OREGON COLONIZATION ACT: MR. BENTON'S SPEECH.
MR. BENTON said: On one point there is unanimity on this floor;
and that is, as to the title to the country in question. All agree
that the title is in the United States. On another point there is
division; and that is, on the point of giving offence to England,
by granting the land to our settlers which the bill proposes. On
this point we divide. Some think it will offend her--some think it
will not. For my part, I think she will take offence, do what we may
in relation to this territory. She wants it herself, and means to
quarrel for it, if she does not fight for it. I think she will take
offence at our bill, and even at our discussion of it. The nation
that could revive the question of impressment in 1842--which could
direct a peace mission to revive that question--the nation that can
insist upon the right of search, and which was ready to go to war
with us for what gentlemen call a few acres of barren ground in a
frozen region--the nation that could do these things, and which has
set up a claim to our territory on the western coast of our own
continent, must be ripe and ready to take offence at any thing that
we may do. I grant that she will take offence; but that is not the
question with me. Has she a _right_ to take offence? That is my
question! and this being decided in the negative, I neither fear nor
calculate consequences. I take for my rule of action the maxim of
President Jackson in his controversy with France--ask nothing but
what is right, submit to nothing wrong and leave the consequences
to God and the country. That maxim brought us safely and honorably
out of our little difficulty with France, notwithstanding the fears
which so many then entertained; and it will do the same with Great
Britain, in spite of our present apprehensions. Courage will keep
her off, fear will bring her upon us. The assertion of our rights
will command her respect; the fear to assert them will bring us her
contempt. The question, then, with me, is the question of right,
and not of fear! Is it right for us to make these grants on the
Columbia? Has Great Britain just cause to be offended at it? These
are my questions; and these being answered to my satisfaction, I go
forward with the grants, and leave the consequences to follow at
their pleasure.
The fear of Great Britain is pressed upon us; at the same time her
pacific disposition is enforced and insisted upon. And here it
seems to me, that gentlemen fall into a grievous inconsistency.
While they dwell on the peaceable disposition of Great Britain,
they show her ready to go to war with us for nothing, or even for
our own! The northeastern boundary is called a dispute for a few
acres of barren land in a frozen region, worth nothing; yet we are
called upon to thank God Almighty and Daniel Webster for saving us
from a war about these few frozen and barren acres. Would Great
Britain have gone to war with us for these few acres? and is that a
sign of her pacific temper? The Columbia is admitted on all hands
to be ours; yet gentlemen fear war with Great Britain if we touch
it--worthless as it is in their eyes. Is this a sign of peace? Is
it a pacific disposition to go to war with us, for what is our own;
and which is besides, according to their opinion, not worth a straw?
Is this peaceful? If it is, I should like to know what is hostile.
The late special minister is said to have come here, bearing the
olive branch of peace in his hand. Granting that the olive branch
was in one hand, what was in the other? Was not the war question of
impressment in the other? also, the war question of search, on the
coast of Africa? also, the war question of the Columbia, which he
refused to include in the peace treaty? Were not these three war
questions in the other hand?--to say nothing of the Caroline; for
which he refused atonement; and the Creole, which he says would
have occasioned the rejection of the treaty, if named in it. All
these war questions were in the other hand; and the special mission,
having accomplished its peace object in getting possession of the
military frontiers of Maine, has adjourned all the war questions
to London, where we may follow them if we please. But there is one
of these subjects for which we need not go to London--the Creole,
and its kindred cases. The conference of Lord Ashburton with the
abolition committee of New York shows that that question need not
go to London--that England means to maintain all her grounds on
the subject of slaves, and that any treaty inconsistent with these
grounds would be rejected. This is what he says:
"Lord Ashburton said that, when the delegation came to read his
correspondence with Mr. Webster, they would see that he had
taken all possible care to prevent any injury being done to
the people of color; that, if he had been willing to introduce
an article including cases similar to that of the Creole, his
government would never have ratified it, as they will adhere to
the great principles they have so long avowed and maintained;
and that the friends of the slave in England would be very
watchful to see that no wrong practice took place under the
tenth article."
This is what his lordship said in New York, and which shows that it
was not want of instructions to act on the Creole case, as alleged
in Mr. Webster's correspondence, but want of inclination in the
British government to settle the case. The treaty would have been
rejected, if the Creole case had been named in it; and if we had
had a protocol showing that fact, I presume the important note of
Lord Ashburton would have stood for as little in the eyes of other
senators as it did in mine, and that the treaty would have found
but few supporters. The Creole case would not be admitted into
the treaty; and what was put in it, is to give the friends of the
slaves in England a right to watch us, and to correct our wrong
practices under the treaty! This is what the protocol after the
treaty informs us; and if we had had a protocol before it, it is
probable that there would have been no occasion for this conference
with the New York abolitionists. Be that as it may, the peace
mission, with its olive branch in one hand, brought a budget of war
questions in the other, and has carried them all back to London, to
become the subject of future negotiations. All these subjects are
pregnant with danger. One of them will force itself upon us in five
years--the search question--which we have purchased off for a time;
and when the purchase is out we must purchase again, or submit to be
searched, or resist with arms. I repeat it: the pacific England has
a budget of war questions now in reserve for us, and that we cannot
escape them by fearing war. Neither nations nor individuals ever
escaped danger by fearing it. They must face it, and defy it. An
abandonment of a right, for fear of bringing on an attack, instead
of keeping it off, will inevitably bring on the outrage that is
dreaded.
Other objections are urged to this bill, to which I cannot agree.
The distance is objected to it. It is said to be eighteen thousand
miles by water (around Cape Horn), and above three thousand miles
by land and water, through the continent. Granted. The very
distance, by Cape Horn, was urged by me, twenty years ago, as a
reason for occupying and fortifying the mouth of the Columbia.
My argument was, that we had merchant ships and ships of war in
the North Pacific Ocean; that these vessels were twenty thousand
miles from an Atlantic port; that a port on the western coast of
America was indispensable to their safety; and that it would be
suicidal in us to abandon the port we have there to any power,
and especially to the most formidable and domineering naval power
which the world ever saw. And I instanced the case of Commodore
Porter, his prizes lost, and his own ship eventually captured in
a neutral port, because we had no port of our own to receive and
shelter him. The twenty thousand miles distance, and dangerous and
tempestuous cape to be doubled, were with me arguments in favor of
a port on the western coast of America, and, as such, urged on this
floor near twenty years ago. The distance through the continent
is also objected to. It is said to exceed three thousand miles.
Granted. But it is further than that to Africa, where we propose to
build up a colony of negroes out of our recaptured Africans. Our
eighty-gun fleet is to carry her intercepted slaves to Liberia: so
says the correspondence of the naval captains (Bell and Paine) with
Mr. Webster. Hunting in couples with the British, at an expense
of money (to say nothing of the loss of lives and ships) of six
hundred thousand dollars per annum, to recapture kidnapped negroes,
we are to carry them to Liberia, and build up a black colony there,
four thousand miles from us, while the Columbia is too far off for
a white colony! The English are to carry their redeemed captives
to Jamaica, and make apprentices of them for life. We are to
carry ours to Liberia; and then we must go to Liberia to protect
and defend them. Liberia is four thousand miles distant, and not
objected to on account of the distance; the Columbia is not so far,
and distance becomes a formidable objection.
The expense is brought forward as another objection, and repeated,
notwithstanding the decisive answer it has received from my
colleague. He has shown that it is but a fraction of the expense of
the African squadron; that this squadron is the one-twelfth part of
our whole naval establishment, which is to cost us seven millions of
dollars per annum, and that the annual cost of the squadron must be
near six hundred thousand dollars, and its expense for five years
three millions. For the forts in the Oregon--forts which are only to
be stockades and block-houses, for security against the Indians--for
these forts, only one hundred thousand dollars is appropriated;
being the sixth part of the annual expense, and the thirtieth part
of the whole expense, of the African fleet. Thus the objection of
expense becomes futile and ridiculous. But why this everlasting
objection of expense to every thing western? Our dragoons
dismounted, because, they say, horses are too expensive. The western
rivers unimproved, on account of the expense. No western armory,
because of the expense. Yet hundreds of thousands, and millions, for
the African squadron!
Another great objection to the bill is the land clause--the grants
of land to the settler, his wife, and his children. Gentlemen say
they will vote for the bill if that clause is stricken out; and
I say, I will vote against it if that clause is stricken out. It
is, in fact, the whole strength and essence of the bill. Without
these grants, the bill will be worth nothing. Nobody will go three
thousand miles to settle a new country, unless he gets land by it.
The whole power of the bill is in this clause; and if it is stricken
out, the friends of the bill will give it up. They will give it up
now, and wait for the next Congress, when the full representation of
the people, under the new census, will be in power, and when a more
auspicious result might be expected.
Time is invoked, as the agent that is to help us. Gentlemen object
to the present time, refer us to the future, and beg us to wait,
and rely upon TIME and NEGOTIATIONS to accomplish all our wishes.
Alas! _time_ and _negotiation_ have been fatal agents to us, in all
our discussions with Great Britain. Time has been constantly working
for her, and against us. She now has the exclusive possession of the
Columbia; and all she wants is _time_, to ripen her possession into
title. For above twenty years--from the time of Dr. Floyd's bill, in
1820, down to the present moment--the present time, for vindicating
our rights on the Columbia, has been constantly objected to; and we
were bidden to wait. Well, we have waited: and what have we got by
it? Insult and defiance!--a declaration from the British ministers
that large British interests have grown up on the Columbia during
this time, which they will protect!--and a flat refusal from the
olive-branch minister to include this question among those which his
peaceful mission was to settle! No, sir; time and negotiation have
been bad agents for us, in our controversies with Great Britain.
They have just lost us the military frontiers of Maine, which we had
held for sixty years; and the trading frontier of the Northwest,
which we had held for the same time. Sixty years' possession, and
eight treaties, secured these ancient and valuable boundaries: one
negotiation, and a few days of time, have taken them from us! And
so it may be again. The Webster treaty of 1842 has obliterated the
great boundaries of 1783--placed the British, their fur company and
their Indians, within our ancient limits: and I, for one, want no
more treaties from the hand which is always seen on the side of the
British. I go now for vindicating our rights on the Columbia; and,
as the first step towards it, passing this bill, and making these
grants of land, which will soon place the thirty or forty thousand
rifles beyond the Rocky Mountains, which will be our effective
negotiators.