RESIGNATION OF MR. TYLER'S CABINET.
This event, with the exception of Mr. Webster who was prevailed upon
to remain, took place on the 11th day of September--being two days
after the second veto message--the one on the fiscal corporation
bill--had been sent to the House of Representatives. It was a thing
to take place in consequence of the President's conduct in relation
to that bill; but the immediate cause, or rather, the circumstance
which gave impulse to the other causes, was the appearance of a
letter from Washington city in the New York Herald in which the
cabinet was much vituperated--accused of remaining in their places
contrary to the will of the President, and in spite of the neglects
and slights which he put upon them with a view to make them resign.
Appearing in that paper, which had come to be considered as the
familiar of the President, and the part in relation to the slights
and neglects being felt to be true, it could not escape the serious
attention of those to whom it referred. But there was something else
in it which seemed to carry its origin directly to the President
himself. There was an account of a cabinet meeting in it, in which
things were told which were strictly confidential between the
President and his ministers--which had actually occurred; and which
no one but themselves or the President could have communicated.
They conferred together: the conviction was unanimous that the
President had licensed this communication: and this circumstance
authorized them to consider the whole letter as his, of course by
subaltern hand. To this letter Mr. Ewing alluded in his letter of
resignation when he said to the President: "The very secrets of
our cabinet councils made their appearance in an infamous paper,
printed in a neighboring city, the columns of which were daily
charged with flattery of yourself and foul abuse of your cabinet."
There was no exception in the letter in favor of any one. All were
equally included: all took their resolutions together (Mr. Granger
excepted who was not present), and determined to resign at once, and
in a body, and to publish their reasons--the circumstances under
which they acted justifying, in their opinion, this abrupt and
unceremonious separation from their chief. All carried this resolve
into effect, except Mr. Webster, who was induced to re-consider his
determination, and to remain. The reasons for this act should be
given, so far as they are essential, in the words of the retiring
ministers themselves: and, accordingly here they are; and first from
Mr. Ewing:
"This bill, framed and fashioned according to your own
suggestions, in the initiation of which I and another member of
your cabinet were made by you the agents and negotiators, was
passed by large majorities through the two Houses of Congress,
and sent to you, and you rejected it. Important as was the part
which I had taken, at your request, in the origination of this
bill, and deeply as I was committed for your action upon it,
you never consulted me on the subject of the veto message. You
did not even refer to it in conversation, and the first notice
I had of its contents was derived from rumor. And to me, at
least, you have done nothing to wipe away the personal indignity
arising out of the act. I gathered, it is true, from your
conversation, shortly after the bill had passed the House, that
you had a strong purpose to reject it; but nothing was said like
softening or apology to me, either in reference to myself or
to those with whom I had communicated at your request, and who
had acted themselves and induced the two Houses to act upon the
faith of that communication. And, strange as it may seem, the
veto message attacks in an especial manner the very provisions
which were inserted at your request; and even the name of the
corporation, which was not only agreed to by you, but especially
changed to meet your expressed wishes, is made the subject of
your criticism. Different men might view this transaction in
different points of light, but, under these circumstances, as
a matter of personal honor, it would be hard for me to remain
of your counsel, to seal my lips and leave unexplained and
undisclosed where lies in this transaction the departure from
straightforwardness and candor. So far indeed from admitting
the encouragement which you gave to this bill in its inception,
and explaining and excusing your sudden and violent hostility
towards it, you throw into your veto message an interrogatory
equivalent to an assertion that it was such a bill as you had
already declared could not receive your sanction. Such is the
obvious effect of the first interrogatory clause on the second
page. It has all the force of an assertion without its open
fairness. I have met and refuted this, the necessary inference
from your language, in my preceding statement, the correctness
of which you I am sure will not call in question."
Of the cause assigned for the President's change in relation to the
bill, namely Mr. Botts' letter, Mr. Ewing thus expresses himself:
"And no doubt was thrown out on the subject (veto of the fiscal
corporation bill) by you, in my hearing, or within my knowledge,
until the letter of Mr. Botts came to your hands. Soon after the
reading of that letter, you threw out strong intimations that
you would veto the bill if it were not postponed. That letter I
did and do most unequivocally condemn, but it did not effect the
constitutionality of the bill, or justify you in rejecting it on
that ground; it could affect only the expediency of your action;
and, whatever you may now believe as to the scruples existing
in your mind, in this and in a kindred source there is strong
ground to believe they have their origin."
Mr. Badger, Secretary of the Navy:
"At the cabinet meeting held on the 18th of August last (the
attorney-general and the postmaster-general being absent), the
subject of an exchange bank, or institution, was brought forward
by the President himself, and was fully considered. Into the
particulars of what passed I do not propose now to enter. It
will be sufficient to say that it was then distinctly stated
and understood that such an institution met the approbation of
the President, and was deemed by him free of constitutional
objections; that he desired (if Congress should deem it
necessary to act upon the subject during the session) that
such an institution should be adopted by that body, and that
the members of his cabinet would aid in bringing about that
result; and Messrs. Webster and Ewing were specially requested
by the President to have a communication upon the subject with
certain members of Congress. In consequence of what passed at
this meeting, I saw such friends in Congress as I deemed it
proper to approach, and urged upon them the passage of a bill
to establish such an institution, assuring them that I did
not doubt it would receive the approbation of the President.
The bill was passed, as the public know, and was met by the
veto. Now, if the President, after the meeting of the 18th
August, had changed his mind as to the constitutional power of
Congress, and had come to doubt or deny what he had admitted in
that meeting (which is the most favorable interpretation that
can be put upon his conduct), it was, in my opinion, a plain
duty on his part to have made known to the gentlemen concerned
this change of sentiment--to have offered them an apology for
the unpleasant situation in which they were placed by his
agency--or, at least, to have softened, by a full explanation
of his motives, his intended veto of a measure in promoting
the success of which they, at his request, had rendered their
assistance. But this the President did not do. Never, from the
moment of my leaving his house on the 18th, did he open his
lips to me on the subject. It was only from the newspapers,
from rumor, from hearsay, I learned that he had denied the
constitutionality of the proposed institution, and had made the
most solemn asseverations that he would never approve a measure
which I knew was suggested by himself, and which had been, at
his own instance, introduced into Congress. It is scarcely
necessary to say that I have not supposed, and do not now
suppose, that a difference merely between the President and his
cabinet, either as to the constitutionality or the expediency
of a bank, necessarily interposes any obstacles to a full and
cordial co-operation between them in the general conduct of his
administration; and therefore deeply as I regretted the veto
of the first bill, I did not feel myself at liberty to retire
on that account from my situation. But the facts attending
the initiation and disapproval of the last bill made a case
totally different from that--one it is believed without a
parallel in the history of our cabinets; presenting, to say
nothing more, a measure embraced and then repudiated--efforts
prompted and then disowned--services rendered and then treated
with scorn or neglect. Such a case required, in my judgment,
upon considerations, private and public, that the official
relations subsisting between the President and myself should be
immediately dissolved."
Mr. BELL, Secretary at War.
"I called to see the President on official business on the
morning (Monday, 16th August) before the first veto message was
sent in. I found him reading the message to the Secretary of the
Treasury. He did me the honor to read the material passages to
me. Upon reading that part of it which treats of the superior
importance and value of the business done by the late bank of
the United States in furnishing exchanges between the different
States and sections of the Union, I was so strongly impressed
with the idea that he meant to intimate that he would have no
objection to a bank which should be restricted in dealing in
exchanges, that I interrupted him in the reading, and asked
if I was to understand, by what he had just read, that he
was prepared to give his assent to a bank in the District of
Columbia, with offices or agencies in the States, having the
privilege, without their assent, to deal in exchanges between
them, and in foreign bills. He promptly replied that he thought
experience had shown the necessity of such a power in the
government. I could not restrain the immediate expression of my
gratification upon hearing this avowal. I said to the President
at once, that what I had feared would lead to fatal dissension
among our friends, I now regarded as rather fortunate than
otherwise; that his veto of the bill then before him (the first
one), would lead to the adoption of a much better one. I also
congratulated him upon the happy circumstance of the delay which
had taken place in sending in his veto message. The heat and
violence which might have been expected if the veto had been
sent in immediately upon the passage of the bill, would now be
avoided. Time had been given for cool reflection, and as the
message did not exclude the idea of a bank in some form, no
unpleasant consequences would be likely to follow. He expressed
his great surprise that there should be so much excitement
upon the subject; said that he had had his mind made up on the
bill before him from the first, but had delayed his message
that there should be time for the excitement to wear off; that
nothing could be more easy than to pass a bill which would
answer all necessary purposes; that it could be done in three
days. The next day, having occasion to see the President again,
he requested me to furnish him with such information as the war
department afforded of the embarrassments attending the transfer
and disbursement of the public revenue to distant points on
the frontier, in Florida, &c. He at the same time requested
me to draw up a brief statement of my views upon the subject,
showing the practical advantages and necessity of such a fiscal
institution as he had thought of proposing. Such information
as I could hastily collect from the heads of the principal
disbursing bureaus of the department I handed to him on the
evening of the same day, knowing that time was of the utmost
importance in the state in which the question then was. He
received the statements I gave him with manifest indifference,
and alarmed me by remarking that he began to doubt whether he
would give his assent (as I understood him) to any bank."
This was Mr. Bell's first knowledge of the second bill--all got from
the President himself, and while he was under nervous apprehension
of the storm which was to burst upon him. He goes on to detail the
subsequent consultations with his cabinet, and especially with Mr.
Webster, as heretofore given; and concludes with expressing the
impossibility of his remaining longer in the cabinet.
Mr. CRITTENDEN, the attorney-general, resigned in a brief and
general letter, only stating that circumstances chiefly connected
with the fiscal agent bills, made it his duty to do so. His reserve
was supposed to be induced by the close friendly relation in which
he stood with respect to Mr. Clay. Palliation for Mr. Tyler's
conduct was attempted to be found by some of his friends in the
alleged hostility of Mr. Clay to him, and desire to brow-beat him,
and embarrass him. No doubt Mr. Clay was indignant, and justly so,
at the first veto, well knowing the cause of it as he showed in
his replies to Mr. Rives and Mr. Archer: but that was after the
veto. But even then the expression of his indignation was greatly
restrained, and he yielded to his friends in twice putting off his
speech on that first veto, that he might not disturb Mr. Tyler in
his preparation of the second bill. The interest at stake was too
great--no less than the loss of the main fruits of the presidential
election--for him to break voluntarily with Mr. Tyler. He restrained
himself, and only ceased his self-restraint, when temporizing would
no longer answer any purpose; and only denounced Mr. Tyler when he
knew that he had gone into the embraces of a third party--taken his
stand against any national bank as a means of reconciling himself
to the democracy--and substituted "_a secret cabal_" (which he
stigmatized as "_a kitchen cabinet_") in place of his constitutional
advisers.
Two days after the appearance of those letters of resignation,
the whole of which came out in the National Intelligencer, Mr.
Webster published his reasons for not joining in that act with his
colleagues: and justice to him requires this paper to be given in
his own words. It is dated September 13th, and addressed to Messrs.
Gales and Seaton, the well reliable whig editors in Washington.
"Lest any misapprehension should exist, as to the reasons
which have led me to differ from the course pursued by my late
colleagues, I wish to say that I remain in my place, first,
because I have seen no sufficient reasons for the dissolution
of the late cabinet, by the voluntary act of its own members.
I am perfectly persuaded of the absolute necessity of an
institution, under the authority of Congress, to aid revenue and
financial operations, and to give the country the blessings of
a good currency and cheap exchanges. Notwithstanding what has
passed, I have confidence that the President will co-operate
with the legislature in overcoming all difficulties in the
attainment of these objects; and it is to the union of the whig
party--by which I mean the whole party, the whig President,
the whig Congress, and the whig people--that I look for a
realization of our wishes. I can look nowhere else. In the
second place, if I had seen reasons to resign my office, I
should not have done so, without giving the President reasonable
notice, and affording him time to select the hands to which he
should confide the delicate and important affairs now pending in
this department."
Notwithstanding the tone of this letter, it is entirely certain
that Mr. Webster had agreed to go out with his colleagues, and
was expected to have done so at the time they sent in their
resignations; but, in the mean while, means had been found to
effect a change in his determination, probably by disavowing
the application of any part of the New York Herald letter to
him--certainly (as it appears from his letter) by promising a
co-operation in the establishment of a national bank (for that is
what was intended by the blessings of a sound currency and cheap
exchanges): and also equally certain, from the same letter, that
he was made to expect that he would be able to keep all whiggery
together--whig President Tyler, whig members of Congress, and whig
people, throughout the Union. The belief of these things shows that
Mr. Webster was entirely ignorant of the formation of a third party,
resting on a democratic basis; and that the President himself was in
regular march to the democratic camp. But of all this hereafter.
The reconstruction of his cabinet became the immediate care of
the President, and in the course of a month it was accomplished.
Mr. Walter Forward, of Pennsylvania, was appointed Secretary of
the Treasury; the department of War was offered to Mr. Justice
McLean of the Supreme Court of the United States, and upon his
refusal to accept the place, it was conferred upon John C. Spencer,
Esq., of New York; Mr. Abel P. Upshur, of Virginia, was appointed
Secretary of the Navy--Hugh S. Legare, Esq., of South Carolina,
Attorney-General--Charles A. Wickliffe, Esq., of Kentucky,
Postmaster-General. This cabinet was not of uniform political
complexion. Mr. Webster had been permanently of that party which,
under whatsoever name, had remained antagonistic to the democracy.
Mr. Forward came into public life democratic, and afterwards acted
with its antagonists: the same of Mr. Wickliffe and Mr. Spencer: Mr.
Upshur a whig, classed with Mr. Calhoun's political friends--Mr.
Legare the contrary, and democratic, and distinguished for
opposition to nullification, secession, and disunion.