THE CRAIGAVON POLICY AND THE U.F.V.
No time was lost in giving practical shape to the policy outlined at
Craigavon, and in taking steps to give effect to it. On the 25th of
September a meeting of four hundred delegates representing the Ulster
Unionist Council, the County Grand Orange Lodges, and the Unionist
Clubs, was held in Belfast, and, after lengthy discussion in private,
when the only differences of opinion were as to the most effective
methods of proceeding, two resolutions were unanimously adopted and
published. It is noteworthy that, at this early stage in the movement,
out of nearly four hundred popularly elected delegates, numbers of whom
were men holding responsible positions or engaged in commercial
business, not one raised an objection to the policy itself, although its
grave possibilities were thoroughly appreciated by all present. Both
Lord Londonderry, who presided, and Sir Edward Carson left no room for
doubt in that respect; the developments they might be called upon to
face were thoroughly searched and explained, and the fullest opportunity
to draw back was offered to any present who might shrink from going on.
The first Resolution registered a "call upon our leaders to take any
steps they may consider necessary to resist the establishment of Home
Rule in Ireland, solemnly pledging ourselves that under no conditions
shall we acknowledge any such Government"; and it gave an assurance that
those whom the delegates represented would give the leaders "their
unwavering support in any danger they may be called upon to face." The
second decided that "the time has now come when we consider it our
imperative duty to make arrangements for the provisional government of
Ulster," and for that purpose it went on to appoint a Commission of
five leading local men, namely, Captain James Craig, M.P., Colonel
Sharman Crawford, M.P., the Right Hon. Thomas Sinclair, Colonel R.H.
Wallace, C.B., and Mr. Edward Sclater, Secretary of the Unionist Clubs,
whose duties were _(a)_ "to keep Sir Edward Carson in constant and close
touch with the feeling of Unionist Ulster," and _(b)_ "to take immediate
steps, in consultation with Sir Edward Carson, to frame and submit a
Constitution for a Provisional Government of Ulster, having due regard
to the interests of the Loyalists in other parts of Ireland: the powers
and duration of such Provisional Government to come into operation on
the day of the passage of any Home Rule Bill, to remain in force until
Ulster shall again resume unimpaired her citizenship in the United
Kingdom."
At the luncheon given by Lord Londonderry after this business
conference, Carson took occasion to refer to a particularly contemptible
slander to which currency had been given some days previously by Sir
John Benn, one of the Eighty Club strolling seekers after truth. It was
perhaps hardly worth while to notice a statement so silly as that the
Ulster leader had been ready a few weeks previously to betray Ulster in
order to save the House of Lords, but Carson did not yet realise the
degree to which he had already won the confidence of his followers;
moreover, the incident proved useful as an opportunity of emphasising
the uninterrupted mutual confidence between Lord Londonderry and
himself, in spite of their divergence of opinion over the Parliament
Bill. It also gave those present a glimpse of their leader's power of
shrivelling meanness with a few caustic drops of scorn.
The proceedings at Craigavon and at the Conference naturally created a
sensation on both sides of the Channel. They brought the question of
Ireland once more, for the first time since 1895, into the forefront of
British politics. The House of Commons might spend the autumn ploughing
its way through the intricacies of the National Insurance Bill, but
everyone knew that the last and bitterest battle against Home Rule was
now approaching. And, now that the Parliament Act was safely on the
Statute-book, Ministers had no further interest in concealment. During
the elections, from which alone they could procure authority for
legislation of so fundamental a character, Mr. Asquith, as we have seen,
regarded any inquiry as to his intentions as "confusing the issue." But
now that he had the constituencies in his pocket for five years and
nothing further was to be feared from that quarter, his cards were
placed on the table.
On the 3rd of October Mr. Winston Churchill told his followers at Dundee
that the Government would introduce a Home Rule Bill next session "and
press it forward with all their strength," and he added the
characteristic injunction that "they must not take Sir Edward Carson too
seriously." But that advice did not prevent Mr. Herbert Samuel, another
member of the Cabinet, from putting in an appearance in Belfast four
days later, where he threw himself into a ludicrously unequal combat
with Carson, exerting himself to calm the fears of business men as to
the effect of Home Rule on their prosperity; while, in the same week,
Carson himself, at a great Unionist demonstration in Dublin, described
the growth of Irish prosperity in the last twenty years as "almost a
fairy tale," which would be cut short by Home Rule. On the 19th of the
same month Mr. Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, in a speech at
Ilfracombe, gave some scraps of meagre information in regard to the
provisions that would be included in the coming Home Rule Bill; and on
the 21st Mr. Redmond announced that the drafting of the Bill was almost
completed, and that the measure would be "satisfactory to Nationalists
both in principle and detail."[13]
So the autumn of 1911 wore through--Ministers doling out snippets of
information; members of Parliament and the Press urging them to give
more. The people of Ulster, on the other hand, were not worrying over
details. They did not require to be told that the principle would be
"satisfactory to Nationalists," for they knew that the Government had to
"toe the line"; nor were they in doubt that what was satisfactory to
Nationalists must be unsatisfactory to themselves. What they were
thinking about was not what the Bill would or would not contain, but the
preparations they were making to resist its operation.
A day or two after Craigavon the leader spoke at a great meeting in
Portrush, after receiving, at every important station he passed _en
route_ from Belfast, enthusiastic addresses expressing confidence in
himself and approval of the Craigavon declaration; and in this speech he
considerably amplified what he had said at Craigavon. After explaining
how the whole outlook had been changed by the Parliament Act, which cut
them off from appeal to the sympathies of Englishmen, he pointed out to
his hearers the only course now open to them, namely, that resolved upon
at Craigavon.
"Some people," he continued, "say that I am preaching disorder. No,
in the course I am advising I am preaching order, because I believe
that, unless we are in a position ourselves to take over the
government of those places we are able to control, the people of
Ulster, if let loose without that organisation, and without that
organised determination, might in a foolish moment find themselves
in a condition of antagonism and grips with their foes which I
believe even the present Government would lament. And therefore I
say that the course we recommend--and it has been solemnly adopted
by your four hundred representatives, after mature discussion in
which every man understood what it was he was voting about--is the
only course that I know of that is possible under the circumstances
of this Province which is consistent with the maintenance of law
and order and the prevention of bloodshed."
Superficially, these words may appear boldly paradoxical; but in fact
they were prophetic, for the closest observers of the events of the next
three years, familiar with Irish character and conditions, were in no
doubt whatever that it was the disciplined organisation of the Ulster
Unionists alone that prevented the outbreak of serious disorders in the
North. There was, on the contrary, a diminution even of ordinary crime,
accompanied by a marked improvement in the general demeanour, and
especially in the sobriety, of the people.
The speaker then touched upon a question which naturally arose out of
the Craigavon policy of resistance to Home Rule. He had been asked, he
said, whether Ulster proposed to fight against the forces of the Crown.
He had already contrasted their own methods with those of the
Nationalists, saying that Ulstermen would never descend to action "from
behind hedges or by maiming cattle, or by boycotting of individuals"; he
now added that they were "not going to fight the Army and the Navy ...
God forbid that any loyal Irishman should ever shoot or think of
shooting the British soldier or sailor. But, believe me, any Government
will ponder long before it dares to shoot a loyal Ulster Protestant,
devoted to his country and loyal to his King."
In newspaper reports of public meetings, sayings of pith and moment are
often attributed to "A Voice" from the audience. On this occasion, when
Sir Edward Carson referred to the Army and the Navy, "A Voice" cried
"They are on our side." It was the truth, as subsequent events were to
show. It would indeed have been strange had it been otherwise. Men
wearing His Majesty's uniform, who had been quartered at one time in
Belfast or Carrickfergus and at another in Cork or Limerick, could be
under no illusion as to where that uniform was held in respect and where
it was scorned. The certainty that the reality of their own loyalty was
understood by the men who served the King was a sustaining thought to
Ulstermen through these years of trial.
This Portrush speech cleared the air. It made known the _modus
operandi_, as Craigavon had made known the policy. Henceforward Ulster
Unionists had a definite idea of what was before them, and they had
already unbounded confidence both in the sagacity and in the courage of
the man who had become their leader.
The Craigavon meeting led, almost by accident as it were, to a
development the importance of which was hardly foreseen at the time.
Among the processionists who passed through Captain Craig's grounds
there was a contingent of Orangemen from County Tyrone who attracted
general attention by their smart appearance and the orderly precision of
their marching. On inquiry it was learnt that these men had of their own
accord been learning military drill. The spirit of emulation naturally
suggested to others to follow the example of the Tyrone Lodges. It was
soon followed, not by Orangemen alone, but by members of the Unionist
Clubs, very many of whom belonged to no Orange Lodge. Within a few
months drilling--of an elementary kind, it is true--had become popular
in many parts of the country. Colonel R.H. Wallace, C.B., who had served
with distinction in the South African War, where he commanded the 5th
Royal Irish Rifles, was a prominent member of the Orange Institution, in
which he was in 1911 Grand Master of the Belfast Lodges, and Grand
Secretary of the Provincial Grand Orange Lodge of Ulster; and, being a
man of marked ability and widespread popularity, his influence was
powerful and extensive. He was a devoted adherent of Carson, and there
was no keener spirit among the Ulster Loyalist leaders. Colonel Wallace
was among the first to perceive the importance of this military drilling
that was taking place throughout Ulster, and through his leading
position in the Orange Institution his encouragement did much to extend
the practice.
Having been a lawyer by profession before South Africa called him to
serve his country in arms, Wallace was careful to ascertain how the law
stood with regard to the drilling that was going on. He consulted Mr.
James Campbell (afterwards Lord Chancellor of Ireland), who advised that
any two Justices of the Peace had power to authorise drill and other
military exercises within the area of their jurisdiction on certain
conditions. The terms of the application made by Colonel Wallace himself
to two Belfast magistrates show what the conditions were, and, under the
circumstances of the time, are not without a flavour of humour. The
request stated that Wallace and another officer of the Belfast Grand
Lodge were--
"Authorised on behalf of the members thereof to apply for lawful
authority to them to hold meetings of the members of the said Lodge and
the Lodges under its jurisdiction for the purpose of training and
drilling themselves and of being trained and drilled to the use of arms,
and for the purpose of practising military exercises, movements, and
evolutions. And we are authorised, on their behalf, to give their
assurance that they desire this authority as faithful subjects of His
Majesty the King, and their undertaking that such authority is sought
and will be used by them only to make them more efficient citizens for
the purpose of maintaining the constitution of the United Kingdom as now
established and protecting their rights and liberties thereunder."
The _bona fides_ of an application couched in these terms, which
followed well-established precedent, could not be questioned by any
loyal subject of His Majesty. The purpose for which the licence was
requested was stated with literal exactness and without subterfuge.
There was nothing seditious or revolutionary in it, and the desire of
men to make themselves more efficient citizens for maintaining the
established government of their country, and their rights and liberties
under it, was surely not merely innocent of offence, but praiseworthy.
Such, at all events, was the view taken by numbers of strictly
conscientious holders of the Commission of the Peace throughout Ulster,
with the result that the Ulster Volunteer Force sprang into existence
within a few months without the smallest violation of the law.
Originating in the Orange Lodges and the Unionist Clubs, it soon
enrolled large numbers of men outside both those organisations. Men with
military experience interested themselves in training the volunteers in
their districts; the local bodies were before long drawn into a single
coherent organisation on a territorial basis, which soon gave rise to an
_esprit de corps_ leading to friendly rivalry in efficiency between the
local battalions.
This Ulster Volunteer Force had as yet no arms in their hands, but, as
the first act of the Liberal Government on coming into power in 1906 had
been to drop the "coercion" Act which prohibited the importation of
firearms into Ireland, there was no reason why, in the course of time,
the U.V.F. should not be fully armed with as complete an avoidance of
illegality as that with which in the meantime they were acquiring some
knowledge of military duties. But for the present they had to be content
with wooden "dummy" rifles with which to learn their drill, an expedient
which, as will be seen later on, excited the derisive mirth of the
English Radical Press.
The application to the Belfast Justices for leave to drill the Orange
Lodges was dated the 5th of January, 1912. For some months both before
and after that date the formation of new battalions proceeded rapidly,
so that by the summer of 1912 the force was of considerable strength and
decent efficiency; but already in the autumn of 1911 it soon became
apparent that the existence of such a force would give a backing to the
Craigavon policy which nothing else could provide. At Craigavon the
leader of the movement had foreshadowed the possibility of having to
take charge of the government of those districts which the Loyalists
could control. The U.V.F. made such control a practical proposition, and
the consciousness of this throughout Ulster gave a solid reality to the
movement which it must otherwise have lacked.
The special Commission of Five set to work immediately after the
Craigavon meeting to carry out the task entrusted to them by the
Council. But, as more than two years must elapse before the Home Rule
Bill could become law under the Parliament Act, there was no immediate
urgency in making arrangements for setting up the Provisional Government
resolved upon by the Council on the 25th of September, 1911, and the
outside public heard nothing about what was being done in the matter for
many months to come.
Meantime the Ulster Loyalists watched with something akin to dismay the
dissensions in the Unionist party in England over the question of Tariff
Reform, which made impossible a united front against the revived attack
on the Union, and woefully weakened the effective force of the
Opposition both in Parliament and the country. Public opinion was
diverted from the one thing that really mattered--had Englishmen been
able to realise it--from an Imperial standpoint, no less than from the
standpoint of Irish Loyalists. On the 8th of November, 1911, mainly in
consequence of these dissensions, Mr. Balfour resigned the leadership of
the Unionist Party. This event was regarded in Ulster as a calamity. Mr.
Balfour was the ablest and most zealous living defender of the Union,
and the great services he had rendered to the country during his
memorable Chief Secretaryship were not forgotten. Ulstermen, in whose
eyes the tariff question was of very subordinate importance, feared that
no one could be found to take command of the Unionist forces comparable
with the Achilles who, as they supposed, was now retiring to his tent.
What happened in regard to the vacant leadership is well known--how Mr.
Walter Long and Mr. Austen Chamberlain, after presenting themselves for
a day or two as rival candidates, patriotically agreed to stand aside
and give united support to Mr. Bonar Law in order to avoid a division in
the ranks of the party. It is less generally known that Mr. Bonar Law,
before consenting to his name being proposed, wrote and asked Sir Edward
Carson if he would accept the leadership, and that it was only when he
received an emphatic reply in the negative that he assumed the
responsibility himself. If this had been known at the time in Ulster
there can be little doubt that consternation would have been caused by
the refusal of their own leader to place himself at the head of the
whole Unionist Party. It is quite certain that Sir Edward Carson would
have been acceptable to the party meeting at the Carlton Club, for he
was then much better known to the party both in the House of Commons and
in the country than was Mr. Bonar Law, whose great qualities as
parliamentarian and statesman had not yet been revealed; but it is not
less certain that, if his first thought was to be of service to Ulster,
Carson acted wisely in maintaining a position of independence, in which
all his powers could continue to be concentrated on a single aim of
statecraft.
At all events, the new leader of the Unionist Party was not long in
proving that the Ulster cause had suffered no set-back by the change,
and his constant and courageous backing of the Ulster leader won him
the unstinted admiration and affection of every Irish Loyalist. Mr.
Balfour also soon showed that he was no sulking Achilles; his loyalty to
the Unionist cause was undimmed; he never for a moment acted, as a
meaner man might, as if his successor were a supplanter; and within the
next few months he many times rose from beside Mr. Bonar Law in the
House of Commons to deliver some of the best speeches he ever made on
the question of Irish Government, full of cogent and crushing criticism
of the Home Rule proposals of Mr. Asquith.
FOOTNOTES:
[13] _Annual Register_, 1911, p. 228.