SECRET HISTORY OF THE SECOND BILL FOR A FISCAL AGENT, CALLED FISCAL
CORPORATION: ITS ORIGIN WITH MR. TYLER: ITS PROGRESS THROUGH
CONGRESS UNDER HIS LEAD: ITS REJECTION UNDER HIS VETO.
Soon after the meeting of Congress in this extra session--in the
course of the first week of it--Mr. Gilmer, of Virginia, held a
conversation with a whig member of the House, in which he suggested
to him that "a couple of gentlemen of about their size," might
become important men in this country--leading men--and get the
control of the government. An explanation was requested--and
given. It was to withdraw Mr. Tyler from the whig party, and make
him the head of a third party, in which those who did it would
become chiefs, and have control in the administration. This was
the explanation; and the scheme was based, not upon any particular
circumstances, but upon a knowledge of Mr. Tyler's character and
antecedents: and upon a calculation that he would be dazzled with
the idea of being the head of a party, and let the government
fall into the hands of those who pleased him--his indolence,
and want of business habits disqualifying him for the labors of
administration. Democratic doctrines were to be the basis of the
new party, especially opposition to a national bank: but recruits
from all parties received. The whig member to whom this suggestion
for the third party was made, declined to have any thing to do with
it: nor was he further consulted. But his eyes were opened, and he
had to see; and he saw other whigs do what he would not. And he had
received a clue which led to the comprehension of things which he
did not see, and had got an insight that would make him observant.
But his lips were sealed under an injunction; and remained so, as
far as the public was concerned. I never heard him quoted for a
word on the subject; but either himself, or some one equally well
informed, must have given Mr. Clay exact information; otherwise he
could not have hit the nail on the head at every lick, as he did in
his replies to Mr. Rives and Mr. Archer in the debate on the first
veto message: as shown in the preceding chapter.
The movement went on: Mr. Tyler fell into it: the new party
germinated, microscopically small; but potent in the President's
veto power. A national bank was the touchstone; and that involved
a courtship with the democracy--a breach with the whigs. The
democracy rejoiced, and patted Mr. Tyler on the shoulder--even
those who despised the new party: for they deemed it fair to avail
themselves of a treachery of which they were not the authors; and
felt it to be a retributive justice to deprive the whigs of the
fruits of a victory which they had won by log-cabin, coonskin, and
hard cider tactics; and especially to effect the deprivation in
the person of one whom they had taken from the democratic camp,
and set up against his old friends--the more annoying to them
because he could tell of their supposed misdeeds when he was one
of them. To break their heads with such a stick had retribution
in it, as well as gratification: and Mr. Tyler was greatly
extolled. To the whigs, it was a galling and mortifying desertion,
and ruinous besides. A national bank was their life--the vital
principle--without which they could not live as a party--the
power which was to give them power: which was to beat down their
adversaries--uphold themselves--and give them the political and the
financial control of the Union. To lose it, was to lose the fruits
of the election, with the prospect of losing the party itself.
Indignation was their pervading feeling; but the stake was too great
to be given up in a passion; and policy required the temporizing
expedient of conciliation--the proud spirit of Mr. Clay finding
it hard to bend to it; but yielding a little at first. The breach
with the whigs was resolved on: how to effect it without too much
rudeness--without a violence which would show him an aggressor as
well as a deserter--was the difficulty; and indirect methods were
taken to effect it. Newspapers in his interest--the _Madisonian_ at
Washington and _Herald_ at New York--vituperated the whig party,
and even his cabinet ministers. Slights and neglects were put upon
those ministers: the bank question was to complete the breach; but
only after a long management which should have the appearance of
keeping faith with the whigs, and throwing the blame of the breach
upon them. This brings us to the point of commencing the history of
the second fiscal bank bill, ending with a second veto, and an open
rupture between the President and the whigs.
The beginning of the second bill was laid in the death of the first
one; as the seed of a separation from his cabinet was planted in
the same place. The first veto message, in rejecting one bill, gave
promise to accept another, and even defined the kind of bill which
the President could approve: this was encouraging to the whigs. But
that first veto was resolved upon, and the message for it drawn,
without consultation with his cabinet--without reference to them;
and without their knowledge--except from hearsay and accident. They
first got wind of it in street rumor, and in paragraphs in the
_Madisonian_, and in letters to the _New York Herald_: and got the
first knowledge of it from coming in upon the President while he
was drawing it. This was a great slight to his cabinet, and very
unaccountable to ministers who, only two short months before,
had been solicited to remain in their places--had been saluted
with expressions of confidence; and cheered with the declaration
that their advice and counsel would be often wanted. They felt the
slight of the neglected consultation, as well as the disappointment
in the rejected bill; but the President consoled them for the
disappointment (saying nothing about the slight) by showing himself
ready, and even impatient for another bill. This readiness for
another bill is thus related by Mr. Ewing, the Secretary of the
Treasury, in his letter of resignation of his office addressed to
the President; dated Sept. 11th, 1841:
"On the morning of the 16th of August I called at your chamber,
and found you preparing the first veto message, to be despatched
to the Senate. The Secretary of War came in also, and you read a
portion of the message to us. He observed that though the veto
would create a great sensation in Congress, yet he thought the
minds of our friends better prepared for it than they were some
days ago, and he hoped it would be calmly received, especially
as it did not shut out all hope of a bank. To this you replied,
that you really thought that there ought to be no difficulty
about it; that you had sufficiently indicated the kind of a bank
you would approve, and that Congress might, if they saw fit,
pass such a bill in three days."
Mr. Bell, the Secretary of War, referred to in the foregoing
statement of Mr. Ewing, thus gives his account of the same interview:
"I called on the President on official business on the morning
of Monday the 16th of August, before the first veto message was
sent in. I found him reading the message to the Secretary of the
Treasury. He did me the honor to read the material passages to
me. Upon reading that part of it which treats of the superior
importance and value of the business done by the late Bank of
the United States in furnishing exchanges between different
States and sections of the Union, I was so strongly impressed
with the idea that he meant to intimate that he would have no
objection to a bank which should be restricted to dealing in
exchanges, that I interrupted him in the reading, and asked
if I was to understand (by what he had just read) that he
was prepared to give his assent to a bank in the District of
Columbia, with offices or agencies in the States, having the
privilege, without their assent, to deal in exchanges between
them, and in foreign bills. He promptly replied that he thought
experience had shown the necessity of such a power in the
government. And (after some further remarks favorable to such a
bill) expressed the opinion that nothing could be more easy than
to pass a bill which would answer all necessary purposes--that
it could be done in three days."
Such are the concurrent statements of two of the cabinet; and Mr.
Alexander A. Stuart, a member of the House of Representatives from
Virginia, thus gives his statement to the same effect in his account
of the readiness of the President, amounting to anxiety, for the
introduction and passage of a second bill.
"After the adjournment of the House (on the 16th of August),
Mr. Pearce of Maryland (then a representative in Congress,
now a senator) called at my boarding-house, and informed me
that he was induced to believe that there was still some hope
of compromising the difficulties between Congress and the
President, by adopting a bank bill on the basis of a proposition
which had been submitted by Mr. Bayard (Richard H.) in the
Senate, modified so as to leave out the last clause which
authorized the conversion of the agencies into offices of
discount and deposit on certain contingencies. He produced to me
a portion of the Senate journal, containing that proposition,
with the obnoxious clause crossed out with ink; and requested
me to visit the President and see if we could not adjust the
difficulty. At first I declined, but at length yielded to his
desire, and promised to do so. About 5 o'clock, I drove to the
President's house, but found him engaged with a distinguished
_democratic_ senator. This I thought rather a bad omen; but
I made known my wish for a private audience; which in a few
minutes was granted. This was the first occasion on which I
had ventured to approach the President on the subject. I made
known to him at once the object of my visit, and expressed the
hope that some measure might be adopted to heal the division
between himself and the whig party in Congress. I informed
him of the existence of the committee to which I referred,
and mentioned the names of those who composed it, and relied
on their age and known character for prudence and moderation,
as the best guarantees of the conciliatory spirit of the whig
party in Congress. He seemed to meet me in the proper temper,
and expressed the belief that a fair ground of compromise might
yet be agreed upon. I then made known what I had heard of his
opinions in regard to Mr. Bayard's proposition. He asked me if I
had it with me? I replied in the affirmative, and produced the
paper, which had been given to me by Mr. Pearce with the clause
struck out, as above stated. He read it over carefully, and
said it would do, making no objection whatever to the clause in
regard to the establishment of agencies in the several States
without their assent. But he said the capital was too large, and
referred to Mr. Appleton and Mr. Jaudon as authority to prove
that ten or fifteen millions would be enough. I objected that it
might hereafter be found insufficient; and as the charter had
twenty years to run, it might be as well to provide against a
contingency which would leave the government dependent on the
bank for permission to enlarge the capital; and to obviate the
difficulty I suggested the propriety of giving to Congress the
power to increase it as the public exigencies should require. To
this he assented; and by his direction I made the note on the
margin of the paper; 'capital to be 15 millions of dollars--to
be increased at the option of Congress when public interests
require.' The President then said: 'Now if you will send me this
bill I will sign it in twenty-four hours.' (After informing
the President that there was a statute in Virginia against
establishing agencies of foreign banks in the State, he said),
'This must be provided for:' and he then took the paper and
wrote on the margin the following words, which were to come in
after the word 'or,' and before the word 'bank' in the first
line of the proposition of Mr. Bayard, (the blank line in this
paper), 'In case such agencies are forbidden by the laws of the
State.' I remonstrated against this addition as unnecessary, and
not meeting the objection; but he said: 'Let it stand for the
present; I will think about it.'--The President then instructed
me to go to Mr. Webster, and have the bill prepared at once; and
as I rose to leave him, after cautioning me not to expose him
to the charge of dictating to Congress, he held my right hand
in his left, and raising his right hand upwards, exclaimed with
much feeling: 'Stuart! if you can be instrumental in passing
this bill through Congress, I will esteem you the best friend I
have on earth.'"
The original paper of Mr. Bayard, here referred to, with the
President's autographic emendations upon it, were in the possession
of Mr. Benton, and burnt in the conflagration of his house, books
and papers, in February, 1855.
These statements from Messrs. Ewing, Bell, and Stuart are enough
(though others might be added) to show that Mr. Tyler, at the time
that he sent in the first veto message, was in favor of a second
bill--open and earnest in his professions for it--impatient for its
advent--and ready to sign it within twenty-four hours. The only
question is whether these professions were sincere, or only phrases
to deceive the whigs--to calm the commotion which raged in their
camp--and of which he was well informed--and to avert the storm
which was ready to burst upon him; trusting all the while to the
chapter of contingencies to swamp the bill in one of the two Houses,
or to furnish pretexts for a second veto if it should come back to
his hands. The progress of the narrative must solve the problem;
and, therefore, let it proceed.
The 18th of August--the day on which Mr. Clay was to have spoken in
the Senate on the first veto message, and which subject was then
postponed on the motion of Mr. Berrien for reasons which he declined
to state--Mr. Tyler had a meeting with his cabinet, in which the
provisions of the new bill were discussed, and agreed upon--the two
members picked out (one in each House--Mr. Sergeant and Mr. Berrien)
to conduct it--the cabinet invited to stand by him (the President)
and see that the bill passed. Mr. Ewing gives this account, of this
days' work, in his letter of resignation addressed to the President.
"I then said to you, 'I have no doubt that the House having
ascertained your views will pass a bill in conformity to
them, provided they can be satisfied that it would answer the
purposes of the Treasury, and relieve the country.' You then
said, 'cannot my cabinet see that this is brought about? You
must stand by me in this emergency. Cannot you see that a bill
passes Congress such as I can approve without inconsistency?' I
declared again my belief that such a bill might be passed. And
you then said to me, 'what do you understand to be my opinions?
State them: so that I may see that there is no misapprehension
about them.' I then said that I understood you to be of opinion
that Congress might charter a bank in the District of Columbia,
giving it its location here. To this you assented. That they
might authorize such bank to establish offices of discount and
deposit in the several States, with the assent of the States.
To this you replied, 'don't name discounts: they have been
the source of the most abominable corruptions, and are wholly
unnecessary to enable the bank to discharge its duties to the
country and the government.' I observed in reply that I was
proposing nothing, but simply endeavoring to state what I had
understood to be your opinion as to the powers which Congress
might constitutionally confer on a bank; that on that point I
stood corrected. I then proceeded to say that I understood you
to be of opinion that Congress might authorize such bank to
establish agencies in the several States, with power to deal in
bills of exchange, without the assent of the States, to which
you replied, 'yes, if they be foreign bills, or bills drawn
in one State and payable in another. That is all the power
necessary for transmitting the public funds and regulating
exchanges and the currency.' Mr. Webster then expressed, in
strong terms, his opinion that such a charter would answer
all just purposes of government and be satisfactory to the
people; and declared his preference for it over any which had
been proposed, especially as it dispensed with the assent of
the States to the creation of an institution necessary for
carrying on the fiscal operations of government. He examined
it at some length, both as to its constitutionality and its
influence on the currency and exchanges, in all which views you
expressed your concurrence, desired that such a bill should be
introduced, and especially that it should go into the hands
of some of your _friends_. To my inquiry whether Mr. Sergeant
would be agreeable to you, you replied that he would. You
especially requested Mr. Webster and myself to communicate with
Messrs. Berrien and Sergeant on the subject, to whom you said
you had promised to address a note, but you doubted not that
this personal communication would be equally satisfactory.
You desired us, also, in communicating with those gentlemen,
not to commit you personally, lest, this being recognized as
your measure, it might be made a subject of comparison to your
prejudice in the course of discussion. You and Mr. Webster then
conversed about the particular wording of the 16th fundamental
article, containing the grant of power to deal in exchanges, and
of the connection in which that grant should be introduced; you
also spoke of the name of the institution, desiring that _that_
should be changed. To this I objected, as it would probably be
made a subject of ridicule, but you insisted that there was much
in a name, and this institution ought not to be called a bank.
Mr. Webster undertook to adapt it in this particular to your
wishes. Mr. Bell then observed to Mr. Webster and myself that we
had no time to lose; that if this were not immediately attended
to, another bill, less acceptable, might be got up and reported.
We replied that we would lose no time. Mr. Webster accordingly
called on Messrs. Berrien and Sergeant immediately, and I waited
on them by his appointment at 5 o'clock on the same day, and
agreed upon the principles of the bill in accordance with your
expressed wishes. And I am apprised of the fact, though it did
not occur in my presence, that after the bill was drawn up, and
before it was reported, it was seen and examined by yourself;
that your attention was specially called to the 16th fundamental
article: that on full examination you concurred in its
provisions: that at the same time its name was so modified as to
meet your approbation: and the bill was reported and passed, in
all essential particulars, as it was when it came through your
hands."
The sixteenth fundamental article, here declared to have been
especially examined and approved by the President, was the part
of the bill on which he afterwards rested his objections to its
approval, and the one that had been previously adjusted to suit him
in the interview with Mr. Stuart: Mr. Sergeant, and Mr. Berrien
(mentioned as the President's choice to conduct the bill through
the two Houses), were the two members that actually did it; and
they did it with a celerity which subjected themselves to great
censure; but which corresponded with the President's expressed
desire to have it back in three days. Every part of the bill was
made to suit him. The title, about which he was so solicitous to
preserve his consistency, and about which his cabinet was so fearful
of incurring ridicule, was also adjusted to his desire. Mr. Bell
says of this ticklish point: "A name, he (the President) said, was
important. What should it be? Fiscal Institute would do." It was
objected to by a member of the cabinet, and Fiscal Bank preferred.
He replied, "there was a great deal in a name, and he did not want
the word bank to appear in the bill." Finally, Fiscal Corporation
was agreed upon. Other members of the cabinet, in their letters of
resignation, who were present on the 18th, when the bill was agreed
upon, corroborated the statement of Mr. Ewing, in all particulars.
Mr. Badger said, "It was then distinctly stated and understood
that such an institution (the plan before the cabinet) met the
approbation of the President, and was deemed by him free from
constitutional objections; that he desired (if Congress should deem
it necessary to act upon the subject during the session) that such
an institution should be adopted by that body, and that the members
of his cabinet should aid in bringing about that result: and Messrs.
Webster and Ewing were specially requested by the President to have
a communication on the subject with certain members of Congress.
In consequence of what passed at this meeting I saw such friends
in Congress as I deemed it proper to approach, and urged upon them
the passage of a bill to establish such an institution (the one
agreed upon), assuring them that I did not doubt it would receive
the approbation of the President. Mr. Bell is full and particular
in his statement, and especially on the point of constitutionality
in the 16th fundamental article--the reference to Mr. Webster on
that point--his affirmative opinion, and the concurrence of the
President in it. A part of the statement is here given--enough for
the purpose."
"The President then gave the outline of such a bank, or fiscal
institution, as he thought he could sanction. It was to be in
the District of Columbia, to have the privilege of issuing
its own notes, receive moneys on deposit, and to deal in
bills of exchange between the States, and between the United
States and foreign states. But he wished to have the opinion
of his cabinet upon it. His own consistency and reputation
must be looked to. He considered his cabinet his friends, who
must stand by and defend whatever he did upon the subject.
He appealed particularly to Mr. Webster, for his opinion on
the point of consistency; and whether there was not a clear
distinction between the old bank of the United States--a bank of
discount and deposit--and the one he now thought of proposing;
and whether the constitutional question was not different. He
reminded us that in all his former speeches and reports, he
had taken the ground that Congress had no constitutional power
to charter a bank which had the power of local discount. Mr.
Webster pointed out the distinction between the two plans, which
appeared to be satisfactory to him."
On the point of having himself understood, and all chance for
misunderstanding obviated, the President was very particular, and
requested Mr. Ewing to repeat what he (the President) had said. Mr.
Ewing did so; and having at one point deviated from the President's
understanding, he was stopped--corrected--set right; and then
allowed to go on to the end. Mr. Bell's own words must tell the rest.
"The President said he was then understood. He requested Mr.
Webster particularly to communicate with the gentlemen (Messrs.
Sergeant and Berrien), who had waited upon him that morning,
and to let them know the conclusions to which he had come. He
also requested Mr. Ewing to aid in getting the subject properly
before Congress. He requested that they would take care not to
commit him by what they said to members of Congress, to any
intention to dictate to Congress. They might express their
confidence and belief that such a bill as had just been agreed
upon would receive his sanction; but it should be as matter
of inference from his veto message and his general views. He
thought he might request that the measure should be put into the
hands of some friend of his own upon whom he could rely. Mr.
Sergeant was named, and he expressed himself satisfied that he
should have charge of it. He also expressed a wish to see the
bill before it was presented to the House, if it could be so
managed."
Thus instructed and equipped, the members of the cabinet went
forth as requested, and had such success in preparing a majority
of the members of each House for the reception of this Fiscal
Corporation bill, and for its acceptance also that it was taken
up to the exclusion of all business, hurried along, and passed
incontinently--as shown in the public history of the bill in the
preceding chapter; and with such disregard of decent appearances,
as drew upon the President's two conductors of the bill (Messrs.
Sergeant and Berrien) much censure at the time--to be vetoed, like
the first; and upon objections to that 16th fundamental rule, which
had been the subject of such careful consideration--of autographic
correction--clear understanding--and solemn ratification. And here
the opportunity occurs, and the occasion requires, the correction
of a misapprehension into which senators fell (and to the prejudice
of Mr. Berrien), the day he disappointed the public and the Senate
in putting off the debate on the first veto message, and taking up
the bankrupt bill. He declined to give a reason for that motion,
and suspicion assigned it to an imperious requisition on the part
of the senators who had taken the bankrupt act to their bosoms, and
who held the fate of Mr. Clay's leading measures in their hands.
It was afterwards known that this was a mistake, and that this
postponement, as well as the similar one the day before, were both
yielded to conciliate Mr. Tyler--to save him from irritation (for
he had a nervous terror of Mr. Clay's impending speech) while the
new bill was in process of concoction. This process was commenced
on the 16th of August, continued on the 17th, and concluded on the
18th. Mr. Clay consented to the postponement of his anti-veto speech
both on the 17th and on the 18th, not to disturb this concoction;
and spoke on the 19th--being the day after the prepared bill had
been completed, and confided to its sponsors in the House and
the Senate. All this is derived from Mr. Alexander A. Stuart's
subsequent publication, to comprehend which fully, his account of
his connection with the subject must be taken up from the moment
of his leaving the President's house, that night of the 16th; and
premising, that the whig joint committee of which he speaks, was
a standing little body of eminent whigs, whose business it was to
fix up measures for the action of the whole party in Congress. With
this preliminary view, the important statement of Mr. Stuart will be
given.
"Upon leaving the President, I took a hack, and drove
immediately to Mr. Webster's lodgings, which were at the
opposite end of the city; but, unfortunately he was not at
home. I then returned to my boarding-house, where I told what
had transpired to my messmates, Mr. Summers, and others. After
tea I went to the meeting of the joint committee, of which I
have already spoken. I there communicated to Mr. Sergeant,
before the committee was called to order, what had occurred
between the President and myself. When the committee was first
organized there was a good deal of excitement, and difference of
opinion; and an animated debate ensued on various propositions
which were submitted. Finally I was invited by Mr. Sergeant to
state to the committee what had passed between the President
and myself; which I did, accompanied by such remarks as I
thought would have a tendency to allay excitement, and lead to
wise and dispassionate conclusions. After much deliberation,
the committee concluded to recommend to the whig party, in
both Houses of Congress, to accede to the President's views. A
difficulty was then suggested, that the veto message had been
made the order of the day at noon, and Mr. Clay had the floor;
and it was supposed that the debate might possibly assume such
a character as to defeat our purposes of conciliation. Mr.
Mangum at once pledged himself that Mr. Clay should offer no
obstacle to the adjustment of our difficulties; and engaged
to obtain his assent to the postponement of the orders of the
day, until we should have an opportunity of reporting to a
general meeting of the whig party, and ascertaining whether
they would be willing to accept a bank on the basis agreed on
by Mr. Tyler and myself--with this understanding the committee
adjourned. On the next day (17th of August) Mr. Mangum, with Mr.
Clay's assent, moved the postponement of the discussion of the
veto, and it was agreed to (see Senate Journal, p. 170): and
on the 18th of August the subject was again, with Mr. Clay's
concurrence, postponed, on the motion of Mr. Berrien. (Senate
Journal, p. 173.) During this time the whigs held their general
meeting, and agreed to adopt a bill on the President's plan; and
Mr. Sergeant and Mr. Berrien were requested to see that it was
properly drawn; and, if necessary, to seek an interview with the
President to be certain that there was no misunderstanding as to
his opinions. From this statement, confirmed by the journals of
the Senate, it will be seen with how much truth Mr. Tyler has
charged Mr. Clay with an intolerant and dictatorial spirit, and
a settled purpose to embarrass his administration. So far from
such being the fact, I state upon my own personal knowledge,
that Mr. Clay made every sacrifice consistent with honor and
patriotism, to avoid a rupture with Mr. Tyler. The result of
the labors of Messrs. Sergeant and Berrien, was the second
bank bill, which these distinguished jurists supposed to be in
conformity with the President's views."
From this array of testimony it would seem certain that the
President was sincerely in favor of passing this second bill: but
this account has a _per contra_ side to it; and it is necessary to
give the signs and facts on the other side which show him against
it from the beginning. These items are:--1. The letters in the
_New York Herald_; which, from the accuracy with which they told
beforehand what the President was to do, had acquired a credit
not to be despised; and which foreshadowed the veto, lauding the
President and vituperating his cabinet. 2. A sinister rumor to that
effect circulating in the city, and countenanced by the new friends
who were intimate with the President. 3. The concourse of these at
his house. 4. The bitter opposition to it from the same persons in
the House and the Senate; a circumstance on which Mr. Clay often
remarked in debate, with a significant implication. 5. What happened
to Mr. Bell; and which was this: on the 17th day of August Mr.
Tyler requested him to make up a statement from the operations of
the war department (its receipts and disbursements) to show the
advantage of such a bank as they had agreed upon, and to be used as
an argument for it. Mr. Bell complied with alacrity, and carried
the statement to the President himself the same evening--expecting
to be thanked for his zeal and activity. Quite the contrary. "He
received the statements which I gave him (writes Mr. Bell) with
manifest indifference, and alarmed me by remarking that he began
to doubt whether he would give his assent (as I understood him) to
any bill." 6. What happened to Mr. Webster and Mr. Ewing, and which
is thus related by the latter in his letter of resignation to the
President: "You asked Mr. Webster and myself each to prepare and
present you an argument touching the constitutionality of the bill
(as agreed upon); and before those arguments could be prepared and
read by you, you declared, as I heard and believe, to gentlemen,
members of the House, that you would cut off your right hand rather
than approve it." 7. What passed between Mr. Wise and Mr. Thompson
of Indiana in the debate on the veto of this bill, and which thus
appears on the Congress Register: "Mr. Wise rose and said, that
he had _always_ felt perfectly assured that the President would
not sign a bank: that if he had been waked up at any hour of the
night he would have declared his opposition to a bank." To which
Mr. Thompson: "Then why not tell us so at once? Why all this
subterfuge and prevarication--this disingenuous and almost criminal
concealment? What labor, care, and anxiety he would have saved us."
8. Rumors that Mr. Tyler was endeavoring to defeat the bill while
on its passage. 9. Proof _point blanc_ to that effect. As this is
a most responsible allegation, it requires a clear statement and
exact proof; and they shall both be given. On the 25th of August,
after the bill had passed the House and was still before the Senate,
Mr. Webster wrote a letter to Messrs. Choate and Bates (the two
senators from Massachusetts) in which, speaking in the interest of
the President, and of his personal knowledge, he informed them that
the President had seen the rapid progress of the bill in the House
with regret, and wished it might have been postponed;--and advised
the whigs to press it no further; and justified this change in the
President on Mr. Botts' letter, which had just appeared. This is the
allegation, and here is the proof in the letter itself--afterwards
furnished for publication by Mr. Webster to the editors of the
_Madisonian_:
"GENTLEMEN:--As you spoke last evening of the general policy of
the whigs, under the present posture of affairs, relative to the
bank bill, I am willing to place you in full possession of my
opinion on that subject.
"It is not necessary to go further back, into the history of
the past, than the introduction of the present measure into the
House of Representatives.
"That introduction took place, within two or three days, after
the President's disapproval of the former bill; and I have not
the slightest doubt that it was honestly and fairly intended as
a measure likely to meet the President's approbation. I do not
believe that one in fifty of the whigs had any sinister design
whatever, if there was an individual who had such design.
"But I know that the President had been greatly troubled, in
regard to the former bill, being desirous, on one hand, to meet
the wishes of his friends, if he could, and on the other, to do
justice to his own opinions.
"Having returned this first bill with objections, a new one was
presented in the House, and appeared to be making rapid progress.
"_I know the President regretted this, and wished the whole
subject might have been postponed._ At the same time, I believed
he was disposed to consider calmly and conscientiously whatever
other measure might be presented to him. But in the mean time
Mr. Botts' very extraordinary letter made its appearance. Mr.
Botts is a whig of eminence and influence in our ranks. I need
not recall to your mind the contents of the letter. It is enough
to say, that it purported that the whigs designed to circumvent
their own President, to 'head him' as the expression was and to
place him in a condition of embarrassment. From that moment, I
felt that it was the duty of the whigs to forbear from pressing
the bank bill further, at the present time. I thought it was but
just in them to give decisive proof that they entertained no
such purpose, as seemed to be imputed to them. And since there
was reason to believe, that the President would be glad of time,
for information and reflection, before being called on to form
an opinion on another plan for a bank--a plan somewhat new to
the country--I thought his known wishes ought to be complied
with. I think so still. I think this is a course, just to the
President, and wise on behalf of the whig party. _A decisive
rebuke ought, in my judgment, to be given to the intimation,
from whatever quarter, of a disposition among the whigs to
embarrass the President._ This is the main ground of my opinion;
and such a rebuke, I think, would be found in the general
resolution of the party to postpone further proceedings on the
subject to the next session, now only a little more than three
months off.
"The session has been fruitful of important acts.--The wants of
the Treasury have been supplied; provisions have been made for
fortifications, and for the navy; the repeal of the sub-treasury
has passed; the bankrupt bill, that great measure of justice and
benevolence, has been carried through; and the land bill seems
about to receive the sanction of Congress.
"In all these measures, forming a mass of legislation, more
important, I will venture to say, than all the proceedings
of Congress for many years past, the President has cordially
concurred.
"I agree, that the currency question is, nevertheless, the great
question before the country; but considering what has already
been accomplished, in regard to other things; considering the
difference of opinion which exists upon this remaining one;
and, considering, especially, that it is the duty of the whigs
effectually to repel and put down any supposition, that they
are endeavoring to put the President in a condition, in which
he must act under restraint or embarrassment, I am fully and
entirely persuaded, that the bank subject should be postponed
to the next session. I am gentlemen, your friend and obedient
servant. (Signed, Daniel Webster, and addressed to Messrs.
Choate and Bates, senators from Massachusetts, and dated, August
25th, 1841.)"
This is the proof, and leaves it indisputable that the President
undertook to defeat his own bill. No more can be said on that point.
The only point open to remark, and subject to examination, is the
reason given by Mr. Webster for this conduct in the President;
and this reason is found in Mr. Botts' letter--which had just
made its appearance. That letter might be annoyance--might be
offensive--might excite resentment: but it could not change a
constitutional opinion, or reverse a state policy, or justify a
President in breaking his word to his cabinet and to the party that
had elected him. It required a deeper reason to work such results;
and the key to that reason is found in the tack taken in the first
eight or nine days of the session to form a third party, breaking
with the whigs, settling back on the democracy, and making the bank
veto the point of rupture with one, the cement with the other,
the rallying points of the recruits, and the corner-stone of the
infant Tyler party. That was the reason: and all the temporizing and
double-dealing--pushing the bill forward with one hand, and pulling
back with the other--were nothing but expedients to avert or appease
the storm that was brewing, and to get through the tempest of his
own raising with as little damage to himself as possible. The only
quotable part of this letter was the phrase, "_Head Captain Tyler,
or die:_" a phrase quoted by the public to be laughed at--by Mr.
Webster, to justify Mr. Tyler's attempt to defeat his own bill, so
solemnly prepared and sent to the whigs, with a promise to sign it
in twenty-four hours if they would pass it. The phrase was fair
though it presented a ridiculous image. This "heading," applied to
a person signifies to check, or restrain; applied to animals (which
is its common use in the South and the West) is, to turn one round
which is running the wrong way, and make it go back to the right
place. Taken in either sense, the phrase is justifiable, and could
only mean checking Mr. Tyler in his progress to the new party, and
turning him back to the party that elected him Vice-president. As
for the "dying," that could imply no killing of persons, nor any
death of any kind to "Captain Tyler," but only the political death
of the whigs if their President left them. All this Mr. Webster knew
very well, for he was a good philologist, and knew the meaning of
words. He was also a good lawyer, and knew that an odious meaning
must be given to an innocent word when it is intended to make it
offensive. The phrase was, therefore, made to signify a design
to circumvent the President with a view to embarrass him--Mr.
Clay being the person intended at the back of Mr. Botts in this
supposed circumvention and embarrassment. But circumvent was not
the word of the letter, nor its synonyme; and is a word always used
in an evil sense--implying imposition, stratagem, cheat, deceit,
fraud. The word "heading" has no such meaning: and thus the imputed
offence, gratuitously assumed, makes its exit for want of verity.
Embarrassment is the next part of the offence, and its crowning
part, and fails like the other. Mr. Clay had no such design. That is
proved by Mr. Stuart, and by his own conduct--twice putting off his
speech--holding in his proud spirit until chafed by Mr. Rives--then
mollifying indignant language with some expressions of former regard
to Mr. Tyler. He had no design or object in embarrassing him. No
whig had. And they all had a life and death interest (political) in
conciliating him, and getting him to sign: and did their best to do
so. The only design was to get him to sign his own bill--the fiscal
corporation bill--which he had fixed up himself, title and all--sent
out his cabinet to press upon Congress--and desired to have it back
in three days, that he might sign it in twenty-four hours. The only
solution is, that he did not expect it to come back--that he counted
on getting some whigs turned against it, as tried without avail on
Messrs. Choate and Bates; and that he could appease the whig storm
by sending in the bill, and escape the performance of his promise
by getting it defeated. This is the only solution; and the fact is
that he would have signed no bank bill, under any name, after the
eighth or ninth day of the session--from the day that he gave into
the scheme for the third party, himself its head, and settling back
upon his _ci-devant_ democratic character. From that day a national
bank of any kind was the Jonas of his political ship--to be thrown
overboard to save the vessel and crew.
And this is the secret history of the birth, life and death of the
second fiscal bank, called fiscal corporation--doomed from the first
to be vetoed--brought forward to appease a whig storm--sometimes
to be postponed--commended to the nursing care of some--consigned
to the strangling arts of others: but doomed to be vetoed when it
came to the point as being the corner-stone in the edifice of the
new party, and the democratic baptismal regeneration of Mr. Tyler
himself.