PROGRESS OF THE SLAVERY AGITATION: MR. CALHOUN'S APPROVAL OF THE
MISSOURI COMPROMISE
This portentous agitation, destined to act so seriously on the
harmony, and possibly on the stability of the Union, requires to
be noted in its different stages, that responsibility may follow
culpability, and the judgment of history fall where it is due, if
a deplorable calamity is made to come out of it. In this point
of view the movements for and against slavery in the session of
1837-'38 deserve to be noted, as of disturbing effect at the time;
and as having acquired new importance from subsequent events. Early
in the session a memorial was presented in the Senate from the
General Assembly of Vermont, remonstrating against the annexation
of Texas to the United States, and praying for the abolition of
slavery in the District of Columbia--followed by many petitions from
citizens and societies in the Northern States to the same effect;
and, further, for the abolition of slavery in the Territories--for
the abolition of the slave trade between the States--and for the
exclusion of future slave States from the Union.
There was but little in the state of the country at that time to
excite an anti-slavery feeling, or to excuse these disturbing
applications to Congress. There was no slave territory at that time
but that of Florida; and to ask to abolish slavery there, where it
had existed from the discovery of the continent, or to make its
continuance a cause for the rejection of the State when ready for
admission into the Union, and thus form a free State in the rear
of all the great slave States, was equivalent to praying for a
dissolution of the Union. Texas, if annexed, would be south of 36°
30', and its character, in relation to slavery, would be fixed by
the Missouri compromise line of 1820. The slave trade between the
States was an affair of the States, with which Congress had nothing
to do; and the continuance of slavery in the District of Columbia,
so long as it existed in the adjacent States of Virginia and
Maryland, was a point of policy in which every Congress, and every
administration, had concurred from the formation of the Union; and
in which there was never a more decided concurrence than at present.
The petitioners did not live in any Territory, State, or district
subject to slavery. They felt none of the evils of which they
complained--were answerable for none of the supposed sin which they
denounced--were living under a general government which acknowledged
property in slaves--and had no right to disturb the rights of the
owner: and they committed a cruelty upon the slave by the additional
rigors which their pernicious interference brought upon him.
The subject of the petitions was disagreeable in itself; the
language in which they were couched was offensive; and the
wantonness of their presentation aggravated a proceeding
sufficiently provoking in the civilest form in which it could be
conducted. Many petitions were in the same words, bearing internal
evidence of concert among their signers; many were signed by women,
whose proper sphere was far from the field of legislation; all
united in a common purpose, which bespoke community of origin, and
the superintendence of a general direction. Every presentation gave
rise to a question and debate, in which sentiments and feelings
were expressed and consequences predicted, which it was painful to
hear. While almost every senator condemned these petitions, and the
spirit in which they originated, and the language in which they were
couched, and considered them as tending to no practical object, and
only calculated to make dissension and irritation, there were others
who took them in a graver sense, and considered them as leading to
the inevitable separation of the States. In this sense Mr. Calhoun
said:
"He had foreseen what this subject would come to. He knew its
origin, and that it lay deeper than was supposed. It grew out
of a spirit of fanaticism which was daily increasing, and, if
not met _in limine_, would by and by dissolve this Union. It was
particularly our duty to keep the matter out of the Senate--out
of the halls of the National Legislature. These fanatics were
interfering with what they had no right. Grant the reception
of these petitions, and you will next be asked to act on them.
He was for no conciliatory course, no temporizing; instead of
yielding one inch, he would rise in opposition; and he hoped
every man from the South would stand by him to put down this
growing evil. There was but one question that would ever destroy
this Union, and that was involved in this principle. Yes; this
was potent enough for it, and must be early arrested if the
Union was to be preserved. A man must see little into what is
going on if he did not perceive that this spirit was growing,
and that the rising generation was becoming more strongly imbued
with it. It was not to be stopped by reports on paper, but by
action, and very decided action."
The question which occupied the Senate was as to the most judicious
mode of treating these memorials, with a view to prevent their
evil effects: and that was entirely a question of policy, on which
senators disagreed who concurred in the main object. Some deemed
it most advisable to receive and consider the petitions--to refer
them to a committee--and subject them to the adverse report which
they would be sure to receive; as had been done with the Quakers'
petitions at the beginning of the government. Others deemed it
preferable to refuse to receive them. The objection urged to this
latter course was, that it would mix up a new question with the
slavery agitation which would enlist the sympathies of many who did
not co-operate with the Abolitionists--the question of the right
of petition; and that this new question, mixing with the other,
might swell the number of petitioners, keep up the applications
to Congress, and perpetuate an agitation which would otherwise
soon die out. Mr. CLAY, and many others were of this opinion; Mr.
CALHOUN and his friends thought otherwise; and the result was, so
far as it concerned the petitions of individuals and societies, what
it had previously been--a half-way measure between reception and
rejection--a motion to lay the question of reception on the table.
This motion, precluding all discussion, got rid of the petitions
quietly, and kept debate out of the Senate. In the case of the
memorial from the State of Vermont, the proceeding was slightly
different in form, but the same in substance. As the act of a
State, the memorial was received; but after reception was laid on
the table. Thus all the memorials and petitions were disposed of
by the Senate in a way to accomplish the two-fold object, first,
of avoiding discussion; and, next, condemning the object of the
petitioners. It was accomplishing all that the South asked; and
if the subject had rested at that point, there would have been
nothing in the history of this session, on the slavery agitation,
to distinguish it from other sessions about that period: but the
subject was revived; and in a way to force discussion, and to
constitute a point for the retrospect of history.
Every memorial and petition had been disposed of according to the
wishes of the senators from the slaveholding States; but Mr. Calhoun
deemed it due to those States to go further, and to obtain from the
Senate declarations which should cover all the questions of federal
power over the institution of slavery: although he had just said
that paper reports would do no good. For that purpose, he submitted
a series of resolves--six in number--which derive their importance
from their comparison, or rather contrast, with others on the same
subject presented by him in the Senate ten years later; and which
have given birth to doctrines and proceedings which have greatly
disturbed the harmony of the Union, and palpably endangered its
stability. The six resolutions of this period ('37-'38) undertook to
define the whole extent of the power delegated by the States to the
federal government on the subject of slavery; to specify the acts
which would exceed that power; and to show the consequences of doing
any thing not authorized to be done--always ending in a dissolution
of the Union. The first four of these related to the States; about
which, there being no dispute, there was no debate. The sixth,
without naming Texas, was prospective, and looked forward to a case
which might include her annexation; and was laid upon the table to
make way for an express resolution from Mr. Preston on the same
subject. The fifth related to the territories, and to the District
of Columbia, and was the only one which excited attention, or has
left a surviving interest. It was in these words:
"_Resolved_, That the intermeddling of any State, or States,
or their citizens, to abolish slavery in this District, or any
of the territories, on the ground or under the pretext that it
is immoral or sinful, or the passage of any act or measure of
Congress with that view, would be a direct and dangerous attack
on the institutions of all the slaveholding States."
The dogma of "no power in Congress to legislate upon the existence
of slavery in territories" had not been invented at that time;
and, of course, was not asserted in this resolve, intended by
its author to define the extent of the federal legislative power
on the subject. The resolve went upon the existence of the power,
and deprecated its abuse. It put the District of Columbia and
the territories into the same category, both for the exercise of
the power and the consequences to result from the intermeddling
of States or citizens, or the passage of any act of Congress to
abolish slavery in either; and this was admitting the power in
the territory, as in the District; where it is an express grant
in the grant of all legislative power. The intermeddling and
the legislation were deprecated in both solely on the ground
of inexpediency. Mr. Clay believed this inexpediency to rest
upon different grounds in the District and in the territory of
Florida--the only territory in which slavery then existed, and to
which Mr. Calhoun's resolution could apply. He was as much opposed
as any one to the abolition of slavery in either of these places,
but believed that a different reason should be given for each,
founded in their respective circumstances; and, therefore, submitted
an amendment, consisting of two resolutions--one applicable to the
District, the other to the territory. In stating the reasons why
slavery should not be abolished in Florida, he quoted the Missouri
compromise line of 1820. This was objected to by other senators, on
the ground that that line did not apply to Florida, and that her
case was complete without it. Of that opinion was the Senate, and
the clause was struck out. This gave Mr. Calhoun occasion to speak
of that compromise, and of his own course in relation to it; in the
course of which he declared himself to have been favorable to that
memorable measure at the time it was adopted, but opposed to it now,
from having experienced its ill effect in encouraging the spirit of
abolitionism:
"He was glad that the portion of the amendment which referred
to the Missouri compromise had been struck out. He was not a
member of Congress when that compromise was made, but it is
due to candor to state that his impressions were in its favor;
but it is equally due to it to say that, with his present
experience and knowledge of the spirit which then, for the first
time, began to disclose itself, he had entirely changed his
opinion. He now believed that it was a dangerous measure, and
that it has done much to rouse into action the present spirit.
Had it then been met with uncompromising opposition, such as
a then distinguished and sagacious member from Virginia [Mr.
RANDOLPH], now no more, opposed to it, abolition might have
been crushed for ever in its birth. He then thought of Mr.
Randolph as, he doubts not, many think of him now who have not
fully looked into this subject, that he was too unyielding--too
uncompromising--too impracticable; but he had been taught his
error, and took pleasure in acknowledging it."
This declaration is explicit. It is made in a spirit of candor, and
as due to justice. It is a declaration spontaneously made, not an
admission obtained on interrogatories. It shows that Mr. Calhoun
was in favor of the compromise at the time it was adopted, and had
since changed his opinions--"entirely changed" them, to use his
own words--not on constitutional, but expedient grounds. He had
changed upon experience, and upon seeing the dangerous effects of
the measure. He had been taught his error, and took pleasure in
acknowledging it. He blamed Mr. Randolph then for having been too
uncompromising; but now thought him sagacious; and believed that
if the measure had met with uncompromising opposition at the time,
it would have crushed for ever the spirit of abolitionism. All
these are reasons of expediency, derived from after-experience, and
excludes the idea of any constitutional objection. The establishment
of the Missouri compromise line was the highest possible exercise of
legislative authority over the subject of slavery in a territory.
It abolished it where it legally existed. It for ever forbid it
where it had legally existed for one hundred years. Mr. Randolph
was the great opponent of the compromise. He gave its friends all
their trouble. It was then he applied the phrase, so annoying and
destructive to its northern supporters--"dough face,"--a phrase
which did them more harm than the best-reasoned speech. All the
friends of the compromise blamed his impracticable opposition;
and Mr. Calhoun, in joining in that blame, placed himself in the
ranks of the cordial friends of the measure. This abolition and
prohibition extended over an area large enough to make a dozen
States; and of all this Mr. Calhoun had been in favor; and now had
nothing but reasons of expediency, and they _ex post facto_, against
it. His expressed belief now was, that the measure was dangerous--he
does not say unconstitutional, but dangerous--and this corresponds
with the terms of his resolution then submitted; which makes the
intermeddling to abolish slavery in the District or territories, or
any act or measure of Congress to that effect, a "dangerous" attack
on the institutions of the slaveholding States. Certainly the idea
of the unconstitutionality of such legislation had not then entered
his head. The substitute resolve of Mr. Clay differed from that
of Mr. Calhoun, in changing the word "intermeddling" to that of
"interference;" and confining that word to the conduct of citizens,
and making the abolition or attempted abolition of slavery in the
District an injury to its own inhabitants as well as to the States;
and placing its protection under the faith implied in accepting its
cession from Maryland and Virginia. It was in these words:
"That the interference by the citizens of any of the States,
with the view to the abolition of slavery in this District,
is endangering the rights and security of the people of the
District; and that any act or measure of Congress, designed
to abolish slavery in this District, would be a violation of
the faith implied in the cessions by the States of Virginia
and Maryland--a just cause of alarm to the people of the
slaveholding States--and have a direct and inevitable tendency
to disturb and endanger the Union."
The vote on the final adoption of the resolution was:
"YEAS--Messrs. Allen, Bayard, Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan,
Calhoun, Clay, of Alabama, Clay, of Kentucky, Thomas Clayton,
Crittenden, Cuthbert, Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King, Lumpkin, Lyon,
Nicholas, Niles, Norvell, Franklin Pierce, Preston, Rives, Roane,
Robinson, Sevier, Smith, of Connecticut, Strange, Tallmadge, Tipton,
Walker, White, Williams, Wright, Young.
"NAYS--Messrs. Davis, Knight, McKean, Morris, Prentiss, Smith, of
Indiana, Swift, Webster."
The second resolution of Mr. Clay applied to slavery in a territory
where it existed, and deprecated any attempt to abolish it in
such territory, as alarming to the slave States, and as violation
of faith towards its inhabitants, unless they asked it; and in
derogation of its right to decide the question of slavery for itself
when erected into a State. This resolution was intended to cover the
case of Florida, and ran thus:
"_Resolved_, That any attempt of Congress to abolish slavery
in any territory of the United States in which it exists would
create serious alarm and just apprehension in the States
sustaining that domestic institution, and would be a violation
of good faith towards the inhabitants of any such territory who
have been permitted to settle with, and hold, slaves therein;
because the people of any such territory have not asked for
the abolition of slavery therein; and because, when any such
territory shall be admitted into the Union as a State, the
people thereof shall be entitled to decide that question
exclusively for themselves."
And the vote upon it was--
"YEAS--Messrs. Allen, Bayard, Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan,
Calhoun, Clay, of Alabama, Clay, of Kentucky, Crittenden, Cuthbert,
Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King, Lumpkin, Lyon, Merrick, Nicholas,
Niles, Norvell, Franklin Pierce, Preston, Rives, Roane, Robinson,
Sevier, Smith, of Connecticut, Strange, Tipton, Walker, White,
Williams, Wright, and Young.
"NAYS--Messrs. Thomas Clayton, Davis, Knight, McKean, Prentiss,
Robbins, Smith, of Indiana, Swift, and Webster."
The few senators who voted against both resolutions chiefly
did so for reasons wholly unconnected with their merits; some
because opposed to any declarations on the subject, as abstract
and inoperative; others because they dissented from the reasons
expressed, and preferred others: and the senators from Delaware (a
slave State) because they had a nullification odor about them, as
first introduced. Mr. Calhoun voted for both, not in preference to
his own, but as agreeing to them after they had been preferred by
the Senate; and so gave his recorded assent to the doctrines they
contained. Both admit the constitutional power of Congress over
the existence of slavery both in the district and the territories,
but deprecate its abolition where it existed for reasons of high
expediency: and in this view it is believed nearly the entire
Senate concurred; and quite the entire Senate on the constitutional
point--there being no reference to that point in any part of the
debates. Mr. Webster probably spoke the sentiments of most of those
voting with him, as well as his own, when he said:
"If the resolutions set forth that all domestic institutions,
except so far as the constitution might interfere, and any
intermeddling therewith by a State or individual, was contrary
to the spirit of the confederacy, and was thereby illegal and
unjust, he would give them his hearty and cheerful support; and
would do so still if the senator from South Carolina would
consent to such an amendment; but in their present form he must
give his vote against them."
The general feeling of the Senate was that of entire repugnance
to the whole movement--that of the petitions and memorials on the
one hand, and Mr. Calhoun's resolutions on the other. The former
were quietly got rid of, and in a way to rebuke, as well as to
condemn their presentation; that is to say, by motions (sustained
by the body) to lay them on the table. The resolutions could not so
easily be disposed of, especially as their mover earnestly demanded
discussion, spoke at large, and often, himself; "and desired to make
the question, on their rejection or adoption, a _test_ question."
They were abstract, leading to no result, made discussion where
silence was desirable, frustrated the design of the Senate in
refusing to discuss the abolition petitions, gave them an importance
to which they were not entitled, promoted agitation, embarrassed
friendly senators from the North, placed some in false positions;
and brought animadversions from many. Thus, Mr. Buchanan:
"I cannot believe that the senator from South Carolina has taken
the best course to attain these results (quieting agitation).
This is the great centre of agitation; from this capital it
spreads over the whole Union. I therefore deprecate a protracted
discussion of the question here. It can do no good, but may do
much harm, both in the North and in the South. The senators
from Delaware, although representing a slaveholding State, have
voted against these resolutions because, in their opinion, they
can detect in them the poison of nullification. Now, I can see
no such thing in them, and am ready to avow in the main they
contain nothing but correct political principles, to which I am
devoted. But what then? These senators are placed in a false
position, and are compelled to vote against resolutions the
object of which they heartily approve. Again, my friend, the
senator from New Jersey (Mr. Wall), votes against them because
they are political abstractions of which he thinks the Senate
ought not to take cognizance, although he is as much opposed to
abolition, and as willing to maintain the constitutional rights
of the South as any senator upon this floor. Other senators
believe the right of petition has been endangered; and until
that has been established they will not vote for any resolutions
on the subject. Thus we stand: and those of us in the North
who must sustain the brunt of the battle are forced into false
positions. Abolition thus acquires force by bringing to its aid
the right of petition, and the hostility which exists at the
North against the doctrines of nullification. It is in vain
to say that these principles are not really involved in the
question. This may be, and in my opinion is, true; but why,
by our conduct here, should we afford the abolitionists such
plausible pretexts? The fact is, and it cannot be disguised,
that those of us in the Northern States who have determined
to sustain the rights of the slave States at every hazard
are placed in a most embarrassing situation. We are almost
literally between two fires. Whilst in front we are assailed by
the abolitionists, our own friends in the South are constantly
driving us into positions where their enemies and our enemies
may gain important advantages."
And thus Mr. Crittenden:
"If the object of these resolutions was to produce peace, and
allay excitement, it appeared to him that they were not very
likely to accomplish such a purpose. More vague and general
abstractions could hardly have been brought forward, and they
were more calculated to produce agitation and stir up discontent
and bad blood than to do any good whatever. Such he knew was
the general opinion of Southern men, few of whom, however
they assented to the abstractions, approved of this method of
agitating the subject. The mover of these resolutions relies
mainly on two points to carry the Senate with him: first, he
reiterates the cry of danger to the Union; and, next, that if
he is not followed in this movement he urges the inevitable
consequence of the destruction of the Union. It is possible the
gentleman may be mistaken. It possibly might not be exactly true
that, to save the Union, it was necessary to follow him. On the
contrary, some were of opinion, and he for one was much inclined
to be of the same view, that to follow the distinguished mover
of these resolutions--to pursue the course of irritation,
agitation, and intimidation which he chalked out--would be the
very best and surest method that could be chalked out to destroy
this great and happy Union."
And thus Mr. Clay:
"The series of resolutions under consideration has been
introduced by the senator from South Carolina, after he and
other senators from the South had deprecated discussion on the
delicate subject to which they relate. They have occasioned
much discussion, in which hitherto I have not participated. I
hope that the tendency of the resolutions may be to allay the
excitement which unhappily prevails in respect to the abolition
of slavery; but I confess that, taken altogether, and in
connection with other circumstances, and especially considering
the manner in which their author has pressed them on the Senate,
I fear that they will have the opposite effect; and particularly
at the North, that they may increase and exasperate instead of
diminishing and assuaging the existing agitation."
And thus Mr. Preston, of South Carolina:
"His objections to the introduction of the resolutions were
that they allowed ground for discussion; and that the subject
ought never to be allowed to enter the halls of the legislative
assembly, was always to be taken for granted by the South; and
what would abstract propositions of this nature effect?"
And thus Mr. Strange, of North Carolina:
"What did they set forth but abstract principles, to which the
South had again and again certified? What bulwark of defence was
needed stronger than the constitution itself? Every movement
on the part of the South only gave additional strength to
her opponents. The wisest, nay, the only safe, course was to
remain quiet, though prepared at the same time to resist all
aggression. Questions like this only tended to excite angry
feelings. The senator from South Carolina (Mr. CALHOUN) charged
him with '_preaching_' to one side. Perhaps he had sermonized
too long for the patience of the Senate; but then he had
_preached_ to all sides. It was the agitation of the question in
any form, or shape, that rendered it dangerous. Agitating this
question in any shape was ruinous to the South."
And thus Mr. Richard H. Bayard, of Delaware:
"Though he denounced the spirit of abolition as dangerous and
wicked in the extreme, yet he did not feel himself authorized
to vote for the resolutions. If the doctrines contained in them
were correct, then nullification was correct; and if passed
might hereafter be appealed to as a precedent in favor of that
doctrine; though he acquitted the senator [Mr. CALHOUN] of
having the most remote intention of smuggling in any thing in
relation to that doctrine under cover of these resolutions."
Mr. Calhoun, annoyed by so much condemnation of his course, and
especially from those as determined as himself to protect the slave
institution where it legally existed, spoke often and warmly; and
justified his course from the greatness of the danger, and the fatal
consequences to the Union if it was not arrested.
"I fear (said Mr. C.) that the Senate has not elevated its
view sufficiently to comprehend the extent and magnitude of
the existing danger. It was perhaps his misfortune to look too
much to the future, and to move against dangers at too great
a distance, which had involved him in many difficulties and
exposed him often to the imputation of unworthy motives. Thus
he had long foreseen the immense surplus revenue which a false
system of legislation must pour into the Treasury, and the fatal
consequences to the morals and institutions of the country
which must follow. When nothing else could arrest it he threw
himself, with his State, into the breach, to arrest dangers
which could not otherwise be arrested; whether wisely or not he
left posterity to judge. He now saw with equal clearness--as
clear as the noonday sun--the fatal consequences which must
follow if the present disease be not timely arrested. He would
repeat again what he had so often said on this floor. This was
the only question of sufficient magnitude and potency to divide
this Union; and divide it it would, or drench the country in
blood, if not arrested. He knew how much the sentiment he had
uttered would be misconstrued and misrepresented. There were
those who saw no danger to the Union in the violation of all its
fundamental principles, but who were full of apprehension when
danger was foretold or resisted, and who held not the authors of
the danger, but those who forewarned or opposed it, responsible
for consequences."
"But the cry of disunion by the weak or designing had no
terror for him. If his attachment to the Union was less, he
might tamper with the deep disease which now afflicts the body
politic, and keep silent till the patient was ready to sink
under its mortal blows. It is a cheap, and he must say but too
certain a mode of acquiring the character of devoted attachment
to the Union. But, seeing the danger as he did, he would be a
traitor to the Union and those he represented to keep silence.
The assaults daily made on the institutions of nearly one
half of the States of this Union by the other--institutions
interwoven from the beginning with their political and social
existence, and which cannot be other than that without their
inevitable destruction--will and must, if continued, _make
two people of one_ by destroying every sympathy between
the two great sections--obliterating from their hearts the
recollection of their common danger and glory--and implanting
in their place a mutual hatred, more deadly than ever existed
between two neighboring people since the commencement of the
human race. He feared not the circulation of the thousands of
incendiary and slanderous publications which were daily issued
from an organized and powerful press among those intended
to be vilified. They cannot penetrate our section; that
was not the danger; it lay in a different direction. Their
circulation in the non-slaveholding States was what was to be
dreaded. It was infusing a deadly poison into the minds of
the rising generation, implanting in them feelings of hatred,
the most deadly hatred, instead of affection and love, for
one half of this Union, to be returned, on their part, with
equal detestation. The fatal, the immutable consequences,
if not arrested, and that without delay, were such as he had
presented. The first and desirable object is to arrest it in
the non-slaveholding States; to meet the disease where it
originated and where it exists; and the first step to this is to
find some common constitutional ground on which a rally, with
that object, can be made. These resolutions present the ground,
and the only one, on which it can be made. The only remedy is
in the State rights doctrines; and if those who profess them
in slaveholding States do not rally on them as their political
creed, and organize as a party against the fanatics in order to
put them down, the South and West will be compelled to take the
remedy into their own hands. They will then stand justified in
the sight of God and man; and what in that event will follow
no mortal can anticipate. Mr. President (said Mr. C.), we are
reposing on a volcano. The Senate seems entirely ignorant of
the state of feeling in the South. The mail has just brought
us intelligence of a most important step taken by one of the
Southern States in connection with this subject, which will give
some conception of the tone of feeling which begins to prevail
in that quarter."
It was such speaking as this that induced some votes against the
resolutions. All the senators were dissatisfied at the constant
exhibition of the same remedy (disunion), for all the diseases of
the body politic; but the greater part deemed it right, if they
voted at all, to vote their real sentiments. Many were disposed to
lay the resolutions on the table, as the disturbing petitions had
been; but it was concluded that policy made it preferable to vote
upon them.
Mr. BENTON did not speak in this debate. He believed, as others
did, that discussion was injurious; that it was the way to keep
up and extend agitation, and the thing above all others which the
abolitionists desired. Discussion upon the floor of the American
Senate was to them the concession of an immense advantage--the
concession of an elevated and commanding theatre for the display
and dissemination of their doctrines. It gave them the point to
stand upon from which they could reach every part of the Union;
and it gave them the _Register of the Debates_, instead of their
local papers, for their organ of communication. Mr. Calhoun was a
fortunate customer for them.
The Senate, in laying all their petitions and the memorial of
Vermont on the table without debate, signified its desire to
yield them no such advantage. The introduction of Mr. Calhoun's
resolution frustrated that desire, and induced many to do what they
condemned. Mr. Benton took his own sense of the proper course, in
abstaining from debate, and confining the expression of his opinions
to the delivery of votes: and in that he conformed to the _sense_ of
the Senate, and the _action_ of the House of Representatives. Many
hundreds of these petitions were presented in the House, and quietly
laid upon the table (after a stormy scene, and the adoption of a
new rule), under motions to that effect; and this would have been
the case in the Senate, had it not been for the resolutions, the
introduction of which was so generally deprecated.
The part of this debate which excited no attention at the time,
but has since acquired a momentous importance, is that part in
which Mr. Calhoun declared his favorable disposition to the
Missouri compromise, and his condemnation of Mr. Randolph (its
chief opponent), for opposing it; and his change of opinion since,
not for unconstitutionality, but because he believed it to have
become dangerous in encouraging the spirit of abolitionism. This
compromise was the highest, the most solemn, the most momentous,
the most emphatic assertion of Congressional power over slavery in
a territory which had ever been made, or could be conceived. It
not only abolished slavery where it legally existed; but for ever
prohibited it where it had long existed, and that over an extent
of territory larger than the area of all the Atlantic slave States
put together: and thus yielding to the free States the absolute
predominance in the Union.
Mr. Calhoun was for that resolution in 1820,--blamed those who
opposed it; and could see no objection to it in 1838 but the
encouragement it gave to the spirit of abolitionism. Nine years
afterwards (session of 1846-'47) he submitted other resolutions
(five in number) on the same power of Congress over slavery
legislation in the territories; in which he denied the power,
and asserted that any such legislation to the prejudice of the
slaveholding emigrants from the States, in preventing them from
removing, with their slave property, to such territory, "would be
a violation of the constitution and the rights of the States from
which such citizens emigrated, and a derogation of that perfect
equality which belongs to them as members of this Union; _and would
tend directly to subvert the Union itself_."
These resolutions, so new and startling in their doctrines--so
contrary to their antecessors, and to the whole course of the
government--were denounced by the writer of this View the instant
they were read in the Senate, and, being much discountenanced by
other senators, they were never pressed to a vote in that body; but
were afterwards adopted by some of the slave State legislatures. One
year afterwards, in a debate on the Oregon territorial bill, and on
the section which proposed to declare the anti-slavery clause of
the ordinance of 1787 to be in force in that territory, Mr. Calhoun
denied the power of Congress to make any such declaration, or in any
way to legislate upon slavery in a territory. He delivered a most
elaborate and thoroughly considered speech on the subject, in the
course of which he laid down three propositions:
1. That Congress had no power to legislate upon slavery in a
territory, so as to prevent the citizens of slaveholding States
from removing into it with their slave property. 2. That Congress
had no power to delegate such authority to a territory. 3. That
the territory had no such power in itself (thus leaving the
subject of slavery in a territory without any legislative power
over it at all). He deduced these dogmas from a new insight into
the constitution, which, according to this fresh introspection,
recognized slavery as a national institution, and carried that part
of itself (by its own vigor) into all the territories; and protected
slavery there: _ergo_, neither Congress, nor its deputed territorial
legislature, nor the people of the territory during their
territorial condition, could any way touch the subject--either to
affirm, or disaffirm the institution. He endeavored to obtain from
Congress a crutch to aid these lame doctrines in limping into the
territories by getting the constitution voted into them, as part of
their organic law; and, failing in that attempt (repeatedly made),
he took position on the ground that the constitution went into these
possessions of itself, so far as slavery was concerned, it being a
national institution.
These three propositions being in flagrant conflict with the
power exercised by Congress in the establishment of the Missouri
compromise line (which had become a tradition as a Southern
measure, supported by Southern members of Congress, and sanctioned
by the cabinet of Mr. Monroe, of which Mr. Calhoun was a member),
the fact of that compromise and his concurrence in it was
immediately used against him by Senator Dix, of New York, to
invalidate his present opinions.
Unfortunately he had forgotten this cabinet consultation, and his
own concurrence in its decision--believing fully that no such thing
had occurred, and adhering firmly to the new dogma of total denial
of all constitutional power in Congress to legislate upon slavery in
a territory. This brought up recollections to sustain the tradition
which told of the consultation--to show that it took place--that its
voice was unanimous in favor of the compromise; and, consequently,
that Mr. Calhoun himself was in favor of it. Old writings were
produced:
_First_, a _fac simile_ copy of an original paper in Mr. Monroe's
handwriting, found among his manuscripts, dated March 4, 1820 (two
days before the approval of the Missouri compromise act), and
indorsed: "Interrogatories--Missouri--to the Heads of Departments
and the Attorney-General;" and containing within two questions:
"1. Has Congress a right, under the powers vested in it by the
constitution, to make a regulation prohibiting slavery in a
territory? 2. Is the 8th section of the act which passed both Houses
of Congress on the 3d instant for the admission of Missouri into
the Union, consistent with the constitution?" _Secondly_, the draft
of an original letter in Mr. Monroe's handwriting, but without
signature, date, or address, but believed to have been addressed
to General Jackson, in which he says: "The question which lately
agitated Congress and the public has been settled, as you have
seen, by the passage of an act for the admission of Missouri as a
State, unrestricted, and Arkansas, also, when it reaches maturity;
and the establishment of the parallel of 36 degrees 30 minutes as a
line north of which slavery is prohibited, and permitted south of
it. I took the opinion, in writing, of the administration as to the
constitutionality of restraining territories, which was explicit
in favor of it, and, as it was, that the 8th section of the act
was applicable to territories only, and not to States when they
should be admitted into the Union." _Thirdly_, an extract from
the diary of Mr. John Quincy Adams, under date of the 3d of March,
1820, stating that the President on that day assembled his cabinet
to ask their opinions on the two questions mentioned--which the
whole cabinet immediately answered unanimously, and affirmatively;
that on the 5th he sent the questions in writing to the members
of his cabinet, to receive their written answers, to be filed
in the department of State; and that on the 6th he took his own
answer to the President, to be filed with the rest--all agreeing
in the affirmative, and only differing some in assigning, others
not assigning reasons for his opinion. The diary states that the
President signed his approval of the Missouri act on the 6th (which
the act shows he did), and requested Mr. Adams to have all the
opinions filed in the department of State.
Upon this evidence it would have rested without question that Mr.
Monroe's cabinet had been consulted on the constitutionality of
the Missouri compromise line, and that all concurred in it, had
it not been for the denial of Mr. Calhoun in the debate on the
Oregon territorial bill. His denial brought out this evidence;
and, notwithstanding its production and conclusiveness, he adhered
tenaciously to his disbelief of the whole occurrence and especially
the whole of his own imputed share in it. Two circumstances,
specious in themselves, favored this denial: _first_, that no such
papers as those described by Mr. Adams were to be found in the
department of State; _secondly_, that in the original draft of Mr.
Monroe's letter it had first been written that the affirmative
answers of his cabinet to his two interrogatories were "_unanimous_"
which word had been crossed out and "_explicit_" substituted.
With some these two circumstances weighed nothing against the
testimony of two witnesses, and the current corroborating incidents
of tradition. In the lapse of twenty-seven years, and in the changes
to which our cabinet officers and the clerks of departments are
subjected, it was easy to believe that the papers had been mislaid
or lost--far easier than to believe that Mr. Adams could have been
mistaken in the entry made in his diary at the time. And as to the
substitution of "explicit" for "unanimous," that was known to be
necessary in order to avoid the violation of the rule which forbid
the disclosure of individual opinions in the cabinet consultations.
With others, and especially with the political friends of Mr.
Calhoun, they were received as full confirmation of his denial,
and left them at liberty to accept his present opinions as those
of his whole life, uninvalidated by previous personal discrepancy,
and uncounteracted by the weight of a cabinet decision under Mr.
Monroe: and accordingly the new-born dogma of _no power in Congress
to legislate upon the existence of slavery in the territories_
became an article of political faith, incorporated in the creed, and
that for action, of a large political party. What is now brought
to light of the proceedings in the Senate in '37-'38 shows this to
have been a mistake--that Mr. Calhoun admitted the power in 1820,
when he favored the compromise and blamed Mr. Randolph for opposing
it; that he admitted it again in 1838, when he submitted his own
resolutions, and voted for those of Mr. Clay. It so happened that
no one recollected these proceedings of '37-'38 at the time of the
Oregon debate of '47-'48. The writer of this View, though possessing
a memory credited as tenacious, did not recollect them, nor remember
them at all, until found among the materials collected for this
history--a circumstance which he attributes to his repugnance to the
whole debate, and taking no part in the proceedings except to vote.
The cabinet consultation of 1820 was not mentioned by Mr. Calhoun in
his avowal of 1838, nor is it necessary to the object of this View
to pursue his connection with that private executive counselling.
The only material inquiry is as to his approval of the Missouri
compromise at the time it was adopted; and that is fully established
by himself.
It would be a labor unworthy of history to look up the conduct
of any public man, and trace him through shifting scenes, with
a mere view to personal effect--with a mere view to personal
disparagement, by showing him contradictory and inconsistent at some
period of his course. Such a labor would be idle, unprofitable,
and derogatory; but, when a change takes place in a public man's
opinions which leads to a change of conduct, and into a new line of
action disastrous to the country, it becomes the duty of history to
note the fact, and to expose the contradiction--not for personal
disparagement--but to counteract the force of the new and dangerous
opinion.
In this sense it becomes an obligatory task to show the change, or
rather changes, in Mr. Calhoun's opinions on the constitutional
power of Congress over the existence of slavery in the national
territories; and these changes have been great--too great to admit
of followers if they had been known. _First_, fully admitting the
power, and justifying its exercise in the largest and highest
possible case. _Next_, admitting the power, but deprecating its
exercise in certain limited, specified, qualified cases. _Then_,
denying it in a limited and specified case. _Finally_, denying
the power any where, and every where, either in Congress, or in
the territorial legislature as its delegate, or in the people as
sovereign. The last of these mutations, or rather the one before
the last (for there are but few who can go the whole length of
the three propositions in the Oregon speech), has been adopted
by a large political party and acted upon; and with deplorable
effect to the country. Holding the Missouri compromise to have
been unconstitutional, they have abrogated it as a nullity; and in
so doing have done more to disturb the harmony of this Union, to
unsettle its foundations, to shake its stability, and to prepare
the two halves of the Union for parting, than any act, or all acts
put together, since the commencement of the federal government.
This lamentable act could not have been done,--could not have found
a party to do it,--if Mr. Calhoun had not changed his opinion on
the constitutionality of the Missouri compromise line; or if he
could have recollected in 1848 that he approved that line in 1820;
and further remembered, that he saw nothing unconstitutional in it
as late as 1838. The change being now shown, and the imperfection
of his memory made manifest by his own testimony, it becomes
certain that the new doctrine was an after-thought, disowned by
its antecedents--a figment of the brain lately hatched--and which
its author would have been estopped from promulgating if these
antecedents had been recollected. History now pleads them as an
estoppel against his followers.
Mr. Monroe, in his letter to General Jackson, immediately after the
establishment of the Missouri compromise, said that that compromise
settled the slavery agitation which threatened to break up the
Union. Thirty-four years of quiet and harmony under that settlement
bear witness to the truth of these words, spoken in the fulness
of patriotic gratitude at seeing his country escape from a great
danger. The year 1854 has seen the abrogation of that compromise;
and with its abrogation the revival of the agitation, and with a
force and fury never known before: and now may be seen in fact what
was hypothetically foreseen by Mr. Calhoun in 1838, when, as the
fruit of this agitation, he saw the destruction of all sympathy
between the two sections of the Union--obliteration from the memory
of all proud recollections of former common danger and glory--hatred
in the hearts of the North and the South, more deadly than ever
existed between two neighboring nations. May we not have to witness
the remainder of his prophetic vision--"TWO PEOPLE MADE OF ONE!"
P.S.--After this chapter had been written, the author received
authentic information that, during the time that John M. Clayton,
Esq. of Delaware, was Secretary of State under President Taylor
(1849-50), evidence had been found in the Department of State, of
the fact, that the opinion of Mr. Calhoun and of the rest of Mr.
Monroe's cabinet, had been filed there. In consequence a note of
inquiry was addressed to Mr. Clayton, who answered (under date of
July 19th, 1855) as follows:
"In reply to your inquiry I have to state that I have no
recollection of having ever met with Mr. Calhoun's answer to Mr.
Monroe's cabinet queries, as to the constitutionality of the
Missouri compromise. It had not been found while I was in the
department of state, as I was then informed: but the archives of
the department disclose the fact, that Mr. Calhoun, and other
members of the cabinet, did answer Mr. Monroe's questions. It
appears by an index that these answers were filed among the
archives of that department. I was told they had been abstracted
from the records, and could not be found; but I did not make a
search for them myself. I have never doubted that Mr. Calhoun
at least acquiesced in the decision of the cabinet of that day.
Since I left the Department of State I have heard it rumored
that Mr. Calhoun's answer to Mr. Monroe's queries had been
found; but I know not upon what authority the statement was
made."