had code to show. It also had the burdens of any
software-based enterprise. As more and more Unix
developers began playing with the software, money,
gifts, and requests for tapes began to pour in. To
address the business side of the GNU Project, Stallman
drafted a few of his colleagues and formed the Free
Software Foundation (FSF), a nonprofit organization
dedicated to speeding the GNU Project towards its goal.
With Stallman as president and various hacker allies as
board members, the FSF helped provide a corporate face
for the GNU Project.
Robert Chassell, a programmer then working at Lisp
Machines, Inc., became one of five charter board
members at the Free Software Foundation following a
dinner conversation with Stallman. Chassell also served
as the organization's treasurer, a role that started
small but quickly grew.
"I think in '85 our total expenses and revenue were
something in the order of $23,000, give or take,"
Chassell recalls. "Richard had his office, and we
borrowed space. I put all the stuff, especially the
tapes, under my desk. It wasn't until sometime later
LMI loaned us some space where we could store tapes and
things of that sort."
In addition to providing a face, the Free Software
Foundation provided a center of gravity for other
disenchanted programmers. The Unix market that had
seemed so collegial even at the time of Stallman's
initial GNU announcement was becoming increasingly
competitive. In an attempt to tighten their hold on
customers, companies were starting to close off access
to Unix source code, a trend that only speeded the
number of inquiries into ongoing GNU software projects.
The Unix wizards who once regarded Stallman as a noisy
kook were now beginning to see him as a software Cassandra.
"A lot of people don't realize, until they've had it
happen to them, how frustrating it can be to spend a
few years working on a software program only to have it
taken away," says Chassell, summarizing the feelings
and opinions of the correspondents writing in to the
FSF during the early years. "After that happens a
couple of times, you start to say to yourself, `Hey,
wait a minute.'"
For Chassell, the decision to participate in the Free
Software Foundation came down to his own personal
feelings of loss. Prior to LMI, Chassell had been
working for hire, writing an introductory book on Unix
for Cadmus, Inc., a Cambridge-area software company.
When Cadmus folded, taking the rights to the book down
with it, Chassell says he attempted to buy the rights
back with no success.
"As far as I know, that book is still sitting on shelf
somewhere, unusable, uncopyable, just taken out of the
system," Chassell says. "It was quite a good
introduction if I may say so myself. It would have
taken maybe three or four months to convert [the book]
into a perfectly usable introduction to GNU/Linux
today. The whole experience, aside from what I have in
my memory, was lost."
Forced to watch his work sink into the mire while his
erstwhile employer struggled through bankruptcy,
Chassell says he felt a hint of the anger that drove
Stallman to fits of apoplexy. "The main clarity, for
me, was the sense that if you want to have a decent
life, you don't want to have bits of it closed off,"
Chassell says. "This whole idea of having the freedom
to go in and to fix something and modify it, whatever
it may be, it really makes a difference. It makes one
think happily that after you've lived a few years that
what you've done is worthwhile. Because otherwise it
just gets taken away and thrown out or abandoned or, at
the very least, you no longer have any relation to it.
It's like losing a bit of your life."
St. Ignucius
The Maui High Performance Computing Center is located
in a single-story building in the dusty red hills just
above the town of Kihei. Framed by million-dollar views
and the multimillion dollar real estate of the
Silversword Golf Course, the center seems like the
ultimate scientific boondoggle. Far from the boxy,
sterile confines of Tech Square or even the sprawling
research metropolises of Argonne, Illinois and Los
Alamos, New Mexico, the MHPCC seems like the kind of
place where scientists spend more time on their tans
than their post-doctoral research projects.
The image is only half true. Although researchers at
the MHPCC do take advantage of the local recreational
opportunities, they also take their work seriously.
According to Top500.org, a web site that tracks the
most powerful supercomputers in the world, the IBM SP
Power3 supercomputer housed within the MHPCC clocks in
at 837 billion floating-point operations per second,
making it one of 25 most powerful computers in the
world. Co-owned and operated by the University of
Hawaii and the U.S. Air Force, the machine divides its
computer cycles between the number crunching tasks
associated with military logistics and high-temperature
physics research.
Simply put, the MHPCC is a unique place, a place where
the brainy culture of science and engineering and the
laid-back culture of the Hawaiian islands coexist in
peaceful equilibrium. A slogan on the lab's 2000 web
site sums it up: "Computing in paradise."
It's not exactly the kind of place you'd expect to find
Richard Stallman, a man who, when taking in the
beautiful view of the nearby Maui Channel through the
picture windows of a staffer's office, mutters a terse
critique: "Too much sun." Still, as an emissary from
one computing paradise to another, Stallman has a
message to deliver, even if it means subjecting his
pale hacker skin to the hazards of tropical exposure.
The conference room is already full by the time I
arrive to catch Stallman's speech. The gender breakdown
is a little better than at the New York speech, 85%
male, 15% female, but not by much. About half of the
audience members wear khaki pants and logo-encrusted
golf shirts. The other half seems to have gone native.
Dressed in the gaudy flower-print shirts so popular in
this corner of the world, their faces are a deep shade
of ochre. The only residual indication of geek status
are the gadgets: Nokia cell phones, Palm Pilots, and
Sony VAIO laptops.
Needless to say, Stallman, who stands in front of the
room dressed in plain blue T-shirt, brown polyester
slacks, and white socks, sticks out like a sore thumb.
The fluorescent lights of the conference room help
bring out the unhealthy color of his sun-starved skin.
His beard and hair are enough to trigger beads of sweat
on even the coolest Hawaiian neck. Short of having the
words "mainlander" tattooed on his forehead, Stallman
couldn't look more alien if he tried.
As Stallman putters around the front of the room, a few
audience members wearing T-shirts with the logo of the
Maui FreeBSD Users Group (MFUG) race to set up camera
and audio equipment. FreeBSD, a free software offshoot
of the Berkeley Software Distribution, the venerable
1970s academic version of Unix, is technically a
competitor to the GNU/Linux operating system. Still, in
the hacking world, Stallman speeches are documented
with a fervor reminiscent of the Grateful Dead and its
legendary army of amateur archivists. As the local free
software heads, it's up to the MFUG members to make
sure fellow programmers in Hamburg, Mumbai, and
Novosibirsk don't miss out on the latest pearls of RMS wisdom.
The analogy to the Grateful Dead is apt. Often, when
describing the business opportunities inherent within
the free software model, Stallman has held up the
Grateful Dead as an example. In refusing to restrict
fans' ability to record live concerts, the Grateful
Dead became more than a rock group. They became the
center of a tribal community dedicated to Grateful Dead
music. Over time, that tribal community became so large
and so devoted that the band shunned record contracts
and supported itself solely through musical tours and
live appearances. In 1994, the band's last year as a
touring act, the Grateful Dead drew $52 million in gate
receipts alone.See "Grateful Dead Time Capsule: 1985-1995 North
American Tour Grosses." http://www.accessplace.com/gdtc/1197.htm
While few software companies have been able to match
that success, the tribal aspect of the free software
community is one reason many in the latter half of the
1990s started to accept the notion that publishing
software source code might be a good thing. Hoping to
build their own loyal followings, companies such as
IBM, Sun Microsystems, and Hewlett Packard have come to
accept the letter, if not the spirit, of the Stallman
free software message. Describing the GPL as the
information-technology industry's "Magna Carta," ZDNet
software columnist Evan Leibovitch sees the growing
affection for all things GNU as more than just a trend.
"This societal shift is letting users take back control
of their futures," Leibovitch writes. "Just as the
Magna Carta gave rights to British subjects, the GPL
enforces consumer rights and freedoms on behalf of the
users of computer software."See Evan Leibovitch, "Who's Afraid of Big Bad
Wolves,"
ZDNet Tech Update (December 15, 2000).
http://techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/main/0Y/A
The tribal aspect of the free software community also
helps explain why 40-odd programmers, who might
otherwise be working on physics projects or surfing the
Web for windsurfing buoy reports, have packed into a
conference room to hear Stallman speak.
Unlike the New York speech, Stallman gets no
introduction. He also offers no self-introduction. When
the FreeBSD people finally get their equipment up and
running, Stallman simply steps forward, starts
speaking, and steamrolls over every other voice in the room.
"Most of the time when people consider the question of
what rules society should have for using software, the
people considering it are from software companies, and
they consider the question from a self-serving
perspective," says Stallman, opening his speech. "What
rules can we impose on everybody else so they have to
pay us lots of money? I had the good fortune in the
1970s to be part of a community of programmers who
shared software. And because of this I always like to
look at the same issue from a different direction to
ask: what kind of rules make possible a good society
that is good for the people who are in it? And
therefore I reach completely different answers."
Once again, Stallman quickly segues into the parable of
the Xerox laser printer, taking a moment to deliver the
same dramatic finger-pointing gestures to the crowd. He
also devotes a minute or two to the GNU/Linux name.
"Some people say to me, `Why make such a fuss about
getting credit for this system? After all, the
important thing is the job is done, not whether you get
recognition for it.' Well, this would be wise advice if
it were true. But the job wasn't to build an operating
system; the job is to spread freedom to the users of
computers. And to do that we have to make it possible
to do everything with computers in freedom."For narrative purposes, I have
hesitated to go in-depth
when describing Stallman's full definition of software
"freedom." The GNU Project web site lists four
fundamental components: The freedom to run a program,
for any purpose (freedom 0). The freedom to study how a
program works, and adapt it to your needs (freedom 1).
The freedom to redistribute copies of a program so you
can help your neighbor (freedom 2). The freedom to
improve the program, and release your improvements to
the public, so that the whole community benefits
(freedom 3). For more information, please visit "The
Free Software Definition" at
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html.
Adds Stallman, "There's a lot more work to do."
For some in the audience, this is old material. For
others, it's a little arcane. When a member of the
golf-shirt contingent starts dozing off, Stallman stops
the speech and asks somebody to wake the person up.
"Somebody once said my voice was so soothing, he asked
if I was some kind of healer," says Stallman, drawing a
quick laugh from the crowd. "I guess that probably
means I can help you drift gently into a blissful,
relaxing sleep. And some of you might need that. I
guess I shouldn't object if you do. If you need to
sleep, by all means do."
The speech ends with a brief discussion of software
patents, a growing issue of concern both within the
software industry and within the free software
community. Like Napster, software patents reflect the
awkward nature of applying laws and concepts written
for the physical world to the frictionless universe of
information technology. The difference between
protecting a program under copyright and protecting a
program under software patents is subtle but
significant. In the case of copyright, a software
creator can restrict duplication of the source code but
not duplication of the idea or functionality that the
source code addresses. In other words, if a developer
chooses not to use a software program under the
original developer's terms, that second developer is
still free to reverse-engineer the program-i.e.,
duplicate the software program's functionality by
rewriting the source code from scratch. Such
duplication of ideas is common within the commercial
software industry, where companies often isolate
reverse-engineering teams to head off accusations of
corporate espionage or developer hanky-panky. In the
jargon of modern software development, companies refer
to this technique as "clean room" engineering.
Software patents work differently. According to the
U.S. Patent Office, companies and individuals may
secure patents for innovative algorithms provided they
submit their claims to a public review. In theory, this
allows the patent-holder to trade off disclosure of
their invention for a limited monopoly of a minimum of
20 years after the patent filing. In practice, the
disclosure is of limited value, since the operation of
the program is often self-evident. Unlike copyright, a
patent gives its holder the ability to head off the
independent development of software programs with the
same or similar functionality.
In the software industry, where 20 years can cover the
entire life cycle of a marketplace, patents take on a
strategic weight. Where companies such as Microsoft and
Apple once battled over copyright and the "look and
feel" of various technologies, today's Internet
companies use patents as a way to stake out individual
applications and business models, the most notorious
example being Amazon.com's 2000 attempt to patent the
company's "one-click" online shopping process. For most
companies, however, software patents have become a
defensive tool, with cross-licensing deals balancing
one set of corporate patents against another in a tense
form of corporate detente. Still, in a few notable
cases of computer encryption and graphic imaging
algorithms, software vendors have successfully stifled
rival technologies.
For Stallman, the software-patent issue dramatizes the
need for eternal hacker vigilance. It also underlines
the importance of stressing the political benefits of
free software programs over the competitive benefits.
Pointing to software patents' ability to create
sheltered regions in the marketplace, Stallman says
competitive performance and price, two areas where free
software operating systems such as GNU/Linux and
FreeBSD already hold a distinct advantage over their
proprietary counterparts, are red herrings compared to
the large issues of user and developer freedom.
"It's not because we don't have the talent to make
better software," says Stallman. "It's because we don't
have the right. Somebody has prohibited us from serving
the public. So what's going to happen when users
encounter these gaps in free software? Well, if they
have been persuaded by the open source movement that
these freedoms are good because they lead to
more-powerful reliable software, they're likely to say,
`You didn't deliver what you promised. This software's
not more powerful. It's missing this feature. You lied
to me.' But if they have come to agree with the free
software movement, that the freedom is important in
itself, then they will say, `How dare those people stop
me from having this feature and my freedom too.' And
with that kind of response, we may survive the hits
that we're going to take as these patents explode."
Such comments involve a hefty dose of spin, of course.
Most open source advocates are equally, if not more,
vociferous as Stallman when it comes to opposing
software patents. Still, the underlying logic of
Stallman's argument-that open source advocates
emphasize the utilitarian advantages of free software
over the political advantages-remains uncontested.
Rather than stress the political significance of free
software programs, open source advocates have chosen to
stress the engineering integrity of the hacker
development model. Citing the power of peer review, the
open source argument paints programs such as GNU/Linux
or FreeBSD as better built, better inspected and, by
extension, more trushworthy to the average user.
That's not to say the term "open source" doesn't have
its political implications. For open source advocates,
the term open source serves two purposes. First, it
eliminates the confusion associated with the word
"free," a word many businesses interpret as meaning
"zero cost." Second, it allows companies to examine the
free software phenomenon on a technological, rather
than ethical, basis. Eric Raymond, cofounder of the
Open Source Initiative and one of the leading hackers
to endorse the term, effectively summed up the
frustration of following Stallman down the political
path in a 1999 essay, titled " Shut Up and Show Them
the Code": RMS's rhetoric is very seductive to the kind
of people we are. We hackers are thinkers and idealists
who readily resonate with appeals to "principle" and
"freedom" and "rights." Even when we disagree with bits
of his program, we want RMS's rhetorical style to work;
we think it ought to work; we tend to be puzzled and
disbelieving when it fails on the 95% of people who
aren't wired like we are.4 Included among that 95%,
Raymond writes, are the bulk of business managers,
investors, and nonhacker computer users who, through
sheer weight of numbers, tend to decide the overall
direction of the commercial software marketplace.
Without a way to win these people over, Raymond argues,
programmers are doomed to pursue their ideology on the
periphery of society: When RMS insists that we talk
about "computer users' rights," he's issuing a
dangerously attractive invitation to us to repeat old
failures. It's one we should reject-not because his
principles are wrong, but because that kind of
language, applied to software, simply does not persuade
anybody but us. In fact, it confuses and repels most
people outside our culture.4 Watching Stallman deliver
his political message in person, it is hard to see
anything confusing or repellent. Stallman's appearance
may seem off-putting, but his message is logical. When
an audience member asks if, in shunning proprietary
software, free software proponents lose the ability to
keep up with the latest technological advancements,
Stallman answers the question in terms of his own
personal beliefs. "I think that freedom is more
important than mere technical advance," he says. "I
would always choose a less advanced free program rather
than a more advanced nonfree program, because I won't
give up my freedom for something like that. My rule is,
if I can't share it with you, I won't take it."
Such answers, however, reinforce the quasi-religious
nature of the Stallman message. Like a Jew keeping
kosher or a Mormon refusing to drink alcohol, Stallman
paints his decision to use free software in the place
of proprietary in the color of tradition and personal
belief. As software evangelists go, Stallman avoids
forcing those beliefs down listeners' throats. Then
again, a listener rarely leaves a Stallman speech not
knowing where the true path to software righteousness lies.
As if to drive home this message, Stallman punctuates
his speech with an unusual ritual. Pulling a black robe
out of a plastic grocery bag, Stallman puts it on. Out
of a second bag, he pulls a reflective yellow computer
disk and places it on his head. The crowd lets out a
startled laugh.
"I am St. Ignucius of the Church of Emacs," says
Stallman, raising his right hand in mock-blessing. "I
bless your computer, my child."
<Graphic file:books/free_0801.png>
Stallman dressed as St. Ignucius. Photo by Wouter van
Oortmerssen.
The laughter turns into full-blown applause after a few
seconds. As audience members clap, the computer disk on
Stallman's head catches the glare of an overhead light,
eliciting a perfect halo effect. In the blink of an
eye, Stallman goes from awkward haole to Russian
religious icon.
" Emacs was initially a text editor," says Stallman,
explaining the getup. "Eventually it became a way of
life for many and a religion for some. We call this
religion the Church of Emacs."
The skit is a lighthearted moment of self-pardoy, a
humorous return-jab at the many people who might see
Stallman's form of software asceticism as religious
fanaticism in disguise. It is also the sound of the
other shoe dropping-loudly. It's as if, in donning his
robe and halo, Stallman is finally letting listeners of
the hook, saying, "It's OK to laugh. I know I'm weird."
Discussing the St. Ignucius persona afterward, Stallman
says he first came up with it in 1996, long after the
creation of Emacs but well before the emergence of the
"open source" term and the struggle for
hacker-community leadership that precipitated it. At
the time, Stallman says, he wanted a way to "poke fun
at himself," to remind listeners that, though stubborn,
Stallman was not the fanatic some made him out to be.
It was only later, Stallman adds, that others seized
the persona as a convenient way to play up his
reputation as software ideologue, as Eric Raymond did
in an 1999 interview with the linux.com web site: When
I say RMS calibrates what he does, I'm not belittling
or accusing him of insincerity. I'm saying that like
all good communicators he's got a theatrical streak.
Sometimes it's conscious-have you ever seen him in his
St. Ignucius drag, blessing software with a disk
platter on his head? Mostly it's unconscious; he's just
learned the degree of irritating stimulus that works,
that holds attention without (usually) freaking people out.See "Guest
Interview: Eric S. Raymond," Linux.com (May
18, 1999). http://www.linux.com/interviews/19990518/8/
Stallman takes issue with the Raymond analysis. "It's
simply my way of making fun of myself," he says. "The
fact that others see it as anything more than that is a
reflection of their agenda, not mine."
That said, Stallman does admit to being a ham. "Are you
kidding?" he says at one point. "I love being the
center of attention." To facilitate that process,
Stallman says he once enrolled in Toastmasters, an
organization that helps members bolster their
public-speaking skills and one Stallman recommends
highly to others. He possesses a stage presence that
would be the envy of most theatrical performers and
feels a link to vaudevillians of years past. A few days
after the Maui High Performance Computing Center
speech, I allude to the 1999 LinuxWorld performace and
ask Stallman if he has a Groucho Marx complex-i.e., the
unwillingness to belong to any club that would have him
as a member. Stallman's response is immediate: "No, but
I admire Groucho Marx in a lot of ways and certainly
have been in some things I say inspired by him. But
then I've also been inspired in some ways by Harpo."
The Groucho Marx influence is certainly evident in
Stallman's lifelong fondness for punning. Then again,
punning and wordplay are common hacker traits. Perhaps
the most Groucho-like aspect of Stallman's personality,
however, is the deadpan manner in which the puns are
delivered. Most come so stealthily-without even the
hint of a raised eyebrow or upturned smile-you almost
have to wonder if Stallman's laughing at his audience
more than the audience is laughing at him.
Watching members of the Maui High Performance Computer
Center laugh at the St. Ignucius parody, such concerns
evaporate. While not exactly a standup act, Stallman
certainly possesses the chops to keep a roomful of
engineers in stitches. "To be a saint in the Church of
Emacs does not require celibacy, but it does require
making a commitment to living a life of moral purity,"
he tells the Maui audience. "You must exorcise the evil
proprietary operating system from all your computer and
then install a wholly [holy] free operating system. And
then you must install only free software on top of
that. If you make this commitment and live by it, then
you too will be a saint in the Church of Emacs, and you
too may have a halo."
The St. Ignucius skit ends with a brief inside joke. On
most Unix systems and Unix-related offshoots, the
primary competitor program to Emacs is vi, a
text-editing program developed by former UC Berkeley
student and current Sun Microsystems chief scientist,
Bill Joy. Before doffing his "halo," Stallman pokes fun
at the rival program. "People sometimes ask me if it is
a sin in the Church of Emacs to use vi," he says.
"Using a free version of vi is not a sin; it is a
penance. So happy hacking."
After a brief question-and-answer session, audience
members gather around Stallman. A few ask for
autographs. "I'll sign this," says Stallman, holding up
one woman's print out of the GNU General Public
License, "but only if you promise me to use the term
GNU/Linux instead of Linux and tell all your friends to
do likewise."
The comment merely confirms a private observation.
Unlike other stage performers and political figures,
Stallman has no "off" mode. Aside from the St. Ignucius
character, the ideologue you see onstage is the
ideologue you meet backstage. Later that evening,
during a dinner conversation in which a programmer
mentions his affinity for "open source" programs,
Stallman, between bites, upbraids his tablemate: "You
mean free software. That's the proper way to refer to it."
During the question-and-answer session, Stallman admits
to playing the pedagogue at times. "There are many
people who say, `Well, first let's invite people to
join the community, and then let's teach them about
freedom.' And that could be a reasonable strategy, but
what we have is almost everybody's inviting people to
join the community, and hardly anybody's teaching them
about freedom once they come in."
The result, Stallman says, is something akin to a
third-world city. People move in, hoping to strike it
rich or at the very least to take part in a vibrant,
open culture, and yet those who hold the true power
keep evolving new tricks and strategies-i.e., software
patents-to keep the masses out. "You have millions of
people moving in and building shantytowns, but nobody's
working on step two: getting them out of those
shantytowns. If you think talking about software
freedom is a good strategy, please join in doing step
two. There are plenty working on step one. We need more
people working on step two."
Working on "step two" means driving home the issue that
freedom, not acceptance, is the root issue of the free
software movement. Those who hope to reform the
proprietary software industry from the inside are on a
fool's errand. "Change from the inside is risky,"
Stallman stays. "Unless you're working at the level of
a Gorbachev, you're going to be neutralized."
Hands pop up. Stallman points to a member of the golf
shirt-wearing contingent. "Without patents, how would
you suggest dealing with commercial espionage?"
"Well, those two questions have nothing to do with each
other, really," says Stallman.
"But I mean if someone wants to steal another company's
piece of software."
Stallman's recoils as if hit by a poisonous spray.
"Wait a second," Stallman says. "Steal? I'm sorry,
there's so much prejudice in that statement that the
only thing I can say is that I reject that prejudice.
Companies that develop nonfree software and other
things keep lots and lots of trade secrets, and so
that's not really likely to change. In the old
days-even in the 1980s-for the most part programmers
were not aware that there were even software patents
and were paying no attention to them. What happened was
that people published the interesting ideas, and if
they were not in the free software movement, they kept
secret the little details. And now they patent those
broad ideas and keep secret the little details. So as
far as what you're describing, patents really make no
difference to it one way or another."
"But if it doesn't affect their publication," a new
audience member jumps in, his voice trailing off almost
as soon as he starts speaking.
"But it does," Stallman says. "Their publication is
telling you that this is an idea that's off limits to
the rest of the community for 20 years. And what the
hell good is that? Besides, they've written it in such
a hard way to read, both to obfuscate the idea and to
make the patent as broad as possible, that it's
basically useless looking at the published information
to learn anything anyway. The only reason to look at
patents is to see the bad news of what you can't do."
The audience falls silent. The speech, which began at
3:15, is now nearing the 5:00 whistle, and most
listeners are already squirming in their seats, antsy
to get a jump start on the weekend. Sensing the
fatigue, Stallman glances around the room and hastily
shuts things down. "So it looks like we're done," he
says, following the observation with an auctioneer's
"going, going, gone" to flush out any last-minute
questioners. When nobody throws their hand up, Stallman
signs off with a traditional exit line.
"Happy hacking," he says. Endnotes
1. See "Grateful Dead Time Capsule: 1985-1995 North
American Tour Grosses."
http://www.accessplace.com/gdtc/1197.htm 2. See Evan
Leibovitch, "Who's Afraid of Big Bad Wolves," ZDNet
Tech Update (December 15, 2000).
http://techupdate.zdnet.com/techupdate/stories/main/0Y/A>
3. For narrative purposes, I have hesitated to go
in-depth when describing Stallman's full definition of
software "freedom." The GNU Project web site lists four
fundamental components: The freedom to run a program,
for any purpose (freedom 0). The freedom to study how a
program works, and adapt it to your needs (freedom 1).
The freedom to redistribute copies of a program so you
can help your neighbor (freedom 2). The freedom to
improve the program, and release your improvements to
the public, so that the whole community benefits
(freedom 3). For more information, please visit "The
Free Software Definition" at
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-sw.html. 4. See Eric
Raymond, "Shut Up and Show Them the Code," online
essay, (June 28, 1999). 5. See "Guest Interview: Eric
S. Raymond," Linux.com (May 18, 1999).
http://www.linux.com/interviews/19990518/8/
The GNU General Public License
By the spring of 1985, Richard Stallman had settled on
the GNU Project's first milestone-a Lisp-based free
software version of Emacs. To meet this goal, however,
he faced two challenges. First, he had to rebuild Emacs
in a way that made it platform independent. Second, he
had to rebuild the Emacs Commune in a similar fashion.
The dispute with UniPress had highlighted a flaw in the
Emacs Commune social contract. Where users relied on
Stallman's expert insight, the Commune's rules held. In
areas where Stallman no longer held the position of
alpha hacker-pre-1984 Unix systems, for
example-individuals and companies were free to make
their own rules.
The tension between the freedom to modify and the
freedom to exert authorial privilege had been building
before GOSMACS. The Copyright Act of 1976 had
overhauled U.S. copyright law, extending the legal
protection of copyright to software programs. According
to Section 102(b) of the Act, individuals and companies
now possessed the ability to copyright the "expression"
of a software program but not the "actual processes or
methods embodied in the program."See Hal Abelson, Mike Fischer, and Joanne
Costello,
"Software and Copyright Law," updated version (1998).
Translated, programmers and companies had the ability
to treat software programs like a story or song. Other
programmers could take inspiration from the work, but
to make a direct copy or nonsatirical derivative, they
first had to secure permission from the original
creator. Although the new law guaranteed that even
programs without copyright notices carried copyright
protection, programmers quickly asserted their rights,
attaching coypright notices to their software programs.
At first, Stallman viewed these notices with alarm.
Rare was the software program that didn't borrow source
code from past programs, and yet, with a single stroke
of the president's pen, Congress had given programmers
and companies the power to assert individual authorship
over communally built programs. It also injected a dose
of formality into what had otherwise been an informal
system. Even if hackers could demonstrate how a given
program's source-code bloodlines stretched back years,
if not decades, the resources and money that went into
battling each copyright notice were beyond most
hackers' means. Simply put, disputes that had once been
settled hacker-to-hacker were now settled
lawyer-to-lawyer. In such a system, companies, not
hackers, held the automatic advantage.
Proponents of software copyright had their
counter-arguments: without copyright, works might
otherwise slip into the public domain. Putting a
copyright notice on a work also served as a statement
of quality. Programmers or companies who attached their
name to the copyright attached their reputations as
well. Finally, it was a contract, as well as a
statement of ownership. Using copyright as a flexible
form of license, an author could give away certain
rights in exchange for certain forms of behavior on the
part of the user. For example, an author could give
away the right to suppress unauthorized copies just so
long as the end user agreed not to create a commercial offshoot.
It was this last argument that eventually softened
Stallman's resistance to software copyright notices.
Looking back on the years leading up to the GNU
Project, Stallman says he began to sense the beneficial
nature of copyright sometime around the release of
Emacs 15.0, the last significant pre-GNU Project
upgrade of Emacs. "I had seen email messages with
copyright notices plus simple `verbatim copying
permitted' licenses," Stallman recalls. "Those
definitely were [an] inspiration."
For Emacs 15, Stallman drafted a copyright that gave
users the right to make and distribute copies. It also
gave users the right to make modified versions, but not
the right to claim sole ownership of those modified
versions, as in the case of GOSMACS.
Although helpful in codifying the social contract of
the Emacs Commune, the Emacs 15 license remained too
"informal" for the purposes of the GNU Project,
Stallman says. Soon after starting work on a GNU
version of Emacs, Stallman began consulting with the
other members of the Free Software Foundation on how to
shore up the license's language. He also consulted with
the attorneys who had helped him set up the Free
Software Foundation.
Mark Fischer, a Boston attorney specializing in
intellectual-property law, recalls discussing the
license with Stallman during this period. "Richard had
very strong views about how it should work," Fischer
says, "He had two principles. The first was to make the
software absolutely as open as possible. The second was
to encourage others to adopt the same licensing practices."
Encouraging others to adopt the same licensing
practices meant closing off the escape hatch that had
allowed privately owned versions of Emacs to emerge. To
close that escape hatch, Stallman and his free software
colleagues came up with a solution: users would be free
to modify GNU Emacs just so long as they published
their modifications. In addition, the resulting
"derivative" works would also have carry the same GNU
Emacs License.
The revolutionary nature of this final condition would
take a while to sink in. At the time, Fischer says, he
simply viewed the GNU Emacs License as a simple
contract. It put a price tag on GNU Emacs' use. Instead
of money, Stallman was charging users access to their
own later modifications. That said, Fischer does
remember the contract terms as unique.
"I think asking other people to accept the price was,
if not unique, highly unusual at that time," he says.
The GNU Emacs License made its debut when Stallman
finally released GNU Emacs in 1985. Following the
release, Stallman welcomed input from the general
hacker community on how to improve the license's
language. One hacker to take up the offer was future
software activist John Gilmore, then working as a
consultant to Sun Microsystems. As part of his
consulting work, Gilmore had ported Emacs over to
SunOS, the company's in-house version of Unix. In the
process of doing so, Gilmore had published the changes
as per the demands of the GNU Emacs License. Instead of
viewing the license as a liability, Gilmore saw it as
clear and concise expression of the hacker ethos. "Up
until then, most licenses were very informal," Gilmore recalls.
As an example of this informality, Gilmore cites a
copyright notice for trn, a Unix utility. Written by
Larry Wall, future creator of the Perl programming
language, patch made it simple for Unix programmers to
insert source-code fixes-" patches" in hacker
jargon-into any large program. Recognizing the utility
of this feature, Wall put the following copyright
notice in the program's accompanying README file:
Copyright (c) 1985, Larry Wall You may copy the trn kit
in whole or in part as long as you don't try to make
money off it, or pretend that you wrote it.See Trn Kit README.
http://www.za.debian.org/doc/trn/trn-readme
Such statements, while reflective of the hacker ethic,
also reflected the difficulty of translating the loose,
informal nature of that ethic into the rigid, legal
language of copyright. In writing the GNU Emacs
License, Stallman had done more than close up the
escape hatch that permitted proprietary offshoots. He
had expressed the hacker ethic in a manner
understandable to both lawyer and hacker alike.
It wasn't long, Gilmore says, before other hackers
began discussing ways to "port" the GNU Emacs License
over to their own programs. Prompted by a conversation
on Usenet, Gilmore sent an email to Stallman in
November, 1986, suggesting modification: You should
probably remove "EMACS" from the license and replace it
with "SOFTWARE" or something. Soon, we hope, Emacs will
not be the biggest part of the GNU system, and the
license applies to all of it.See John Gilmore, quoted from email to author.
Gilmore wasn't the only
person suggesting a more general approach. By the end
of 1986, Stallman himself was at work with GNU
Project's next major milestone, a source-code debugger,
and was looking for ways to revamp the Emacs license so
that it might apply to both programs. Stallman's
solution: remove all specific references to Emacs and
convert the license into a generic copyright umbrella
for GNU Project software. The GNU General Public
License, GPL for short, was born.
In fashioning the GPL, Stallman followed the software
convention of using decimal numbers to indicate
prototype versions and whole numbers to indicate mature
versions. Stallman published Version 1.0 of the GPL in
1989 (a project Stallman was developing in 1985),
almost a full year after the release of the GNU
Debugger, Stallman's second major foray into the realm
of Unix programming. The license contained a preamble
spelling out its political intentions:
The General Public License is designed to make sure
that you have the freedom to give away or sell copies
of free software, that you receive source code or can
get it if you want it, that you can change the software
or use pieces of it in new free programs; and that you
know you can do these things.
To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions
that forbid anyone to deny you these rights or to ask
you to surrender the rights. These restrictions
translate to certain responsibilities for you if you
distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it.See Richard Stallman, et
al., "GNU General Public
License: Version 1," (February, 1989).
http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/copying-1.0.html
In fashioning the GPL, Stallman had been forced to make
an additional adjustment to the informal tenets of the
old Emacs Commune. Where he had once demanded that
Commune members publish any and all changes, Stallman
now demanded publication only in instances when
programmers circulated their derivative versions in the
same public manner as Stallman. In other words,
programmers who simply modified Emacs for private use
no longer needed to send the source-code changes back
to Stallman. In what would become a rare compromise of
free software doctrine, Stallman slashed the price tag
for free software. Users could innovate without
Stallman looking over their shoulders just so long as
they didn't bar Stallman and the rest of the hacker
community from future exchanges of the same program.
Looking back, Stallman says the GPL compromise was
fueled by his own dissatisfaction with the Big Brother
aspect of the original Emacs Commune social contract.
As much as he liked peering into other hackers'
systems, the knowledge that some future source-code
maintainer might use that power to ill effect forced
him to temper the GPL.
"It was wrong to require people to publish all
changes," says Stallman. "It was wrong to require them
to be sent to one privileged developer. That kind of
centralization and privilege for one was not consistent
with a society in which all had equal rights."
As hacks go, the GPL stands as one of Stallman's best.
It created a system of communal ownership within the
normally proprietary confines of copyright law. More
importantly, it demonstrated the intellectual
similarity between legal code and software code.
Implicit within the GPL's preamble was a profound
message: instead of viewing copyright law with
suspicion, hackers should view it as yet another system
begging to be hacked.
"The GPL developed much like any piece of free software
with a large community discussing its structure, its
respect or the opposite in their observation, needs for
tweaking and even to compromise it mildly for greater
acceptance," says Jerry Cohen, another attorney who
helped Stallman with the creation of the license. "The
process worked very well and GPL in its several
versions has gone from widespread skeptical and at
times hostile response to widespread acceptance."
In a 1986 interview with Byte magazine, Stallman summed
up the GPL in colorful terms. In addition to
proclaiming hacker values, Stallman said, readers
should also "see it as a form of intellectual jujitsu,
using the legal system that software hoarders have set
up against them."See David Betz and Jon Edwards, "Richard Stallman
discusses his public-domain [sic] Unix-compatible
software system with BYTE editors," BYTE (July, 1996).
(Reprinted on the GNU Project web site:
http://www.gnu.org/gnu/byte-interview.html.) This
interview offers an interesting, not to mention candid,
glimpse at Stallman's political attitudes during the
earliest days of the GNU Project. It is also helpful in
tracing the evolution of Stallman's rhetoric.
Describing the purpose of the GPL, Stallman says, "I'm
trying to change the way people approach knowledge and
information in general. I think that to try to own
knowledge, to try to control whether people are allowed
to use it, or to try to stop other people from sharing
it, is sabotage." Contrast this with a statement to the
author in August 2000: "I urge you not to use the term
`intellectual property' in your thinking. It will lead
you to misunderstand things, because that term
generalizes about copyrights, patents, and trademarks.
And those things are so different in their effects that
it is entirely foolish to try to talk about them at
once. If you hear somebody saying something about
intellectual property, without quotes, then he's not
thinking very clearly and you shouldn't join."
Years later, Stallman would describe the GPL's creation
in less hostile terms. "I was thinking about issues
that were in a sense ethical and in a sense political
and in a sense legal," he says. "I had to try to do
what could be sustained by the legal system that we're
in. In spirit the job was that of legislating the basis
for a new society, but since I wasn't a government, I
couldn't actually change any laws. I had to try to do
this by building on top of the existing legal system,
which had not been designed for anything like this."
About the time Stallman was pondering the ethical,
political, and legal issues associated with free
software, a California hacker named Don Hopkins mailed
him a manual for the 68000 microprocessor. Hopkins, a
Unix hacker and fellow science-fiction buff, had
borrowed the manual from Stallman a while earlier. As a
display of gratitude, Hopkins decorated the return
envelope with a number of stickers obtained at a local
science-fiction convention. One sticker in particular
caught Stallman's eye. It read, "Copyleft (L), All
Rights Reversed." Following the release of the first
version of GPL, Stallman paid tribute to the sticker,
nicknaming the free software license "Copyleft." Over
time, the nickname and its shorthand symbol, a
backwards "C," would become an official Free Software
Foundation synonym for the GPL.
The German sociologist Max Weber once proposed that all
great religions are built upon the "routinization" or
"institutionalization" of charisma. Every successful
religion, Weber argued, converts the charisma or
message of the original religious leader into a social,
political, and ethical apparatus more easily
translatable across cultures and time.
While not religious per se, the GNU GPL certainly
qualifies as an interesting example of this
"routinization" process at work in the modern,
decentralized world of software development. Since its
unveiling, programmers and companies who have otherwise
expressed little loyalty or allegiance to Stallman have
willingly accepted the GPL bargain at face value. A few
have even accepted the GPL as a preemptive protective
mechanism for their own software programs. Even those
who reject the GPL contract as too compulsory, still
credit it as influential.
One hacker falling into this latter group was Keith
Bostic, a University of California employee at the time
of the GPL 1.0 release. Bostic's department, the
Computer Systems Research Group (SRG), had been
involved in Unix development since the late 1970s and
was responsible for many key parts of Unix, including
the TCP/IP networking protocol, the cornerstone of
modern Internet communications. By the late 1980s,
AT&T, the original owner of the Unix brand name, began
to focus on commercializing Unix and began looking to
the Berkeley Software Distribution, or BSD, the
academic version of Unix developed by Bostic and his
Berkeley peers, as a key source of commercial technology.
Although the Berkeley BSD source code was shared among
researchers and commercial programmers with a
source-code license, this commercialization presented a
problem. The Berkeley code was intermixed with
proprietary AT&T code. As a result, Berkeley
distributions were available only to institutions that
already had a Unix source license from AT&T. As AT&T
raised its license fees, this arrangement, which had at
first seemed innocuous, became increasingly burdensome.
Hired in 1986, Bostic had taken on the personal project
of porting BSD over to the Digital Equipment
Corporation's PDP-11 computer. It was during this
period, Bostic says, that he came into close
interaction with Stallman during Stallman's occasional
forays out to the west coast. "I remember vividly
arguing copyright with Stallman while he sat at
borrowed workstations at CSRG," says Bostic. "We'd go
to dinner afterward and continue arguing about
copyright over dinner."
The arguments eventually took hold, although not in the
way Stallman would have liked. In June, 1989, Berkeley
separated its networking code from the rest of the
AT&T-owned operating system and distributed it under a
University of California license. The contract terms
were liberal. All a licensee had to do was give credit
to the university in advertisements touting derivative programs.The University
of California's "obnoxious advertising
clause" would later prove to be a problem. Looking for
a less restrictive alternative to the GPL, some hackers
used the University of California, replacing
"University of California" with the name of their own
instution. The result: free software programs that
borrowed from dozens of other programs would have to
cite dozens of institutions in advertisements. In 1999,
after a decade of lobbying on Stallman's part, the
University of California agreed to drop this clause.
In contrast to the GPL, proprietary offshoots were
permissible. Only one problem hampered the license's
rapid adoption: the BSD Networking release wasn't a
complete operating system. People could study the code,
but it could only be run in conjunction with other
proprietary-licensed code.
Over the next few years, Bostic and other University of
California employees worked to replace the missing
components and turn BSD into a complete, freely
redistributable operating system. Although delayed by a
legal challenge from Unix Systems Laboratories-the AT&T
spin-off that retained ownership of the Unix brand
name-the effort would finally bear fruit in the early
1990s. Even before then, however, many of the Berkeley
utilities would make their way into Stallman's GNU Project.
"I think it's highly unlikely that we ever would have
gone as strongly as we did without the GNU influence,"
says Bostic, looking back. "It was clearly something
where they were pushing hard and we liked the idea."
By the end of the 1980s, the GPL was beginning to exert
a gravitational effect on the free software community.
A program didn't have to carry the GPL to qualify as
free software-witness the case of the BSD utilities-but
putting a program under the GPL sent a definite
message. "I think the very existence of the GPL
inspired people to think through whether they were
making free software, and how they would license it,"
says Bruce Perens, creator of Electric Fence, a popular
Unix utility, and future leader of the Debian GNU/Linux
development team. A few years after the release of the
GPL, Perens says he decided to discard Electric Fence's
homegrown license in favor of Stallman's lawyer-vetted
copyright. "It was actually pretty easy to do," Perens recalls.
Rich Morin, the programmer who had viewed Stallman's
initial GNU announcement with a degree of skepticism,
recalls being impressed by the software that began to
gather under the GPL umbrella. As the leader of a SunOS
user group, one of Morin's primary duties during the
1980s had been to send out distribution tapes
containing the best freeware or free software
utilities. The job often mandated calling up original
program authors to verify whether their programs were
copyright protected or whether they had been consigned
to the public domain. Around 1989, Morin says, he began
to notice that the best software programs typically
fell under the GPL license. "As a software distributor,
as soon as I saw the word GPL, I knew I was home free,"
recalls Morin.
To compensate for the prior hassles that went into
compiling distribution tapes to the Sun User Group,
Morin had charged recipients a convenience fee. Now,
with programs moving over to the GPL, Morin was
suddenly getting his tapes put together in half the
time, turning a tidy profit in the process. Sensing a
commercial opportunity, Morin rechristened his hobby as
a business: Prime Time Freeware.
Such commercial exploitation was completely within the
confines of the free software agenda. "When we speak of
free software, we are referring to freedom, not price,"
advised Stallman in the GPL's preamble. By the late
1980s, Stallman had refined it to a more simple
mnemonic: "Don't think free as in free beer; think free
as in free speech."
For the most part, businesses ignored Stallman's
entreaties. Still, for a few entrepreneurs, the freedom
associated with free software was the same freedom
associated with free markets. Take software ownership
out of the commercial equation, and you had a situation
where even the smallest software company was free to
compete against the IBMs and DECs of the world.
One of the first entrepreneurs to grasp this concept
was Michael Tiemann, a software programmer and graduate
student at Stanford University. During the 1980s,
Tiemann had followed the GNU Project like an aspiring
jazz musician following a favorite artist. It wasn't
until the release of the GNU C Compiler in 1987,
however, that he began to grasp the full potential of
free software. Dubbing GCC a "bombshell," Tiemann says
the program's own existence underlined Stallman's
determination as a programmer.
"Just as every writer dreams of writing the great
American novel, every programmer back in the 1980s
talked about writing the great American compiler,"
Tiemman recalls. "Suddenly Stallman had done it. It was
very humbling."
"You talk about single points of failure, GCC was it,"
echoes Bostic. "Nobody had a compiler back then, until
GCC came along."
Rather than compete with Stallman, Tiemann decided to
build on top of his work. The original version of GCC
weighed in at 110,000 lines of code, but Tiemann
recalls the program as surprisingly easy to understand.
So easy in fact that Tiemann says it took less than
five days to master and another week to port the
software to a new hardware platform, National
Semiconductor's 32032 microchip. Over the next year,
Tiemann began playing around with the source code,
creating a native compiler for the C+ programming
language. One day, while delivering a lecture on the
program at Bell Labs, Tiemann ran into some AT&T
developers struggling to pull off the same thing.
"There were about 40 or 50 people in the room, and I
asked how many people were working on the native code
compiler," Tiemann recalls. "My host said the
information was confidential but added that if I took a
look around the room I might get a good general idea."
It wasn't long after, Tiemann says, that the light bulb
went off in his head. "I had been working on that
project for six months," Tiemann says. I just thought
to myself, whether it's me or the code this is a level
of efficiency that the free market should be ready to reward."
Tiemann found added inspiration in the GNU Manifesto,
which, while excoriating the greed of some software
vendors, encourages other vendors to consider the
advantages of free software from a consumer point of
view. By removing the power of monopoly from the
commerical software question, the GPL makes it possible
for the smartest vendors to compete on the basis of
service and consulting, the two most profit-rich
corners of the software marketplace.
In a 1999 essay, Tiemann recalls the impact of
Stallman's Manifesto. "It read like a socialist
polemic, but I saw something different. I saw a
business plan in disguise."7. See Michael Tiemann, "Future of Cygnus Solutions:
An
Entrepreneur's Account," Open Sources (O'Reilly &
Associates, Inc., 1999): 139.
Teaming up with John Gilmore, another GNU Project fan,
Tiemann launched a software consulting service
dedicated to customizing GNU programs. Dubbed Cygnus
Support, the company signed its first development
contract in February, 1990. By the end of the year, the
company had $725,000 worth of support and development contracts.
GNU Emacs, GDB, and GCC were the "big three" of
developer-oriented tools, but they weren't the only
ones developed by Stallman during the GNU Project's
first half decade. By 1990, Stallman had also generated
GNU versions of the Bourne Shell (rechristened the
Bourne Again Shell, or BASH), YACC (rechristened
Bison), and awk (rechristened gawk). Like GCC , every
GNU program had to be designed to run on multiple
systems, not just a single vendor's platform. In the
process of making programs more flexible, Stallman and
his collaborators often made them more useful as well.
Recalling the GNU universalist approach, Prime Time
Freeware's Morin points to a critical, albeit mundane,
software package called hello. "It's the hello world
program which is five lines of C, packaged up as if it
were a GNU distribution," Morin says. "And so it's got
the Texinfo stuff and the configure stuff. It's got all
the other software engineering goo that the GNU Project
has come up with to allow packages to port to all these
different environments smoothly. That's tremendously
important work, and it affects not only all of
[Stallman's] software, but also all of the other GNU
Project software."
According to Stallman, improving software programs was
secondary to building them in the first place. "With
each piece I may or may not find a way to improve it,"
said Stallman to Byte. "To some extent I am getting the
benefit of reimplementation, which makes many systems
much better. To some extent it's because I have been in
the field a long time and worked on many other systems.
I therefore have many ideas to bring to bear."See Richard Stallman, BYTE
(1986).
Nevertheless, as GNU tools made their mark in the late
1980s, Stallman's AI Lab-honed reputation for design
fastidiousness soon became legendary throughout the
entire software-development community.
Jeremy Allison, a Sun user during the late 1980s and
programmer destined to run his own free software
project, Samba, in the 1990s, recalls that reputation
with a laugh. During the late 1980s, Allison began
using Emacs. Inspired by the program's
community-development model, Allison says he sent in a
snippet of source code only to have it rejected by Stallman.
"It was like the Onion headline," Allison says.
"`Child's prayers to God answered: No.'"
Stallman's growing stature as a software programmer,
however, was balanced by his struggles as a project
manager. Although the GNU Project moved from success to
success in creation of developer-oriented tools, its
inability to generate a working kernel-the central
"traffic cop" program in all Unix systems that
determines which devices and applications get access to
the microprocessor and when-was starting to elicit
grumbles as the 1980s came to a close. As with most GNU
Project efforts, Stallman had started kernel
development by looking for an existing program to
modify. According to a January 1987 "Gnusletter,"
Stallman was already working to overhaul TRIX, a Unix
kernel developed at MIT.
A review of GNU Project "GNUsletters" of the late 1980s
reflects the management tension. In January, 1987,
Stallman announced to the world that the GNU Project
was working to overhaul TRIX, a Unix kernel developed
at MIT. A year later, in February of 1988, the GNU
Project announced that it had shifted its attentions to
Mach, a lightweight "micro-kernel" developed at
Carnegie Mellon. All told, however, official GNU
Project kernel development wouldn't commence until 1990.See "HURD History."
http://www.gnu.org/software/hurd/history.html
The delays in kernel development were just one of many
concerns weighing on Stallman during this period. In
1989, Lotus Development Corporation filed suit against
rival software company, Paperback Software
International, for copying menu commands in Lotus'
popular 1-2-3 Spreadsheet program. Lotus' suit, coupled
with the Apple -Microsoft "look and feel" battle,
provided a troublesome backdrop for the GNU Project.
Although both suits fell outside the scope of the GNU
Project, both revolved around operating systems and
software applications developed for the personal
computer, not Unix-compatible hardware systems-they
threatened to impose a chilling effect on the entire
culture of software development. Determined to do
something, Stallman recruited a few programmer friends
and composed a magazine ad blasting the lawsuits. He
then followed up the ad by helping to organize a group
to protest the corporations filing the suit. Calling
itself the League of Programming Freedom, the group
held protests outside the offices of Lotus, Inc. and
the Boston courtroom hosting the Lotus trial.
The protests were notable.According to a League of Programming Freedom Press,
the
protests were notable for featuring the first
hexadecimal protest chant: 1-2-3-4, toss the lawyers
out the door; 5-6-7-8, innovate don't litigate;
9-A-B-C, 1-2-3 is not for me; D-E-F-O, look and feel
have got to go
http://lpf.ai.mit.edu/Links/prep.ai.mit.edu/demo.final.release
They document the evolving nature of software
industry. Applications had quietly replaced operating
systems as the primary corporate battleground. In its
unfulfilled quest to build a free software operating
system, the GNU Project seemed hopelessly behind the
times. Indeed, the very fact that Stallman had felt it
necessary to put together an entirely new group
dedicated to battling the "look and feel" lawsuits
reinforced that obsolescence in the eyes of some observers.
In 1990, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation cerified Stallman's genius status when it
granted Stallman a MacArthur fellowship, therefore
making him a recipient for the organization's so-called
"genius grant." The grant, a $240,000 reward for
launching the GNU Project and giving voice to the free
software philosophy, relieved a number of short-term
concerns. First and foremost, it gave Stallman, a
nonsalaried employee of the FSF who had been supporting
himself through consulting contracts, the ability to
devote more time to writing GNU code.I use the term "writing" here loosely.
About the time
of the MacArthur award, Stallman began suffering
chronic pain in his hands and was dictating his work to
FSF-employed typists. Although some have speculated
that the hand pain was the result of repetitive stress
injury, or RSI, an injury common among software
programmers, Stallman is not 100% sure. "It was NOT
carpal tunnel syndrome," he writes. "My hand problem
was in the hands themselves, not in the wrists."
Stallman has since learned to work without typists
after switching to a keyboard with a lighter touch.
Ironically, the award also made it possible for
Stallman to vote. Months before the award, a fire in
Stallman's apartment house had consumed his few earthly
possessions. By the time of the award, Stallman was
listing himself as a "squatter"See Reuven Lerner, "Stallman wins $240,000
MacArthur
award," MIT, The Tech (July 18, 1990).
http://the-tech.mit.edu/V110/N30/rms.30n.html
at 545 Technology Square. "[The registrar of voters]
didn't want to accept that as my address," Stallman
would later recall. "A newspaper article about the
MacArthur grant said that and then they let me register."See Michael Gross,
"Richard Stallman: High School
Misfit, Symbol of Free Software, MacArthur-certified
Genius" (1999).
Most importantly, the MacArthur money gave Stallman
more freedom. Already dedicated to the issue of
software freedom, Stallman chose to use the additional
freedom to increase his travels in support of the GNU
Project mission.
Interestingly, the ultimate success of the GNU Project
and the free software movement in general would stem
from one of these trips. In 1990, Stallman paid a visit
to the Polytechnic University in Helsinki, Finland.
Among the audience members was 21-year-old Linus
Torvalds, future developer of the Linux kernel-the free
software kernel destined to fill the GNU Project's most
sizable gap.
A student at the nearby University of Helsinki at the
time, Torvalds regarded Stallman with bemusement. "I
saw, for the first time in my life, the stereotypical
long-haired, bearded hacker type," recalls Torvalds in
his 2001 autobiography Just for Fun. "We don't have
much of them in Helsinki."See Linus Torvalds and David Diamond, Just For Fun:
The
Story of an Accidentaly Revolutionary (HarperCollins
Publishers, Inc., 2001): 58-59.
While not exactly attuned to the "sociopolitical" side
of the Stallman agenda, Torvalds nevertheless
appreciated the agenda's underlying logic: no
programmer writes error-free code. By sharing software,
hackers put a program's improvement ahead of individual
motivations such as greed or ego protection.
Like many programmers of his generation, Torvalds had
cut his teeth not on mainframe computers like the IBM
7094, but on a motley assortment of home-built computer
systems. As university student, Torvalds had made the
step up from C programming to Unix, using the
university's MicroVAX. This ladder-like progression had
given Torvalds a different perspective on the barriers
to machine access. For Stallman, the chief barriers
were bureaucracy and privilege. For Torvalds, the chief
barriers were geography and the harsh Helsinki winter.
Forced to trek across the University of Helsinki just
to log in to his Unix account, Torvalds quickly began
looking for a way to log in from the warm confines of
his off-campus apartment.
The search led Torvalds to the operating system Minix,
a lightweight version of Unix developed for
instructional purposes by Dutch university professor
Andrew Tanenbaum. The program fit within the memory
confines of a 386 PC, the most powerful machine
Torvalds could afford, but still lacked a few necessary
features. It most notably lacked terminal emulation,
the feature that allowed Torvalds' machine to mimic a
university terminal, making it possible to log in to
the MicroVAX from home.
During the summer of 1991, Torvalds rewrote Minix from
the ground up, adding other features as he did so. By
the end of the summer, Torvalds was referring to his
evolving work as the "GNU/Emacs of terminal emulation programs."See Linus
Torvalds and David Diamond, Just For Fun: The
Story of an Accidentaly Revolutionary (HarperCollins
Publishers, Inc., 2001): 78.
Feeling confident, he solicited a Minix newsgroup for
copies of the POSIX standards, the software blue prints
that determined whether a program was Unix compatible.
A few weeks later, Torvalds was posting a message
eerily reminiscent of Stallman's original 1983 GNU posting:
Hello everybody out there using minix-
I'm doing a (free) operating system (just a hobby,
won't be big and professional like gnu for 386 (486) AT
clones). This has been brewing since April, and is
starting to get ready. I'd like any feedback on things
people like/dislike in minix, as my OS resembles it
somewhat (same physical layout of the file-system (due
to practical reasons) among other things).See "Linux 10th Anniversary."
http://www.linux10.org/history/
The posting drew a smattering of responses and within a
month, Torvalds had posted a 0.01 version of the
operating system-i.e., the earliest possible version
fit for outside review-on an Internet FTP site. In the
course of doing so, Torvalds had to come up with a name
for the new system. On his own PC hard drive, Torvalds
had saved the program as Linux, a name that paid its
respects to the software convention of giving each Unix
variant a name that ended with the letter X. Deeming
the name too "egotistical," Torvalds changed it to
Freax, only to have the FTP site manager change it back.
Although Torvalds had set out build a full operating
system, both he and other developers knew at the time
that most of the functional tools needed to do so were
already available, thanks to the work of GNU, BSD, and
other free software developers. One of the first tools
the Linux development team took advantage of was the
GNU C Compiler, a tool that made it possible to process
programs written in the C programming language.
Integrating GCC improved the performance of Linux. It
also raised issues. Although the GPL's "viral" powers
didn't apply to the Linux kernel, Torvald's willingness
to borrow GCC for the purposes of his own free software
operating system indicated a certain obligation to let
other users borrow back. As Torvalds would later put
it: "I had hoisted myself up on the shoulders of giants."See Linus Torvalds and
David Diamond, Just For Fun: The
Story of an Accidentaly Revolutionary (HarperCollins
Publishers, Inc., 2001): 96-97.
Not surprisingly, he began to think about what would
happen when other people looked to him for similar
support. A decade after the decision, Torvalds echoes
the Free Software Foundation's Robert Chassel when he
sums up his thoughts at the time: You put six months of
your life into this thing and you want to make it
available and you want to get something out of it, but
you don't want people to take advantage of it. I wanted
people to be able to see [Linux], and to make changes
and improvements to their hearts' content. But I also
wanted to make sure that what I got out of it was to
see what they were doing. I wanted to always have
access to the sources so that if they made
improvements, I could make those improvements myself.See Linus Torvalds and
David Diamond, Just For Fun: The
Story of an Accidentaly Revolutionary (HarperCollins
Publishers, Inc., 2001): 94-95.
When it was time to release the 0.12 version of Linux,
the first to include a fully integrated version of GCC,
Torvalds decided to voice his allegiance with the free
software movement. He discarded the old kernel license
and replaced it with the GPL. The decision triggered a
porting spree, as Torvalds and his collaborators looked
to other GNU programs to fold into the growing Linux
stew. Within three years, Linux developers were
offering their first production release, Linux 1.0,
including fully modified versions of GCC, GDB, and a
host of BSD tools.
By 1994, the amalgamated operating system had earned
enough respect in the hacker world to make some
observers wonder if Torvalds hadn't given away the farm
by switching to the GPL in the project's initial
months. In the first issue of Linux Journal, publisher
Robert Young sat down with Torvalds for an interview.
When Young asked the Finnish programmer if he felt
regret at giving up private ownership of the Linux
source code, Torvalds said no. "Even with 20/20
hindsight," Torvalds said, he considered the GPL "one
of the very best design decisions" made during the
early stages of the Linux project.See Robert Young, "Interview with Linus, the
Author of
Linux," Linux Journal (March 1, 1994).
http://www.linuxjournal.com/article.php?sid=2736
That the decision had been made with zero appeal or
deference to Stallman and the Free Software Foundation
speaks to the GPL's growing portability. Although it
would take a few years to be recognized by Stallman,
the explosiveness of Linux development conjured
flashbacks of Emacs. This time around, however, the
innovation triggering the explosion wasn't a software
hack like Control-R but the novelty of running a
Unix-like system on the PC architecture. The motives
may have been different, but the end result certainly
fit the ethical specifications: a fully functional
operating system composed entirely of free software.
As his initial email message to the comp.os.minix
newsgroup indicates, it would take a few months before
Torvalds saw Linux as anything less than a holdover
until the GNU developers delivered on the HURD kernel.
This initial unwillingness to see Linux in political
terms would represent a major blow to the Free Software
Foundation.
As far as Torvalds was concerned, he was simply the
latest in a long line of kids taking apart and
reassembling things just for fun. Nevertheless, when
summing up the runaway success of a project that could
have just as easily spent the rest of its days on an
abandoned computer hard drive, Torvalds credits his
younger self for having the wisdom to give up control
and accept the GPL bargain.
"I may not have seen the light," writes Torvalds,
reflecting on Stallman's 1991 Polytechnic University
speech and his subsequent decision to switch to the
GPL. "But I guess something from his speech sunk in ."See Linus Torvalds and
David Diamond, Just For Fun: The
Story of an Accidentaly Revolutionary (HarperCollins
Publishers, Inc., 2001): 59.
interview offers an interesting, not to mention
candid, glimpse at Stallman's political attitudes
during the earliest days of the GNU Project. It is also
helpful in tracing the evolution of Stallman's
rhetoric. Describing the purpose of the GPL, Stallman
says, "I'm trying to change the way people approach
knowledge and information in general. I think that to
try to own knowledge, to try to control whether people
are allowed to use it, or to try to stop other people
from sharing it, is sabotage." Contrast this with a
statement to the author in August 2000: "I urge you not
to use the term `intellectual property' in your
thinking. It will lead you to misunderstand things,
because that term generalizes about copyrights,
patents, and trademarks. And those things are so
different in their effects that it is entirely foolish
to try to talk about them at once. If you hear somebody
saying something about intellectual property, without
quotes, then he's not thinking very clearly and you
shouldn't join."
GNU/Linux
By 1993, the free software movement was at a
crossroads. To the optimistically inclined, all signs
pointed toward success for the hacker cultur. Wired
magazine, a funky, new publication offering stories on
data encryption, Usenet, and software freedom, was
flying off magazine racks. The Internet, once a slang
term used only by hackers and research scientists, had
found its way into mainstream lexicon. Even President
Clinton was using it. The personal computer, once a
hobbyist's toy, had grown to full-scale respectability,
giving a whole new generation of computer users access
to hacker-built software. And while the GNU Project had
not yet reached its goal of a fully intact, free
software operating system, curious users could still
try Linux in the interim.
Any way you sliced it, the news was good, or so it
seemed. After a decade of struggle, hackers and hacker
values were finally gaining acceptance in mainstream
society. People were getting it.
Or were they? To the pessimistically inclined, each
sign of acceptance carried its own troubling
countersign. Sure, being a hacker was suddenly cool,
but was cool good for a community that thrived on
alienation? Sure, the White House was saying all the
right things about the Internet, even going so far as
to register its own domain name, whitehouse.gov, but it
was also meeting with the companies, censorship
advocates, and law-enforcement officials looking to
tame the Internet's Wild West culture. Sure, PCs were
more powerful, but in commoditizing the PC marketplace
with its chips, Intel had created a situation in which
proprietary software vendors now held the power. For
every new user won over to the free software cause via
Linux, hundreds, perhaps thousands, were booting up
Microsoft Windows for the first time.
Finally, there was the curious nature of Linux itself.
Unrestricted by design bugs (like GNU) and legal
disputes (like BSD), Linux' high-speed evolution had
been so unplanned, its success so accidental, that
programmers closest to the software code itself didn't
know what to make of it. More compilation album than
operating system, it was comprised of a hacker medley
of greatest hits: everything from GCC, GDB, and glibc
(the GNU Project's newly developed C Library) to X (a
Unix-based graphic user interface developed by MIT's
Laboratory for Computer Science) to BSD-developed tools
such as BIND (the Berkeley Internet Naming Daemon,
which lets users substitute easy-to-remember Internet
domain names for numeric IP addresses) and TCP/IP. The
arch's capstone, of course, was the Linux kernel-itself
a bored-out, super-charged version of Minix. Rather
than building their operating system from scratch,
Torvalds and his rapidly expanding Linux development
team had followed the old Picasso adage, "good artists
borrow; great artists steal." Or as Torvalds himself
would later translate it when describing the secret of
his success: "I'm basically a very lazy person who
likes to take credit for things other people actually do."Torvalds has offered
this quote in many different
settings. To date, however, the quote's most notable
appearance is in the Eric Raymond essay, "The Cathedral
and the Bazaar" (May, 1997).
http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/index.html
Such laziness, while admirable from an efficiency
perspective, was troubling from a political
perspective. For one thing, it underlined the lack of
an ideological agenda on Torvalds' part. Unlike the GNU
developers, Torvalds hadn't built an operating system
out of a desire to give his fellow hackers something to
work with; he'd built it to have something he himself
could play with. Like Tom Sawyer whitewashing a fence,
Torvalds' genius lay less in the overall vision and
more in his ability to recruit other hackers to speed
the process.
That Torvalds and his recruits had succeeded where
others had not raised its own troubling question: what,
exactly, was Linux? Was it a manifestation of the free
software philosophy first articulated by Stallman in
the GNU Manifesto? Or was it simply an amalgamation of
nifty software tools that any user, similarly
motivated, could assemble on his own home system?
By late 1993, a growing number of Linux users had begun
to lean toward the latter definition and began brewing
private variations on the Linux theme. They even became
bold enough to bottle and sell their variations-or
"distributions"-to fellow Unix aficionados. The results
were spotty at best.
"This was back before Red Hat and the other commercial
distributions," remembers Ian Murdock, then a computer
science student at Purdue University. "You'd flip
through Unix magazines and find all these business
card-sized ads proclaiming `Linux.' Most of the
companies were fly-by-night operations that saw nothing
wrong with slipping a little of their own source code
into the mix."
Murdock, a Unix programmer, remembers being "swept
away" by Linux when he first downloaded and installed
it on his home PC system. "It was just a lot of fun,"
he says. "It made me want to get involved." The
explosion of poorly built distributions began to dampen
his early enthusiasm, however. Deciding that the best
way to get involved was to build a version of Linux
free of additives, Murdock set about putting a list of
the best free software tools available with the
intention of folding them into his own distribution. "I
wanted something that would live up to the Linux name,"
Murdock says.
In a bid to "stir up some interest," Murdock posted his
intentions on the Internet, including Usenet's
comp.os.linux newsgroup. One of the first responding
email messages was from rms@ai.mit.edu . As a hacker,
Murdock instantly recognized the address. It was
Richard M. Stallman, founder of the GNU Project and a
man Murdock knew even back then as "the hacker of
hackers." Seeing the address in his mail queue, Murdock
was puzzled. Why on Earth would Stallman, a person
leading his own operating-system project, care about
Murdock's gripes over Linux?
Murdock opened the message.
"He said the Free Software Foundation was starting to
look closely at Linux and that the FSF was interested
in possibly doing a Linux system, too. Basically, it
looked to Stallman like our goals were in line with
their philosophy."
The message represented a dramatic about-face on
Stallman's part. Until 1993, Stallman had been content
to keep his nose out of the Linux community's affairs.
In fact, he had all but shunned the renegade operating
system when it first appeared on the Unix programming
landscape in 1991. After receiving the first
notification of a Unix-like operating system that ran
on PCs, Stallman says he delegated the task of
examining the new operating system to a friend. Recalls
Stallman, "He reported back that the software was
modeled after System V, which was the inferior version
of Unix. He also told me it wasn't portable."
The friend's report was correct. Built to run on
386-based machines, Linux was firmly rooted to its
low-cost hardware platform. What the friend failed to
report, however, was the sizable advantage Linux
enjoyed as the only freely modifiable operating system
in the marketplace. In other words, while Stallman
spent the next three years listening to bug reports
from his HURD team, Torvalds was winning over the
programmers who would later uproot and replant the
operating system onto new platforms.
By 1993, the GNU Project's inability to deliver a
working kernel was leading to problems both within the
GNU Project and within the free software movement at
large. A March, 1993, a Wired magazine article by
Simson Garfinkel described the GNU Project as "bogged
down" despite the success of the project's many tools.See Simson Garfinkel, "Is
Stallman Stalled?" Wired
(March, 1993).
Those within the project and its nonprofit adjunct,
the Free Software Foundation, remember the mood as
being even worse than Garfinkel's article let on. "It
was very clear, at least to me at the time, that there
was a window of opportunity to introduce a new
operating system," says Chassell. "And once that window
was closed, people would become less interested. Which
is in fact exactly what happened."Chassel's concern about there being a
36-month "window"
for a new operating system is not unique to the GNU
Project. During the early 1990s, free software versions
of the Berkeley Software Distribution were held up by
Unix System Laboratories' lawsuit restricting the
release of BSD-derived software. While many users
consider BSD offshoots such as FreeBSD and OpenBSD to
be demonstrably superior to GNU/Linux both in terms of
performance and security, the number of FreeBSD and
OpenBSD users remains a fraction of the total GNU/Linux
user population. To view a sample analysis of the
relative success of GNU/Linux in relation to other free
software operating systems, see the essay by New
Zealand hacker, Liam Greenwood, "Why is Linux
Successful" (1999).
Much has been made about the GNU Project's struggles
during the 1990-1993 period. While some place the blame
on Stallman for those struggles, Eric Raymond, an early
member of the GNU Emacs team and later Stallman critic,
says the problem was largely institutional. "The FSF
got arrogant," Raymond says. "They moved away from the
goal of doing a production-ready operating system to
doing operating-system research." Even worse, "They
thought nothing outside the FSF could affect them."
Murdock, a person less privy to the inner dealings of
the GNU Project, adopts a more charitable view. "I
think part of the problem is they were a little too
ambitious and they threw good money after bad," he
says. "Micro-kernels in the late 80s and early 90s were
a hot topic. Unfortunately, that was about the time
that the GNU Project started to design their kernel.
They ended up with alot of baggage and it would have
taken a lot of backpedaling to lose it."
Stallman cites a number of issues when explaining the
delay. The Lotus and Apple lawsuits had provided
political distractions, which, coupled with Stallman's
inability to type, made it difficult for Stallman to
lend a helping hand to the HURD team. Stallman also
cites poor communication between various portions of
the GNU Project. "We had to do a lot of work to get the
debugging environment to work," he recalls. "And the
people maintaining GDB at the time were not that
cooperative." Mostly, however, Stallman says he and the
other members of the GNU Project team underestimated
the difficulty of expanding the Mach microkernal into a
full-fledged Unix kernel.
"I figured, OK, the [Mach] part that has to talk to the
machine has already been debugged," Stallman says,
recalling the HURD team's troubles in a 2000 speech.
"With that head start, we should be able to get it done
faster. But instead, it turned out that debugging these
asynchronous multithreaded programs was really hard.
There were timing books that would clobber the files,
and that's no fun. The end result was that it took
many, many years to produce a test version."See Maui High Performance Computing
Center Speech.
Whatever the excuse, or excuses, the concurrent success
of the Linux-kernel team created a tense situation.
Sure, the Linux kernel had been licensed under the GPL,
but as Murdock himself had noted, the desire to treat
Linux as a purely free software operating system was
far from uniform. By late 1993, the total Linux user
population had grown from a dozen or so Minix
enthusiasts to somewhere between 20,000 and 100,000.GNU/Linux user-population
numbers are sketchy at best,
which is why I've provided such a broad range. The
100,000 total comes from the Red Hat "Milestones" site,
http://www.redhat.com/about/corporate/milestones.html.
What had once been a hobby was now a marketplace ripe
for exploitation. Like Winston Churchill watching
Soviet troops sweep into Berlin, Stallman felt an
understandable set of mixed emotions when it came time
to celebrate the Linux "victory."I wrote this Winston Churchill analogy before
Stallman
himself sent me his own unsolicited comment on
Churchill: World War II and the determination needed to
win it was a very strong memory as I was growing up.
Statements such as Churchill's, "We will fight them in
the landing zones, we will fight them on the beaches .
. . we will never surrender," have always resonated for
me.
Although late to the party, Stallman still had clout.
As soon as the FSF announced that it would lend its
money and moral support to Murdock's software project,
other offers of support began rolling in. Murdock
dubbed the new project Debian-a compression of his and
his wife, Deborah's, names-and within a few weeks was
rolling out the first distribution. "[Richard's
support] catapulted Debian almost overnight from this
interesting little project to something people within
the community had to pay attention to," Murdock says.
In January of 1994, Murdock issued the " Debian
Manifesto." Written in the spirit of Stallman's "GNU
Manifesto" from a decade before, it explained the
importance of working closely with the Free Software
Foundation. Murdock wrote: The Free Software Foundation
plays an extremely important role in the future of
Debian. By the simple fact that they will be
distributing it, a message is sent to the world that
Linux is not a commercial product and that it never
should be, but that this does not mean that Linux will
never be able to compete commercially. For those of you
who disagree, I challenge you to rationalize the
success of GNU Emacs and GCC, which are not commercial
software but which have had quite an impact on the
commercial market regardless of that fact.
The time has come to concentrate on the future of Linux
rather than on the destructive goal of enriching
oneself at the expense of the entire Linux community
and its future. The development and distribution of
Debian may not be the answer to the problems that I
have outlined in the Manifesto, but I hope that it will
at least attract enough attention to these problems to
allow them to be solved. Shortly after the Manifesto's
release, the Free Software Foundation made its first
major request. Stallman wanted Murdock to call its
distribution "GNU/Linux." At first, Murdock says,
Stallman had wanted to use the term " Lignux"-"as in
Linux with GNU at the heart of it"-but a sample testing
of the term on Usenet and in various impromptu hacker
focus groups had merited enough catcalls to convince
Stallman to go with the less awkward GNU/Linux.
Although some would dismiss Stallman's attempt to add
the "GNU" prefix as a belated quest for credit, Murdock
saw it differently. Looking back, Murdock saw it as an
attempt to counteract the growing tension between GNU
Project and Linux-kernel developers. "There was a split
emerging," Murdock recalls. "Richard was concerned."
The deepest split, Murdock says, was over glibc. Short
for GNU C Library, glibc is the package that lets
programmers make "system calls" directed at the kernel.
Over the course of 1993-1994, glibc emerged as a
troublesome bottleneck in Linux development. Because so
many new users were adding new functions to the Linux
kernel, the GNU Project's glibc maintainers were soon
overwhelmed with suggested changes. Frustrated by
delays and the GNU Project's growing reputation for
foot-dragging, some Linux developers suggested creating
a " fork"-i.e., a Linux-specific C Library parallel to glibc.
In the hacker world, forks are an interesting
phenomenon. Although the hacker ethic permits a
programmer to do anything he wants with a given
program's source code, most hackers prefer to pour
their innovations into a central source-code file or "
tree" to ensure compatibility with other people's
programs. To fork glibc this early in the development
of Linux would have meant losing the potential input of
hundreds, even thousands, of Linux developers. It would
also mean growing incompatibility between Linux and the
GNU system that Stallman and the GNU team still hoped
to develop.
As leader of the GNU Project, Stallman had already
experienced the negative effects of a software fork in
1991. A group of Emacs developers working for a
software company named Lucid had a falling out over
Stallman's unwillingness to fold changes back into the
GNU Emacs code base. The fork had given birth to a
parallel version, Lucid Emacs, and hard feelings all around.Jamie Zawinski, a
former Lucid programmer who would go
on to head the Mozilla development team, has a web site
that documents the Lucid/GNU Emacs fork, titled, "The
Lemacs/FSFmacs Schism." http://www.jwz.org/doc/lemacs.html
Murdock says Debian was mounting work on a similar fork
in glibc source code that motivated Stallman to insist
on adding the GNU prefix when Debian rolled out its
software distribution. "The fork has since converged.
Still, at the time, there was a concern that if the
Linux community saw itself as a different thing as the
GNU community, it might be a force for disunity."
Stallman seconds Murdock's recollection. In fact, he
says there were nascent forks appearing in relation to
every major GNU component. At first, Stallman says he
considered the forks to be a product of sour grapes. In
contrast to the fast and informal dynamics of the
Linux-kernel team, GNU source-code maintainers tended
to be slower and more circumspect in making changes
that might affect a program's long-term viability. They
also were unafraid of harshly critiquing other people's
code. Over time, however, Stallman began to sense that
there was an underlying lack of awareness of the GNU
Project and its objectives when reading Linux
developers' emails.
"We discovered that the people who considered
themselves Linux users didn't care about the GNU
Project," Stallman says. "They said, `Why should I
bother doing these things? I don't care about the GNU
Project. It's working for me. It's working for us Linux
users, and nothing else matters to us.' And that was
quite surprising given that people were essentially
using a variant of the GNU system, and they cared so
little. They cared less than anybody else about GNU."
While some viewed descriptions of Linux as a "variant"
of the GNU Project as politically grasping, Murdock,
already sympathetic to the free software cause, saw
Stallman's request to call Debian's version GNU/Linux
as reasonable. "It was more for unity than for credit,"
he says.
Requests of a more technical nature quickly followed.
Although Murdock had been accommodating on political
issues, he struck a firmer pose when it came to the
design and development model of the actual software.
What had begun as a show of solidarity soon became of
model of other GNU projects.
"I can tell you that I've had my share of disagreements
with him," says Murdock with a laugh. "In all honesty
Richard can be a fairly difficult person to work with."
In 1996, Murdock, following his graduation from Purdue,
decided to hand over the reins of the growing Debian
project. He had already been ceding management duties
to Bruce Perens, the hacker best known for his work on
Electric Fence, a Unix utility released under the GPL.
Perens, like Murdock, was a Unix programmer who had
become enamored of GNU/Linux as soon as the program's
Unix-like abilities became manifest. Like Murdock,
Perens sympathized with the political agenda of
Stallman and the Free Software Foundation, albeit from afar.
"I remember after Stallman had already come out with
the GNU Manifesto, GNU Emacs, and GCC, I read an
article that said he was working as a consultant for
Intel," says Perens, recalling his first brush with
Stallman in the late 1980s. "I wrote him asking how he
could be advocating free software on the one hand and
working for Intel on the other. He wrote back saying,
`I work as a consultant to produce free software.' He
was perfectly polite about it, and I thought his answer
made perfect sense."
As a prominent Debian developer, however, Perens
regarded Murdock's design battles with Stallman with
dismay. Upon assuming leadership of the development
team, Perens says he made the command decision to
distance Debian from the Free Software Foundation. "I
decided we did not want Richard's style of
micro-management," he says.
According to Perens, Stallman was taken aback by the
decision but had the wisdom to roll with it. "He gave
it some time to cool off and sent a message that we
really needed a relationship. He requested that we call
it GNU/Linux and left it at that. I decided that was
fine. I made the decision unilaterally. Everybody
breathed a sigh of relief."
Over time, Debian would develop a reputation as the
hacker's version of Linux, alongside Slackware, another
popular distribution founded during the same 1993-1994
period. Outside the realm of hacker-oriented systems,
however, Linux was picking up steam in the commercial
Unix marketplace. In North Carolina, a Unix company
billing itself as Red Hat was revamping its business to
focus on Linux. The chief executive officer was Robert
Young, the former Linux Journal editor who in 1994 had
put the question to Linus Torvalds, asking whether he
had any regrets about putting the kernel under the GPL.
To Young, Torvalds' response had a "profound" impact on
his own view toward Linux. Instead of looking for a way
to corner the GNU/Linux market via traditional software
tactics, Young began to consider what might happen if a
company adopted the same approach as Debian-i.e.,
building an operating system completely out of free
software parts. Cygnus Solutions, the company founded
by Michael Tiemann and John Gilmore in 1990, was
already demonstrating the ability to sell free software
based on quality and customizability. What if Red Hat
took the same approach with GNU/Linux?
"In the western scientific tradition we stand on the
shoulders of giants," says Young, echoing both Torvalds
and Sir Isaac Newton before him. "In business, this
translates to not having to reinvent wheels as we go
along. The beauty of [the GPL] model is you put your
code into the public domain.Young uses the term "public domain" incorrectly
here.
Public domain means not protected by copyright.
GPL-protected programs are by definition protected by
copyright.
If you're an independent software vendor and you're
trying to build some application and you need a
modem-dialer, well, why reinvent modem dialers? You can
just steal PPP off of Red Hat Linux and use that as the
core of your modem-dialing tool. If you need a graphic
tool set, you don't have to write your own graphic
library. Just download GTK. Suddenly you have the
ability to reuse the best of what went before. And
suddenly your focus as an application vendor is less on
software management and more on writing the
applications specific to your customer's needs."
Young wasn't the only software executive intrigued by
the business efficiencies of free software. By late
1996, most Unix companies were starting to wake up and
smell the brewing source code. The Linux sector was
still a good year or two away from full commercial
breakout mode, but those close enough to the hacker
community could feel it: something big was happening.
The Intel 386 chip, the Internet, and the World Wide
Web had hit the marketplace like a set of monster
waves, and Linux-and the host of software programs that
echoed it in terms of source-code accessibility and
permissive licensing-seemed like the largest wave yet.
For Ian Murdock, the programmer courted by Stallman and
then later turned off by Stallman's micromanagement
style, the wave seemed both a fitting tribute and a
fitting punishment for the man who had spent so much
time giving the free software movement an identity.
Like many Linux aficionados, Murdock had seen the
original postings. He'd seen Torvalds's original
admonition that Linux was "just a hobby." He'd also
seen Torvalds's admission to Minix creator Andrew
Tanenbaum: "If the GNU kernel had been ready last
spring, I'd not have bothered to even start my project."This quote is taken
from the much-publicized
Torvalds-Tanenbaum "flame war" following the initial
release of Linux. In the process of defending his
choice of a nonportable monolithic kernel design,
Torvalds says he started working on Linux as a way to
learn more about his new 386 PC. "If the GNU kernel had
been ready last spring, I'd not have bothered to even
start my project." See Chris DiBona et al., Open
Sources (O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., 1999): 224.
Like many, Murdock knew the opportunities that had
been squandered. He also knew the excitement of
watching new opportunities come seeping out of the very
fabric of the Internet.
"Being involved with Linux in those early days was
fun," recalls Murdock. "At the same time, it was
something to do, something to pass the time. If you go
back and read those old [comp.os.minix] exchanges,
you'll see the sentiment: this is something we can play
with until the HURD is ready. People were anxious. It's
funny, but in a lot of ways, I suspect that Linux would
never have happened if the HURD had come along more quickly."
By the end of 1996, however, such "what if" questions
were already moot. Call it Linux, call it GNU/Linux;
the users had spoken. The 36-month window had closed,
meaning that even if the GNU Project had rolled out its
HURD kernel, chances were slim anybody outside the
hard-core hacker community would have noticed. The
first Unix-like free software operating system was
here, and it had momentum. All hackers had left to do
was sit back and wait for the next major wave to come
crashing down on their heads. Even the shaggy-haired
head of one Richard M. Stallman.
Ready or not.
Open Source
In November , 1995, Peter Salus, a member of the Free
Software Foundation and author of the 1994 book, A
Quarter Century of Unix , issued a call for papers to
members of the GNU Project's "system-discuss" mailing
list. Salus, the conference's scheduled chairman,
wanted to tip off fellow hackers about the upcoming
Conference on Freely Redistributable Software in
Cambridge, Massachusetts. Slated for February, 1996 and
sponsored by the Free Software Foundation, the event
promised to be the first engineering conference solely
dedicated to free software and, in a show of unity with
other free software programmers, welcomed papers on
"any aspect of GNU, Linux, NetBSD, 386BSD, FreeBSD,
Perl, Tcl/tk, and other tools for which the code is
accessible and redistributable." Salus wrote: Over the
past 15 years, free and low-cost software has become
ubiquitous. This conference will bring together
implementers of several different types of freely
redistributable software and publishers of such
software (on various media). There will be tutorials
and refereed papers, as well as keynotes by Linus
Torvalds and Richard Stallman.See Peter Salus, "FYI-Conference on Freely
Redistributable Software, 2/2, Cambridge" (1995)
(archived by Terry Winograd).
http://hci.stanford.edu/pcd-archives/pcd-fyi/1995/0078.html
One of the first people to receive Salus' email was
conference committee member Eric S. Raymond. Although
not the leader of a project or company like the various
other members of the list, Raymond had built a tidy
reputation within the hacker community as a major
contributor to GNU Emacs and as editor of The New
Hacker Dictionary, a book version of the hacking
community's decade-old Jargon File.
For Raymond, the 1996 conference was a welcome event.
Active in the GNU Project during the 1980s, Raymond had
distanced himself from the project in 1992, citing,
like many others before him, Stallman's
"micro-management" style. "Richard kicked up a fuss
about my making unauthorized modifications when I was
cleaning up the Emacs LISP libraries," Raymond recalls.
"It frustrated me so much that I decided I didn't want
to work with him anymore."
Despite the falling out, Raymond remained active in the
free software community. So much so that when Salus
suggested a conference pairing Stallman and Torvalds as
keynote speakers, Raymond eagerly seconded the idea.
With Stallman representing the older, wiser contingent
of ITS/Unix hackers and Torvalds representing the
younger, more energetic crop of Linux hackers, the
pairing indicated a symbolic show of unity that could
only be beneficial, especially to ambitious younger
(i.e., below 40) hackers such as Raymond. "I sort of
had a foot in both camps," Raymond says.
By the time of the conference, the tension between
those two camps had become palpable. Both groups had
one thing in common, though: the conference was their
first chance to meet the Finnish wunderkind in the
flesh. Surprisingly, Torvalds proved himself to be a
charming, affable speaker. Possessing only a slight
Swedish accent, Torvalds surprised audience members
with his quick, self-effacing wit.Although Linus Torvalds is Finnish, his
mother tongue
is Swedish. "The Rampantly Unofficial Linus FAQ" offers
a brief explanation: Finland has a significant (about
6%) Swedish-speaking minority population. They call
themselves "finlandssvensk" or "finlandssvenskar" and
consider themselves Finns; many of their families have
lived in Finland for centuries. Swedish is one of
Finland's two official languages.
http://tuxedo.org/~esr/faqs/linus/
Even more surprising, says Raymond, was Torvalds'
equal willingness to take potshots at other prominent
hackers, including the most prominent hacker of all,
Richard Stallman. By the end of the conference,
Torvalds' half-hacker, half-slacker manner was winning
over older and younger conference-goers alike.
"It was a pivotal moment," recalls Raymond. "Before
1996, Richard was the only credible claimant to being
the ideological leader of the entire culture. People
who dissented didn't do so in public. The person who
broke that taboo was Torvalds."
The ultimate breach of taboo would come near the end of
the show. During a discussion on the growing market
dominance of Microsoft Windows or some similar topic,
Torvalds admitted to being a fan of Microsoft's
PowerPoint slideshow software program. From the
perspective of old-line software purists, it was like a
Mormon bragging in church about his fondness of
whiskey. From the perspective of Torvalds and his
growing band of followers, it was simply common sense.
Why shun worthy proprietary software programs just to
make a point? Being a hacker wasn't about suffering, it
was about getting the job done.
"That was a pretty shocking thing to say," Raymond
remembers. "Then again, he was able to do that, because
by 1995 and 1996, he was rapidly acquiring clout."
Stallman, for his part, doesn't remember any tension at
the 1996 conference, but he does remember later feeling
the sting of Torvalds' celebrated cheekiness. "There
was a thing in the Linux documentation which says print
out the GNU coding standards and then tear them up,"
says Stallman, recalling one example. "OK, so he
disagrees with some of our conventions. That's fine,
but he picked a singularly nasty way of saying so. He
could have just said `Here's the way I think you should
indent your code.' Fine. There should be no hostility there."
For Raymond, the warm reception other hackers gave to
Torvalds' comments merely confirmed his suspicions. The
dividing line separating Linux developers from
GNU/Linux developers was largely generational. Many
Linux hackers, like Torvalds, had grown up in a world
of proprietary software. Unless a program was clearly
inferior, most saw little reason to rail against a
program on licensing issues alone. Somewhere in the
universe of free software systems lurked a program that
hackers might someday turn into a free software
alternative to PowerPoint. Until then, why begrudge
Microsoft the initiative of developing the program and
reserving the rights to it?
As a former GNU Project member, Raymond sensed an added
dynamic to the tension between Stallman and Torvalds.
In the decade since launching the GNU Project, Stallman
had built up a fearsome reputation as a programmer. He
had also built up a reputation for intransigence both
in terms of software design and people management.
Shortly before the 1996 conference, the Free Software
Foundation would experience a full-scale staff
defection, blamed in large part on Stallman. Brian
Youmans, a current FSF staffer hired by Salus in the
wake of the resignations, recalls the scene: "At one
point, Peter [Salus] was the only staff member working
in the office."
For Raymond, the defection merely confirmed a growing
suspicion: recent delays such as the HURD and recent
troubles such as the Lucid-Emacs schism reflected
problems normally associated with software project
management, not software code development. Shortly
after the Freely Redistributable Software Conference,
Raymond began working on his own pet software project,
a popmail utility called " fetchmail." Taking a cue
from Torvalds, Raymond issued his program with a
tacked-on promise to update the source code as early
and as often as possible. When users began sending in
bug reports and feature suggestions, Raymond, at first
anticipating a tangled mess, found the resulting
software surprisingly sturdy. Analyzing the success of
the Torvalds approach, Raymond issued a quick analysis:
using the Internet as his "petri dish" and the harsh
scrutiny of the hacker community as a form of natural
selection, Torvalds had created an evolutionary model
free of central planning.
What's more, Raymond decided, Torvalds had found a way
around Brooks' Law. First articulated by Fred P.
Brooks, manager of IBM's OS/360 project and author of
the 1975 book, The Mythical Man-Month , Brooks' Law
held that adding developers to a project only resulted
in further project delays. Believing as most hackers
that software, like soup, benefits from a limited
number of cooks, Raymond sensed something revolutionary
at work. In inviting more and more cooks into the
kitchen, Torvalds had actually found away to make the
resulting software better.Brooks' Law is the shorthand summary of the following
quote taken from Brooks' book: Since software
construction is inherently a systems effort-an exercise
in complex interrelationships-communication effort is
great, and it quickly dominates the decrease in
individual task time brought about by partitioning.
Adding more men then lengthens, not shortens, the
schedule. See Fred P. Brooks, The Mythical Man-Month
(Addison Wesley Publishing, 1995)
Raymond put his observations on paper. He crafted them
into a speech, which he promptly delivered before a
group of friends and neighbors in Chester County,
Pennsylvania. Dubbed " The Cathedral and the Bazaar,"
the speech contrasted the management styles of the GNU
Project with the management style of Torvalds and the
kernel hackers. Raymond says the response was
enthusiastic, but not nearly as enthusiastic as the one
he received during the 1997 Linux Kongress, a gathering
of Linux users in Germany the next spring.
"At the Kongress, they gave me a standing ovation at
the end of the speech," Raymond recalls. "I took that
as significant for two reasons. For one thing, it meant
they were excited by what they were hearing. For
another thing, it meant they were excited even after
hearing the speech delivered through a language barrier."
Eventually, Raymond would convert the speech into a
paper, also titled "The Cathedral and the Bazaar." The
paper drew its name from Raymond's central analogy. GNU
programs were "cathedrals," impressive, centrally
planned monuments to the hacker ethic, built to stand
the test of time. Linux, on the other hand, was more
like "a great babbling bazaar," a software program
developed through the loose decentralizing dynamics of
the Internet.
Implicit within each analogy was a comparison of
Stallman and Torvalds. Where Stallman served as the
classic model of the cathedral architect-i.e., a
programming "wizard" who could disappear for 18 months
and return with something like the GNU C
Compiler-Torvalds was more like a genial dinner-party
host. In letting others lead the Linux design
discussion and stepping in only when the entire table
needed a referee, Torvalds had created a development
model very much reflective of his own laid-back
personality. From the Torvalds' perspective, the most
important managerial task was not imposing control but
keeping the ideas flowing.
Summarized Raymond, "I think Linus's cleverest and most
consequential hack was not the construction of the
Linux kernel itself, but rather his invention of the
Linux development model."See Eric Raymond, "The Cathredral and the Bazaar"
(1997).
In summarizing the secrets of Torvalds' managerial
success, Raymond himself had pulled off a coup. One of
the audience members at the Linux Kongress was Tim
O'Reilly, publisher of O'Reilly & Associates, a company
specializing in software manuals and software-related
books (and the publisher of this book). After hearing
Raymond's Kongress speech, O'Reilly promptly invited
Raymond to deliver it again at the company's inaugural
Perl Conference later that year in Monterey, California.
Although the conference was supposed to focus on Perl,
a scripting language created by Unix hacker Larry Wall,
O'Reilly assured Raymond that the conference would
address other free software technologies. Given the
growing commercial interest in Linux and Apache, a
popular free software web server, O'Reilly hoped to use
the event to publicize the role of free software in
creating the entire infrastructure of the Internet.
From web-friendly languages such as Perl and Python to
back-room programs such as BIND (the Berkeley Internet
Naming Daemon), a software tool that lets users replace
arcane IP numbers with the easy-to-remember domain-name
addresses (e.g., amazon.com), and sendmail, the most
popular mail program on the Internet, free software had
become an emergent phenomenon. Like a colony of ants
creating a beautiful nest one grain of sand at a time,
the only thing missing was the communal self-awareness.
O'Reilly saw Raymond's speech as a good way to inspire
that self-awareness, to drive home the point that free
software development didn't start and end with the GNU
Project. Programming languages, such as Perl and
Python, and Internet software, such as BIND, sendmail,
and Apache, demonstrated that free software was already
ubiquitous and influential. He also assured Raymond an
even warmer reception than the one at Linux Kongress.
O'Reilly was right. "This time, I got the standing
ovation before the speech," says Raymond, laughing.
As predicted, the audience was stocked not only with
hackers, but with other people interested in the
growing power of the free software movement. One
contingent included a group from Netscape, the Mountain
View, California startup then nearing the end game of
its three-year battle with Microsoft for control of the
web-browser market.
Intrigued by Raymond's speech and anxious to win back
lost market share, Netscape executives took the message
back to corporate headquarters. A few months later, in
January, 1998, the company announced its plan to
publish the source code of its flagship Navigator web
browser in the hopes of enlisting hacker support in
future development.
When Netscape CEO Jim Barksdale cited Raymond's
"Cathedral and the Bazaar" essay as a major influence
upon the company's decision, the company instantly
elevated Raymond to the level of hacker celebrity.
Determined not to squander the opportunity, Raymond
traveled west to deliver interviews, advise Netscape
executives, and take part in the eventual party
celebrating the publication of Netscape Navigator's
source code. The code name for Navigator's source code
was "Mozilla": a reference both to the program's
gargantuan size-30 million lines of code-and to its
heritage. Developed as a proprietary offshoot of
Mosaic, the web browser created by Marc Andreessen at
the University of Illinois, Mozilla was proof, yet
again, that when it came to building new programs, most
programmers preferred to borrow on older, modifiable programs.