(_i. e._ it is my _intention_ to go; and believe, or know, that it is your
_intention_ to accompany me.)
The philosophical reason for this distinction will be evident, when we
reflect upon the various ideas produced in the mind by the expression of
either _volition_ or mere _intention_ (in so far as the latter is
distinguishable from active _will_) with regard to _our own_ future
actions, and the same terms with reference to the future actions of
_others_. It will be seen that a mere _intention_ in the _first_ person,
becomes _influence_ when it extends to the _second_ and _third_; we know
nothing, _a priori_ (as it were) of the _intentions_ of others, except in
so far as we may have the power of _determining_ them. When I say "_I_
shall go" (_j'irai_), I merely express an _intention_ or _promise_ to go;
but if I continue "_You_ and _they_ shall go," I convey the idea that _my_
intention or promise is operative on _you_ and _them_; and the terms which
I thus use become unintentionally influential or expressive of an extension
of _my_ volition to the actions of _others_. Again, the terms which I use
to signify _volition_, with reference to _my own_ actions, are but
_declaratory_ or _promissory_ when I speak of _your_ actions, or those of
_others_. I am conscious of _my own_ wish to go; but _my_ wish not
influencing _you_, I do, by continuing the use of the same auxiliary, but
express my belief or knowledge that _your_ wish is, or will be, coincident
with _my own_. When I say "I will go" (_je veux aller_), I express a desire
to go; but if I add, "_You_ and _they_ will go," I simply promise on behalf
of _you_ and _them_, or express _my_ belief or knowledge that _you_ and
_they_ will also desire to go.
It is not unworthy of note, that the nice balance between _shall_ and
_will_ is much impaired by the constant use of the ellipse, "I'll, you'll,"
&c.; and that _volition_ and _intention_ are, to a great extent,
co-existent and inseparable in the _first_ person: the metaphysical reasons
for this do not here require explanation.
I am conscious that I have not elucidated this apparently simple, but
really complex question, in so clear and concise a manner as I could have
wished; but, feeling convinced that my principle at least is sound, I leave
it, for better consideration, in the hands of your correspondent.