CHAPTER V.

ACTUAL SUSPENSION OF THE BANKS: PROPAGATION OF THE ALARM.

None of the public meetings, and there were many following the

leading one in New York, recommended in terms a suspension of specie

payments by the banks. All avoided, by concert or instinct, the

naming of that high measure; but it was in the list, and at the head

of the list, of the measures to be adopted; and every thing said or

done was with a view to that crowning event; and to prepare the way

for it before it came; and to plead its subsequent justification by

showing its previous necessity. It was in the programme, and bound

to come in its appointed time; and did--and that within a few days

after the last great meeting in New York. It took place quietly

and generally, on the morning of the 10th of May, altogether, and

with a concert and punctuality of action, and with a military and

police preparation, which announced arrangement and determination;

such as attend revolts and insurrections in other countries. The

preceding night all the banks of the city, three excepted, met

by their officers, and adopted resolutions to close their doors

in the morning: and gave out notice to that effect. At the same

time three regiments of volunteers, and a squadron of horse, were

placed on duty in the principal parts of the city; and the entire

police force, largely reinforced with special constables, was on

foot. This was to suppress the discontent of those who might be

too much dissatisfied at being repulsed when they came to ask for

the amount of a deposit, or the contents of a bank note. It was

a humiliating spectacle, but an effectual precaution. The people

remained quiet. At twelve o'clock a large mercantile meeting took

place. Resolutions were adopted by it to sustain the suspension,

and the newspaper press was profuse and energetic in its support.

The measure was consummated: the suspension was complete: it was

triumphant in that city whose example, in such a case, was law to

the rest of the Union. But, let due discrimination be made. Though

all the banks joined in the act, all were not equally culpable; and

some, in fact, not culpable at all, but victims of the criminality,

or misfortunes of others. It was the effect of necessity with the

deposit banks, exhausted by vain efforts to meet the quarterly

deliveries of the forty millions to be deposited with the States;

and pressed on all sides because they were government banks, and

because the programme required them to stop first. It was an act of

self-defence in others which were too weak to stand alone, and which

followed with reluctance an example which they could not resist.

With others it was an act of policy, and of criminal contrivance,

as the means of carrying a real distress into the ranks of the

people, and exciting them against the political party to whose

acts the distress was attributed. But the prime mover, and master

manager of the suspension, was the Bank of the United States, then

rotten to the core and tottering to its fall, but strong enough to

carry others with it, and seeking to hide its own downfall in the

crash of a general catastrophe. Having contrived the suspension, it

wished to appear as opposing it, and as having been dragged down

by others; and accordingly took the attitude of a victim. But the

impudence and emptiness of that pretension was soon exposed by the

difficulty which other banks had in forcing her to resume; and by

the facility with which she fell back, "solitary and alone," into

the state of permanent insolvency from which the other banks had

momentarily galvanized her. But the occasion was too good to be lost

for one of those complacent epistles, models of quiet impudence and

cool mendacity, with which Mr. Biddle was accustomed to regale the

public in seasons of moneyed distress. It was impossible to forego

such an opportunity; and, accordingly, three days after the New York

suspension, and two days after his own, he held forth in a strain

of which the following is a sample:

"All the deposit banks of the government of the United States in

the city of New York suspended specie payments this week--the

deposit banks elsewhere have followed their example; which was

of course adopted by the State banks not connected with the

government. I say of course, because it is certain that when

the government banks cease to pay specie, all the other banks

must cease, and for this clear reason. The great creditor in

the United States is the government. It receives for duties the

notes of the various banks, which are placed for collection in

certain government banks, and are paid to those government banks

in specie if requested. From the moment that the deposit banks

of New York, failed to comply with their engagements, it was

manifest that all the other deposit banks must do the same, that

there must be a universal suspension throughout the country, and

that the treasury itself in the midst of its nominal abundance

must be practically bankrupt."

This was all true. The stoppage of the deposit banks was the

stoppage of the Treasury. Non-payment by the government, was an

excuse for non-payment by others. Bankruptcy was the legal condition

of non-payment; and that condition was the fate of the government as

well as of others; and all this was perfectly known before by those

who contrived, and those who resisted the deposit with the States

and the use of paper money by the federal government. These two

measures made the suspension and the bankruptcy; and all this was so

obvious to the writer of this View that he proclaimed it incessantly

in his speeches, and was amazed at the conduct of those professing

friends of the administration who voted with the opposition on

these measures, and by their votes insured the bankruptcy of the

government which they professed to support. Mr. Biddle was right.

The deposit banks were gone; the federal treasury was bankrupt; and

those two events were two steps on the road which was to lead to the

re-establishment of the Bank of the United States! and Mr. Biddle

stood ready with his bank to travel that road. The next paragraph

displayed this readiness.

"In the midst of these disorders the Bank of the United States

occupies a peculiar position, and has special duties. Had it

consulted merely its own strength it would have continued its

payments without reserve. But in such a state of things the

first consideration is how to escape from it--how to provide

at the earliest practicable moment to change a condition which

should not be tolerated beyond the necessity which commanded it.

The old associations, the extensive connections, the established

credit, the large capital of the Bank of the United States,

rendered it the natural rallying point of the country for the

resumption of specie payments. It seemed wiser, therefore, not

to waste its strength in a struggle which might be doubtful

while the Executive persevered in its present policy, but to

husband all its resources so as to profit by the first favorable

moment to take the lead in the early resumption of specie

payments. Accordingly the Bank of the United States assumes that

position. From this moment its efforts will be to keep itself

strong, and to make itself stronger; always prepared and always

anxious to assist in recalling the currency and the exchanges of

the country to the point from which they have fallen. It will

co-operate cordially and zealously with the government, with the

government banks, with all the other banks, and with any other

influences which can aid in that object."

This was a bold face for an eviscerated institution to assume--one

which was then nothing but the empty skin of an immolated

victim--the contriver of the suspension to cover its own rottenness,

and the architect of distress and ruin that out of the public

calamity it might get again into existence and replenish its

coffers out of the revenues and credit of the federal government.

"Would have continued specie payments, if it had only consulted

its own strength"--"only suspended from a sense of duty and

patriotism"--"will take the lead in resuming"--"assumes the position

of restorer of the currency"--"presents itself as the rallying

point of the country in the resumption of specie payments"--"even

promises to co-operate with the government:" such were the impudent

professions at the very moment that this restorer of currency, and

rallying point of resumption, was plotting a continuance of the

distress and suspension until it could get hold of the federal

moneys to recover upon; and without which it never could recover.

Indissolubly connected with this bank suspension, and throwing

a broad light upon its history, (if further light were wanted,)

was Mr. Webster's tour to the West, and the speeches which he

made in the course of it. The tour extended to the Valley of the

Mississippi, and the speeches took for their burden the distress and

the suspension, excusing and justifying the banks, throwing all

blame upon the government, and looking to the Bank of the United

States for the sole remedy. It was at Wheeling that he opened the

series of speeches which he delivered in his tour, it being at that

place that he was overtaken by the news of the suspension, and which

furnished him with the text for his discourse.

"Recent evils have not at all surprised me, except that they

have come sooner and faster than I had anticipated. But, though

not surprised, I am afflicted; I feel any thing but pleasure

in this early fulfilment of my own predictions. Much injury is

done which the wisest future counsels can never repair, and

much more that can never be remedied but by such counsels and

by the lapse of time. From 1832 to the present moment I have

foreseen this result. I may safely say I have foreseen it,

because I have presented and proclaimed its approach in every

important discussion and debate, in the public body of which I

am a member. We learn to-day that most of the eastern banks have

stopped payment; deposit banks as well as others. The experiment

has exploded. That bubble, which so many of us have all along

regarded as the offspring of conceit, presumption and political

quackery, has burst. A general suspension of payment must be the

result; a result which has come, even sooner than was predicted.

Where is now that better currency that was promised? Where is

that specie circulation? Where are those rupees of gold and

silver, which were to fill the treasury of the government as

well as the pockets of the people? Has the government a single

hard dollar? Has the treasury any thing in the world but credit

and deposits in banks that have already suspended payment? How

are public creditors now to be paid in specie? How are the

deposits, which the law requires to be made with the states on

the 1st of July, now to be made."

This was the first speech that Mr. Webster delivered after the

great one before the suspension in New York, and may be considered

the epilogue after the performance as the former was the prologue

before it. It is a speech of exultation, with bitter taunts to

the government. In one respect his information was different from

mine. He said the suspension came sooner than was expected: my

information was that it came later, a month later; and that he

himself was the cause of the delay. My information was that it was

to take place in the first month of Mr. Van Buren's administration,

and that the speech which was to precede it was to be delivered

early in March, immediately after the adjournment of Congress:

but it was not delivered till the middle of that month, nor got

ready for _pamphlet_ publication until the middle of April; which

delay occasioned a corresponding postponement in all the subsequent

proceedings. The complete shutting up of the treasury--the loss

of its moneys--the substitution of broken bank paper for hard

money--the impossibility of paying a dollar to a creditor: these

were the points of his complacent declamation: and having made

these points strong enough and clear enough, he came to the remedy,

and fell upon the same one, in almost the same words, that Mr.

Biddle was using at the same time, four hundred miles distant, in

Philadelphia: and that without the aid of the electric telegraph,

not then in use. The recourse to the Bank of the United States was

that remedy! that bank strong enough to hold out, (unhappily the

news of its suspending arrived while he was speaking:) patriotic

enough to do so! but under no obligation to do better than the

deposit banks! and justifiable in following their example. Hear him:

"The United States Bank, now a mere state institution, with no

public deposits, no aid from government, but, on the contrary,

long an object of bitter persecution by it, was at our latest

advices still firm. But can we expect of that Bank to make

sacrifices to continue specie payment? If it continue to do so,

now the deposit banks have stopped, the government will draw

from it its last dollar, if it can do so, in order to keep up a

pretence of making its own payments in specie. I shall be glad

if this institution find it prudent and proper to hold out; but

as it owes no more duty to the government than any other bank,

and, of course, much less than the deposit banks, I cannot see

any ground for demanding from it efforts and sacrifices to favor

the government, which those holding the public money, and owing

duty to the government, are unwilling or unable to make; nor do

I see how the New England banks can stand alone in the general

crush."

The suspension was now complete; and it was evident, and as good

as admitted by those who had made it, that it was the effect of

contrivance on the part of politicians, and the so-called Bank of

the United States, for the purpose of restoring themselves to power.

The whole process was now clear to the vision of those who could see

nothing while it was going on. Even those of the democratic party

whose votes had helped to do the mischief, could now see that the

attempt to deposit forty millions with the States was destruction

to the deposit banks;--that the repeal of the specie circular was

to fill the treasury with paper money, to be found useless when

wanted;--that distress was purposely created in order to throw the

blame of it upon the party in power;--that the promptitude with

which the Bank of the United States had been brought forward as a

remedy for the distress, showed that it had been held in reserve for

that purpose;--and the delight with which the whig party saluted the

general calamity, showed that they considered it their own passport

to power. All this became visible, after the mischief was over, to

those who could see nothing of it before it was done.

Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2) or, A History of the Working of the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850 · 第 5 / 202 章