery Land,
you were unacquainted with her laws and prohibitions--that
it was against the laws for men-of-war to enter the river.
Having previously received the public officer's (Cushing's)
communication, I, the acting governor, have fully and clearly
stated to him that the ship should be detained outside. Your
Excellency's present coming up to Blenheim reach is therefore,
no doubt, because the despatch sent previously to his Excellency
Cushing had not been made known to you--whence the mistake.
Respecting the salute of twenty-one guns, as it is a salute
among western nations, it does [not] tally with the customs
of China. Your Excellency being now in China, and, moreover,
entered the river, it is not the same as if you were in your own
country; and, consequently, it will be inexpedient to have the
salute performed here; also, China has no such salute as firing
twenty-one guns; and how can we imitate your country's custom
in the number, and make a corresponding ceremony in return?
It will, indeed, not be easy to act according to it. When the
English admirals Parker and Saltoun came up to Canton, they were
both in a passage vessel, not in a man-of-war, when they entered
the river; nor was there any salute. This is evidence plain on
this matter.
"Concerning what is said regarding a personal visit to this
officer to pay respects, it is certainly indicative of good
intention; but the laws of the land direct that whenever
officers from other countries arrive upon the frontier, the
governor and other high officers, not having received his
Majesty's commands, cannot hold any private intercourse with
them; nor can a deputy, not having received a special commission
from the superior officers, have any private intercourse with
foreign functionaries. It will consequently be inexpedient that
your Excellency (whose sentiments are so polite and cordial)
and I, the acting governor, should have an interview; for it is
against the settled laws of the land."
Having thus violated the laws and customs of China in sending
the Brandywine, Mr. Cushing follows it up with threats and
menaces--assumes the attitude of an injured and insulted minister of
peace--and, for the sake of China, regrets what may happen. In this
vein he writes:
"It is customary, among all the nations of the West, for the
ships of war of one country to visit the ports of another in
time of peace, and, in doing so, for the commodore to exchange
salutes with the local authorities, and to pay his compliments
in person to the principal public functionary. To omit these
testimonies of good will is considered as evidence of a hostile,
or at least of an unfriendly feeling. But your Excellency says
the provincial government has no authority to exchange salutes
with Commodore Parker, or to receive a visit of ceremony from
him. And I deeply regret, for the sake of China, that such
is the fact. China will find it very difficult to remain in
peace with any of the great States of the West, so long as her
provincial governors are prohibited either to give or to receive
manifestations of that peace, in the exchange of the ordinary
courtesies of national intercourse. And I cannot forbear to
express my surprise, that, in the great and powerful province
of Kwang Tung, the presence of a single ship of war should be
cause of apprehension to the local government. Least of all,
should such apprehension be entertained in reference to any
ships of war belonging to the United States, which now feels,
and (unless ill-treatment of our public agents should produce a
change of sentiments) will continue to feel, the most hearty and
sincere good will towards China. Coming here, in behalf of my
government, to tender to China the friendship of the greatest of
the Powers of America, it is my duty, in the outset, not to omit
any of the tokens of respect customary among western nations. If
these demonstrations are not met in a correspondent manner, it
will be the misfortune of China, but it will not be the fault of
the United States."
In these sentences China is threatened with a war with the United
States on account of her ill-treatment of the United States'
public agents, meaning himself--the ill-treatment consisting in
not permitting him to trample, without restraint, upon the laws
and customs of the country. In this sense, Ching the governor,
understood it, and answered:
"Regarding what is said of the settled usages of western
nations--that not to receive a high commissioner from another
state is an insult to that state--this certainly, with men,
has a warlike bearing. But during the two hundred years of
commercial intercourse between China and your country, there
has not been the least animosity nor the slightest insult. It
is for harmony and good will your Excellency has come; and your
request to proceed to the capital, and to have an audience with
the Emperor, is wholly of the same good mind. If, then, in the
outset, such pressing language is used, it will destroy the
admirable relations."
To this Mr. Cushing rejoins, following up the menace of war for
the "_ill-treatment_" he was receiving--justifying it if it
comes--reminds China of the five years' hostilities of Great Britain
upon her--points to her antiquated customs as having already brought
disasters upon her; and suggests a dismemberment of her empire as a
consequence of war with the United States, provoked by ill-treatment
of her public agents. Thus:
"I can only assure your Excellency, that this is not the way
for China to cultivate good will and maintain peace. The late
war with England was caused by the conduct of the authorities
at Canton, in disregarding the rights of public officers who
represented the English government. If, in the face of the
experience of the last five years, the Chinese government now
reverts to antiquated customs, which have already brought such
disasters upon her, it can be regarded in no other light than as
evidence that she invites and desires [war with] the other great
western Powers. The United States would sincerely regret such a
result. We have no desire whatever to dismember the territory of
the empire. Our citizens have at all times deported themselves
here in a just and respectful manner. The position and policy
of the United States enable us to be the most disinterested and
the most valuable of the friends of China. I have flattered
myself, therefore, and cannot yet abandon the hope, that the
imperial government will see the wisdom of promptly welcoming
and of cordially responding to the amicable assurances of the
government of the United States."
Quickly following this despatch was another, in which Mr.
Cushing rises still higher in his complaints of molestation and
ill-treatment--refers to the dissatisfaction which the American
people will experience--thought they would have done better,
having just been whipped by the British--confesses that his exalted
opinion of China is undergoing a decline--hopes they will do
better--postpones for a while his measures of redress--suspends his
resentment--and by this forbearance will feel himself the better
justified for what he may do if forced to act. But let his own words
speak:
"I must not conceal from your Excellency the extreme
dissatisfaction and disappointment which the people of America
will experience when they learn that their Envoy, instead of
being promptly and cordially welcomed by the Chinese government,
is thus molested and delayed, on the very threshold of the
province of Yuh. The people of America have been accustomed to
consider China the most refined and the most enlightened of the
nations of the East; and they will demand, how it is possible,
if China be thus refined, she should allow herself to be wanting
in courtesy to their Envoy; and, if China be thus enlightened,
how it is possible that, having just emerged from a war with
England, and being in the daily expectation of the arrival of
the Envoy of the French, she should suffer herself to slight
and repel the good will of the United States. And the people of
America will be disposed indignantly to draw back the proffered
hand of friendship, when they learn how imperfectly the favor
is appreciated by the Chinese government. In consenting,
therefore, to postpone, for a short time longer, my departure
for the North (Peking), and in omitting, for however brief a
period, to consider the action of the Chinese government as
one of open disrespect to the United States, and to take due
measures of redress, I incur the hazard of the disapprobation
and censure of my government; for the American government is
peculiarly sensitive to any act of foreign governments injurious
to the honor of the United States. It is the custom of American
citizens to demean themselves respectfully towards the people
and authorities of any foreign nation in which they may, for
the time being, happen to reside. Your Excellency has frankly
and truly borne witness to the just and respectful deportment
which both scholars and merchants of the United States have
at all times manifested in China. But I left America as a
messenger of peace. I came into China full of sentiments of
respect and friendship towards its sovereign and its people.
And notwithstanding what has occurred, since my arrival here,
to chill the warmth of my previous good will towards China, and
to bring down the high conceptions I had previously been led
to form in regard to the courtesy of its government, I am loth
to give these up entirely, and in so doing put an end perhaps
to the existing harmonious relations between the United States
and China. I have therefore to say to your Excellency, that
I accept, for the present, your assurances of the sincerity
and friendship of the Chinese government. I suspend all the
resentment which I have just cause to feel on account of the
obstructions thrown in the way of the progress of the legation,
and other particulars of the action of the Imperial and
Provincial governments, in the hope that suitable reparation
will be made for these acts in due time. I commit myself, in
all this, to the integrity and honor of the Chinese government;
and if, in the sequel, I shall prove to have done this in vain,
I shall then consider myself the more amply justified, in the
sight of all men, for any determination which, out of regard for
the honor of the United States, it may be my duty to adopt under
such circumstances."
It was now the middle of May, 1844: the correspondence with Ching
had commenced the last of February: the three months had nearly
elapsed, within which a return answer was to be had from Peking:
and by extraordinary speed the answer arrived. It contained the
Emperor's positive refusal to suffer Mr. Cushing to come to
Peking--enjoined him to remain where he was--cautioned him not to
"agitate disorder"--and informing him that an Imperial commissioner
would proceed immediately to Canton, travelling with the greatest
celerity, and under orders to make one hundred and thirty-three
miles a day, there to draw up the treaty with him. This information
took away the excuse for the intrusive journey, or voyage, to
Peking, and also showed that a commercial treaty might be had
with China, without inflicting upon her the calamities of war, or
breeding national dissensions out of diplomatic contentions. It made
a further suspension of his resentment, and postponement of the
measures which the honor of the United States required him to take
for the molestations and ill treatment which the federal government
had received in his person. These formidable measures, well known
to be belligerent, were postponed, not abandoned; and the visit to
Peking, forestalled by the arrival of an imperial commissioner to
sign a treaty, was also postponed, not given up--its pretext now
diminished, and reduced to the errand of delivering Mr. Tyler's
letter to the Emperor. He consents to treat at Canton, but makes
an excuse for it in the want of a steamer, and the non-arrival of
the other ships of the squadron, which would have enabled him to
approach Canton, intimidate the government, and obtain from their
fears the concessions which their manners and customs forbid. All
this he wrote himself to his government, and he is entitled to the
benefit of his own words:
"So far as regards the objects of adjusting in a proper manner
the commercial relations of the United States and China, nothing
could be more advantageous than to negotiate with Tsiyeng at
Canton, instead of running the risk of compromising this great
object by having it mixed up at Tien Tsin, or elsewhere at the
north, with questions of reception at Court. Add to which the
fact that, with the Brandywine alone, without any steamer, and
without even the St. Louis and the Perry, it would be idle to
repair to the neighborhood of the Pih-ho, in any expectation
of acting upon the Chinese by intimidation, and obtaining from
their fears concessions contrary to the feeling and settled
wishes of the Imperial government. To remain here, therefore,
and meet Tsiyeng, if not the most desirable thing, is at present
the only possible thing. It is understood that Tsiyeng will
reach Canton from the 5th to the 10th of June."
This commissioner, Tsiyeng, arrived at the time appointed, and
fortunately for the peace and honor of the country, as the St. Louis
sloop-of-war, and the man-of-war brig Perry, arrived two days after,
and put Mr. Cushing in possession of the force necessary to carry
out his designs upon China. In the joy of receiving this accession
to his force, he thus writes home to his government:
"It is with great pleasure I inform you that the St. Louis
arrived here on the 6th instant, under the command of Lieutenant
Keith, Captain Cocke (for what cause I know not, and cannot
conceive), after detaining the ship at the Cape of Good Hope
three months, having at length relinquished the command to Mr.
Keith. And on the same day arrived also the Perry, commanded by
Lieutenant Tilton. The arrival of these vessels relieves me from
a load of solicitude in regard to the public business; for if
matters do not go smoothly with Tsiyeng, the legation has now
the means of proceeding to and acting at the North."
"If matters do not go smoothly with Tsiyeng!" and the very first
step of Mr. Cushing was an attempt to ruffle that smoothness.
The Chinese commissioner announced his arrival at Canton, and
made known his readiness to draw up the treaty instantly. In this
communication, the name of the United States, as according to
Chinese custom with all foreign nations, was written in a lower
column than that of the Chinese government--in the language of
Mr. Cushing, "the name of the Chinese government stood higher in
column by one character than that of the United States." At this
collocation of the name of his country, Mr. Cushing took fire, and
instantly returned the communication to the Imperial commissioner,
"even at the hazard (as he informed his government) of at once
cutting off all negotiation." Fortunately Tsiyeng was a man of
sense, and of elevation of character, and immediately directed his
clerk to elevate the name of the United States to the level of the
column which contained that of China. By this condescension on the
part of the Chinese commissioner, the negotiation was saved for
the time, and the cannon and ammunition of our three ships of war
prevented from being substituted for goose-quills and ink. The
commissioner showed the greatest readiness, amounting to impatience,
to draw up and execute the treaty; which was done in as little
time as the forms could be gone through: and the next day the
commissioner, taking his formal leave of the American legation,
departed for Peking--a hint that, the business being finished, Mr.
Cushing might depart also for his home. But he was not in such a
hurry to return. "His pride and his feelings (to use his own words)
had been mortified" at not being permitted to go to Peking--at
being in fact stopped at a little island off the coast, where he
had to transact all his business; and his mind still reverted to
the cherished idea of going to Peking, though his business would
be now limited to the errand of carrying Mr. Tyler's letter to the
Emperor. In his despatch, immediately after the conclusion of this
treaty, he justifies himself for not having gone before the Chinese
commissioner arrived, placing the blame on the slow arrival of the
St. Louis and the Perry, the non-arrival at all of the Pacific
squadron, and the want of a steamer.
"With these reflections present to my mind, it only needed to
consider further whether I should endeavor to force my way to
Peking, or at least, by demonstration of force at the mouth of
the Pih-ho, attempt to intimidate the Imperial government into
conceding to me free access to the Court. In regard to this it
is to be observed, that owing to the extraordinary delays of the
St. Louis on her way here, I had no means of making any serious
demonstration of force at the north, prior to the time when
Tsiyeng arrived at Canton, on his way to Macao, there to meet
me and negotiate a treaty. And with an Imperial commissioner
near at hand, ready and willing to treat, would it have been
expedient, or even justifiable, to enter upon acts of hostility
with China, in order, if possible, to make Peking the place of
negotiation?"
The correspondence does not show what was the opinion of the then
administration upon this problem of commencing hostilities upon
China after the commissioner had arrived to make the treaty; and
especially to commit these hostilities to force a negotiation at
Peking, where no treaty with any power had ever been negotiated,
and where he expected serious difficulties in his presentation at
court, as Mr. Cushing was determined not to make the prostrations
(i. e. bumping his head nineteen times against the floor), which the
Chinese ceremonial required.
"I have never disguised from myself the serious difficulties
which I might have to encounter in forcing my way to Peking;
and, if voluntarily admitted there, the difficulties almost
equally serious connected with the question of presentation at
court; for I had firmly resolved not to perform the acts of
prostration to the Emperor. I struggled with the objections
until intelligence was officially communicated to me of the
appointment of Tsiyeng as imperial commissioner, and of his
being actually on his way to Canton. To have left Macao after
receiving this intelligence would have subjected me to the
imputation of fleeing from, and, as it were, evading a meeting
with Tsiyeng; and such an imputation would have constituted a
serious difficulty (if not an insuperable one) in the way of
successful negotiation at the North."
The despatch continues:
"On the other hand, I did not well see how the United States
could make war on China to change the ceremonial of the court.
And for this reason, it had always been with me an object of
great solicitude to dispose of all the commercial questions by
treaty, before venturing on Peking."
"Did not well see how the United States could make war on China to
change the ceremonial of the court." This is very cool language,
and implies that Mr. Cushing was ready to make the war--(assuming
himself to be the United States, and invested with the war
power)--but could not well discover any pretext on which to found
it. He then excuses himself for not having done better, and gone
on to Peking without stopping at the outer port of Canton, and so
giving the Chinese time to send down a negotiator there, and so
cutting off the best pretext for forcing the way to China: and this
excuse resolves itself into the one so often given--the want of a
sufficient squadron to force the way. Thus:
"If it should be suggested that it would have been better for
me to have proceeded at once to the North (Peking), without
stopping at Macao, I reply, that this was impracticable at
the time of my arrival, with the Brandywine alone, before the
southerly monsoon had set in, and without any steamer; that if
at any time I had gone to the North in the view of negotiating
there, I should have been wholly dependent on the Chinese for
the means of lodging and subsisting on shore, and even for the
means of landing at the mouth of the Pih-ho; that only at Macao
could I treat independently, and that here, of necessity, must
all the pecuniary and other arrangements of the mission be
made, and the supplies obtained for the squadron. Such are the
considerations and the circumstances which induced me to consent
to forego proceeding to Peking."
So that, after all, it was only the fear of being whipt and starved
that prevented Mr. Cushing from fighting his way to the foot-stool
of power in the Tartar half of the Chinese Empire. The delay of
the two smaller vessels, the non-arrival of the Pacific squadron,
and the want of a steamer, were fortunate accidents for the peace
and honor of the United States; and even the conflagration of the
magnificent steam frigate, Missouri, with all her equipments, was
a blessing, compared to the use to which she would have been put
if Mr. Cushing's desire to see the coasts of the Mediterranean and
the banks of the Nile had not induced him to take her to Gibraltar,
instead of doubling the Cape of Good Hope in company with the
Brandywine. Finally, he gives the reason for all this craving desire
to get to Peking, which was nothing more nor less (and less it could
not be) than the gratification of his own feelings of pride and
curiosity. Hear him:
"And in regard to Peking itself, I have obtained the means of
direct correspondence between the two governments immediately,
and an express engagement, that if hereafter a minister of the
French, or any other power, should be admitted to the court, the
same privilege shall be accorded to the United States. If the
conclusion of the whole matter be one less agreeable to my own
feelings of pride or curiosity, it is, at any rate, the most
important and useful to my country, and will therefore, I trust,
prove satisfactory to the President."
It does not appear from any published instructions of the
administration (then consisting of Mr. Tyler and his new cabinet
after the resignation of all the whig members except Mr. Webster),
how far Mr. Cushing was warranted in his belligerent designs upon
China; but the great naval force which was assigned to him, the
frankness with which he communicated all his bellicose intentions,
the excuses which he made for not having proceeded to hostilities
and the dismemberment of the Empire, and the encomiums with
which his treaty was communicated to the Senate--all bespeak a
consciousness of approbation on the part of the administration,
and the existence of an expectation which might experience
disappointment in his failing to make war upon the Chinese. In
justice to Mr. Webster, it must be told that, although still in the
cabinet when Mr. Cushing went to China, yet his day of influence was
over: he was then in the process of being forced to resign: and Mr.
Upshur, then Secretary of the Navy, was then virtually, as he was
afterwards actually, Secretary of State, when the negotiations were
carried on.
The publication of Mr. Cushing's correspondence, which was ordered
by the Senate, excited astonishment, and attracted the general
reprobation of the country. Their contents were revolting, and would
have been incredible except for his own revelations. Narrated by
himself they coerced belief, and bespoke an organization void of the
moral sense, and without the knowledge that any body else possessed
it. The conduct of the negotiator was condemned, his treaty was
ratified, and the proceedings on his nomination remain a senatorial
secret--the injunction of secrecy having never been removed from
them.