ULSTER IN THE WAR
More than a year before the outbreak of the Great War a writer in _The
Morning Post_, describing the Ulster Volunteers who were then beginning
to attract attention in England, used language which was more accurately
prophetic than he can have realised in May 1913:
"What these men have been preparing for in Ulster," he wrote, "may
be of value as a military asset in time of national emergency. I
have seen the men at drill, I have seen them on parade, and experts
assure me that in the matter of discipline, physique, and all
things which go to the making of a military force they are worthy
to rank with our regular soldiers. It is an open secret that, once
assured of the maintenance unimpaired of the Union between Great
Britain and Ireland under the Imperial Parliament alone, a vast
proportion of the citizen army of Ulster would cheerfully hold
itself at the disposal of the Imperial Government and volunteer for
service either at home or abroad!"[90]
The only error in the prediction was that the writer underestimated the
sacrifice Ulster would be willing to make for the Empire. When the
testing time came fifteen months after this appreciation was published
all hope of unimpaired maintenance of the Union had to be sorrowfully
given up, and only those who were in a position to comprehend, with
sympathy, the depth and intensity of the feeling in Ulster on the
subject could realise all that this meant to the people there. Yet, all
the same, their "citizen army" did not hesitate to "hold itself at the
disposal of the Imperial Government, and volunteer for service at home
or abroad."
In August 1914 the U.V.F., of 100.000 men, was without question the
most efficient force of infantry in the United Kingdom outside the
Regular Army. The medical comb did not seriously thin its ranks; and
although the age test considerably reduced its number, it still left a
body of fine material for the British Army. Some of the best of its
officers, like Captain Arthur O'Neill, M.P., of the Life Guards, and
Lord Castlereagh of the Blues, had to leave the U.V.F. to rejoin the
regiments to which they belonged, or to take up staff appointments at
the front. In spite of such losses there was a strong desire in the
force, which was shared by the political leaders, that it should be kept
intact as far as possible and form a distinct unit for active service,
and efforts were at once made to get the War Office to arrange for this
to be done. Pressure of work at the War Office, and Lord Kitchener's
aversion from anything that he thought savoured of political
considerations in the organisation of the Army, imposed a delay of
several weeks before this was satisfactorily arranged; and the
consequence was that in the first few weeks of the war a large number of
the keenest young men in Ulster enlisted in various regiments before it
was known that an Ulster Division was to be formed out of the U.V.F.
It was the beginning of September before Carson was in a position to go
to Belfast to announce that such an arrangement had been made with Lord
Kitchener. And when he went he had also the painful duty of telling the
people of Ulster that the Government was going to give them the meanest
recompense for the promptitude with which they had thrown aside all
party purposes in order to assist the Empire.
When war broke out a "party truce" had been proclaimed. The Unionist
leaders promised their support to the Government in carrying on the war,
and Mr. Asquith pledged the Government to drop all controversial
legislation. The consideration of the Amending Bill had been shelved by
agreement, Mr. Asquith stating that the postponement "must be without
prejudice to the domestic and political position of any party." On this
understanding the Unionist Party supported, almost without so much as a
word of criticism, all the emergency measures proposed by the
Government. Yet on the 10th of August Mr. Asquith astonished the
Unionists by announcing that the promise to take no controversial
business was not to prevent him advising the King to sign the Home Rule
Bill, which had been hung up in the House of Lords by the introduction
of the Amending Bill, and had never been either rejected or passed by
that House.
Mr. Balfour immediately protested against this conduct as a breach of
faith; but Mr. Redmond's speech on that occasion contained the
explanation of the Government's conduct. The Nationalist leader gave a
strong hint that any help in the war from the southern provinces of
Ireland would depend on whether or not the Home Rule Bill was to become
law at once. Although the personal loyalty of Mr. Redmond was beyond
question, and although he was no doubt sincere when he subsequently
denied that his speech was so intended, it was in reality an application
of the old maxim that England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity. In
any case, the Cabinet knew that, however unjustly Ulster might be
treated, she could be relied upon to do everything in her power to
further the successful prosecution of the war, and they cynically came
to the conclusion that the best thing to do was to placate those whose
loyalty was less assured.
This was the unpleasant tale that Sir Edward Carson had to unfold to the
Ulster Unionist Council on the 3rd of September. After explaining how
and why he had consented to the indefinite postponement of the Amending
Bill, he continued:
"And so, without any condition of any kind, we agreed that the Bill
should be postponed without prejudice to the position of either
party. England's difficulty is not Ulster's opportunity. England's
difficulty is our difficulty; and England's sorrows have always
been, and always will be, our sorrows. I have seen it stated that
the Germans thought they had hit on an opportune moment, owing to
our domestic difficulties, to make their bullying demand against
our country. They little understood for what we were fighting. We
were not fighting to get away from England; we were fighting to
stay with England, and the Power that attempted to lay a hand upon
England, whatever might be our domestic quarrels, would at once
bring us together--as it has brought us together--as one man."
In order to avoid controversy at such a time, Carson declared he would
say nothing about their opponents. He insisted that, however unworthily
the Government might act in a great national emergency, Ulstermen must
distinguish between the Prime Minister as a party leader and the Prime
Minister as the representative of the whole nation. Their duty was to
"think not of him or his party, but of our country," and they must show
that "we do not seek to purchase terms by selling our patriotism." He
then referred to the pride they all felt in the U.V.F.; how he had
"watched them grow from infancy," through self-sacrificing toil to their
present high efficiency, with the purpose of "allowing us to be put into
no degraded position in the United Kingdom." But under the altered
conditions their duty was clear:
"Our country and our Empire are in danger. And under these
circumstances, knowing that the very basis of our political faith
is our belief in the greatness of the United Kingdom and of the
Empire, I say to our Volunteers without hesitation, go and help to
save your country. Go and win honour for Ulster and for Ireland. To
every man that goes, or has gone, and not to them only, but to
every Irishman, you and I say, from the bottom of our hearts, 'God
bless you and bring you home safe and victorious.'"
The arrangements with the War Office for forming a Division from the
Ulster Volunteers were then explained, which would enable the men "to go
as old comrades accustomed to do their military training together."
Carson touched lightly on fears that had been expressed lest political
advantage should be taken by the Government or by the Nationalists of
the conversion of the U.V.F. into a Division of the British Army, which
would leave Ulster defenceless. "We are quite strong enough," he said,
"to take care of ourselves, and so I say to men, so far as they have
confidence and trust in me, that I advise them to go and do their duty
to the country, and we will take care of politics hereafter." He
concluded by moving a resolution, which was unanimously carried by the
Council, urging "all Loyalists who owe allegiance to our cause" to join
the Army at once if qualified for military service.
From beginning to end of this splendidly patriotic oration no allusion
was made to the Nationalist attitude to the war. Few people in Ulster
had any belief that the spots on the leopard were going to disappear,
even when the Home Rule Bill had been placed on the Statute-book. The
"difficulty" and the "opportunity" would continue in their old
relations. People in Belfast, as elsewhere, did justice to the patriotic
tone of Mr. Redmond's speech in the House of Commons on the 3rd of
August, which made so deep an impression in England; but they believed
him mistaken in attributing to "the democracy of Ireland" a complete
change of sentiment towards England, and their scepticism was more than
justified by subsequent events.
But they also scrutinised more carefully than Englishmen the precise
words used by the Nationalist leader. Englishmen, both in the House of
Commons and in the country, were carried off their feet in an ecstasy of
joy and wonder at Mr. Redmond's confident offer of loyal help from
Ireland to the Empire in the mighty world conflict. Ireland was to be
"the one bright spot." Ulstermen, on the other hand, did not fail to
observe that the offer was limited to service at home. "I say to the
Government," said Mr. Redmond, "that they may to-morrow withdraw every
one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland will
be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this
purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad
to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North."
These sentences were rapturously applauded in the House of Commons. When
they were read in Ulster the shrewd men of the North asked what danger
threatened the "coast of Ireland"; and whether, supposing there were a
danger, the British Navy would not be a surer defence than the "armed
sons" of Ireland whether from South or North. It was not on the coast
of Ireland but the coast of Flanders that men were needed, and it was
thither that the "armed Protestant Ulstermen" were preparing to go in
thousands. They would not be behind the Catholics of the South in the
spirit of comradeship invoked by Mr. Redmond if they were to stand
shoulder to shoulder under the fire of Prussian batteries; but they
could not wax enthusiastic over the suggestion that, while they went to
France, Mr. Redmond's Nationalist Volunteers should be trained and armed
by the Government to defend the Irish coast--and possibly, later, to
impose their will upon Ulster.
The organisation and the training of the Ulster Division forms no part
of the present narrative, but it must be stated that after Carson's
speech on the 3rd of September, recruiting went on uninterruptedly and
rapidly, and the whole energies of the local leaders and of the rank and
file were thrown into the work of preparation. Captain James Craig,
promoted to be Lieutenant-Colonel, was appointed Q.M.G. of the Division;
but the arduous duties of this post, in which he tried to do the work of
half a dozen men, brought about a complete breakdown of health some
months later, with the result that, to his deep disappointment, he was
forbidden to go with the Division to France. No one displayed a finer
spirit than his brother, Mr. Charles Craig, M.P. for South Antrim. He
had never done any soldiering, as his brother had in South Africa, and
he was over military age in 1914; but he did not allow either his age,
his military inexperience, or his membership of the House of Commons to
serve as excuse for separating himself from the men with whom he had
learnt the elements of drill in the U.V.F. He obtained a commission as
Captain in the Ulster Division, and went with it to France, where he was
wounded and taken prisoner in the great engagement at Thiepval in the
battle of the Somme, and had to endure all the rigours of captivity in
Germany till the end of the war. There was afterwards not a little
pungent comment among his friends on the fact that, when honours were
descending in showers on the heads of the just and the unjust alike, a
full share of which reached members of Parliament, sometimes for no very
conspicuous merit, no recognition of any kind was awarded to this
gallant Ulster officer, who had set so fine an example and
unostentatiously done so much more than his duty.
The Government's act of treachery in regard to "controversial business"
was consummated on the 18th of September, when the Home Rule Bill
received the Royal Assent. On the 15th Mr. Asquith put forward his
defence in the House of Commons. In a sentence of mellifluous optimism
that was to be woefully falsified in a not-distant future, he declared
his confidence that the action his Ministry was taking would bring "for
the first time for a hundred years Irish opinion, Irish sentiment, Irish
loyalty, flowing with a strong and a continuous and ever-increasing
stream into the great reservoir of Imperial resources and Imperial
unity." He acknowledged, however, that the Government had pledged itself
not to put the Home Rule Bill on the Statute-book until the Amending
Bill had been disposed of. That promise was not now to be kept; instead
he gave another, which, when the time came, was equally violated,
namely, to introduce the Amending Bill "in the next session of
Parliament, before the Irish Government Bill can possibly come into
operation." Meantime, there was to be a Suspensory Bill to provide that
the Home Rule Bill should remain in abeyance till the end of the war,
and he gave an assurance "which would be in spirit and in substance
completely fulfilled, that the Home Rule Bill will not and cannot come
into operation until Parliament has had the fullest opportunity, by an
Amending Bill, of altering, modifying, or qualifying its provisions in
such a way as to secure the general consent both of Ireland and of the
United Kingdom." The Prime Minister, further, paid a tribute to "the
patriotic and public spirit which had been shown by the Ulster
Volunteers," whose conduct has made "the employment of force, any kind
of force, for what you call the coercion of Ulster, an absolutely
unthinkable thing."
But a verbal acknowledgment of the public spirit shown by the U.V.F. in
the first month of the war was a paltry recompense for the Government's
breach of faith, as Mr. Bonar Law immediately pointed out in a stinging
rejoinder. The leader of the Opposition concluded his powerful
indictment by saying that such conduct by the Government could not be
allowed to pass without protest, but that at such a moment of national
danger debate in Parliament on this domestic quarrel, forced upon them
by Ministers, was indecent; and that, having made his protest, neither
he nor his party would take further part in that indecency. Thereupon
the whole Unionist Party followed Mr. Bonar Law out of the Chamber.
But that was not the end of the incident. It had been decided, with Sir
Edward Carson's approval, that "Ulster Day," the second anniversary of
the Covenant, should be celebrated in Ulster by special religious
services. The intention had been to focus attention on the larger
aspects of Imperial instead of local patriotism; but what had just
occurred in Parliament could not be ignored, and it necessitated a
reaffirmation of Ulster's unchanged attitude in the domestic quarrel.
Mr. Bonar Law now determined to accompany Sir Edward Carson to Belfast
to renew and to amplify under these circumstances the pledges of British
Unionists to Ulster.
The occasion was a memorable one in several respects. On the 17th of
September Sir Edward Carson had been quietly married in the country to
Miss Frewen, and he was accompanied to Belfast a few days later by the
new Lady Carson, who then made acquaintance with Ulster and her
husband's followers for the first time. The scenes that invariably
marked the leader's arrival from England have been already described;
but the presence of his wife led to a more exuberant welcome than ever
on this occasion; and the recent Parliamentary storm, with its sequel in
the visit of the leader of the Unionist Party, contributed further to
the unbounded enthusiasm of the populace.
There was a meeting of the Council on the morning of the 28th, Ulster
Day, at which Carson told the whole story of the conferences,
negotiations, conversations, and what not, that had been going on up to,
and even since, the outbreak of war, in the course of which he observed
that, if he had committed any fault, "it was that he believed the Prime
Minister." He paid a just tribute to Mr. Bonar Law, whose constancy,
patience, and "resolution to be no party even under these difficult
circumstances to anything that would be throwing over Ulster, were
matters which would be photographed upon his mind to the very end of his
life."
But while, naturally, resentment at the conduct of the Government found
forcible expression, and the policy that would be pursued "after the
war" was outlined, the keynote of the speeches at this Council Meeting,
and also at the overwhelming demonstration addressed by Mr. Bonar Law in
the Ulster Hall in the evening, was "country before party." As the
Unionist leader truly said: "This is not an anti-Home Rule meeting. That
can wait, and you are strong enough to let it wait with quiet
confidence." But before passing to the great issues raised by the war,
introduced by a telling allusion to the idea that Germany had calculated
on Ulster being a thorn in England's side, Mr. Bonar Law gave the
message to Ulster which he had specially crossed the Channel to deliver
in person.
He reminded the audience that hitherto the promise of support to Ulster
by the Unionists of Great Britain, given long before at Blenheim, had
been coupled with the condition that, if an appeal were made to the
electorate, the Unionist Party would bow to the verdict of the country.
"But now," he went on, "after the way in which advantage has been taken
of your patriotism, I say to you, and I say it with the full authority
of our party, we give the pledge without any condition."
During the two days which he spent in Belfast Mr. Bonar Law, and other
visitors from England, paid visits to the training camps at Newcastle
and Ballykinler, where the 1st Brigade of the Ulster Division was
undergoing training for the front. Both now, and for some time to come,
there was a good deal of unworthy political jealousy of the Division,
which showed itself in a tendency to belittle the recruiting figures
from Ulster, and in sneers in the Nationalist Press at the delay in
sending to the front a body of troops whose friends had advertised their
supposed efficiency before the war. These troops were themselves
fretting to get to France; and they believed, rightly or wrongly, that
political intrigue was at work to keep them ingloriously at home, while
other Divisions, lacking their preliminary training, were receiving
preference in the supply of equipment.
One small circumstance, arising out of the conditions in which
"Kitchener's Army" had to be raised, afforded genuine enjoyment in
Ulster. Men were enlisting far more rapidly than the factories could
provide arms, uniforms, and other equipment. Rifles for teaching the
recruits to drill and manoeuvre were a long way short of requirements.
It was a great joy to the Ulstermen when the War Office borrowed their
much-ridiculed "dummy rifles" and "wooden guns," and took them to
English training camps for use by the "New Army."
But this volume is not concerned with the conduct of the Great War, nor
is it necessary to enter in detail into the controversy that arose as to
the efforts of the rest of Ireland, in comparison with those of Ulster,
to serve the Empire in the hour of need. It will be sufficient to cite
the testimony of two authorities, neither of whom can be suspected of
bias on the side of Ulster. The chronicler of the _Annual Register_
records that:
"In Ulster, as in England, the flow of recruits outran the
provision made for them by the War Office, and by about the middle
of October the Protestant districts had furnished some 21,000, of
which Belfast alone had contributed 7,581, or 305 per 10,000 of the
population--the highest proportion of all the towns in the United
Kingdom."[91]
The second witness is the democratic orator who took a foremost part in
the House of Commons in denouncing the Curragh officers who resigned
their Commissions rather than march against Ulster. Colonel John Ward,
M.P., writing two years after the war, in which he had not kept his eyes
shut, said:
"It would be presumptuous for a mere Englishman to praise the
gallantry and patriotism of Scotland, Wales, and Ulster; their
record stands second to none in the annals of the war. The case of
the South of Ireland, her most ardent admirer will admit, is not
as any other in the whole British Empire. To the everlasting credit
of the great leader of the Irish Nationalists, Mr. John Redmond,
his gallant son, and his very lovable brother--together with many
real, great-souled Irish soldiers whose loss we so deeply
deplore--saw the light and followed the only course open to good
men and true. But the patriotism and devotion of the few only show
up in greater and more exaggerated contrast the sullen indifference
of the majority, and the active hostility of the minority, who
would have seen our country and its people overrun and defeated not
only without regret, but with fiendish delight."[92]
No generous-minded Ulsterman would wish to detract a word from the
tribute paid by Colonel Ward to the Redmond family and other gallant
Catholic Nationalists who stood manfully for the Empire in the day of
trial; but the concluding sentence in the above quotation cannot be
gainsaid. And the pathetic thing was that Mr. Redmond himself never
seems to have understood the true sentiments of the majority of those
who had been his followers before the war. In a speech in the House on
the 15th of September he referred contemptuously to a "little group of
men who never belonged to the National Constitutional party, who were
circulating anti-recruiting handbills and were publishing little
wretched rags once a week or once a month," which were not worth a
moment's notice.
The near future was to show that these adherents of Sinn Fein were not
so negligible as Mr. Redmond sincerely believed. The real fact was that
his own patriotic attitude at the outbreak of war undermined his
leadership in Ireland. The "separatism" which had always been, as Ulster
never ceased to believe, the true underlying, though not always the
acknowledged, motive power of Irish Nationalism, was beginning again to
assert itself, and to find expression in "handbills" and "wretched
rags." It was discovering other leaders and spokesmen than Mr. Redmond
and his party, whom it was destined before long to sweep utterly away.
FOOTNOTES:
[90] _Morning Post_, May 19th, 1913.
[91] _The Annual Register_, 1914, p. 259.
[92] "The Army and Ireland," _Nineteenth Century and After_, January
1921, by Lieut.-Colonel John Ward, C.B., C.M.G., M.P.