CHAPTER CIV.

BRITISH TREATY: NORTHWESTERN BOUNDARY: MR. BENTON'S SPEECH: EXTRACTS.

The line from Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods never was

susceptible of a dispute. That from the Lake of the Woods to

the head of the Mississippi was disputable, and long disputed;

and it will not do to confound these two lines, so different in

themselves, and in their political history. The line from Lake

Superior was fixed by landmarks as permanent and notorious as the

great features of nature herself--the Isle Royale, in the northwest

of Lake Superior, and the chain of small lakes and rivers which

led from the north of that isle to the Lake of the Woods. Such were

the precise calls of the treaty of 1783, and no room for dispute

existed about it. The Isle Royale was a landmark in the calls of

the treaty, and a great and distinguished one it was--a large rocky

island in Lake Superior, far to the northwest, a hundred miles

from the southern shore; uninhabitable, and almost inaccessible

to the Indians in their canoes; and for that reason believed by

them to be the residence of the Great Spirit, and called in their

language, _Menong_. This isle was as notorious as the lake itself,

and was made a landmark in the treaty of 1783, and the boundary line

directed to go to the north of it, and then to follow the chain of

small lakes and rivers called "Long Lake," which constituted the

line of water communication between Lake Superior and the Lake of

the Woods, a communication which the Indians had followed beyond

the reach of tradition, which was the highway of nations, and which

all travellers and traders have followed since its existence became

known to our first discoverers. A line through the Lake Superior,

from its eastern outlet to the northward of the Isle Royale, leads

direct to this communication; and the line described was evidently

so described for the purpose of going to that precise communication.

The terms of the call are peculiar. Through every lake and every

water-course, from Lake Ontario to the Lake Huron, the language

of the treaty is the same: the line is to follow the _middle_ of

the lake. Through every river it is the same: the _middle_ of the

main channel is to be followed. On entering Lake Superior, this

language changes. It is no longer the _middle_ of the lake that

is to constitute the boundary, but a line through the lake to the

"northward" of Isle Royale--a boundary which, so far from dividing

the lake equally, leaves almost two-thirds of it on the American

side. The words of the treaty are these:

"Thence through Lake Superior, northward of the isles Royale and

Philippeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of said

Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the Lake

of the Woods, to the Lake of the Woods," &c.

These are the words of the call; and this variation of language,

and this different mode of dividing the lake, were for the obvious

purpose of taking the shortest course to the Long Lake, or Pigeon

River, which led to the Lake of the Woods. The communication through

these little lakes and rivers was evidently the object aimed at; and

the call to the north of Isle Royale was for the purpose of getting

to that object. The island itself was nothing, except as a landmark.

Though large (for it is near one hundred miles in circumference),

it has no value, neither for agriculture, commerce, nor war. It is

sterile, inaccessible, remote from shore; and fit for nothing but

the use to which the Indians consigned it--the fabulous residence of

a fabulous deity. Nobody wants it--neither Indians nor white people.

It was assigned to the United States in the treaty of 1783, not as a

possession, but as a landmark, and because the shortest line through

the lake, to the well-known route which led to the Lake of the

Woods, passed to the north of that isle. All this is evident from

the maps, and all the maps are here the same; for these features

of nature are so well defined that there has never been the least

dispute about them. The commissioners under the Ghent treaty (Gen.

Porter for the United States, and Mr. Barclay for Great Britain),

though disagreeing about several things, had no disagreement about

Isle Royale, and the passage of the line to the north of that isle.

In their separate reports, they agreed upon this; and this settled

the whole question. After going to the north of Isle Royale, to

get out of the lake at a known place, it would be absurd to turn

two hundred miles south, to get out of it at an unknown place. The

agreement upon Isle Royale settled the line to the Lake of the

Woods, as it was, and as it is: but it so happened that, in the

year 1790, the English traveller and fur-trader Mr. (afterwards

Sir Alexander) McKenzie, in his voyage to the Northwest, travelled

up this line of water communication, saw the advantages of its

exclusive possession by the British; and proposed in his "History

of the Fur Trade," to obtain it by turning the line down from Isle

Royale, near two hundred miles, to St. Louis River in the southwest

corner of the lake. The Earl of Selkirk, at the head of the Hudson's

Bay Company, repeated the suggestion; and the British government,

for ever attentive to the interests of its subjects, set up a claim,

through the Ghent commissioners, to the St. Louis River as the

boundary. Mr. Barclay made the question, but too faintly to obtain

even a reference to the arbitrator; and Lord Ashburton had too much

candor and honor to revive it. He set up no pretension to the St.

Louis River, as claimed by the Ghent commissioners: he presented

the Pigeon River as the "long lake" of the treaty of 1783, and only

asked for a point six miles south of that river; and he obtained all

he asked. His letter of the 17th of July is explicit on this point.

He says:

"In considering the second point, it really appears of little

importance to either party how the line be determined through

the wild country between Lake Superior and the Lake of the

Woods, but it is important that some line should be fixed and

known. I would propose that the line be taken from a point

about six miles south of Pigeon River, where the Grand Portage

commences on the lake, and continued along the line of the said

portage, alternately by land and water, to Lac la Pluie--the

existing route by land and by water remaining common by both

parties. This line has the advantage of being known, and

attended with no doubt or uncertainty in running it."

These are his Lordship's words: Pigeon River, instead of St. Louis

River! making no pretension to the four millions of acres of

fine mineral land supposed to have been saved between these two

rivers; and not even alluding to the absurd pretension of the Ghent

commissioner! After this, what are we to think of the candor and

veracity of an official paper, which would make a merit of having

saved four millions of acres of fine mineral land, "northward of the

claim set up by the British commissioner under the Ghent treaty?"

What must we think of the candor of a paper which boasts of having

"included this within the United States," when it was never out of

the United States? If there is any merit in the case, it is in Lord

Ashburton--in his not having claimed the 200 miles between Pigeon

River and St. Louis River. What he claimed, he got; and that was

the southern line, commencing six miles south of Pigeon River, and

running south of the true line to Rainy Lake. He got this; making

a difference of some hundreds of thousands of acres, and giving to

the British the exclusive possession of the best route; and a joint

possession of the one which is made the boundary. To understand the

value of this concession, it must be known that there are two lines

of communication from the Lake Superior to the Lake of the Woods,

both beginning at or near the mouth of Pigeon River; that these

lines are the channels of trade and travelling, both for Indians,

and the fur-traders; that they are water communications; and that it

was a great point with the British, in their trade and intercourse

with the Indians, to have the exclusive dominion of the best

communication, and a joint possession with us of the other. This is

what Lord Ashburton claimed--what the treaty gave him--and what our

Secretary-negotiator became his agent and solicitor to obtain for

him. I quote the Secretary's letter of the 25th of July to Mr. James

Ferguson, and the answers of Mr. Ferguson of the same date, and also

the letter of Mr. Joseph Delafield, of the 20th of July, for the

truth of what I say. From these letters, it will be seen that our

Secretary put himself to the trouble to hunt testimony to justify

his surrender of the northern route to the British; that he put

leading questions to his witnesses, to get the information which he

wanted; and that he sought to cover the sacrifice, by depreciating

the agricultural value of the land, and treating the difference

between the lines as a thing of no importance. Here is the letter. I

read an extract from it:

"What is the general nature of the country between the mouth

of Pigeon River and the Rainy Lake? Of what formation is it,

and how is its surface? and will any considerable part of its

area be fit for cultivation? Are its waters active and running

streams, as in other parts of the United States? Or are they

dead lakes, swamps, and morasses? If the latter be their general

character, at what point, as you proceed westward, do the waters

receive a more decided character as running streams?

"There are said to be two lines of communication, each partly by

water and partly by portages, from the neighborhood of Pigeon

River to the Rainy Lake: one by way of Fowl Lake, the Saganaga

Lake, and the Cypress Lake; the other by way of Arrow River

and Lake; then by way of Saganaga Lake, and through the river

Maligne, meeting the other route at Lake la Croix, and through

the river Namekan to the Rainy Lake. Do you know any reason for

attaching great preference to either of these two lines? Or do

you consider it of no importance, in any point of view, which

may be agreed to? Please be full and particular on these several

points."

Here are leading questions, such as the rules of evidence forbid to

be put to any witness, and the answers to which would be suppressed

by the order of any court in England or America. They are called

"leading," because they _lead_ the witness to the answer which

the lawyer wants; and thereby tend to the perversion of justice.

The witnesses are here led to two points: first, that the country

between the two routes or lines is worth nothing for agriculture;

secondly, that it is of no importance to the United States which

of the two lines is established for the boundary. Thus led to the

desired points, the witnesses answer. Mr. Ferguson says:

"As an agricultural district, this region will always be

valueless. The pine timber is of high growth, equal for spars,

perhaps, to the Norway pine, and may, perhaps, in time, find a

market; but there are no alluvions, no arable lands, and the

whole country may be described as one waste of rock and water.

"You have desired me also to express an opinion as to any

preference which I may know to exist between the several lines

claimed as boundaries through this country, between the United

States and Great Britain.

"Considering that Great Britain abandons her claim by the

Fond du Lac and the St. Louis River; cedes also Sugar Island

(otherwise called St. George's Island) in the St. Marie

River; and agrees, generally, to a boundary following the old

commercial route, commencing at the Pigeon River, I do not

think that any reasonable ground exists to prevent a final

determination of this part of the boundary."

And Mr. Delafield adds:

"As an agricultural district, it has no value or interest,

even prospectively, in my opinion. If the climate were

suitable (which it is not), I can only say that I never saw,

in my explorations there, tillable land enough to sustain

any permanent population sufficiently numerous to justify

other settlements than those of the fur-traders; and, I might

add, fishermen. The fur-traders there occupied nearly all

those places; and the opinion now expressed is the only one

I ever heard entertained by those most experienced in these

northwestern regions.

"There is, nevertheless, much interest felt by the fur-traders

on this subject of boundary. To them, it is of much importance,

as they conceive; and it is, in fact, of national importance.

Had the British commissioner consented to proceed by the Pigeon

River (which is the Long Lake of Mitchell's map), it is probable

there would have been an agreement. There were several reasons

for his pertinacity, and for this disagreement; which belong,

however, to the private history of the commission, and can

be stated when required. The Pigeon River is a continuous

water-course. The St. George's Island, in the St. Marie River,

is a valuable island, and worth as much, perhaps, as most of the

country between the Pigeon River and Dog River route, claimed

for the United States, in an agricultural sense."

These are the answers; and while they are conclusive upon the

agricultural character of the country between the two routes, and

present it as of no value; yet, on the relative importance of the

routes as boundaries, they refuse to follow the _lead_ which the

question held out to them, and show that, as commercial routes,

and, consequently, as commanding the Indians and their trade, a

question of national importance is involved. Mr. Delafield says

the fur-traders feel much interest in this boundary: to them, it

is of much importance; and it is, in fact, of national importance.

These are the words of Mr. Delafield; and they show the reason why

Lord Ashburton was so tenacious of this change in the boundary. He

wanted it for the benefit of the fur-trade, and for the consequent

command which it would give the British over the Indians in time

of war. All this is apparent; yet our Secretary would only look at

it as a corn and potato region! And finding it not good for that

purpose, he surrenders it to the British! Both the witnesses look

upon it as a sacrifice on the part of the United States, and suppose

some equivalent in other parts of the boundary was received for it.

There was no such equivalent: and thus this surrender becomes a

gratuitous sacrifice on the part of the United States, aggravated by

the condescension of the American Secretary to act as the attorney

of the British minister, and seeking testimony by unfair and illegal

questions; and then disregarding the part of the answers which made

against his design.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 104 / 202 章