CHAPTER I

ULSTER'S STAND FOR UNION

by

RONALD McNEILL

With Frontispiece

London

John Murray,

Albemarle Street, W.

1922

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF THE UNIONIST PARTY

PREFACE

The term "Ulster," except when the context proves the contrary, is used

in this book not in the geographical, but the political meaning of the

word, which is quite as well understood.

The aim of the book is to present an account of what I have occasionally

in its pages referred to as "the Ulster Movement." The phrase is perhaps

somewhat paradoxical when applied to a political ideal which was the

maintenance of the _status quo_; but, on the other hand, the steps taken

during a period of years to organise an effective opposition to

interference with the established constitution in Ireland did involve a

movement, and it is with these measures, rather than with the policy

behind them, that the book is concerned.

Indeed, except for a brief introductory outline of the historical

background of the Ulster standpoint, I have taken for granted, or only

referred incidentally to the reasons for the unconquerable hostility of

the Ulster Protestants to the idea of allowing the government of

Ireland, and especially of themselves, to pass into the control of a

Parliament in Dublin. Those reasons were many and substantial, based

upon considerations both of a practical and a sentimental nature; but I

have not attempted an exposition of them, having limited myself to a

narrative of the events to which they gave rise.

Having been myself, during the most important part of the period

reviewed, a member of the Standing Committee of the Ulster Unionist

Council, and closely associated with the leaders of the movement, I have

had personal knowledge of practically everything I have had to record. I

have not, however, trusted to unaided memory for any statement of fact.

It is not, of course, a matter where anything that could be called

research was required; but, in addition to the _Parliamentary Reports_,

the _Annual Register_, and similar easily accessible books of reference,

there was a considerable mass of private papers bearing on the subject,

for the use of some of which I am indebted to friends.

I was permitted to consult the Minute-books of the Ulster Unionist

Council and its Standing Committee, and also verbatim reports made for

the Council of unpublished speeches delivered at private meetings of

those bodies. A large collection of miscellaneous documents accumulated

by the late Lord Londonderry was kindly lent to me by the present

Marquis; and I also have to thank Lord Carson of Duncairn for the use of

letters and other papers in his possession. Colonel F.H. Crawford,

C.B.E., was good enough to place at my disposal a very detailed account

written by himself of the voyage of the _Fanny_, and the log kept by

Captain Agnew. My friend Mr. Thomas Moles, M.P., took full shorthand

notes of the proceedings of the Irish Convention and the principal

speeches made in it, and he kindly allowed me to use his transcript. And

I should not like to pass over without acknowledgment the help given me

on several occasions by Miss Omash, of the Union Defence League, in

tracing references.

R. McN.

February 1922.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION: THE ULSTER STANDPOINT

II. THE ELECTORATE AND HOME RULE

III. ORGANISATION AND LEADERSHIP

IV. THE PARLIAMENT ACT: CRAIGAVON

V. THE CRAIGAVON POLICY AND THE U.F.V.

VI. MR. CHURCHILL IN BELFAST

VII. "WHAT ANSWER FROM THE NORTH?"

VIII. THE EXCLUSION OF ULSTER

IX. THE EVE OF THE COVENANT

X. THE SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT

XI. PASSING THE BILL

XII. WAS RESISTANCE JUSTIFIABLE?

XIII. PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PROPAGANDA

XIV. LORD LOREBURN'S LETTER

XV. PREPARATIONS AND PROPOSALS

XVI. THE CURRAGH INCIDENT

XVII. ARMING THE U.V.F.

XVIII. A VOYAGE OF ADVENTURE

XIX. ON THE BRINK OF CIVIL WAR

XX. ULSTER IN THE WAR

XXI. NEGOTIATIONS FOR SETTLEMENT

XXII. THE IRISH CONVENTION

XXIII. NATIONALISTS AND CONSCRIPTION

XXIV. THE ULSTER PARLIAMENT

APPENDIX

A. NATIONALIST LETTER TO PRESIDENT WILSON

B. UNIONIST LETTER TO PRESIDENT WILSON

INDEX

ULSTER'S STAND FOR UNION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE ULSTER STANDPOINT

Like all other movements in human affairs, the opposition of the

Northern Protestants of Ireland to the agitation of their Nationalist

fellow-countrymen for Home Rule can only be properly understood by those

who take some pains to get at the true motives, and to appreciate the

spirit, of those who engaged in it. And as it is nowhere more true than

in Ireland that the events of to-day are the outcome of events that

occurred longer ago than yesterday, and that the motives of to-day have

consequently their roots buried somewhat deeply in the past, it is no

easy task for the outside observer to gain the insight requisite for

understanding fairly the conduct of the persons concerned.

It was Mr. Asquith who very truly said that the Irish question, of which

one of the principal factors is the opposition of Ulster to Home Rule,

"springs from sources that are historic, economic, social, racial, and

religious." It would be a hopeless undertaking to attempt here to probe

to the bottom an origin so complex; but, whether the sympathies of the

reader be for or against the standpoint of the Irish Loyalists, the

actual events which make up what may be called the Ulster Movement would

be wholly unintelligible without some introductory retrospect. Indeed,

to those who set out to judge Irish political conditions without

troubling themselves about anything more ancient than their own memory

can recall, the most fundamental factor of all--the line of cleavage

between Ulster and the rest of the island--- is more than

unintelligible. In the eyes of many it presents itself as an example of

perversity, of "cussedness" on the part of men who insist on magnifying

mere differences of opinion, which would be easily composed by

reasonable people, into obstacles to co-operation which have no reality

behind them.

Writers and speakers on the Nationalist side deride the idea of "two

nations" in Ireland, calling in evidence many obvious identities of

interest, of sentiment, or of temperament between the inhabitants of the

North and of the South. The Ulsterman no more denies these identities

than the Greek, the Bulgar, and the Serb would deny that there are

features common to all dwellers in the Balkan peninsula; but he is more

deeply conscious of the difference than of the likeness between himself

and the man from Munster or Connaught. His reply to those who denounced

the Irish Government Act of 1920 on the ground that it set up a

"partition of Ireland," is that the Act did not "set up," but only

recognised, the partition which history made long ago, and which wrecked

all attempts to solve the problem of Irish Government that neglected to

take it into account. If there be any force in Renan's saying that the

root of nationality is "the will to live together," the Nationalist cry

of "Ireland a Nation" harmonises ill with the actual conditions of

Ireland north and south of the Boyne. This dividing gulf between the two

populations in Ireland is the result of the same causes as the political

dissension that springs from it, as described by Mr. Asquith in words

quoted above. The tendencies of social and racial origin operate for the

most part subconsciously--though not perhaps less powerfully on that

account; those connected with economic considerations, with religious

creeds, and with events in political history enter directly and

consciously into the formation of convictions which in turn become the

motives for actions.

In the mind of the average Ulster Unionist the particular point of

contrast between himself and the Nationalist of which he is more

forcibly conscious than of any other, and in which all other

distinguishing traits are merged, is that he is loyal to the British

Crown and the British Flag, whereas the other man is loyal to neither.

Religious intolerance, so far as the Protestants are concerned, of

which so much is heard, is in actual fact mainly traceable to the same

sentiment. It is unfortunately true that the lines of political and of

religious division coincide; but religious dissensions seldom flare up

except at times of political excitement; and, while it is undeniable

that the temper of the creeds more resembles what prevailed in England

in the seventeenth than in the twentieth century, yet when overt

hostility breaks out it is because the creed is taken--and usually taken

rightly--as _prima facie_ evidence of political opinion--political

opinion meaning "loyalty" or "disloyalty," as the case may be. The label

of "loyalist" is that which the Ulsterman cherishes above all others. It

means something definite to him; its special significance is reinforced

by the consciousness of its wearers that they are a minority; it

sustains the feeling that the division between parties is something

deeper and more fundamental than anything that in England is called

difference of opinion. This feeling accounts for much that sometimes

perplexes even the sympathetic English observer, and moves the hostile

partisan to scornful criticism. The ordinary Protestant farmer or

artisan of Ulster is by nature as far as possible removed from the being

who is derisively nicknamed the "noisy patriot" or the "flag-wagging

jingo." If the National Anthem has become a "party tune" in Ireland, it

is not because the loyalist sings it, but because the dis-loyalist shuns

it; and its avoidance at gatherings both political and social where

Nationalists predominate, naturally makes those who value loyalty the

more punctilious in its use. If there is a profuse display of the Union

Jack, it is because it is in Ulster not merely "bunting" for decorative

purposes as in England, but the symbol of a cherished faith.

There may, perhaps, be some persons, unfamiliar with the Ulster cast of

mind, who find it hard to reconcile this profession of passionate

loyalty with the methods embarked upon in 1912 by the Ulster people. It

is a question upon which there will be something to be said when the

narrative reaches the events of that date. Here it need only be stated

that, in the eyes of Ulstermen at all events, constitutional orthodoxy

is quite a different thing from loyalty, and that true allegiance to

the Sovereign is by them sharply differentiated from passive obedience

to an Act of Parliament.

The sincerity with which this loyalist creed is held by practically the

entire Protestant population of Ulster cannot be questioned by anyone

who knows the people, however much he may criticise it on other grounds.

And equally sincere is the conviction held by the same people that

disloyalty is, and always has been, the essential characteristic of

Nationalism. The conviction is founded on close personal contact

continued through many generations with the adherents of that political

party, and the tradition thus formed draws more support from authentic

history than many Englishmen are willing to believe. Consequently, when

the General Election of 1918 revealed that the whole of Nationalist

Ireland had gone over with foot, horse, and artillery, with bag and

baggage, from the camp of so-called Constitutional Home Rule, to the

Sinn Feiners who made no pretence that their aim was anything short of

complete independent sovereignty for Ireland, no surprise was felt in

Ulster. It was there realised that nothing had happened beyond the

throwing off of the mask which had been used as a matter of political

tactics to disguise what had always been the real underlying aim, if not

of the parliamentary leaders, at all events of the great mass of

Nationalist opinion throughout the three southern provinces. The whole

population had not with one consent changed their views in the course of

a night; they had merely rallied to support the first leaders whom they

had found prepared to proclaim the true objective. Curiously enough,

this truth was realised by an English politician who was in other

respects conspicuously deficient in insight regarding Ireland. The

Easter insurrection of 1916 in Dublin was only rendered possible by the

negligence or the incompetence of the Chief Secretary; but, in giving

evidence before the Commission appointed to inquire into it, Mr. Birrell

said: "The spirit of what to-day is called Sinn Feinism is mainly

composed of the old hatred and distrust of the British connection ...

always there as the background of Irish politics and character"; and,

after recalling that Cardinal Newman had observed the same state of

feeling in Dublin more than half a century before, Mr. Birrell added

quite truly that "this dislike, hatred, disloyalty (so unintelligible to

many Englishmen) is hard to define but easy to discern, though incapable

of exact measurement from year to year." This disloyal spirit, which

struck Newman, and which Mr. Birrell found easy to discern, was of

course always familiar to Ulstermen as characteristic of "the South and

West," and was their justification for the badge of "loyalist," their

assumption of which English Liberals, knowing nothing of Ireland, held

to be an unjust slur on the Irish majority.

If this belief in the inherent disloyalty of Nationalist Ireland to the

British Empire did any injustice to individual Nationalist politicians,

they had nobody but themselves to blame for it. Their pronouncements in

America, as well as at home, were scrutinised in Ulster with a care that

Englishmen seldom took the trouble to give them. Nor must it be

forgotten that, up to the date when Mr. Gladstone made Home Rule a plank

in an English party's programme--which, whatever else it did, could not

alter the facts of the case--the same conviction, held in Ulster so

tenaciously, had prevailed almost universally in Great Britain also; and

had been proclaimed by no one so vehemently as by Mr. Gladstone himself,

whose famous declarations that the Nationalists of that day were

"steeped to the lips in treason," and were "marching through rapine to

the dismemberment of the Empire," were not so quickly forgotten in

Ulster as in England, nor so easily passed over as either meaningless or

untrue as soon as they became inconvenient for a political party to

remember. English supporters of Home Rule, when reminded of such

utterances, dismissed with a shrug the "unedifying pastime of unearthing

buried speeches"; and showed equal determination to see nothing in

speeches delivered by Nationalist leaders in America inconsistent with

the purely constitutional demand for "extended self-government."

Ulster never would consent to bandage her own eyes in similar fashion,

or to plug her ears with wool. The "two voices" of Nationalist leaders,

from Mr. Parnell to Mr. Dillon, were equally audible to her; and, of the

two, she was certain that the true aim of Nationalist policy was

expressed by the one whose tone was disloyal to the British Empire.

Look-out was kept for any change in the direction of moderation, for any

real indication that those who professed to be "constitutional

Nationalists" were any less determined than "the physical force party"

to reach the goal described by Parnell in the famous sentence, "None of

us will be ... satisfied until we have destroyed the last link which

keeps Ireland bound to England."

No such indication was ever discernible. On the contrary, Parnell's

phrase became a refrain to be heard in many later pronouncements of his

successors, and the policy he thus described was again and again

propounded in after-years on innumerable Nationalist platforms, in

speeches constantly quoted to prove, as was the contention of Ulster

from the first, that Home Rule as understood by English Liberals was no

more than an instalment of the real demand of Nationalists, who, if they

once obtained the "comparative freedom" of an Irish legislature--to

quote the words used by Mr. Devlin at a later date--would then, with

that leverage, "operate by whatever means they should think best to

achieve the great and desirable end" of complete independence of Great

Britain.

This was an end that could not by any juggling be reconciled with the

Ulsterman's notion of "loyalty." Moreover, whatever knowledge he

possessed of his country's history--and he knows a good deal more, man

for man, than the Englishman--confirmed his deep distrust of those whom,

following the example of John Bright, he always bluntly described as

"the rebel party." He knew something of the rebellions in Ireland in the

seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, and was under no

illusion as to the design for which arms had been taken up in the past.

He knew that that design had not changed with the passing of

generations, although gentler methods of accomplishing it might

sometimes find favour. Indeed, one Nationalist leader himself took

pains, at a comparatively recent date, to remove any excuse there may

ever have been for doubt on this point. Mr. John Redmond was an orator

who selected his words with care, and his appeals to historical

analogies were not made haphazard. When he declared (in a speech in

1901) that, "in its essence, the national movement to-day is the same as

it was in the days of Hugh O'Neill, of Owen Roe, of Emmet, or of Wolfe

Tone," those names, which would have had but a shadowy significance for

a popular audience in England, carried very definite meaning to the ears

of Irishmen, whether Nationalist or Unionist. Mr. Gladstone, in the

fervour of his conversion to Home Rule, was fond of allusions to the

work of Molyneux and Swift, Flood and Grattan; but these were men whose

Irish patriotism never betrayed them into disloyalty to the British

Crown or hostility to the British connection. They were reformers, not

rebels. But it was not with the political ideals of such men that Mr.

Redmond claimed his own to be identical, nor even with that of

O'Connell, the apostle of repeal of the Union, but with the aims of men

who, animated solely by hatred of England, sought to establish the

complete independence of Ireland by force of arms, and in some cases by

calling in (like Roger Casement in our own day) the aid of England's

foreign enemies.

In the face of appeals like this to the historic imagination of an

impressionable people, it is not surprising that by neither Mr.

Redmond's followers nor by his opponents was much account taken of his

own personal disapproval of extremes both of means and ends. His

opponents in Ulster simply accepted such utterances as confirmation of

what they had known all along from other sources to be the actual facts,

namely, that the Home Rule agitation was "in its essence" a separatist

movement; that its adherents were, as Mr. Redmond himself said on

another occasion, "as much rebels as their fathers were in 1798"; and

that the men of Ulster were, together with some scattered sympathisers

in the other Provinces, the depositaries of the "loyal" tradition.

The latter could boast of a pedigree as long as that of the rebels. If

Mr. Redmond's followers were to trace their political ancestry, as he

told them, to the great Earl of Tyrone who essayed to overthrow England

with the help of the Spaniard and the Pope, the Ulster Protestants could

claim descent from the men of the Plantation, through generation after

generation of loyalists who had kept the British flag flying in Ireland

in times of stress and danger, when Mr. Redmond's historical heroes were

making England's difficulty Ireland's opportunity.

There have been, and are, many individual Nationalists, no doubt,

especially among the more educated and thoughtful, to whom it would be

unjust to impute bad faith when they professed that their political

aspirations for Ireland were really limited to obtaining local control

of local affairs, and who resented being called "Separatists," since

their desire was not for separation from Great Britain but for the

"union of hearts," which they believed would grow out of extended

self-government. But the answer of Irish Unionists, especially in

Ulster, has always been that, whatever such "moderate," or

"constitutional" Nationalists might dream, it would be found in

practice, if the experiment were made, that no halting-place could be

found between legislative union and complete separation. Moreover, the

same view was held by men as far as possible removed from the standpoint

of the Ulster Protestant. Cardinal Manning, for example, although an

intimate personal friend of Gladstone, in a letter to Leo XIII, wrote:

"As for myself, Holy Father, allow me to say that I consider a

Parliament in Dublin and a separation to be equivalent to the same

thing. Ireland is not a Colony like Canada, but it is an integral and

vital part of one country."[1]

It is improbable that identical lines of reasoning led the Roman

Catholic Cardinal and the Belfast Orangeman and Presbyterian to this

identical conclusion; but a position reached by convergent paths from

such distant points of departure is defensible presumably on grounds

more solid than prejudice or passion. It is unnecessary here to examine

those grounds at length, for the present purpose is not to argue the

Ulster case, but to let the reader know what was, as a matter of fact,

the Ulster point of view, whether that point of view was well or ill

founded.

But, while the opinion that a Dublin Parliament meant separation was

shared by many who had little else in common with the Ulster

Protestants, the latter stood alone in the intensity of their conviction

that "Home Rule meant Rome Rule." It has already been mentioned that it

is the "disloyalty" attributed rightly or wrongly to the Roman Catholics

as a body that has been, in recent times at all events, the mainspring

of Protestant distrust. But sectarian feeling, everywhere common between

rival creeds, is, of course, by no means absent. Englishmen find it hard

to understand what seems to them the bigoted and senseless animosity of

the rival faiths in Ireland. This is due to the astonishing shortness of

their memory in regard to their own history, and their very limited

outlook on the world outside their own island. If, without looking

further back in their history, they reflected that the "No Popery"

feeling in England in mid-Victorian days was scarcely less intense than

it is in Ulster to-day; or if they realised the extent to which

Gambetta's "Le cléricalisme, voilà l'ennemi" continues still to

influence public life in France, they might be less ready to censure the

Irish Protestant's dislike of priestly interference in affairs outside

the domain of faith and morals. It is indeed remarkable that

Nonconformists, especially in Wales, who within living memory have

displayed their own horror of the much milder form of sacerdotalism to

be found in the Anglican Church, have no sympathy apparently with the

Presbyterian and the Methodist in Ulster when the latter kick against

the encompassing pressure of the Roman Catholic priesthood, not in

educational matters alone, but in all the petty activities of every-day

life.

Whenever this aspect of the Home Rule controversy was emphasised

Englishmen asked what sort of persecution Irish Protestants had to fear

from a Parliament in Dublin, and appeared to think all such fear

illusory unless evidence could be adduced that the Holy Office was to be

set up at Maynooth, equipped with faggot and thumb-screw. Of persecution

of that sort there never has been, of course, any apprehension in

modern times. Individual Catholics and Protestants live side by side in

Ireland with fully as much amity as elsewhere, but whereas the Catholic

instinctively, and by upbringing, looks to the parish priest as his

director in all affairs of life, the Protestant dislikes and resists

clerical influence as strongly as does the Nonconformist in England and

Wales--and with much better reason. For the latter has never known

clericalism as it exists in a Roman Catholic country where the Church is

wholly unrestrained by the civil power. He has resented what he regards

as Anglican arrogance in regard to educational management or the use of

burying-grounds, but he has never experienced a much more aggressive

clerical temper exercised in all the incidents of daily life--in the

market, the political meeting, the disposition of property, the

amusements of the people, the polling booth, the farm, and the home.

This involves no condemnation of the Irish priest as an individual or as

a minister of his Church. He is kind-hearted, charitable, and

conscientious; and, except that it does not encourage self-reliance and

enterprise, his influence with his own people is no more open to

criticism than that of any other body of religious ministers. But the

Roman Catholic Church has always made a larger claim than any other on

the obedience of its adherents, and it has always enforced that

obedience whenever it has had the power by methods which, in Protestant

opinion, are extremely objectionable. In theory the claim may be limited

to affairs concerned with faith and morals; but the definition of such

affairs is a very elastic one. Cardinal Logue not many years ago said:

"When political action trenches upon faith or morals or affects

religion, the Vicar of Christ, as the supreme teacher and guardian of

faith and morals, and as the custodian of the immunities of religion,

has, by Divine Right, authority to interfere and to enforce his

decisions." How far this principle is in practice carried beyond the

limits so denned was proved in the famous Meath election petition in

1892, in which the Judge who tried it, himself a devout Catholic,

declared: "The Church became converted for the time being into a vast

political agency, a great moral machine moving with resistless

influence, united action, and a single will. Every priest who was

examined was a canvasser; the canvas was everywhere--on the altar, in

the vestry, on the roads, in the houses." And while an election was in

progress in County Tyrone in 1911 a parish priest announced that any

Catholic who should vote for the Unionist candidate "would be held

responsible at the Day of Judgment." A still more notorious example of

clericalism in secular affairs, within the recollection of Englishmen,

was the veto on the Military Service Act proclaimed from the altars of

the Catholic Churches, which, during the Great War, defeated the

application to Ireland of the compulsory service which England,

Scotland, and Wales accepted as the only alternative to national defeat

and humiliation.

But these were only conspicuous examples of what the Irish Protestant

sees around him every day of his life. The promulgation in 1908 of the

Vatican decree, _Nec Temere_, a papal reassertion of the canonical

invalidity of mixed marriages, followed as it was by notorious cases of

the victimisation of Protestant women by the application of its

principles, did not encourage the Protestants to welcome the prospect of

a Catholic Parliament that would have control of the marriage law; nor

did they any more readily welcome the prospect of national education on

purely ecclesiastical lines. Another Vatican decree that was equally

alarming to Protestants was that entitled _Motu Proprio_, by which any

Catholic layman was _ipso facto_ excommunicated who should have the

temerity to bring a priest into a civil court either as defendant or

witness. Medievalism like this was felt by Ulster Protestants to be

irreconcilable with modern ideas of democratic freedom, and to indicate

a temper that boded ill for any regime which would be subject to its

inspiration. These were matters, it is true,--and there were perhaps

some others of a similar nature--on which it is possible to conceive

more or less satisfactory legislative safeguards being provided; but as

regards the indefinable but innumerable minutiae in which the prevailing

ecclesiastical standpoint creates an atmosphere in which daily life has

to be carried on, no safeguards could be devised, and it was the

realisation of this truth in the light of their own experience that made

the Ulstermen continually close their ears to allurements of that sort.

The Roman Church is quite consistent, and from its own point of view

praiseworthy, in its assertion of its right, and its duty, to control

the lives and thoughts of men; but this assertion has produced a clash

with the non-ecclesiastical mind in almost every country, where

Catholicism is the dominant religious faith. But in Ireland, unlike

Continental countries, there is no Catholic lay opinion--or almost

none--able to make its voice heard against clerical dictation, and

consequently the Protestants felt convinced, with good reason, that any

legislature in Ireland must take its tone from this pervading mental and

moral atmosphere, and that all its proceedings would necessarily be

tainted by it.

Prior to 1885 the political complexion of Ulster was in the main

Liberal. The Presbyterians, who formed the majority of the Protestant

population, collateral descendants of the men who emigrated in the

eighteenth century and formed the backbone of Washington's army, and

direct descendants of those who joined the United Irishmen in 1798, were

of a pronounced Liberal type, and their frequently strong disapproval of

Orangeism made any united political action an improbable occurrence. But

the crisis brought about by Gladstone's declaration in favour of Home

Rule instantly swept all sections of Loyalists into a single camp. There

was practically not a Liberal left who did not become Unionist, and,

although a separate organisation of Liberal Unionists was maintained,

the co-operation with Conservatives was so whole-hearted and complete as

almost to amount to fusion from the outset.

The immediate cessation of class friction was still more remarkable. For

more than a decade the perennial quarrel between landlord and tenant had

been increasing in intensity, and the recent land legislation had

disposed the latter to look upon Gladstone as a deliverer. Their

gratitude was wiped out the moment he hoisted the green flag, while the

labourers enfranchised by the Act of 1884 eagerly enrolled themselves

as the bitterest enemies of his new Irish policy. The unanimity of the

country-side was matched in the towns, and especially in Belfast, where,

with the single exception of a definitely Catholic quarter, employer and

artisan were as whole-heartedly united as were landlord and tenant in

passionate resentment at what they regarded as the betrayal by England's

foremost statesman of England's only friends in Ireland.

The defeat of the Home Rule Bill of 1886 brought relief from the

immediate strain of anxiety. But it was at once realised that the

encouragement and support given to Irish disloyalty for the first time

by one of the great political parties in Great Britain was a step that

could never be recalled. Henceforth the vigilance required to prevent

being taken unawares, and the untiring organisation necessary for making

effective defence against an attack which, although it had signally

failed at the first onslaught, was certain to be renewed, welded all the

previously diverse social and political elements in Ulster into a single

compact mass, tempered to the maximum power of resistance. There was

room for no other thought in the minds of men who felt as if living in a

beleaguered citadel, whose flag they were bound in honour to keep flying

to the last. The "loyalist" tradition acquired fresh meaning and

strength, and its historical setting took a more conscious hold on the

public mind of Ulster, as men studied afresh the story of the Relief of

Derry or the horrors of 1641. Visits of encouragement from the leaders

of Unionism across the Channel, men like Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour,

Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Randolph Churchill, fortified the resolution of a

populace that came more and more to regard themselves as a bulwark of

the Empire, on whom destiny, while conferring on them the honour of

upholding the flag, had imposed the duty of putting into actual practice

the familiar motto of the Orange Lodges--"No surrender."

From a psychology so bred and nourished sprang a political temper which,

as it hardened with the passing years, appeared to English Home Rulers

to be "stiff-necked," "bigoted," and "intractable." It certainly was a

state of mind very different from those shifting gusts of transient

impression which in England go by the name of public opinion; and, if

these epithets in the mouths of opponents be taken as no more than

synonyms for "uncompromising," they were not undeserved. At a memorable

meeting at the Albert Hall in London on the 22nd of April, 1893, Dr.

Alexander, Bishop of Derry, poet, orator, and divine, declared in an

eloquent passage that was felt to be the exact expression of Ulster

conviction, that the people of Ulster, when exhorted to show confidence

in their southern fellow-countrymen, "could no more be confiding about

its liberty than a pure woman can be confiding about her honour."

Here was the irreconcilable division. The Nationalist talked of

centuries of "oppression," and demanded the dissolution of the Union in

the name of liberty. The Ulsterman, while far from denying the

misgovernment of former times, knew that it was the fruit of false ideas

which had passed away, and that the Ireland in which he lived enjoyed as

much liberty as any land on earth; and he feared the loss of the true

liberty he had gained if put back under a regime of Nationalist and

Utramontane domination. And so for more than thirty years the people of

Ulster for whom Bishop Alexander spoke made good his words. If in the

end compromise was forced upon them it was not because their standpoint

had changed, and it was only in circumstances which involved no

dishonour, and which preserved them from what they chiefly dreaded,

subjection to a Dublin Parliament inspired by clericalism and disloyalty

to the Empire.

The development which brought about the change from Ulster's resolute

stand for unimpaired union with Great Britain to her reluctant

acceptance of a separate local constitution for the predominantly

Protestant portion of the Province, presents a deeply interesting

illustration of the truth of a pregnant dictum of Maine's on the working

of democratic institutions.

"Democracies," he says, "are quite paralysed by the plea of nationality.

There is no more effective way of attacking them than by admitting the

right of the majority to govern, but denying that the majority so

entitled is the particular majority which claims the right."[2]

This is precisely what occurred in regard to Ulster's relation to Great

Britain and to the rest of Ireland respectively. The will of the

majority must prevail, certainly. But what majority? Unionists

maintained that only the majority in the United Kingdom could decide,

and that it had never in fact decided in favour of repealing the Act of

Union; Lord Rosebery at one time held that a majority in Great Britain

alone, as the "Predominant Partner," must first give its consent; Irish

Nationalists argued that the majority in Ireland, as a distinct unit,

was the only one that should count. Ulster, whilst agreeing with the

general Unionist position, contended ultimately that her own majority

was as well entitled to be heard in regard to her own fate as the

majority in Ireland as a whole. To the Nationalist claim that Ireland

was a nation she replied that it was either two nations or none, and

that if one of the two had a right to "self-determination," the other

had it equally. Thus the axiom of democracy that government is by the

majority was, as Maine said, "paralysed by the plea of nationality,"

since the contending parties appealed to the same principle without

having any common ground as to how it should be applied to the case in

dispute.

If the Union with Great Britain was to be abrogated, which Pitt had only

established when "a full measure of Home Rule" had produced a bloody

insurrection and Irish collusion with England's external enemies, Ulster

could at all events in the last resort take her stand on Abraham

Lincoln's famous proposition which created West Virginia: "A minority of

a large community who make certain claims for self-government cannot, in

logic or in substance, refuse the same claims to a much larger

proportionate minority among themselves."

The Loyalists of Ulster were successful in holding this second line,

when the first was no longer tenable; but they only retired from the

first line--the maintenance of the legislative union--after a long and

obstinate defence which it is the purpose of the following pages to

relate.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Henry Edward Manning_, by Shane Leslie, p. 406.

[2] Sir S.H. Maine, _Popular Government_, p. 28.

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