At this time Sir Horatio Nelson had been despatched to the Mediterranean
with a small squadron to ascertain the object of the great expedition
which was fitting out, under Napoleon Bonaparte, at Toulon.
Nelson had for a long time past been displaying, in a series of
complicated and difficult operations in the Mediterranean, those
splendid qualities which had already won for him unusual honours and
fame, and which were about to raise him to that proud pinnacle which he
ultimately attained as England's greatest naval hero. His address and
success in matters of diplomacy had filled his superiors and the
Government with sentiments of respect; his moral courage in risking
reputation and position, with unflinching resolution, by _disobeying_
orders when by so doing the good and credit of his country could be
advanced, made him an object of dread to some, of admiration to others,
while his lion-like animal courage and amiability endeared him to his
officers and men. Sailors had begun to feel that where Nelson led the
way victory was certain, and those who were ordered to join his fleet
esteemed themselves most fortunate.
The defeat of the French armament was considered by the English
Government a matter of so great importance, that Earl St. Vincent, then
engaged in blockading the Spanish fleet, was directed, if he thought it
necessary, to draw off his entire fleet for the purpose, and relinquish
the blockade. He was, however, told that, if he thought a detachment
sufficient, he was to place it under the command of Sir Horatio Nelson.
The Earl did consider a detachment sufficient, and had already made up
his mind to give the command to Nelson, being thoroughly alive to his
great talents and other good qualities. He accordingly sent him to the
Mediterranean with three ships of the line, four frigates, and a sloop
of war.
This force was now, by the addition to which we have referred, augmented
so largely that Nelson found himself in possession of a fleet with which
he might not only "watch" the enemy, but, if occasion should offer,
attack him.
He was refitting after a storm in the Sardinian harbour of St. Pietro,
when the reinforcements hove in sight. As soon as the ships were seen
from the masthead of the Admiral's vessel, Nelson immediately signalled
that they should put to sea. Accordingly the united fleet set sail, and
began a vigorous search for the French armament, which had left Toulon a
short time before.
The search was for some time unsuccessful. No tidings could be obtained
of the destination of the enemy for some time, but at length it was
learned that he had surprised Malta.
Although his fleet was inferior in size to that of the French, Nelson--
and indeed all his officers and men--longed to meet with and engage
them. The Admiral, therefore, formed a plan to attack them while at
anchor at Gozo, but he received information that the French had left
that island the day after their arrival. Holding very strongly the
opinion that they were bound for Egypt, he set sail at once in pursuit,
and arrived off Alexandria on the 28th of June 1798.
There, to his intense disappointment, he found that nothing had been
seen or heard of the enemy. Nelson's great desire was to meet with
Napoleon Bonaparte and fight him on the sea. But this wish was not to
be gratified. He found, however, that the governor of Alexandria was
endeavouring to put the city in a state of defence, for he had received
information from Leghorn that the French expedition intended to proceed
against Egypt after having taken Malta.
Leaving Alexandria, Nelson proceeded in various directions in search of
the French, carrying a press of sail night and day in his anxiety to
fall in with them, but being baffled in his search, he was compelled to
return to Sicily to obtain fresh supplies in order to continue the
pursuit.
Of course Nelson was blamed in England for his want of success in this
expedition, and Earl St. Vincent was severely censured for having sent
so young an officer on a service so important. Anticipating the
objection, that he ought not to have made so long a voyage without more
certain information, Nelson said, in vindication of his conduct:--
"Who was I to get such information from? The Governments of Naples and
Sicily either knew not, or chose to keep me in ignorance. Was I to wait
patiently until I heard certain accounts? If Egypt were their object,
before I could hear of them, they would have been in India. To do
nothing was disgraceful; therefore I made use of my understanding. I am
before your lordships' judgment; and if, under all circumstances, it is
decided that I am wrong, I ought, for the sake of our country, to be
superseded; for at this moment, when I know the French are not in
Alexandria, I hold the same opinion as off Cape Passaro--that, under all
circumstances, I was right in steering for Alexandria; and by that
opinion I must stand or fall."
It was ere long proved that Nelson _was_ right, and that Earl St.
Vincent had made no mistake in sending him on a service so important;
for we now know that in all the British fleet there was not another man
so admirably adapted for the duty which was assigned to him, of finding,
fighting, and conquering, the French, in reference to whom he wrote to
the first lord of the Admiralty, "Be they bound to the antipodes, your
lordship may rely that I will not lose a moment in bringing them to
action!"
Re-victualled and watered, the British fleet set sail on the 25th of
July from Syracuse. On the 28th, intelligence was received that the
enemy had been seen about four weeks before, steering to the South East
from Candia.
With characteristic disregard of the possible consequences to his own
fame and interest, in his determination to "do the right," Nelson at
once resolved to return to Alexandria. Accordingly, with all sail set,
the fleet stood once more towards the coast of Egypt.
Perseverance was at length rewarded. On the 1st of August 1798, about
ten in the morning, they sighted Alexandria, and saw with inexpressible
delight that the port was crowded with the ships of France.
And here we venture to say that we sympathise with the joy of the
British on this occasion, and shall explain why we do so.
Not every battle that is fought--however brilliant in military or naval
tactics it may be, or in exhibitions of personal prowess--deserves our
sympathy. Only that war which is waged against oppression is entitled
to respect, and this, we hold, applies to the war in which the British
were engaged at that time.
France, under the Directory, had commenced a career of unwarrantable
conquest, for the simple purpose of self-aggrandisement, and her great
general, Bonaparte, had begun that course of successful warfare in which
he displayed those brilliant talents which won for him an empire,
constituted him, in the ordinary acceptation of the word, a hero, and
advanced France to a high position of tyrannical power. But brilliant
talents and success could not free him from the charge of being a
wholesale murderer.
To oppose such pretentions and practices was a bounden duty on the part
of those who loved justice, just as much as it is the duty of every one
who has the power to thwart the designs of, and forcibly overcome, a
highwayman or a pirate.
Observe, reader, that we do not intend here to imply an invidious
comparison. We have no sympathy with those who hold that England was
and always is in favour of fair play, while France was bent on tyranny.
On the contrary, we believe that England has in some instances been
guilty of the sin which we now condemn, and that, on the other hand,
many Frenchmen of the present day would disapprove of the policy of
France in the time of Napoleon the First. Neither do we sympathise with
the famous saying of Nelson that "one Englishman is equal to three
Frenchmen!" The tendency to praise one's-self has always been regarded
among Christian nations as a despicable, or at least a pitiable,
quality, and we confess that we cannot see much difference between a
boastful man and a boastful nation. Frenchmen have always displayed
chivalrous courage, not a whit inferior to the British, and history
proves that in war they have been eminently successful. The question
whether they could beat us or we could beat them, if tested in a fair
stand-up fight with equal numbers, besides being an unprofitable one, is
not now before us. All that we are concerned about at present is, that
in the war now under consideration the British _did_ beat the French,
and we rejoice to record the fact solely on the ground that we fought in
a righteous cause.
With these remarks we proceed to give an account of one of the greatest
naval victories ever achieved by British arms.