A short distance to the southwest of Verdun, on the bare face of a

hill, is Fort de la Chaume. Like the other fortifications built to

defend the city, it no longer has any military value save for purposes

of observation. Peering through a narrow slit in one of its armored

_observatoires_, I was able to view the whole field of the world's

greatest battle--a battle which lasted a year and cost a million

men--as from the gallery of a theatre one might look down upon the

stage, the boxes, and the orchestra-stalls. Below me, rising from the

meadows beside the Meuse, were the shattered roofs and fire-blackened

walls of Verdun, dominated by the stately tower of the cathedral and

by the great bulk of the citadel. The environs of the town and the

hill slopes beyond the river were constantly pricked by sudden scarlet

jets as the flame leaped from the mouths of the carefully concealed

French guns, which seemed to be literally everywhere, while countless

geyser-like irruptions of the earth, succeeded by drifting patches of

white vapor, showed where the German shells were bursting. Sweeping

the landscape with my field-glasses, a long column of motor-trucks

laden with ammunition came within my field of vision. As I looked

there suddenly appeared, squarely in the path of the foremost vehicle,

a splotch of yellow smoke shot through with red. When the smoke and

dust had cleared away, the motor-truck had disappeared. The artillery

officer who accompanied me directed my gaze across the level valley to

where, beyond the river, rose the great brown ridge known as the

Heights of the Meuse.

"Do you appreciate," he asked, "that on three miles of that ridge a

million men--400,000 French and 600,000 Germans--have already fallen?"

Beyond the ridge, but hidden by it, were Hill 304 and Le Mort Homme of

bloody memory, while on the horizon, looking like low, round-topped

hillocks, were Forts Douaumont and de Vaux (what a thrill those names

must give to every Frenchman!) and farther down the slope and a

little nearer me were Fleury and Tavannes. The fountains of earth and

smoke which leaped upward from each of them at the rate of half a

dozen to the minute, showed us that they were enduring a particularly

vicious hammering by the Germans.

There are no words between the covers of the dictionary which can

bring home to one who has not witnessed them the awful violence of the

shell-storms which have desolated these hills about Verdun. In one

week's attack to the north of the city the Germans threw five million

shells, the total weight of which was forty-seven thousand tons.

Eighty thousand shells rained upon one shallow sector of a thousand

yards, and these were so marvellously placed that the crater of one

cut into that of its neighbor, pulverizing everything that lived and

turning the man-filled trenches into tombs. Hence there is no longer

any such thing as a continuous line of trenches. Indeed, there are no

longer any trenches at all, nor entanglements either, but only a

series of craters. It is these craters which the French infantry has

held with such unparalleled heroism. The men holding the craters are

kept supplied with food and ammunition from the chain of little

forts--Vaux, Douaumont, and the others--and the forts, themselves

battered almost to pieces by the torrents of steel which have been

poured upon them, have relied in turn on the citadel back in Verdun

for their reinforcements, their ammunition, and their provisions, all

of which have had to be sent out at night, the latter on the backs of

men.

So violent and long-continued have been the hurricanes of steel which

have swept these slopes, that the surface of the earth has been

literally blasted away, leaving a treacherous and incredibly tenacious

quagmire in which horses and even soldiers have lost their lives.

General Dubois told me that, only a few days before my visit to

Verdun, one of his staff-officers, returning alone and afoot from an

errand to Vaux, had fallen into a shell-crater and had drowned in the

mud. Indeed, the whole terrain is pitted with shell-holes as is

pitted the face of a man who has had the small-pox. So terrible is the

condition of the country that it often takes a soldier an hour to

cover a mile. What was once a smiling and prosperous countryside has

been rendered, by human agency, as barren and worthless as the slopes

of Vesuvius.

Verdun, I repeat, was held not by gun-power but by man-power. It was

not the monster guns on railway-trucks, or even the great numbers of

quick-firing, hard-hitting 75's, but the magnificent courage and

tenacity of the tired men in the mud-splashed uniforms, which held

Verdun for France. Though their forts were crumbling under the

violence of the German bombardment; though their trenches were pounded

into pudding; though the unceasing barrage made it at times impossible

to bring up food or water or reinforcements, the French hung

stubbornly on, and against the granite wall of their defense the waves

of men in gray flung themselves in vain. And when the fury of the

German assaults had in a measure spent itself, General Nivelle retook

in a few hours, on October 24, 1916, Forts Douaumont and de Vaux,

which had cost the Germans seven months of incessant efforts and a

sacrifice of human lives unparalleled in history.

The fighting before Verdun illustrated and emphasized the revolution

in methods of attack and defense which has taken place in the French

army. At the beginning of the war the French believed in depending

largely on their light artillery both to prepare and to support an

attack, and for this purpose their 75's were admirably adapted. This

method worked well when carried out properly, and before the Germans

had time to bring up their heavy guns; it was by resorting to it that

the French won the victory of the Marne. But the Marne taught the

Germans that the surest way to break up the French system of attack

was to interpose obstacles, such as woods, wire entanglements, and

particularly trenches. To destroy these obstacles the French then had

to resort to heavy-calibered pieces, with which, as I have already

remarked, they were at first very inadequately supplied. In the spring

of 1915 in Artois, and in the autumn of the same year in Champagne,

they attempted to break through the German lines, but these attacks

were not supported by sufficient artillery and were each conducted in

a single locality over a limited front. Then, at Verdun, the Germans

tried opposite tactics, attempting to break through on a wide front

extending on both sides of the Meuse. So appalling were their losses,

however, that, as the attack progressed, they were compelled by lack

of sufficient effectives to constantly narrow their front until

finally the action was taking place along a line of only a few

kilometres. This permitted the French to concentrate both their

infantry and their artillery into dense formations, and before this

concentrated and intensive fire the German attacking columns withered

and were swept away like leaves before an autumn wind.

The French infantry--and the same is, I believe, true of the

German--is now to all intents and purposes divided into two classes:

holding troops and attacking, or "shock" troops, as the French call

them. The latter consist of such picked elements as the Chasseur

battalions, the Zouaves, the Colonials, the First, Twentieth, and

Twenty-first Army Corps, and, of course, the Foreign Legion. All these

are recruited from the youngest and most vigorous men, due regard

being also paid to selecting recruits from those parts of France which

have always produced the best fighting stock--and among these are the

invaded districts. Shock troops are rarely sent into the trenches, but

when not actively engaged in conducting or resisting an attack, are

kept in cantonments well to the rear. Here they can get undisturbed

rest at night, but by day they are worked as a negro teamster works

his mule. As a result, they are always "on their toes," and in perfect

fighting trim. In this way mobility, cohesion, and enthusiasm, all

qualities which are seriously impaired by a long stay in the trenches,

are preserved in the attacking troops, who, when they go into battle,

are as keen and hard and well-trained as a prize-fighter who steps

into the ring to battle for the championship belt.

The most striking feature of the new French system of attack is the

team-work of the infantry, artillery, and airplanes. The former

advance to the assault in successive waves, each made up of several

lines, the men being deployed at five-yard intervals. The first wave

advances at a slow walk behind a curtain of artillery fire, which

moves forward at the rate of fifty yards a minute, the first line of

the wave keeping a hundred to a hundred and fifty yards, or, in other

words, at a safe distance, behind this protecting fire-curtain. The

men in this first line carry no rifles, but consist exclusively of

grenadiers, automatic riflemen, and their ammunition carriers, every

eighth man being armed with the new Chauchat automatic rifle, a

recently adopted weapon which weighs only nineteen pounds, and fires

at the rate of five shots a second. Three men, carrying between them

one thousand cartridges, are assigned to each of these guns, of which

there are now more than fifty thousand in use on the French front. The

automatic riflemen fire from the hip as they advance, keeping streams

of bullets playing on the enemy just as firemen keep streams of water

playing on a fire. In the second line the men are armed with rifles,

some having bayonets and others rifle grenades, the latter being

specially designed to break up counter-attacks against captured

trenches. A third line follows, consisting of "trench cleaners,"

though it must not be inferred from their name that they use mops and

brooms. The native African troops are generally used for this

trench-cleaning business, and they do it very handily with grenades,

pistols and knives.

When the first wave reaches a point within two hundred to three

hundred yards of the enemy's trenches, a halt of five minutes is made

to re-form for the final charge. In addition to the advancing

curtain-fire immediately preceding the troops, a second screen of fire

is dropped between the enemy's first and second lines, thus preventing

the men in the first line from retreating and making it equally

impossible for the men in the second line to get reinforcements or

supplies to their comrades in the first. Still other batteries are

engaged in keeping down the fire of the hostile artillery while the

big guns, mounted on railway-trucks, shell the enemy's headquarters,

his supports, and his lines of communication.

The attack is accompanied by and largely directed by airplanes,

certain of which are assigned to regulating the artillery fire, while

others devote themselves exclusively to giving information to the

infantry, with whom they communicate by means of dropping from one to

six fire-balls. As the aircraft used for infantry and artillery

regulation are comparatively slow machines, they are protected from

the attacks of enemy aviators by a screen of small, fast

battle-planes--the destroyers of the air--which, in several cases,

have swooped low enough to use their machine-guns on the German

trenches. If it becomes necessary to give to the infantry some special

information not provided for by the prearranged signals, the aviator

will volplane down to within a hundred feet above the infantry and

drop a written message. I was told that in one of the successful

French attacks before Verdun such a message proved extremely useful as

by means of it the troops advancing toward Douaumont, which was then

held by the Germans, were informed that the enemy was in force on

their right, but that there was practically no resistance on their

left. Acting in response to this information from the skies, they

swung forward on this flank, and took the Germans on their right in

the rear. Just as a football team is coached from the side-lines, so a

charge is nowadays directed from the clouds.

[Illustration: Australians on the Way to the Trenches.

Despite gas, bullets, shells, rain, mud, and cold the British

soldier remains incorrigibly cheerful. He is a born optimist.]

[Illustration: The Fire Trench.

"Figures, looking strangely mediæval in their steel helmets,

crouched motionless, peering out into No Man's Land."]

One of the picturesque developments of the war is _camouflage_, as

the French call their system of disguising or concealing batteries,

airplane-sheds, ammunition stores, and the like, from observation and

possible destruction by enemy aviators. This work is done in the main

by a corps specially recruited for the purpose from the artists and

scene painters of France. It is considered prudent, for example, to

conceal the location of a certain "ammunition dump," as the British

term the vast accumulations of shells, cartridges, and other supplies

which are piled up at the railheads awaiting transportation to the

front by motor-lorry. Over the great mound of shells and

cartridge-boxes is spread an enormous piece of canvas, often larger by

far than the "big top" of a four-ring circus. Then the scene painters

get to work with their paints and brushes and transform that expanse

of canvas into what, when viewed from the sky, appears to be, let us

say, a group of innocent farm-buildings. The next day, perhaps, a

German airman, circling high overhead, peers earthward through his

glasses and descries, far beneath him, a cluster of red

rectangles--the tiled roofs of cottages or stables, he supposes; a

patch of green--evidently a bit of lawn; a square of gray--the

cobble-paved barnyard--and pays it no further attention. How can he

know that what he takes to be a farmstead is but a piece of painted

canvas concealing a small mountain of potential death?

At a certain very important point on the French front there long

stood, in an exposed and commanding position, a large and solitary

tree, or rather the trunk of a tree, for it had been shorn of its

branches by shell-fire. A landmark in that flat and devastated region,

every detail of this gaunt sentinel had long since become familiar to

the keen eyed observers in the German trenches, a few hundred yards

away. Were a man to climb to its top--and live--he would be able to

command a comprehensive view of the surrounding terrain. The German

sharpshooters saw to it, however, that no one climbed it. But one day

the resourceful French took the measurements of that tree and

photographed it. These measurements and photographs were sent to

Paris. A few weeks later there arrived at the French front by railway

an imitation tree, made of steel, which was an exact duplicate in

every respect, even to the splintered branches and the bark, of the

original. Under cover of darkness the real tree was cut down and the

fake tree erected in its place, so that, when daylight came, there was

no change in the landscape to arouse the Germans' suspicions. The lone

tree-trunk to which they had grown so accustomed still reared itself

skyward. But the "tree" at which the Germans were now looking was of

hollow steel, and concealed in its interior in a sort of

conning-tower, forty feet above the ground, a French observing

officer, field-glasses at his eyes and a telephone at his lips, was

peering through a cleverly concealed peep-hole, spotting the bursts of

the French shells and regulating the fire of the French batteries.

Nearly three years have passed since Germany tore up the Scrap of

Paper. In that time the French army has been hammered and tempered and

tested until it has become the most formidable weapon of offense and

defense in existence. I am convinced that in organization and in

efficiency it is now, after close on three years of experiments and

object-lessons, as good, if not better, than the German--and I have

marched with both and have seen both in action. Its light artillery is

admittedly the finest in the world. Though without any heavy artillery

to speak of at the beginning of the war, it has in this respect

already equalled if not surpassed the Germans. It has created an air

service which, in efficiency and in number of machines, is unequalled.

And the men, themselves, in addition to their characteristic _élan_,

possess that invaluable quality which the German soldier

lacks--initiative.

It is worthy of note, in this connection, that the entire

reorganization of the French army has been carried out virtually

without any action on the part of the French Congress, and with merely

the formal approval of the Minister of War. The politicians in Paris

have, save in a few instances, wisely refrained from interference, and

have left military problems to be decided by military men. But, when

all is said and done, it will not be the generals who will decide this

war; it will be the soldiers. And they are truly wonderful men, these

French soldiers. It is their amazing calm, their total freedom from

nervousness or apprehension, that impresses one the most, and the

secret of this calm is confidence. They are as confident of eventual

victory as they are that the sun will rise to-morrow morning. They are

fanatics, and France is their Allah. You can't beat men like that,

because they never know when they are beaten, and keep on fighting.

I like to think that sometimes, in that cold and dismal hour before

the dawn, when hope and courage are at their lowest ebb, there

appears among the worn and homesick soldiers in the trenches the

spirit of the Great Emperor. Cheeringly he claps each man upon the

shoulder.

"Courage, mon brave," he whispers. "On les aura!"

FOOTNOTES:

[C] A nickname for the Hispana-Suiza.

[D] Though great numbers of American-built airplanes have been

shipped to Europe, they are being used only for purposes of

instruction, as they are not considered fast enough for work on the

front.

[E] Commandant Bunau-Varilla was really sent as a compliment to my

companion, Mr. Arthur Page, editor of _The World's Work_.

VII

"THAT CONTEMPTIBLE LITTLE ARMY"

In watching the operations on the British front I have always had the

feeling that I was witnessing a gigantic engineering undertaking. The

amazing network of rails which the British have thrown over Northern

France, the endless strings of lorries, the warehouses bulging with

supplies, the cranes and derricks, the repair depots, the

machine-shops, the tens of thousands of men whose only weapons are the

shovel and the pick, all help to further this impression. And, when

you stop to think about it, it is an engineering undertaking. These

muddy men in khaki are engaged in checking and draining off an unclean

flood which, were it not for them, would soon inundate all Europe. And

so, because I love things that are clean and green and beautiful, I

am very grateful to them for their work of sanitation.

Because most of the despatches from the British front have related to

trenches and tanks and howitzers and flying men and raiding-parties,

the attention of the American people has been diverted from the

remarkable and tremendously important work which is being played by

the army behind the army. Yet one of the most splendid achievements of

the entire war is the creation of the great organization which links

the British trenches with the British Isles. In failing to take into

account the Anglo-Saxon's genius for rapid organization and

improvization in emergencies, Germany made a fatal error. She had

spent upward of forty years in perfecting her war machine; the British

have built a better one in less than three. I said in "_Vive la

France!_" if I remember rightly, that the British machine, though

still somewhat wabbly and creaky in its joints, was, I believed,

eventually going to do the business for which it was designed. That

was a year ago. It has already shown in unmistakable fashion that it

can do the business and do it well, and it is, moreover, just entering

on the period of its greatest efficiency.

In order to understand the workings and the ramifications of this

great machine in France (its work in England is another story) you

must begin your study of it at the base camps which the British have

established at Calais, Havre, Boulogne, and Rouen, and the

training-schools at Etaples and elsewhere. Let us take, for example,

"Cinder City," as the base camp outside Calais is called because the

ground on which it stands was made by dumping ships' cinders into a

marsh. It is in many respects one of the most remarkable cities in the

world. Its population, which fluctuates with the tide of war,

averages, I suppose, about one hundred thousand. It has many miles of

macadamized streets (as sandy locations are chosen for these base

camps, mud is almost unknown) lined with storehouses--one of them the

largest in the world--with stores, with machine-shops, churches,

restaurant, club-rooms, libraries, Y. M. C. A.'s--there are over a

thousand of them in the war zone--Salvation Army barracks, schools,

bathing establishments, theatres, motion-picture houses, hospitals for

men and hospitals for horses, and thousands upon thousands of portable

wooden huts. This city is lighted by electricity, it has highly

efficient police, fire, and street-cleaning departments, and its water

and sewage systems would make jealous many municipalities of twice its

size. Among its novel features is a school for army bakers and another

for army cooks, for good food has almost as much to do with winning

battles as good ammunition. But most significant and important of all

are the "economy shops" where are repaired or manufactured practically

everything required by an army. War, as the British have found, is a

staggeringly expensive business, and, in order that there may be a

minimum of wastage, they have organized a Salvage Corps whose

business it is to sort the litter of the battle-fields and to send

everything that can by any possibility be re-utilized to the "economy

shops" at the rear. In one of these shops I saw upward of a thousand

French and Belgian women renovating clothing that had come back from

the front, uniforms which arrived as bundles of muddy, bloody rags

being fumigated and cleaned and mended and pressed until they were

almost as good as new. Tens of thousands of boots are sent in to be

repaired; those that can stand the operation are soled and heeled by

American machines brought over for the purpose, and even the others

are not wasted, for their tops are converted into boot-laces. In one

shop the worn-out tubes and springs of guns are replaced with new

ones. (Did you know that during an intense bombardment the springs of

the guns will last only two days?) In another fragments of valuable

metal sent in from the battle-field are melted and reused. (Perhaps

you were not aware that a 5-inch shell carries a copper band weighing

a pound and a quarter. The weight of copper shot off in this way

during a single brief bombardment was four hundred tons.) The millions

of empty shells which litter the ground behind the batteries are

cleaned and classified and shipped over to England to be reloaded.

Steel rails which the retreating Germans believed they had made quite

useless are here straightened out and used over again. Shattered

rifles, bits of harness, haversacks, machine-gun belts, trench

helmets, sand-bags, barbed wire--nothing escapes the Salvage Corps.

They even collect and send in old rags, which are sold for two hundred

and fifty dollars a ton. Let us talk less hereafter of _German_

efficiency.

Even more significant than the base camps of the efficiency and

painstaking thoroughness of the British war-machine are the training

camps scattered behind the lines. Typical of these is the great camp

at Etaples, on the French coast, where 150,000 men can be trained at a

time. These are not schools for raw recruits, mind you--that work is

done in England--but "finishing schools," as it were, where men who

are supposed to have already learned the business of war are given

final examinations in the various subjects in which they have received

instruction before being sent up to the front. And the soldier who is

unable to pass these final tests does not go to the front until he

can. The camp at Etaples, which is built on a stretch of rolling sand

beside the sea, is five miles long and a mile wide, and on every acre

of it there are squads of soldiers drilling, drilling, drilling. Here

a gymnastic instructor from Sandhurst, lithe and active as a panther,

is teaching a class of sergeants drawn from many regiments how to

become instructors themselves. His language would have amazed and

delighted Kipling's Ortheris and Mulvaney; I could have listened to

him all day. Over there a platoon of Highlanders are practising the

taking of German trenches. At the blast of a whistle they clamber out

of a length of trench built for the purpose, and, with shrill Gaelic

yells, go swarming across a stretch of broken ground, through a tangle

of twisted wire, and over the top of the German parapet, whereupon a

row of German soldiers, stuffed with straw and automatically

controlled, spring up to meet them. If a man fails to bury his bayonet

in the "German" who opposes him, he is sent back to the awkward squad

and spends a few days lunging at a dummy swung from a beam.

Italy at war and the Allies in the West · 第 8 / 12 段