THE LORD HIGH COMMISSIONER
The rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada profoundly affected public
opinion in the mother country. That the first year of the reign of the
young Queen Victoria should have been marred by an armed revolt in an
important British colony shocked the sensibilities of Englishmen and
forced the country and the government to realize that the grievances of
the Canadian Reformers were more serious than they had imagined. It
was clear that the old system of alternating concession and repression
had broken down and that the situation demanded radical action. The
Melbourne government suspended the constitution of Lower Canada for
three years, and appointed the Earl of Durham as Lord High
Commissioner, with very full powers, to go out to Canada to investigate
the grievances and to report on a remedy.
John George Lambton, the first Earl of {105} Durham, was a wealthy and
powerful Whig nobleman, of decided Liberal, if not Radical, leanings.
He had taken no small part in the framing of the Reform Bill of 1832,
and at one time he had been hailed by the English Radicals or Chartists
as their coming leader. It was therefore expected that he would be
decently sympathetic with the Reform movements in the Canadas. At the
same time, Melbourne and his ministers were only too glad to ship him
out of the country. There was no question of his great ability and
statesmanlike outlook. But his advanced Radical views were distasteful
to many of his former colleagues; and his arrogant manners, his lack of
tact, and his love of pomp and circumstance made him unpopular even in
his own party. The truth is that he was an excellent leader to work
under, but a bad colleague to work with. The Melbourne government had
first got rid of him by sending him to St Petersburg as ambassador
extraordinary; and then, on his return from St Petersburg, they got him
out of the way by sending him to Canada. He was at first loath to go,
mainly on the ground of ill health; but at the personal intercession of
the young queen he accepted the commission offered him. It was {106}
an evil day for himself, but a good day for Canada, when he did so.
Durham arrived in Quebec, with an almost regal retinue, on May 28,
1838. Gosford, who had remained in Canada throughout the rebellion,
had gone home at the end of February; and the administration had been
taken over by Sir John Colborne, the commander-in-chief of the forces.
As soon as the news of the suspension of the constitution reached Lower
Canada, Sir John Colborne appointed a provisional special council of
twenty-two members, half of them French and half of them English, to
administer the affairs of the province until Lord Durham should arrive.
The first official act of Lord Durham in the colony swept this council
out of existence. 'His Excellency believes,' the members of the
council were told, 'that it is as much the interest of you all, as for
the advantage of his own mission, that his administrative conduct
should be free from all suspicions of political influence or party
feeling; that it should rest on his own undivided responsibility, and
that when he quits the Province, he should leave none of its permanent
residents in any way committed by the acts which his Government may
have {107} found it necessary to perform, during the temporary
suspension of the Constitution.' In its place he appointed a small
council of five members, all but one from his own staff. The one
Canadian called to this council was Dominick Daly, the provincial
secretary, whom Colborne recommended as being unidentified with any
political party.
The first great problem with which Lord Durham and his council had to
deal was the question of the political prisoners, numbers of whom were
still lying in the prisons of Montreal. Sir John Colborne had not
attempted to decide what should be done with them, preferring to shift
this responsibility upon Lord Durham. It would probably have been much
better to have settled the matter before Lord Durham set foot in the
colony, so that his mission might not have been handicapped at the
outset with so thorny a problem; but it is easy to follow Colborne's
reasoning. In the first place, he did not bring the prisoners to trial
because no Lower-Canadian jury at that time could have been induced to
convict them, a reasonable inference from the fact that the murder of
Weir had gone unavenged, even as the murderers of Chartrand were to be
acquitted {108} by a jury a few months later. In the second place,
Colborne had not the power to deal with the prisoners summarily.
Moreover, most of the rebel leaders had not been captured. The only
three prisoners of much importance were Wolfred Nelson, Robert
Bouchette, and Bonaventure Viger. The rest of the _Patriote_ leaders
were scattered far and wide. Chenier and Girod lay beneath the
springing sod; Papineau, O'Callaghan, Storrow Brown, Robert Nelson,
Cote, and Rodier were across the American border; Morin had just come
out of his hiding-place in the Canadian backwoods; and LaFontaine,
after vainly endeavouring, on the outbreak of rebellion, to get Gosford
to call together the legislature of Lower Canada, had gone abroad. The
future course of the rebels who had fled to the United States was still
doubtful; there was a strong probability that they might create further
disturbances. And, while the situation was still unsettled, Colborne
thought it better to leave the fate of the prisoners to be decided by
Durham.
Durham's instructions were to temper justice with mercy. His own
instincts were apparently in favour of a complete amnesty; but he
supposed it necessary to make an {109} example of some of the leaders.
After earnest deliberation and consultation with his council, and
especially with his chief secretary, Charles Buller, the friend and
pupil of Thomas Carlyle, Durham determined to grant to the rebels a
general amnesty, with only twenty-four exceptions. Eight of the men
excepted were political prisoners who had been prominent in the revolt
and who had confessed their guilt and had thrown themselves on the
mercy of the Lord High Commissioner; the remaining sixteen were rebel
leaders who had fled from the country. Durham gave orders that the
eight prisoners should be transported to the Bermudas during the
queen's pleasure. The sixteen refugees were forbidden to return to
Canada under penalty of death without benefit of clergy.
No one can fail to see that this course was dictated by the humanest
considerations. A criminal rebellion had terminated without the
shedding judicially of a drop of blood. Lord Durham even took care
that the eight prisoners should not be sent to a convict colony. The
only criticism directed against his course in Canada was on the ground
of its excessive lenity. Wolfred Nelson and Robert Bouchette had
certainly suffered a milder fate {110} than that of Samuel Lount and
Peter Matthews, who had been hanged in Upper Canada for rebellion. Yet
when the news of Durham's action reached England, it was immediately
attacked as arbitrary and unconstitutional. The assault was opened by
Lord Brougham, a bitter personal enemy of Lord Durham. In the House of
Lords Brougham contended that Durham had had no right to pass sentence
on the rebel prisoners and refugees when they had not been brought to
trial; and that he had no right to order them to be transported to, and
held in, Bermuda, where his authority did not run. In this attitude he
was supported by the Duke of Wellington, the leader of the Tory party.
Wellington's name is one which is usually remembered with honour in the
history of the British Empire; but on this occasion he did not think it
beneath him to play fast and loose with the interests of Canada for the
sake of a paltry party advantage. It would have been easy for him to
recognize the humanity of Durham's policy, and to join with the
government in legislating away any technical illegalities that may have
existed in Durham's ordinance; but Wellington could not resist the
temptation to embarrass the Whig {111} administration, regardless of
the injury which he might be doing to the sorely tried people of Canada.
The Melbourne administration, which had sent Durham to Canada, might
have been expected to stand behind him when he was attacked. Lord John
Russell, indeed, rose in the House of Commons and made a thoroughgoing
defence of Durham's policy as 'wise and statesmanlike.' But he alone
of the ministers gave Durham loyal support. In the House of Lords
Melbourne contented himself with a feeble defence of Durham and then
capitulated to the Opposition. Nothing would have been easier for him
than to introduce a bill making valid whatever may have been irregular
in Durham's ordinance; but instead of that he disallowed the ordinance,
and passed an Act of Indemnity for all those who had had a part in
carrying it out. Without waiting to hear Durham's defence, or to
consult with him as to the course which should be followed, the Cabinet
weakly surrendered to an attack of his personal enemies. Durham was
betrayed in the house of his friends.
The news of the disallowance of the ordinance first reached Durham
through the columns of an American newspaper. {112} Immediately his
mind was made up. Without waiting for any official notification, he
sent in his resignation to the colonial secretary. He was quite
satisfied himself that he had not exceeded his powers. 'Until I
learn,' he wrote, 'from some one better versed in the English language
that despotism means anything but such an aggregation of the supreme
executive and legislative authority in a single head, as was
deliberately made by Parliament in the Act which constituted my powers,
I shall not blush to hear that I have exercised a despotism; I shall
feel anxious only to know how well and wisely I have used, or rather
exhibited an intention of using, my great powers.' But he felt that if
he could expect no firm support from the Melbourne government, his
usefulness was gone, and resignation was the only course open to him.
He wrote, however, that he intended to remain in Canada until he had
completed the inquiries he had instituted. In view of the 'lamentable
want of information' with regard to Canada which existed in the
Imperial parliament, he confessed that he 'would take shame to himself
if he left his inquiry incomplete.'
A few days before Durham left Canada he took the unusual and, under
ordinary {113} circumstances, unconstitutional course of issuing a
proclamation, in which he explained the reasons for his resignation,
and in effect appealed from the action of the home government to
Canadian public opinion. It was this proclamation which drew down on
him from _The Times_ the nickname of 'Lord High Seditioner.' The
wisdom of the proclamation was afterwards, however, vigorously defended
by Charles Duller. The general unpopularity of the British government,
Duller explained, was such in Canada that a little more or less could
not affect it; whereas it was a matter of vital importance that the
angry and suspicious colonists should find one British statesman with
whom they could agree. The real justification of the proclamation lay
in the magical effect which it had upon the public temper. The news
that the ordinance had been disallowed, and that the whole question of
the political prisoners had been once more thrown into the melting-pot,
had greatly excited the public mind; and the proclamation fell like oil
upon the troubled waters. 'No disorder, no increase of disaffection
ensued; on the contrary, all parties in the Province expressed a
revival of confidence.'
Lord Durham left Quebec on November 1, {114} 1838. 'It was a sad day
and a sad departure,' wrote Buller. 'The streets were crowded. The
spectators filled every window and every house-top, and, though every
hat was raised as we passed, a deep silence marked the general grief
for Lord Durham's departure.' Durham had been in Canada only five
short months. Yet in that time he had gained a knowledge of, and an
insight into, the Canadian situation such as no other governor of
Canada had possessed. The permanent monument of that insight is, of
course, his famous _Report on the Affairs of British North America_,
issued by the Colonial Office in 1839. This is no place to write at
length about that greatest of all documents ever published with regard
to colonial affairs. This much, however, may be said. In the _Report_
Lord Durham rightly diagnosed the evils of the body politic in Canada.
He traced the rebellion to two causes, in the main: first, racial
feeling; and, secondly, that 'union of representative and irresponsible
government' of which he said that it was difficult to understand how
any English statesman ever imagined that such a system would work. And
yet one of the two chief remedies which he recommended seemed like a
death sentence passed on the French in Canada. {115} This was the
proposal for the legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada with the
avowed object of anglicizing by absorption the French population. This
suggestion certainly did not promote racial peace. The other proposal,
that of granting to the Canadian people responsible government in all
matters not infringing 'strictly imperial interests,' blazed the trail
leading out of the swamps of pre-rebellion politics.
In one respect only is Lord Durham's _Report_ seriously faulty: it is
not fair to French Canadians. 'They cling,' wrote Durham, 'to ancient
prejudices, ancient customs, and ancient laws, not from any strong
sense of their beneficial effects, but with the unreasoning tenacity of
an uneducated and unprogressive people.' To their racial and
nationalist ambitions he was far from favourable. 'The error,' he
contended, 'to which the present contest is to be attributed is the
vain endeavour to preserve a French-Canadian nationality in the midst
of Anglo-American colonies and states'; and he quoted with seeming
approval the statement of one of the Lower Canada 'Bureaucrats' that
'Lower Canada must be _English_, at the expense, if necessary, of not
being _British_.' His primary {116} object in recommending the union
of the two Canadas, to place the French in a minority in the united
province, was surely a mistaken policy. Fortunately, it did not become
operative. Lord Elgin, a far wiser statesman, who completed Durham's
work by introducing the substance of responsible government which the
_Report_ recommended, decidedly opposed anything in the nature of a
gradual crusade against French-Canadian nationalism. 'I for one,' he
wrote, 'am deeply convinced of the impolicy of all such attempts to
denationalize the French. Generally speaking, they produce the
opposite effect, causing the flame of national prejudice and animosity
to burn more fiercely. But suppose them to be successful, what would
be the result? You may perhaps _Americanize_, but, depend upon it, by
methods of this description you will never _Anglicize_ the French
inhabitants of the province. Let them feel, on the other hand, that
their religion, their habits, their prepossessions, their prejudices if
you will, are more considered and respected here than in other portions
of this vast continent, and who will venture to say that the last hand
which waves the British flag on American ground may not be that of a
French Canadian?'
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