Germany's Fleet in the Last Century
Though the sword of Napoleon completed the destruction of the Holy
Roman Empire, which had done so much to hamper the development of the
Teutonic race, the Vienna Congress, rearranging the map of Europe after
his overthrow, left Germany still divided into thirty-nine different
states. There were four kingdoms, one electorate, seven grand duchies,
ten duchies, ten principalities, one landgraviate, and the four free
towns--Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, and Frankfort-on-Main. These states
were loosely united in the German Confederacy.
The people of Germany, and especially those who had risen against
Napoleon, had expected a more complete unity on a democratic basis,
and the disappointment of their hopes was one of the chief causes of
the revolution which, in 1848, broke out simultaneously in nearly
every one of the federal capitals. This movement took the Governments
by surprise, and so overwhelming was the popular demand for unity,
that they offered but little opposition to the convening of a National
Assembly, which met at Frankfort-on-Main on May 18th, 1848, and
appointed the Austrian Archduke Johann provisional "Administrator of
the Empire." It is generally asserted that the failure of this serious
attempt to weld Germany together was an inevitable consequence of
the jealousy existing between Austria and Prussia, but none can say
with certainty what the sequel might not have been, had not Frederick
William IV., the grand-uncle of the present German Emperor, refused the
imperial crown when it was offered to him by the National Assembly.
It is very well conceivable that, if that monarch had been less fully
persuaded of the divine rights of kings and of the incompetence of
popular representatives to bestow crowns, the work which Bismarck did
in the next twenty years, with so grievous an expenditure of blood and
iron, might have been accomplished by peaceable means, and that the
world might to-day have been confronted with the problem of a much
larger, much richer, and much more united Germany. Those who would
not regard German domination in Europe as an unmixed blessing have
reason to be thankful for Frederick William's archaic theories on the
relationships of Princes to their peoples.
And those who care to amuse themselves by following up the grand
alternatives of history must not forget that 1848 saw the birth of the
modern German Fleet, which was the fruit of a purely popular movement.
Indeed, the patriots of the Frankfort Parliament found in the "imperial
fleet," which they actually founded, the necessary symbol of that
national unity which was the goal of their aspirations.
Strong, spontaneous, and almost universal as was the German naval
movement of 1848, it did not attain its actual dimensions without
an effective external stimulus. In the very month in which the
revolutionaries were defending their barricades in the streets of
Berlin and other German capitals, Frederick VII. had declared his
intention of incorporating Schleswig in Denmark; and, while an informal
convention was arranging the preliminaries for the National Assembly,
the Danish fleet was blockading the coasts of Prussia in retaliation
for the military support afforded by that Kingdom, as the mandatory of
the German Confederation, to the rebellious duchies. Nothing was better
calculated than an incident of this sort to bring home to the German
mind the importance of sea-power. That the ships of a little country
like Denmark should be able, with impunity, to forbid the sea to a
great military Power, seemed to every German who reflected upon it a
grotesque inversion of the natural order of events.
Though the National Assembly, at one of its first sittings, appointed a
permanent committee to grapple with the naval question, the impatient
interest of the public displayed itself in schemes and suggestions
which poured in from every side. In many places committees were formed
to help to raise the funds necessary for the equipment of a fleet.
It is significant of the widespread nature of the movement that the
raftsmen of Gernsbach, in the Black Forest, offered to transport down
the River Murg free of cost the timber required for the building
of Germany's war ships. The seaports, which felt most keenly the
insulting pressure of the Danish blockade, took the leading part in
the agitation. A congress of delegates from the German coast towns
came together at Hamburg and nominated a "naval commission," on which,
in addition to the Governments most immediately concerned, a number
of private committees were represented. This body wasted no time in
talk, but set to work with feverish activity. As warships were not to
be had ready-made, several merchant vessels were purchased and hastily
armed with guns furnished by Hanover; and at the beginning of July,
the Federal Government was notified that these extemporized men-of-war
were ready to put out and attack the enemy. But at the moment the
negotiations with Denmark for a truce had already begun, and for the
time being the squadron remained peacefully at its moorings.
Meanwhile, even before an Imperial Executive had been got together, the
Frankfort Parliament had voted for naval purposes a sum of 6,000,000
thalers,[6] half of which was to be spent immediately and the remainder
as necessity might arise. Part of the money was to be taken from
the fortress fund of the old Confederacy, and the remainder raised
by levies in due proportion on the various states of the union. The
question of these "matricular contributions," which in some cases were
altogether refused, and in others only paid after much hesitation and
vacillation, was one of the chief reasons for the ultimate dissolution
of the first "German" Navy.
In November an imperial naval authority was constituted under the
control of the Minister of Commerce, who was at the same time deputy
for Bremen. An advisory commission of experts was also appointed,
and the chair in this body was, at the personal request of the
Archduke-Administrator, taken by the man who, in one sense, may be
regarded as the father of the present German Fleet, Prince Adalbert of
Prussia, and to whom, for this reason, more detailed reference must
be made hereafter. The commission submitted a scheme, in which it was
recommended that Germany should, for the present, make no attempt to
gain a place in the ranks of the first-class naval Powers, but content
herself with the protection of her Baltic and North Sea coasts and
her sea-borne trade. These purposes, it was held, could be fulfilled
by a fleet of fifteen sixty-gun sailing frigates--if possible with
auxiliary engines--five steam frigates, twenty steam corvettes, ten
despatch-boats, five schooners, and thirty gun-sloops.
During the winter, officials were despatched to England to purchase
and order ships, and to America to induce the United States Government
to allow some of its naval officers to enter temporarily into the
German service. These latter negotiations at first promised success,
but in the end the Government at Washington declared itself unable
to entertain the request. With the purchase of material the German
emissaries had better luck, and when the truce with Denmark expired
in the spring of 1849, the Navy List already contained the names of
twelve vessels, though, it is true, hardly one of them was yet fit for
action. A Commander-in-Chief had also been found in the person of Karl
Bromme, a native of Leipzig, whose name had been permanently anglicized
into "Brommy" while he was learning seafaring in the American merchant
service. This man, "the first German Admiral," had followed Cochrane
to Greece, where he was successively Flag Captain to Admiral Miaulis,
organizer in the Ministry of Marine, and Commandant of the Military
School at the Piræus. From there he was tempted away to become
"Imperial Commissioner" to the incipient German Navy, and after taking
part in the sittings of the commission of experts, he was sent in that
capacity to Bremerhaven to supervise the formation of the fleet and to
found a naval arsenal.
On June 4th Brommy, with a steam frigate and two steam corvettes,
attacked a Danish frigate which was lying becalmed off Heligoland.
Hardly, however, had the engagement commenced before a signal shot
from the island warned the belligerents that they were within British
territorial waters, and must suspend hostilities. Soon afterwards the
Danish blockading squadron approached the scene, and the German ships
hurried back to their harbour. This was the only opportunity the German
Fleet had of showing its quality. Brommy was promoted to Rear-Admiral
later in the year.
Insignificant as the Heligoland skirmish was in itself, it had a
sequel which has played a great part in all subsequent movements for
increasing the German Fleet. Brommy's ships had fought under the
black-red-and-gold that were to be the colours of the new Empire. But
this Empire had then no legal existence, and, as a matter of fact,
never did have one, and no doubt Palmerston was only giving expression
to recognised principles of international law when he wrote that
vessels committing acts of belligerency under the black-red-and-gold
flag would render themselves liable to be treated as "pirates." The
Frankfort Government, a product of excitement and inexperience,
made many mistakes which the ripe tradition of an old-established
administration would have avoided, and, in its haste to assert
itself on the seas, doubtless did not give sufficient thought to the
restrictions imposed upon it by its own anomalous status. The hoisting
of the black-red-and-gold on a flotilla or warships was undeniably a
questionable proceeding, and one which justified the view propounded
by the British Foreign Minister. At the same time, his words belong to
the category of things which had better have been left unsaid. The word
"pirate" rankled then, and has ever since continued to rankle, and the
Palmerstonian note has been cited ten thousand times, and is still
cited, as the supreme example of the tyrannous arrogance with which
Britain rules the waves.
A fortnight after Brommy's one exploit as a German naval commander,
the remnant of the National Assembly was dispersed by military force
at Stuttgart, where it had taken refuge, and Germany relapsed into
the condition of a loosely-jointed federation of mutually jealous
and suspicious Princes, whose rival claims had to be settled on the
battlefield before the great work of unification could be accomplished.
The infant navy, which had been the work of a popular movement and a
popular Parliament, proved a source of dissension and embarrassment
to the Confederacy Governments. Several of the inland states were
altogether opposed to the idea that Germany needed a navy. A strong
party advocated that one fleet should be provided by Austria for the
Adriatic, a second by Prussia for the Baltic, and a third by the
remaining German states for the North Sea. The last point of this
project was the subject of special negotiations, and at one time there
seemed some chance of Hanover assuming the office of "Federal Admiral."
In the end, however, divergent interests and irreconcilable rivalries
produced the only possible result, and, in February, 1852, the
Confederated Governments decided to cut the Gordian knot. The promising
German Navy was dissolved, Admiral Brommy received his discharge (he
was subsequently employed for some time as Chief of the Technical
Department of the Austrian Admiralty), and an Oldenburg official,
whose unforgettable name has helped to brand his memory with the whole
infamy of a transaction for which he was in nowise responsible, was
appointed "Commissioner of the Germanic Confederation charged with
the regulation of naval affairs." This, at least, is the designation
appended to his signature on the advertisement which, in the German,
English, and French languages, announced to all the world that the
German Navy was forthwith to be knocked down to the highest bidder. It
was the form rather than the fact of the sale which was taken so ill in
Privy Councillor Hannibal Fischer, but it is difficult to see what else
he could have done. He made efforts to dispose of the ships by private
treaty, and actually sold some of them to Prussia and others to English
firms, but a residue remained for which no purchaser could be found in
this way, and there was nothing for it but to put them up to public
auction. There thus came under the hammer two steam frigates, six steam
corvettes, a sailing frigate, and twenty-seven gunboats propelled by
oars. Of the eight steamers three had been built at Bristol, and one
each at Glasgow, Leith, New York, Hamburg, and Bremen. Except in the
case of the American vessel, the engines were all of British make.
Concurrently with the abortive efforts to found a German Navy, Prussia
had taken independent action, and laid the real foundation of the great
fleet which now aspires to contest the British mastery of the seas.
At that time there was not even the slenderest basis for the kingdom
to work upon. The task had to be undertaken from the very beginning.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, it is true, the
advisability of building a navy had more than once been exhaustively
discussed by the Prussian Government. In the general resettlement of
1815, the island of Rügen and the strip of Pomeranian coast opposite
to it had passed from Sweden to Prussia, and included in the transfer
were six gun-sloops and a Swedish officer, Captain Christian Lange,
who was summoned to Berlin to report to the War Ministry on the utility
of the little flotilla. As the result of his representations, he was
commissioned to submit plans and estimates for a war schooner, and
for an armed rowing boat for use on the rivers. These vessels were
eventually built, with the express idea that they were to serve as
experiments and models for the construction of a regular fleet. In
great haste prescriptions as to a naval uniform were issued, and the
questions of dockyards and harbour works were also deliberated. But
the only issue of all this work was the conviction that the national
resources were not yet equal to the financial strain which would have
been entailed by the creation of a navy. Similar investigations and
discussions in the years 1825 and 1832 were, for the same reason,
equally fruitless. At the commencement of the revolutionary year,
the only vessels in the possession of the Prussian Government were a
corvette, which was employed as a Navigation School, a paddle steamer,
which conveyed the mails between Stettin and St. Petersburg, and
which, under the terms of the contract for its construction, was to be
adaptable to the purposes of an "auxiliary cruiser," and a couple of
armed yawls.
By the autumn of 1848 a Prussian flotilla of ten sloops and yawls,
three of which had been built with the funds collected by private
committees, was ready for operations against the Danes. It was placed
under the command of a Dutch ex-naval captain named Schröder. The crews
provided for him--465 men in all--were a strange medley of active
soldiers, reservists, and seamen from the merchant service. For various
reasons, not the least weighty of which was the doubtful status of
the black-red-and-gold flag, the squadron sailed under the Prussian
colours. While it was fitting out, the first steps were taken towards
the establishment of a naval organization and the training of a corps
of officers.
By the following summer the Prussian fleet could already boast two
steamers, one sailing corvette, and twenty-one gun sloops, with a total
complement of thirty-seven officers and 1,521 men, and mounting in
all sixty-seven guns. But only once did this primitive navy have the
satisfaction of taking part in a pitched naval engagement. This was a
duel between a Prussian steamer and a Danish brig, which fought for
five hours off the island of Rügen. The encounter was terminated by the
fall of darkness, and before day broke again another Danish corvette
arrived on the scene and put the Prussians to flight. But, in spite of
a lack of fighting, the presence of Commodore Schröder's force along
the coast undoubtedly did much to relieve the pressure of the blockade.
The peace with Denmark in 1850 ushered in a period of assiduous
and systematic labour at the task of building up a Prussian fleet.
Throughout this important period, the moving spirit was the man who
has already been described as the father of the German Navy, Prince
Adalbert of Prussia. This enthusiastic and indefatigable sailor was a
first cousin of King Frederick William IV., who refused the imperial
crown as a democratic gift, and of the Emperor William I., who finally
won it on the battlefields of France. In his boyhood, Prince Adalbert
had had the doctrine of the vital importance of sea-power implanted in
his mind by a veteran soldier, Field-Marshal Gneisenau, and he never
forgot the lesson. At the age of twenty-one he paid a visit of two
months' duration to England, where he was cordially welcomed into
naval circles, and where his passion for the sea was inflamed by the
conversation of men who had fought under Nelson at Trafalgar. He lost
no opportunity of inspecting war vessels, shipyards, and docks, and
returned to Germany with note-books crammed with information as to
all he had seen and heard. A British admiral is said to have declared
that the Prince knew more about the warships of Great Britain than
many of their own officers, and one of the last acts of this sailor
Hohenzollern was to pay a visit to the English dockyards to familiarize
himself with the latest novelties in naval construction.
Four years after his first journey to England, one of those naval
enquiries already alluded to was held at Berlin, and a commission was
appointed to advise as to the types of vessels to be chosen for the
fleet which the Prussian Government contemplated building at some
indefinite future date. Prince Adalbert was a member of this body,
but when asked for his views on the subject he satisfied himself
with laying before his colleagues the opinion of his friend, Captain
Mingaye, a British naval officer, who advised that the triumph of steam
over sails and oars presented Prussia with a splendid opportunity to
create sea-power which should be "mighty" from the outset. Curiously
enough, the War Minister, von Rauch, inferred from this suggestion
that naval construction was passing through a transition stage of
doubtful issue, and it was used by him as a pretext for postponing
the consideration of the whole question; for, he argued, Prussia
could not afford to squander money on uncertain experiments. In the
succeeding years, the Prince cruised the Mediterranean in an Austrian
ship with his friend the Archduke Johann, afterwards the Imperial
Administrator, and made in Sardinian and British war vessels several
longer voyages, during which he devoted himself with a whole heart to
the study of seamanship and navigation. He also added materially to his
knowledge while on board one of the ships of the British Mediterranean
Squadron, which at the time was engaged in manoeuvres. On his return
home from these experiences, he secured the appointment of Schröder
to the Navigation School ship _Amazon_, always with the idea that the
vessel would be the training-ground of the officers' corps of a future
Prussian Navy. As we have seen, the Prince was chosen as chairman
of the Frankfort advisory committee on naval questions. Some months
previously he had addressed to the National Assembly a "Memorandum as
to the Formation of a German Fleet." This document, which was printed
and published, not only is a remarkable testimony to the author's
insight into the true nature of naval problems, but also contains a
clear enunciation of the principles which have since guided Germany's
naval policy. Pointing to the humiliation of the Danish blockade he
wrote:
"And this Germany--united Germany--must calmly submit to, precisely
at the great moment when, after long years, it once more feels itself
a whole, a Power of forty millions of people. But the Fatherland
recognises the oppressive nature of its situation; it demands a remedy
all the more speedy because after these events, it foresees with
certainty how much more painful its position might some day be if it
were pitted against one of the great Sea Powers, a Power against which
the German ships would not be secure even in their own harbours, a
fleet which could menace our coasts with debarkations on a much more
extensive scale than is possible to our present foe. United Germany,
however, wishes to see her territories energetically protected, her
flag respected, her trade once more flourishing, and in the future to
have some influence on the sea."
Prince Adalbert then weighed the three alternatives: (_a_) Defensive
coast protection; (_b_) offensive coast protection; and (_c_) an
independent German sea-power; and finally reached the conclusion:
"Germany must either build no battleships or at once build so many
that she can act towards her neighbours as an independent Sea-Power.
Anything intermediate would be a useless expense, an empty pretension,
and would arouse in the nation expectations which, in the moment of
danger, our sea-power would not be able to fulfil.
"If we now ask what would be the smallest number of battleships which
would allow us to act in European waters as an independent fleet,
especially against the ever-ready Russian Baltic fleet, I think we
must take twenty battleships as the minimum that would be able to
measure itself with it. But such a fleet would make Germany fourth
among the Sea-Powers of first rank, and place her incontestably in a
position to play a great rôle on the sea, a rôle which would be worthy
of her position in Europe. For with her twenty battleships she would
be able to throw an enormous weight into the scales, turn the balance
by her adherence to an alliance, and consequently be as much sought
after as an ally on account of her sea-power as on account of her
land-power."
The Prince accordingly proposed that the German building programme
should include 20 battleships with auxiliary screws, 10 frigates,
30 steam cruisers, 40 gunboats, and 80 gun-sloops; and that the
construction of these vessels should be spread over a period of ten
years. In this project we have that same principle of the gradual
working up to a fixed standard of strength which has characterised all
modern German naval legislation.
However, the Prince did not manage to persuade the Frankfort
technical commission to adopt his scheme in its entirety, though the
programme approved went a long way towards meeting his views. Why
this programme was never carried out has already been seen. In the
Memorandum just quoted from, Prince Adalbert had written: "The entire
nation unanimously demands a German war fleet, for German, absolutely
German, it must be, a true representative of the new-born unity of the
Fatherland"; and it must have been with a heavy heart that he saw his
vision melt away, and went back to Berlin to employ his gifts in a more
restricted and less promising field.
The difficulties which opposed themselves to the realisation of the
Prince's ideas will be appreciated, when it is stated that the man
who built the first warship of any size which had been launched from
a German yard since the days of the Hanseatic League is still alive.
Wilhelm Schwarm, now ninety-four years of age, was employed as a young
man in Klawitter's shipyard at Dantzig, and at the time when the air
was filled with talk of a future German Navy, the firm very shrewdly
sent him over to the works of Robinson and Russell, on the Thames, to
learn the art of constructing vessels of larger size than were then
built on the Baltic. He brought back with him the plans for a paddle
corvette, which was built under his supervision on the Klawitter slips,
fitted with English engines, and, under the name of _Dantzig_, was an
important addition to the Prussian fleet.
At the time of the Crimean War this vessel showed the Prussian flag
at Constantinople for the first time in history, and it was also with
her that Prince Adalbert experienced a rather grotesque adventure in
the Mediterranean in 1856. In the previous year a German ship had been
plundered by the Riff pirates, and the Prince, happening to be in
those parts with the _Dantzig_, made a reconnaissance, in one of the
ship's boats, of the coast of Cape Tree Forcas, where the outrage had
occurred. The natives, as was their custom, fired on the party from
the shore. Annoyed by this molestation, Prince Adalbert determined to
teach the Arabs a severe lesson. Having manned and armed all his boats,
he stormed the steep and rocky shore and planted the Prussian flag on
the summit of the cliffs. His triumph was, however, a very brief one,
for the enemy immediately returned to the attack, and drove the landing
party back to the boats with the loss of seven killed and twenty-three
wounded. Official panegyrists extol this rash escapade as an "heroic
deed," and declare that it did much to raise the confidence of the
young Prussian Navy. As the Riff pirates were no doubt also exultant
over their victory, the affair must have been one of those rare
encounters with the issue of which both sides were equally satisfied.
The _Dantzig_ was sold a few years later in England, in the belief that
her timbers were unsound, and was then passed on to Japan, where she
was run ashore and burnt by her own crew during an engagement in the
civil war.
The problem of obtaining properly qualified personnel for the corps of
naval officers was not less difficult to solve than that of building
efficient warships. England would have been the natural source on which
to draw for instructors, but for political reasons it was decided
not to seek assistance from that most competent of all quarters, and
the services of three officers of the Swedish Navy were secured. For
similar reasons a Swedish naval constructor was engaged. A few years
later, however, permission was asked and obtained for a number of
cadets to learn their profession on British men-of-war.
The year 1852 brought an event of the utmost importance for the
development of the Prussian Navy--the acquisition of Wilhelmshaven
as a North Sea base. At that time Prussia did not possess an inch
of coast-line on the North Sea, and could obtain access to it only
through the Belt and the Sound, then under the control of the superior
naval power of Denmark. Among the innumerable projects with which the
National Assembly had been deluged, was the scheme of three citizens
of Rendsburg for the construction of a water-way pretty much along the
line subsequently followed by the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. This plan was,
however, based on the false assumption that Schleswig-Holstein would at
once become, and ever afterwards remain, German territory. It had also
been proposed to the Frankfort Government by an Oldenburg official that
the Jade Bay should be chosen as the North Sea base for the fleet, and
this suggestion seems to have fixed the attention of Prince Adalbert
on the inlet which is now the chief naval headquarters of the German
Empire. The Grand Duke of Oldenburg was approached, and he consented
to cede to Prussia the piece of marshly land which has since been
covered by the harbours, docks, shipyards, workshops, barracks, and
fortifications of Wilhelmshaven. Prussia paid a sum of 500,000 thalers
for this invaluable possession, and at the same time took upon herself
the protection of the coast and sea-trade of the duchy.
Herculean efforts and inexhaustible patience were required to adapt
Prussia's acquisition on the Jade to its destined purposes. Years had
to be spent in a careful survey of the bed of the harbour, in order to
ascertain how far the channel was affected by the movements of sand and
mud under the influence of the tide. Further years were consumed by the
task of sinking piles in the treacherous peaty soil to obtain a solid
foundation for dock and harbour walls. Frequently a storm or a spring
tide destroyed in a few hours the fruits of months of strenuous labour.
As Hanover refused to allow the construction of a railway across her
territory, which lay between Prussia and Oldenburg, it was necessary to
convey all the building materials to the spot by the long and tedious
sea-route. At first not even drinking-water was to be had on the
desolate site, and prolonged and costly exertions were needful before
it could be procured in sufficient quantities. Sixteen years elapsed
before the new harbour was formally declared open by the Prussian
King, afterwards the Emperor William I., in the presence of British
ships, the officers of which probably regarded the works with indulgent
curiosity and little guessed the significance which Wilhelmshaven
would one day possess for their own country.
When the second war with Denmark broke out in 1864, Prussia's fleet was
still absurdly inadequate to deal with the naval force opposed to it.
The ship establishment at the close of 1863 was composed as under:
_Steamships with Fighting Value._
3 corvettes, mounting 27 or 28 guns each.
1 corvette, mounting 17 guns.
_Steamships with little Fighting Value._
4 first-class gunboats, mounting 3 guns each.
17 second-class gunboats, mounting 2 guns each.
3 despatch-boats, mounting together 8 guns.
_Steamship without Fighting Value._
1 corvette, mounting 9 guns.
_Sailing Ships with little or no Fighting Value._
3 frigates, mounting a total of 112 guns.
3 brigs, mounting a total of 4 guns.
2 schooners, mounting a total of 4 guns.
_Also without Fighting Value._
40 rowing-boats, mounting a total of 76 guns.
Denmark, on the other hand, had 31 steam war vessels, among which
were 1 battleship, 5 frigates, 3 corvettes, and 4 armoured craft.
Even with the assistance of a number of Austrian ships, which arrived
in the North Sea from the Mediterranean, the Prussian fleet could
contribute nothing decisive towards the issue of the war. At the most
it prevented the Danish blockade of the German coast-line from being
effective. The Prussian Government attempted to reduce its inferiority
by hiring merchant vessels, and hurriedly purchased warships in France
and England. One of these latter, the monitor _Arminius_, which was
of English build, was almost entirely paid for with the voluntary
contributions which had continued to flow in. This fact shows how
steady and keen the interest of a large section of the population in
the development of the navy already was, and how erroneous it is to
ascribe the naval enthusiasm in Germany of recent years entirely to the
official agitation. Peace was concluded before the new ships could be
made ready for sea.
The war of 1864 was one of the great cross-roads of British history.
Difficult as it is to "overlook the cards of Providence," as Bismarck
puts it, there can be little doubt that we took the wrong turning.
The great German Chancellor candidly admitted that the possession of
Kiel and a strategic canal through Holstein were two of the principal
objects which Prussia had in view when she drew the sword. The two
leading members of the British Cabinet were in favour of backing up
Denmark; and one of them, Palmerston, used language in Parliament which
might well have led that country to count upon our support. A strong
body of English public opinion also warmly espoused the Danish cause.
But Queen Victoria, largely influenced by the sympathy for Germany
which she had imbibed from the Prince Consort, threw all the weight of
the Crown into the opposite scale.
There are few more agitated passages to be found in the records of
diplomacy than those letters to Lord Granville in which she argued,
threatened, entreated, and, finally falling back on the last strength
of woman, her weakness, complained that she was "completely exhausted
by anxiety and suspense," and "so tired and unwell she can hardly hold
up her head or hold her pen." Her will prevailed in the end, and she
was able to congratulate herself that, "owing to the determined stand
she had made against her two principal ministers, she had saved the
country from an unnecessary war." When Prussia, completely reversing
her attitude, made those very claims of the Danish King which she
had contested by force of arms her pretext for annexing the two
duchies under the "rights of conquest," the Queen suffered a bitter
disillusionment, and, on her instructions General Grey wrote to Lord
Granville, that "Prussia should at least be made aware of what she and
her Government and every honest man in Europe must think of the gross
and unblushing violation of every assurance and pledge that she had
given which Prussia had been guilty of." It will hardly be contended
now that a war which should have left Schleswig-Holstein in the hands
of Denmark would have been anything but exceedingly advantageous,
economical, and opportune for Great Britain.
Even before, in the formal division of the spoils, Prussia had obtained
Austrian recognition of her right to Kiel, she had occupied that port
and transferred her naval headquarters thither from Dantzig. The
construction of the North Sea Baltic Canal was delayed many years,
mainly by the opposition of Count Moltke, who argued that its cost
would be so great that it would, on the whole, be cheaper to build a
second fleet with the money. He further urged that the canal would be
navigable only in the summer, and that in the event of a war the army
would be weakened by the necessity of providing for its defence. But
for the doubts and jealousies of the sister service, the German Navy
might years ago have enjoyed the benefits of that prolongation of the
Canal, contemplated by Bismarck, which would have allowed its ironclads
to steam from Kiel to Wilhelmshaven without putting out into the open
sea.
In the hope that the lessons of the war would have produced the
desirable effect on the public mind, the Prussian Government, in
1865, laid before its Parliament a bill that may be considered as the
definite inauguration of the naval policy which Germany has ever since
pursued. In the Memorandum submitted to the House with the measure, it
was contended that the time had come for Prussia to join the ranks of
the Sea-Powers, in order that she might be in a position to protect
her own and the other German coasts and maritime trade, and, for all
future time, to assert her European position as against such States as
were accessible only by water. "For the present," it was stated, "she
is unable to enter into rivalry with the first-class naval Powers, but
she must occupy a position commanding esteem among those of the second
class."
Accordingly, the Government asked for authority to build 10 armoured
frigates of the highest efficiency, an equal number of armoured
vessels of the cupola or turret type for coast defence, 16 corvettes
for the protection of sea-borne trade, 6 despatch-boats, and at least
4 transports. It was calculated that ten years would be necessary
for the execution of this plan, but rather for the training of the
personnel and the provision of the indispensable harbour works than for
the actual construction of the ships. The cost of the proposed fleet
was estimated at 34,500,000 thalers, that of its annual maintenance
at about 5,000,000 thalers. In recommending the scheme to the Diet,
Bismarck used the following words, which contain very noteworthy
implications: "During the last twenty years no question has so
unanimously interested public opinion in Germany as precisely the naval
question. We have seen associations, the Press, and the Diets give
expression to their sympathy, and this sympathy exercised itself in
the collection of comparatively important sums. The Government and the
Conservative party have been reproached with the slowness and parsimony
with which action has been taken in this direction. It was particularly
the Liberal parties which carried on this agitation. We believe,
therefore, that we are doing you a great pleasure with this Bill."
But the Liberal majority, then exclusively preoccupied with the
constitutional struggle against the masterful and autocratic
Minister-President, threw out the Bill, and modified naval estimates
were given the force of law by royal decree. The attitude of the
Prussian Liberals of that epoch was very similar to that of the
Socialists in recent years.
In the brief war of 1866, the Austrian fleet was tied down to the
Mediterranean by the superior sea-power of Italy, and the operations
of the Prussian ships were confined to a few cheap victories over the
antiquated coast and river fortifications of Hanover. As the result of
the war, Prussia was rounded off by the incorporation of the Kingdom
of Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Nassau, and the old imperial town of
Frankfort-on-Main. She thus secured for herself the entire German North
Sea littoral, with the exception of the coast-line of Oldenburg, which
by treaty was already hers in fact if not in law. Immediately after
the conclusion of peace, all the States to the north of the Main were
closely welded together in the North German Confederation, the first
decisive step towards the creation of the Empire. An article in the
Federal Constitution ran: "The Federal Navy is one and indivisible
under the command of Prussia. Its organization and composition fall
to His Majesty the King of Prussia, who nominates the officials and
officers of the navy, and to whom they, as well as the crews, must take
the oath of fealty. Kiel harbour and the Jade harbour are federal war
harbours. The expenses necessary for the establishment and maintenance
of the fleet and the institutions connected therewith will be borne by
the Federal Treasury."
Two years later a fresh naval programme was submitted to, and approved
by, the North German Reichstag. It laid down that within ten years the
fleet should be brought up to the subjoined strength:
16 large and small armoured ships.
20 corvettes.
8 despatch-boats.
3 transports.
22 steam gunboats.
7 school-ships.
The new vessels actually needed for the attainment of this
establishment were 12 armoured ships, 12 corvettes, 6 despatch-boats,
2 transports, and 1 school-ship. As native ship-builders had so far
had no experience in the construction of ironclads, only one vessel
of this type was placed in Germany, the State yard at Dantzic being
experimentally entrusted with the work, while the rest were purchased
or ordered in England or France. No fact could illustrate more vividly
the tremendous progress which Germany has since made in this respect.
Oddly enough, the great war with France was succeeded by a marked
cooling-off of the popular enthusiasm for the navy in Germany. The
reasons for this appear to have been disappointment with what the
fleet actually accomplished and the complete overthrow of the enemy
without its assistance. Even if all the federal ships had been in
perfect trim and manned by thoroughly trained crews, they were
confronted by so overwhelming a superiority of force that at best they
could have achieved little or nothing. But the outbreak of hostilities
coincided with a series of accidents which temporarily disabled several
of Germany's best war vessels, and at that time there was not a single
dock in the country in which they could be repaired. Officers and crews
were, too, imperfectly trained and insufficiently familiar with both
engines and guns, the harbour equipments were inadequate, and, in fact,
everything was in a state of unpreparedness.
That the French, with their great naval superiority, effected so
little, and did not even make a determined attempt to force the Jade
and destroy the works at Wilhelmshaven, can only be ascribed to their
lack of initiative and the paralyzing operation of their crushing
defeats on land. The only regular engagement fought at sea during
the war was an encounter of uncertain issue between a small German
gunboat and a French despatch-boat off the coast of Cuba. But in spite
of the odds against the federal fleet, public opinion in Germany
protested that it should have shown more dash and enterprise, and in
some way have crowned itself with laurels. Even more prejudicial to
the popularity of an ambitious naval policy was the patent fact that
the hereditary and most formidable foe had been thoroughly and rapidly
humbled by a purely land campaign, and that his superiority on the sea
had availed him practically nothing. To such considerations must be
attributed a large share of the indifference with which many Germans
regarded their navy during the next thirty years.
The prevalent views were reflected in the Memorandum with which, in
1872, the Minister of Marine, Lieutenant-General von Stosch, ushered
in the first naval programme of the new German Empire. This document
stated that in a long war Germany must leave the offensive to her land
force, and that the proper task of her navy was to assert the power of
the Empire where smaller interests were at stake in places to which the
army could not penetrate. An increase in the fleet was, however, stated
to be necessary on the ground of the growth of German sea-borne trade,
and it was proposed that the following vessels should be available by
the year 1882:
8 armoured frigates.
6 armoured corvettes.
7 armoured monitors.
2 armoured batteries.
20 cruisers.
6 despatch-boats.
18 gunboats.
28 torpedo-boats.
5 school-ships.
The cost of these vessels was estimated at 73,000,000 thalers, that
of their maintenance in the year 1882 at 1,300,000 thalers. The plan,
which was much more modest in its pretensions than its predecessors,
and in principle constituted a retirement from the position formerly
taken up, was approved by the first Parliament of the new Germany.
The first royal review of the German Fleet took place in the Warnemünde
roads in 1875. The ships present were four ironclads, a despatch-boat,
and four school-ships; their total complements 2,862 officers and men.
When the year 1883 arrived, General von Stosch published a Memorandum
on the execution of his plan. It is significant of the change that had
come over public opinion that the Government had not dared to ask the
Reichstag for a substitute for the armoured frigate _Grosser Kurfürst_,
which was lost in collision off Folkestone, and that consequently one
of the eight vessels of her type was lacking. The last of the six
armoured corvettes had yet to be built, and instead of five monitors
thirteen armoured gunboats had been constructed, because it was thought
that the latter class of ship was better suited for the defence of the
Jade, Weser, and Elbe. It had been decided not to build the floating
batteries, which would have been an easy prey to the "fish" torpedo,
introduced as a weapon of naval warfare since they were projected. One
out of the twenty corvettes, and eight large and nine small torpedo
craft were also still wanting. German national vanity had, however,
secured a questionable triumph: the Empire was now entirely independent
of foreigners so far as its warships were concerned. But if Germany had
continued to purchase some of her warships in England while she was
still but a tyro in the art of naval architecture, she would have saved
much money, and made more rapid progress.
General von Stosch simultaneously presented another Memorandum, dealing
with the future development of the navy. In it he laid stress on the
reasons which could be adduced against the principle hitherto followed,
and since readopted, of fixing the building programme in advance for
a longer period, and advised that it was inexpedient to look farther
ahead than three or four years. While admitting that "the seas are
ever more ceasing to separate the nations," and that "the course of
history seems ever more to indicate that a State cannot withdraw
from the sea if it is striving to maintain for itself a position in
the world beyond the immediate future," he laid down the axiom that
"naval battles alone seldom decide the destinies of States, and for
immeasurable time the decision of every war will for Germany lie
with her land army." Thus, though he admitted the desirability of "a
concentrated high sea fleet always ready for action," he considered it
best to defer the construction of battleships till further experience
had shown whether their functions could not be equally well performed
by vessels of a smaller type. The conclusion reached by the Memorandum
was that it was necessary to add without delay to only one class of
vessel--namely, that which served the purposes of coast defence. In
this connection the following words were used:
"Here it is the torpedo-boat, which, especially when used in large
numbers at night, will render the carrying through of a blockade
almost impossible. Every night the blockading ships would be compelled
to withdraw to a distance under steam. Their coal consumption would
thereby be much increased, the tension of the crews, in consequence of
the need for unremitting vigilance, would become intolerable, and at
night the blockaded harbours would be accessible. Even when in motion,
the blockading ships would not be safe at night. The torpedo-boats
would follow them and recognize their aim by the lights which the
enemy would not be able to do without when steaming in squadron
formation. The torpedo-boat is a weapon which is of special advantage
to the weaker on the sea. A few States already possess a considerable
strength in torpedo craft. For the German Navy 150 torpedo-boats
are considered necessary, and of these thirty-five will be ready for
service shortly."
It was while the German Fleet was still impotent for all serious
purposes that the Empire acquired the mass of its colonies: South-West
Africa, Togo, the Cameroons, German New Guinea, the Bismarck
Archipelago, and the Marshall Islands were all annexed in 1884. The
decisive step towards the acquisition of German East Africa was taken
in the following year.
William I. lived just long enough to lay the foundation-stone of the
Kiel Canal, which had been one of the dreams of the Frankfort patriots
forty years earlier. His death was followed after an interval of three
months by that of Frederick I., and with the accession of William II.,
in 1888, the latest era of German naval policy may be said to have
commenced. Until, however, Admiral Tirpitz was put in charge of the
Ministry of Marine, in 1897, practically nothing was done to add to
the fighting strength of the fleet. Any progress which was made in
connection with the navy was confined to developments of organisation,
and to the exchange of German rights in Zanzibar and Witu for the islet
of Heligoland. This transaction was scoffed at by Bismarck, then in
retirement, who, however, only contemplated the possibility of a naval
war with France, and it was bitterly resented by German public opinion,
and especially by that heated section of it which poses as the pioneer
on the path of militarism, navalism, and colonism. Only during the last
three or four years has the conviction gradually begun to gain ground,
that perhaps, after all, Germany did not make such a bad bargain, and
Heligoland has simultaneously taken an ever more and more prominent
place in the speculations of political prophets as to the probable
outcome of an Anglo-German war.
The keen interest of the Emperor William, and his ambition to play
the leading part on the stage of the world, would not, in themselves,
have sufficed to bring about the change which has been wrought during
the past seventeen years. The decisive personal factors here have
been the fixed purpose, the steady will, the unflagging energy, the
inexhaustible patience, the profound political insight, and the rare
diplomatic skill of Admiral Tirpitz, the nearest approach to a really
great man that Germany has produced since Bismarck. He is the true
creator of the German fleet.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 6: Thaler = about 3s.]