THE IRISH CONVENTION
After the failure of Mr. Lloyd George's negotiations for settlement in
the summer of 1916 the Nationalists practically dropped all pretence of
helping the Government to carry on the war. They were, no doubt,
beginning to realise how completely they were losing hold of the people
of Southern Ireland, and that the only chance of regaining their
vanishing popularity was by an attitude of hostility to the British
Government.
Frequently during the autumn and winter they raised debates in
Parliament on the demand that the Home Rule Act should immediately come
into operation, and threatened that if this were not done recruits from
Ireland would not be forthcoming, although the need for men was now a
matter of great national urgency. They ignored the fact that Mr. Redmond
was a consenting party to Mr. Asquith's policy of holding Home Rule in
abeyance till after the war, and attempted to explain away their own
loss of influence in Ireland by alleging that the exasperation of the
Irish people at the delay in obtaining "self-government" was the cause
of their alienation from England, and of the growth of Sinn Fein.
In December 1916 the Asquith Government came to an end, and Mr. Lloyd
George became Prime Minister. He had shown his estimate of Sir Edward
Carson's statesmanship by pressing Mr. Asquith to entrust the entire
conduct of the war to a Committee of four, of whom the Ulster leader
should be one; and, having failed in this attempt to infuse energy and
decision into the counsels of his Chief, he turned him out and formed a
Ministry with Carson in the office of First Lord of the Admiralty, at
that time one of the most vital in the Government. Colonel James Craig
also joined the Ministry as Treasurer of the Household.
The change of Government did nothing to alter the attitude of the
Nationalists, unless, indeed, the return of Carson to high office added
to the fierceness of their attacks. On the 26th of February 1917--just
when "unrestricted submarine warfare" was bringing the country into its
greatest peril--Mr. Dillon called upon the Government to release
twenty-eight men who had been deported from Ireland, and who were
declared by Mr. Duke, the Chief Secretary, to have been deeply
implicated in the Easter rebellion of the previous year; and a week
later Mr. T.P. O'Connor returned to the charge with another demand for
Home Rule without further ado.
The debate on Mr. O'Connor's motion on the 7th of March was made
memorable by the speech of Major William Redmond, home on leave from the
trenches in France, whose sincere and impassioned appeal for oblivion of
old historic quarrels between Irish Catholics and Protestants, who were
at that moment fighting and dying side by side in France, made a deep
impression on the House of Commons and the country. And when this
gallant officer fell in action not long afterwards and was carried out
of the firing line by Ulster soldiers, his speech on the 7th of March
was recalled and made the peg on which to hang many adjurations to
Ulster to come into line with their Nationalist fellow-countrymen of the
South.
Such appeals revealed a curious inability to grasp the realities of the
situation. Men spoke and wrote as if it were something new and wonderful
for Irishmen of the "two nations" to be found fighting side by side in
the British Army--as if the same thing had not been seen in the
Peninsula, in the Crimea, on the Indian frontier, in South Africa, and
in many another fight. Ulstermen, like everybody else who knew Major
Redmond, deplored the loss of a very gallant officer and a very lovable
man. But they could not understand why his death should be made a reason
for a change in their political convictions. When Major Arthur O'Neill,
an Ulster member, was killed in action in 1914, no one had suggested
that Nationalists should on that account turn Unionists. Why, they
wondered, should Unionists any more turn Nationalists because a
Nationalist M.P. had made the same supreme sacrifice? All this
sentimental talk of that time was founded on the misconception that
Ulster's attachment to the Union was the result of personal prejudice
against Catholics of the South, instead of being, as it was, a
deliberate and reasoned conviction as to the best government for
Ireland.
This distinction was clearly brought out in the same debate by Sir John
Lonsdale, who, when Carson became a member of the Cabinet, had been
elected leader of the Ulster Party in the House of Commons; and an
emphatic pronouncement, which went to the root of the controversy, was
made in reply to the Nationalists by the Prime Minister. In the
north-eastern portion of Ireland, he said:
"You have a population as hostile to Irish rule as the rest of
Ireland is to British rule, yea, and as ready to rebel against it
as the rest of Ireland is against British rule--as alien in blood,
in religious faith, in traditions, in outlook--as alien from the
rest of Ireland in this respect as the inhabitants of Fife or
Aberdeen. To place them under National rule against their will
would be as glaring an outrage on the principles of liberty and
self-government as the denial of self-government would be for the
rest of Ireland."
The Government were, therefore, prepared, said Mr. Lloyd George, to
bring in Home Rule immediately for that part of Ireland that wanted it,
but not for the Northern part which did not want it. Mr. Redmond made a
fine display of indignation at this refusal to coerce Ulster; and, in
imitation of the Unionists in 1914, marched out of the House at the head
of his party. Next day he issued a manifesto to men of Irish blood in
the United States and in the Dominions, calling on them to use all means
in their power to exert pressure on the British Government. It was clear
that this sort of thing could not be tolerated in the middle of a war in
which Great Britain was fighting for her life, and at a crisis in it
when her fortunes were far from prosperous. Accordingly, on the 16th of
March Mr. Bonar Law warned the Nationalists that their conduct might
make it necessary to appeal to the country on the ground that they were
obstructing the prosecution of the war. But he also announced that the
Cabinet intended to make one more attempt to arrive at a settlement of
the apparently insoluble problem of Irish government.
Two months passed before it was made known how this attempt was to be
made. On the 16th of May the Prime Minister addressed a letter in
duplicate to Mr. Redmond and Sir John Lonsdale, representing the two
Irish parties respectively, in which he put forward for their
consideration two alternative methods of procedure, after premising that
the Government felt precluded from proposing during the war any measures
except such as "would be substantially accepted by both sides."
These alternatives were: _(a)_ a "Bill for the immediate application of
the Home Rule Act to Ireland, but excluding therefrom the six counties
of North-East Ulster," or, _(b)_ a Convention of Irishmen "for the
purpose of drafting a Constitution ... which should secure a just
balance of all the opposing interests." Sir John Lonsdale replied to the
Prime Minister that he would take the Government's first proposal to
Belfast for consideration by the Council; but as Mr. Redmond, on the
other hand, peremptorily refused to have anything to say to it, it
became necessary to fall back on the other alternative, namely the
assembling of an Irish Convention.
The members chosen to sit in the Convention were to be "representative
men" in Emerson's meaning of the words, but not in the democratic sense
as deriving their authority from direct popular election. Certain
political organisations and parties were each invited to nominate a
certain number; the Churches were represented by their leading clergy;
men occupying public positions, such as chairmen of local authorities,
were given _ex-officio_ seats; and a certain number were nominated by
the Government. The total membership of this variegated assembly was
ninety-five. The Sinn Fein party were invited to join, but refused to
have anything to do with it, declaring that they would consider nothing
short of complete independence for Ireland. The majority of the Irish
people thus stood aloof from the Convention altogether.
As the purpose for which the Convention was called was quickly lost
sight of by many, and by none more than its Chairman, it is well to
remember what that purpose was. If it had not been for the opposition of
Ulster, the Home Rule Act of 1914 would have been in force for years,
and none of the many attempts at settlement would have been necessary.
The one and only thing required was to reconcile, if possible, the
aspirations of Ulster with those of the rest of Ireland. That was the
purpose, and the only purpose, of the Convention; and in the letter
addressed to Sir John Lonsdale equally with Mr. Redmond, the Prime
Minister distinctly laid it down that unless its conclusions were
accepted "by both sides," nothing could come of it. To leave no shadow
of doubt on this point Mr. Bonar Law, in reply to a specific question,
said that there could be no "substantial agreement" to which Ulster was
not a party.
It is necessary to emphasise this point, because for such a purpose the
heterogeneous conglomeration of Nationalists of all shades that formed
the great majority of the Convention was worse than useless. The
Convention was in reality a bi-lateral conference, in which one of the
two sides was four times as numerous as the other. Yet much party
capital was subsequently made of the fact that the Nationalist members
agreed upon a scheme of Home Rule--an achievement which had no element
of the miraculous or even of the unexpected about it.
Notwithstanding that the Sinn Fein party had displayed their contempt
for the Convention, and under the delusion that it would "create an
atmosphere of good-will" for its meeting, the Government released
without condition or reservation all the prisoners concerned in the
Easter rebellion of 1916. It was like playing a penny whistle to
conciliate a cobra. The prisoners, from whose minds nothing was further
than any thought of good-will to England, were received by the populace
in Dublin with a rapturous ovation, their triumphal procession being
headed by Mr. De Valera, who was soon afterwards elected member for East
Clare by a majority of nearly thirty thousand. Four months later, the
Chief Secretary told Parliament that the young men of Southern Ireland,
who had refused to serve in the Army, were being enrolled in preparation
for another rebellion.
It was only after some hesitation that the Ulster Unionist Council
decided not to hold aloof from the Convention, as the Sinn Feiners did.
Carson accompanied Sir John Lonsdale to Belfast and explained the
explicit pledges by Ministers that participation would not commit them
to anything, that they would not be bound by any majority vote, and that
without their concurrence no legislation was to be founded on any
agreement between the other groups in the Convention; he also urged that
Ulster could not refuse to do what the Government held would be helpful
in the prosecution of the war.
The invitation to nominate five delegates was therefore accepted; and
when the membership of the Convention was complete there were nineteen
out of ninety-five who could be reckoned as supporters in general of the
Ulster point of view. Among them were the Primate, the Moderator of the
General Assembly, the Duke of Abercorn, the Marquis of Londonderry, Mr.
H.M. Pollock, Chairman of the Belfast Chamber of Commerce, one Labour
representative, Mr J. Hanna, and the Lord Mayors of Belfast and Derry.
It was agreed that Mr. H.T. Barrie, member for North Derry, should act
as chairman and leader of the Ulster group, and he discharged this
difficult duty with unfailing tact and ability.
There was some difficulty in finding a suitable Chairman, for no party
was willing to accept any strong man opposed to their own views, while
an impartial man was not to be found in Ireland. Eventually the choice
fell on Sir Horace Plunkett as a gentleman who, if eagerly supported by
none, was accepted by each group as preferable to a more formidable
opponent. Sir Horace made no pretence of impartiality. Whatever
influence he possessed was used as a partisan of the Nationalists. He
was not, like the Speaker of the House of Commons, a silent guardian of
order; he often harangued the assembly, which, on one occasion at least,
he addressed for over an hour; and he issued manifestos,
_questionnaires_, and letters to members, one of which was sharply
censured as misleading both by Mr. Barrie and the Bishop of Raphoe.
The procedure adopted was described by the Chairman himself as
"unprecedented." It was not only that, but was unsuitable in the last
degree for the purpose in view. When it is borne in mind what that
purpose was, it is clear that the only business-like method would have
been to invite the Ulster delegates at the outset to formulate their
objections to coming under the Home Rule Act of 1914, and then to see
whether Mr. Redmond could make any concessions which would persuade
Ulster to accept something less than the permanent exclusion of six
counties, which had been their _minimum_ hitherto.
The procedure actually followed was ludicrously different. The object,
as stated by the chairman, was "to avoid raising contentious issues in
such a way as to divide the Convention on party lines,"[96] which, to
say the least, was a curious method of handling the most contentious
problem in British politics. A fine opportunity was offered to amateur
constitution-mongers. Anyone was allowed to propound a scheme for the
future government of Ireland, which, of course, was an encouragement to
endless wide-ranging debate, with the least conceivable likelihood of
arriving at definite decisions. Neither of the leaders of the two
parties whose agreement was essential if the Convention was to have any
result took the initiative in bringing forward proposals. Mr. Redmond
was invited to do so, but declined. Mr. Barrie had no reason to do so,
because the Ulster scheme for the government of Ireland was the
legislative union. So it was left to individuals with no official
responsibility to set forth their ideas, which became the subject of
protracted debates of a general character.
It was further arranged that while contentious issues--the only ones
that mattered--should be avoided, any conclusions reached on minor
matters should be purely provisional, and contingent on agreement being
come to ultimately on fundamentals. Month after month was spent in thus
discussing such questions as the powers which an Irish Parliament ought
to wield, while the question whether Ulster was to come into that
Parliament was left to stand over. Committees and sub-committees were
appointed to thresh out these details, and some of them relieved the
tedium by wandering into such interesting by-ways of irrelevancy as
housing and land purchase, all of which, in Gilbertian phrase, "had
nothing to do with the case."
The Ulster group raised no objection to all this expenditure of time and
energy. For they saw that it was not time wasted. From the standpoint of
the highest national interest it was, indeed, more useful than anything
the Convention could have accomplished by business-like methods. The
summer and autumn of 1917, and the early months of 1918, covered a
terribly critical period of the war. The country was never in greater
peril, and the attitude of the Nationalists in the House of Commons
added to the difficulties of the Government, as Mr. Bonar Law had
complained in March. It was to placate them that the Convention had been
summoned. It was a bone thrown to a snarling dog, and the longer there
was anything to gnaw the longer would the dog keep quiet. The Ulster
delegates understood this perfectly, and, as their chief desire was to
help the Government to get on with the war, they had no wish to curtail
the proceedings of the Convention, although they were never under the
delusion that it could lead to anything in Ireland.
Having regard to the origin of this strange assembly of Irishmen it
might have been supposed that its ingenuity would be directed to finding
some modification of Mr. Asquith's Home Rule Act which Ulster could
accept. That Act was the point of departure for its investigation, and
the quest was _ex hypothesi_ for some amendment that would not be an
enlargement of the authority to be delegated to the subordinate
Parliament, or any further loosening of the tie with Great Britain. Any
proposal of the latter sort would be in the opposite direction from that
in which the Convention was intended to travel. Yet this is precisely
what was done from the very outset. The Act of 1914 was brushed aside as
beneath contempt; and the Ulster delegates had to listen with amazement
week after week to proposals for giving to the whole of Ireland,
including their own Province, a constitution practically as independent
of Great Britain as that of the Dominions.
But what astonished the Ulstermen above everything was to find these
extravagant demands of the Nationalists supported by those who were
supposed to be representatives of Southern Unionism, with Lord Midleton,
a prominent member of the Unionist Party in England, at their head. The
only material point on which Lord Midleton differed from the extremists
led by the Bishop of Raphoe was that he wished to limit complete fiscal
autonomy for Ireland by reserving the control of Customs duties to the
Imperial Parliament. Save in this single particular he joined forces
with the Nationalists, and shocked the Unionists of the North by giving
his support to a scheme of Home Rule going beyond anything ever
suggested at Westminster by any Radical from Gladstone to Asquith.
This question of the financial powers to be exercised by the
hypothetical Irish Parliament occupied the Convention and its committees
for the greater part of its eight months of existence. In January 1918
Lord Midleton and Mr. Redmond came to an agreement on the subject which
proved the undoing of them both, and produced the only really impressive
scene in the Convention.
For some time Mr. Redmond had given the impression of being a tired man
who had lost his wonted driving-force. He took little or no part in the
lobbying and canvassing that was constantly going on behind the scenes
in the Convention; he appeared to be losing grip as a leader. But he
cannot be blamed for his anxiety to come to terms with Lord Midleton;
and when he found, no doubt greatly to his surprise, that a Unionist
leader was ready to abandon Unionist principles and to accept Dominion
Home Rule for Ireland, subject to a single reservation on the subject of
Customs, he naturally jumped at it, and assumed that his followers would
do the same.
But, while Mr. Redmond had been losing ground, the influence of the
Catholic Bishop of Raphoe had been on the increase, and that able and
astute prelate was entirely opposed to the compromise on which Mr.
Redmond and Lord Midleton were agreed. On the evening of the 14th of
January it came to the knowledge of Mr. Redmond that when the question
came up for decision next day, he would find Mr. Devlin, his principal
lieutenant, in league with the ecclesiastics against him. He was
personally too far committed to retrace his steps; to go forward meant
disaster, for it would produce a deep cleavage in the Nationalist ranks;
and, as the state of affairs was generally known to members of the
Convention, the sitting of the following day was anticipated with
unusual interest.
There was an atmosphere of suppressed excitement when the Chairman took
his seat on the 15th. Mr. Redmond entered a few seconds later and took
his usual place without betraying the slightest sign of disturbed
equanimity. The Bishop of Raphoe strode past him, casting to left and
right swift, challenging glances. Mr. Devlin slipped quietly into his
seat beside the leader he had thrown over, without a word or gesture of
greeting. All over the room small groups of members engaged in whispered
conversation; an air of mysterious expectancy prevailed. The Ulster
members had been threatened that it was to be for them a day of disaster
and dismay--a little isolated group, about to be deserted by friends and
crushed by enemies. The Chairman, in an agitated voice, opened
proceedings by inviting questions. There was no response. A minute or so
of tense pause ensued. Then Mr. Redmond rose, and in a perfectly even
voice and his usual measured diction, stated that he was aware that his
proposal was repudiated by many of his usual followers; that the bishops
were against him, and some leading Nationalists, including Mr. Devlin;
that, while he believed if he persisted he would have a majority, the
result would be to split his party, a thing he wished to avoid; and that
he had therefore decided not to proceed with his amendment, and under
these circumstances felt he could be of no further use to the Convention
in the matter.
For a minute or two the assembly could not grasp the full significance
of what had happened. Then it broke upon them that this was the fall of
a notable leader, although they did not yet know that it was also the
close of a distinguished career. Mr. Redmond's demeanour throughout
what must have been a painful ordeal was beyond all praise. There was
not a quiver in his voice, nor a hesitation for word or phrase. His
self-possession and dignity and high-bred bearing won the respect and
sympathy of the most strenuous of political opponents, even while they
recognised that the defeat of the Nationalist leader meant relief from
pressure on themselves. Mr. Redmond took no further part in the work of
the Convention; his health was failing, and the members were startled by
the news of his death on the 6th of March.
Not a single vote was taken in the Convention until the 12th of March,
1918, when it had been sitting for nearly seven months, and two days
later the question which it had been summoned to consider, namely, the
relation of Ulster to the rest of Ireland, was touched for the first
time. The first clause in the Bishop of Raphoe's scheme, establishing a
Home Rule constitution for all Ireland, having been carried with Lord
Midleton's help against the vote of the nineteen representatives of
Ulster, the latter proposed an amendment for the exclusion of the
Province, and were, of course, defeated by the combined forces of
Nationalism and Southern Unionism.
Thus, on the only issue that really mattered, there was no such
"substantial agreement" as the Government had postulated as essential
before legislation could be undertaken; and on the 5th of April the
Convention came to an end without having achieved any useful result,
except that it gave the Government a breathing space from the Irish
question to get on with the war.
It served, however, to bring prominently forward two of the Ulster
representatives whose full worth had not till then been sufficiently
appreciated. Mr. H.M. Pollock had, it is true, been a valued adviser of
Sir Edward Carson on questions touching the trade and commerce of
Belfast. But in the Convention he made more than one speech which proved
him to be a financier with a comprehensive grasp of principle, and an
extensive knowledge of the history and the intricate details of the
financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland.
Lord Londonderry (the 7th Marquis), who during his father's lifetime
had represented an English constituency in the House of Commons and
naturally took no very prominent part in Ulster affairs, although he
made many excellent speeches on Home Rule both in Parliament and on
English platforms, and was Colonel of a regiment of U.V.F., gave proof
at once, on succeeding to the peerage in 1915, that he was desirous of
doing everything in his power to fill his father's place in the Ulster
Movement. He displayed the same readiness to subordinate personal
convenience, and other claims on his time and energy, to the cause so
closely associated historically with his family. But it was his work in
the Convention that first convinced Ulstermen of his capacity as well as
his zeal. Several of Lord Londonderry's speeches, and especially one in
which he made an impromptu reply to Mr. Redmond, impressed the
Convention with his debating power and his general ability; and it gave
the greatest satisfaction in Ulster when it was realised that the son of
the leader whose loss they mourned so deeply was as able as he was
willing to carry on the hereditary tradition of service to the loyalist
cause.
In another respect, too, the Convention had an indirect influence on the
position in Ulster. When it appeared likely, in January 1918, that a
deadlock would be reached in the Convention, the Prime Minister himself
intervened. A letter to the Chairman was drafted and discussed in the
Cabinet; but the policy which appeared to commend itself to his
colleagues was one that Sir Edward Carson was unable to support, and he
accordingly resigned office on the 21st, and was accompanied into
retirement by Colonel Craig, the other Ulster member of the Ministry.
Sir John Lonsdale, who for many years had been the very efficient
Honorary Secretary and "Whip" of the Ulster Parliamentary Party, and its
leader while Carson was in office, had been raised to the peerage at the
New Year, with the title of Lord Armaghdale, so that the Ulster
leadership was vacant for Carson to resume when he left the Government,
and he was formally re-elected to the position on the 28th of January.
It was fortunate for Ulster that the old helmsman was again free to
take his place at the wheel, for there was still some rough weather
ahead.
The official Report of the Convention which was issued on the 10th of
April was one of the most extraordinary documents ever published in a
Government Blue Book.[97] It consisted for the most part of a confused
bundle of separate Notes and Reports by a number of different groups and
individuals, and numerous appendices comprising a mass of miscellaneous
memoranda bristling with cross-references. The Chairman was restricted
to providing a bald narrative of the proceedings without any of the
usual critical estimate of the general results attained; but he made up
for this by setting forth his personal opinions in a letter to the Prime
Minister, which, without the sanction of the Convention, he prefixed to
the Report. As it was no easy matter to gain any clear idea from the
Report as to what the Convention had done, its proceedings while in
session having been screened from publicity by drastic censorship of the
Press, many people contented themselves with reading Sir Horace
Plunkett's unauthorised letter to Mr. Lloyd George; and, as it was in
some important respects gravely misleading, it is not surprising that
the truth in regard to the Convention was never properly understood, and
the Ulster Unionist Council had solid justification for its resolution
censuring the Chairman's conduct as "unprecedented and unconstitutional."
In this personal letter, as was to be expected of a partisan of the
Nationalists, Sir Horace Plunkett laid stress on the fact that Lord
Midleton had "accepted self-government for Ireland "--by which was
meant, of course, not self-government such as Ireland always enjoyed
through her representation, and indeed over-representation, in the
Imperial Parliament, but through separate institutions. But if it had
not been for this support of separate institutions by the Southern
Unionists there would not have been even a colourable pretext for the
assertion of Sir Horace Plunkett that "a larger measure of agreement has
been reached upon the principles and details of Irish self-government
than has ever yet been attained." The really surprising thing was how
little agreement was displayed even among the Nationalists themselves,
who on several important issues were nearly equally divided.
It was soon seen how little the policy of Lord Midleton was approved by
those whom he was supposed to represent. Although it was exceedingly
difficult to obtain accurate information about what was going on in the
Convention, enough became known in Dublin to cause serious misgiving to
Southern Unionists. The Council of the Irish Unionist Alliance, who had
nominated Lord Midleton as a delegate, asked him to confer with them on
the subject; but he refused. On the 4th of March, 1918, a "Call to
Unionists," a manifesto signed by twenty-four influential Southern
Unionists, appeared in the Press. A Southern Unionist Committee was
formed which before the end of May was able to publish the names of 350
well-known men in all walks of life who were in accord with the "Call,"
and to announce that the supporters of their protest against Lord
Midleton's proceedings numbered upwards of fourteen thousand, of whom
more than two thousand were farmers in the South and West.
This Committee then took steps to purge the Irish Unionist Alliance by
making it more truly representative of Southern Unionist opinion. A
special meeting of the Council of the organisation on the 24th of
January, 1919, brought on a general engagement between Lord Midleton and
his opponents. The general trend of opinion was disclosed when, after
the defeat of a motion by Lord Midleton for excluding Ulster Unionists
from full membership of the Alliance, Sir Edward Carson was elected one
of its Presidents, and Lord Farnham was chosen Chairman of the Executive
Committee. The Executive Committee was then entirely reconstituted, by
the rejection of every one of Lord Midleton's supporters; and the new
body issued a statement explaining the grounds of dissatisfaction with
Lord Midleton's action in the Convention, and declaring that he had
"lost the confidence of the general body of Southern Unionists."
Thereupon Lord Midleton and a small aristocratic clique associated with
him seceded from the Alliance, and set up a little organisation of their
own.
FOOTNOTES:
[96] _Report of the Proceedings of the Irish Convention_ (Cd. 9019), p.
10.
[97] Cd. 9019.