only themselves to blame for their defeat. But England is not defeated,
and I am convinced that she can be defeated only by our defection on
the lines advocated by Lindbergh. She was to blame for her refusal
to see her danger in time, and for the same reason France was to
blame for her defeat. I agree to this, but to waste time now in such
recriminations is folly. Lindbergh says England and France were always
too late and that now we in America are too late to save England. But
it is our Lindberghs who are making us late. We are still not armed,
agreed, but how can we win the time to arm? We can gain the time to
arm only by upholding Britain, keeping her fighting, and keeping the
Germans out of control of the Atlantic. We can do that now by going
to war with Germany and reinforcing Britain with all the force at our
disposal, which is adequate when ranged beside the present strength of
Britain but inadequate to fight alone. Only our entry into the war now,
before it is too late, can guarantee that Britain stands, and as long
as Britain stands we can build our arms in perfect security until the
combined British and American might is strong enough to defeat Germany.
Lindbergh’s argument is that if we fight beside Britain now we lose; if
we fight alone later, we win.
He says we cannot be invaded: “I believe that we can build a military
and commercial position on this continent that is impregnable to
attack.” But in the preceding paragraph he says that for us to win a
war we must prepare for it “not for one year, or for two, but for ten
years or for twenty as Germany has done.” Does he imagine that Hitler
would give us twenty years to prepare for war, or ten, or two, or even
one after he had beaten Britain?
But they cannot get at us, says Lindbergh, citing the difficulty of
air-borne invasion by Greenland or South America. Nobody imagines an
exclusively air-borne invasion of America is possible. But if the
British lose the war before we complete our two-ocean navy in 1947,
sea power goes to the Germans. Lindbergh at no time discussed this
all-important fact. Nor the fact that a defeated Britain, like defeated
France, would be yoked into the Nazi war machine to be used against
the last enemy, ourselves. Does he really believe that if this happens
within the next year or eighteen months, much less in shorter time, we
shall be able alone to repel a German attack on this hemisphere, an
attack supported by all the navies and warplanes left on earth except
our own? We have already set forth the fact that after conquest of
Britain Germany would possess shipping to transport millions, twenty
to thirty thousand tanks, five or six times the number of warplanes we
shall be able to produce in eighteen months, and the most formidable
army the world has ever seen, driven by the indomitable will of Hitler
to conquer the globe or die.
Leave aside, though, the possibility of direct invasion of the
continental United States, and let us discuss with Lindbergh the
possibility of German invasion of South America. He declares this, too,
would be impossible “in opposition to the armed forces of Brazil backed
by our own Army, Navy and Air Corps.” But it is 4,258 miles from New
York to Pernambuco, Brazil, the place nearest to us where the Germans
might want to land, while it is only 3,847 miles from New York to
London. Lindbergh advocates that we should attempt to defend Pernambuco
though it is 400 miles farther from New York than London, which he says
we should not defend because, among other things, of the difficulty
of sending an expeditionary force so far. Does Lindbergh truly think
Pernambuco easier and more worth while for us to defend than London?
Does he really believe after Germany had conquered Europe and Britain
that Brazil or any other South American state would oppose Germany or
invite us to help it fight Germany?
But he demands to know, how can we defeat Germany if we do go to war?
He knows the answer to that better than anyone. We can defeat Germany
only by obtaining mastery of the air over Germany, then destroying
the German air force; once the Luftwaffe is destroyed, the impact of
that blow alone may cause the first crack in the military and civilian
morale of Germany and lift the morale of the conquered peoples to aid
in expelling their conquerors. Let me reiterate that the conquered
peoples will never revolt until they see the possibility of successful
revolt and that will come only with the first serious military setback
of the Germans.
Would we have to send an expeditionary land army? We probably shall
have to send our best units, and do it quickly, to prevent German
seizure of the West African ports and islands affording springboards
to America. Our troops would be useful now in North Africa and the
Near East. Wherever contact with the enemy can be had, we should be
represented as strongly as possible. It is also likely that we shall
need to send an A.E.F. to the continent, although not necessarily as
large as in the last war. If we can get air superiority, it will mean
the war is practically won. I should expect Germany then to crack up.
Even if she did not break down at once, the demoralization entailed
by loss of control of the air would be so great that landings on the
continent should be feasible at almost any place the Allies chose.
Lindbergh persistently asks where we could land an expeditionary force.
The answer is that if we get there in time we shall have an excellent
base of operations across the seas, Great Britain. From there the coast
of Nazi Europe presents hundreds of opportunities for invasion, once
the Nazi air force is eliminated.
Lindbergh demands to know how long it would take to win if we think,
contrary to his judgment, that we can win. I should think it would take
a minimum of three years after we enter the war, maybe four, possibly
five or six. It can be accomplished only by expanding our present
aircraft production program, which has orders now for 80,000 planes, to
whatever dimensions prove necessary. This depends on how many planes
the Germans are able to produce from their own and conquered factories,
including all the facilities of their conquests in the East. We shall
certainly have to think in terms of hundreds of thousands of planes.
We and the British will have to supply the pilots and crews and ground
crews for these planes, and it may be that our Air Corps will number
upwards of a million before we are through. We have the men and the
machines to do it.
“How much would it cost in American lives?” Lindbergh demands. Who
can tell? We know only that until the Germans went into Russia the
casualties in this war had been inconsiderable compared with the
last war. As long as combat was confined to the air and the sea, the
numbers of combatant lives lost were in the thousands compared with
the hundreds of thousands of soldier lives lost in comparable periods
in the land fighting of the last war. The bombardment of civilians
has been ghastly, but the number of lives lost has been on the whole
surprisingly small--41,900 persons killed in Britain from January 1940
to June 1941. It has even been asserted that in Britain, despite the
hardships, war has so elevated the tone, the spirit of the population,
that death by disease has declined until the gain has made up for the
loss of life by bombardment. The relatively small number of deaths
is explained by Mr. Churchill as the result of air raid precautions.
After the bloodiest month of the Battle of Britain, September 1940, Mr.
Churchill made a remarkable analysis.
“We are told,” he said, “by the Germans that 251 tons of explosives
were thrown upon London in a single night, that is to say, only a few
tons less than the total dropped on the whole country throughout the
last war. Now we know exactly what our casualties have been. On that
particular Thursday night 180 persons were killed in London as a result
of 251 tons of bombs. That is to say it took one ton of bombs to kill
three-quarters of a person. We know, of course, exactly the ratio of
loss in the last war, because all the facts were ascertained after it
was over. In that war the small bombs of early patterns which were used
killed ten persons for every ton discharged in the built-up areas. That
is, the mortality is now less than one-tenth of the mortality attaching
to the German bombing attacks in the last war....
“What is the explanation? There can only be one, namely the vastly
improved methods of shelter which have been adopted.... Whereas when we
entered this war at the call of duty and honor we expected to sustain
losses which would amount to 3,000 killed in a single night and 12,000
wounded, night after night, and made hospital arrangements on the basis
of a quarter of a million casualties merely as a first provision;
whereas that is what we did at the beginning of the war, we have
actually had since it began, up to last Saturday, as a result of air
bombing, about 8,500 killed and 13,000 wounded.” This was after three
months of the Blitz; today with the figure of 41,900 as the total dead,
the Prime Minister’s point is all the stronger as he concluded: “This
shows that things do not always turn out as badly as one expects.” Mr.
Churchill might have been speaking directly to Lindbergh.
Q. _But if air bombardment is as ineffective as these figures of
Churchill indicate, how do you expect us to be able to beat Germany
by winning air superiority and destroying the German air force? Isn’t
there a discrepancy in your argument?_
A. No, because Britain has come off so lightly precisely because the
Germans never have gotten air supremacy over Britain. If they ever
did, it would mean they would win the war, just as if we ever get
air supremacy over Germany, it will mean that we will win the war.
Air supremacy means you can come over in the daytime, and bomb with
precision. Antiaircraft guns are unable to prevent bombing. If there
are no fighters to beat off the bombers, the bombers can do just
about as they like. They can dive-bomb and destroy any objective they
choose with about ninety per cent accuracy. If the Luftwaffe is ever
destroyed, British and American planes can annihilate the entire German
war industry and then what will it avail Hitler to be the conqueror of
all Europe, or of Asia, too?
The R.A.F. has never been out to bomb civilians. The Germans have
proved how useless civilian bombing is against a brave people. The
R.A.F. has preferred the more difficult job of bombing military
objectives and already it has affected the Reich’s war-making capacity.
British bombs on the invasion ports had much to do with Hitler’s
postponement of his trip to England. With the addition to the R.A.F. of
hundreds of thousands of American machines, and with our own hundreds
of thousands in the American Air Force, there is no reason to doubt
that eventually the German military apparatus can be smashed.
Q. _What damage have the Germans done to the British war machine; or to
the buildings of London? Lindbergh insists Britain is already beaten to
her knees._
A. Exactly! Well, you have seen the loss of civilian life, amazingly
small. Now Mr. Churchill has given us an interesting estimate on the
damage to London. He said: “Statisticians may amuse themselves by
calculating that after making allowance for the working of the law of
diminishing returns, through the same house being struck twice or three
times over, it would take ten years at the present rate, for half of
the houses of London to be demolished. After that, of course, progress
would be much slower. Quite a lot of things are going to happen to
Herr Hitler and the Nazi regime before ten years are up.... Neither by
material damage nor by slaughter will the people of the British Empire
be turned from their solemn and inexorable purpose.” Does Lindbergh
really think the British are beaten?
But you may object, surely we shall not have to suffer bombing of
our civilian population. No, not if we enter the war in time to keep
it on the other side of the ocean. The oddest thing of all about the
Lindbergh policy is that it would wait for the war to come to us,
so that the bombs should fall on our homes, not on the homes of our
enemies. He represents precisely the fatal “Maginot line policy” which
he so decries in the French. He advises us to sit behind our Maginot
Atlantic and dream of our security until the Germans break through.
Finally Lindbergh demands that we “define our war aims,” and tell “how
we are to impose our ideology on Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan.”
We do not wish to “impose our ideology” on anyone. All we wish at the
moment is to preserve our nation, keep from becoming slaves of the
Nazis, and prevent Hitler from imposing his ideology upon us. We want
only to make the world safe for the United States, which means also for
the friends and allies of the United States, and if victory is ours we
shall attempt to include in the circle of security all the nations of
good will on earth. If this means “policing the earth,” let it mean
that. The first step to organize common security was taken when men
agreed to have a police force and for it sacrificed their individual
right to exercise individual justice, and agreed to pay taxes for the
protection. We are just now vigilantes trying to rid the community of
bandits.
It is a troublesome matter and after it is settled we may have sense
enough to organize at least for transient tranquillity and hope against
hope that education may help us to permanent peace. I have not much
hope of that myself, but if we, the United States of America, were to
put our heart into the effort, I would have hope. Unless we do there is
no hope at all.
Q. _But how many lives could it cost America?_
A. Nobody can say how many lives it will cost us to preserve
our liberty and independence. Maybe surprisingly few, maybe
heart-breakingly many. But is this a matter for bargaining? Does
Lindbergh ask us to say: “We, the United States of America will give
so and so many American lives in order to preserve our national
independence, our institutions, our children’s lives and our liberty,
but we will give so many and no more? If it costs more, we will
surrender! If it takes two years to win, we will make the trade; if it
costs ten, we give in!” If that is our attitude, we are beaten before
we begin. It is not America’s attitude. It was Vallandigham’s, but not
America’s.
Index
Abetz, Otto, 243, 251
America First Committee, 311, 345, 346, 361-362, 367
American Expeditionary Force, 278, 293, 314, 333, 371
Anabaptists, 56
Angell, Sir Norman, 193-194
Anti-Semitism, in Germany, 13-14, 64-65,82, 360
in Lindbergh’s philosophy, 361-362
Assassinations, political, 60-79, 239
Atlantic Charter, 184, 185-187, 200-202,227, 333-334
Atrocity stories, 79-83
Australian armed forces, 155
Austria, Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10
independence guaranteed, 7-8
seizure of, 27
Baltic states, fate of, 193, 227-228
Baruch, Bernard, 170
Bayes, William D., 43
_Berliner Illustrierte_, 42
Bernstein, Henri, 148-149
Bezbozhnik Society, 99
Birdsall, Paul, 286
Black Guards, 15, 39, 56, 62-63, 83
Blood Purge (June 30, 1934), 12, 32, 34, 39-40, 64, 78
Blum, Leon, 267, 279
Brest-Litovsk treaty, 58, 107
British Expeditionary Force, 21-22
British Intelligence Service, 66-68
British Navy, and American safety, 276
Churchill’s tribute to, 168-169
as a fighting force, 152-156
Bucharest treaty, 58
Cagoulard movement, 243, 251-259
Canada, and the war effort, 152, 154, 155, 204
China, 320, 366
war economy, 109
Churchill, Randolph, 26, 166, 172, 176, 177-178
Churchill, Winston, 139-183
address to French people, 284
Atlantic meeting with Roosevelt, 184-185
aversions, 176-177
as a bricklayer, 178-179
characteristics, 144, 148-151
on effect of air bombardment, 372-375
gift of prophecy, 148
military judgment, 156-161, 182-183
opinion of Roosevelt and the New Deal, 145-148
opinion of United States, 144-145
as a painter, 179
place in history, 139
popularity in England, 139-142
principal interests, 166-183
realist and idealist, 142-144
secret of success, 163-166
as a speaker, 171-174
speeches on defense of Britain, 151-153, 160, 164-166
as a writer, 163-164, 169, 170, 179
Ciano, Count, 7
Clapper, Raymond, 350
Cole, G. D. H., 141-142
Communism, compared with England’s wartime socialism, 231-233
compared with Nazism, 84-87
economic failure in Russia, 116-134
in France, 241, 249-250
in Germany, 13-14, 214-215
in Spain, 98
threat of revolution in Europe, 101-103
in the United States, 273-274
Compiègne armistice, 283
Conant, James B., 323
Conscientious objectors, 321-324
Cooper, Hugh, 107
Corrigan, Douglas, 353-355
Crete, battle of, 153, 158, 303
Croix de Feu, 250
Curie, Eve, 281, 318
Czechoslovakia, 51-52
occupied by Germany, 27-28
Darlan, Admiral, 266-268, 272
Darre, Walther, 54, 309
_Das Kapital_, 85
Deloncle, Colonel Eugene, 243
Deuxième Bureau, 243, 251-256
Dneiper dam, 107-108
Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10
Dunkirk, evacuation of, 21, 22, 151, 152, 303, 316
Duranty, Walter, 90
Dusseigneur, General, 243, 251
Einstein, Albert, 323
England, at war, 139-183
defense against Hitler, 300-306
and wartime socialism, 231-233
Fayard, Arthème, 252-253
Faymonville, Colonel, 135
Fifth Columnists, 339-376
Finland, 100, 105, 175, 364-366
Fish, Hamilton, 344-345
Foreign trade, effect of Nazi slave labor on, 192-197, 208-212
and Nazi economy, 53-54
France, compared with America, 273-280
declining birth rate, 234, 263, 277-278
future under Nazis, 283-284, 290-291
hope for, 281-282
indemnity and reparations to Germans, 285-292
Maginot line complex, 234, 240, 274-275, 296, 375
reasons for fall of, 30, 234-273
venality of press, 234, 280-281
French Army, equipment of, 234-235
morale of, 235-238
treason in, 238-262
Franco, General, 264
Fuller, Colonel Horace M., 20
de Gaulle, General, 266, 315
recognition of government, 292
Garvin, J. L., 174
Gaxotte, Pierre, 252-253, 256
George, General, 243
Georgiev, Vlada, 63, 77
German Air Force, strength of, 299, 333, 359, 372-374
German Army, 16, 297
Hitler’s ascendancy over, 8-9, 17-34
German people, attitude toward America, 329-331
character of, 55-58, 217-218, 226-227, 282
Hitler’s relation to, 36-38
Germany, 1-87
Communism in, 15-16, 214-215
deindustrialization vs. military occupation, 219-226
postwar reconstruction, 56-58
Gestapo, 15, 62, 67-68, 228, 243
in Holland, 67
murder monopoly of, 79, 83-84
and Nazi economy, 53-54
political position of, 74-76
in Spain, 25, 356
Goebbels, Joseph, 8, 15, 33, 163
and propaganda, 80, 243, 330-331
as a public speaker, 37
Goering, Hermann, 14-16, 24, 32, 163, 359
Glass, Senator Carter, 51
G. P. U., 70-71, 83-85, 119-120, 133, 228
political position of, 74-77
Greece, 158-159
Hackett, Francis, 43-44
Haushofer, Karl, 17
Hayes, Carlton J., 357
Hemingway, Ernest, 97
Hess’s flight to England, 15, 161-163
Hillenkoetter, Lieutenant-Commander, 20
Himmler, Heinrich, 15, 64, 67, 163, 243
Hitler, Adolf, 1-69
assassination attempts analyzed, 60-69
attack on Russia, 23, 30, 110-111, 160-161
compared with Hohenzollerns, 263-264, 328
and homosexuality, 34-35
impressions of, 1-3, 10-12, 43-51
military mistakes, 19-30
and Mussolini, 4-10
and Napoleon, 17, 30, 113-114
occupation of Czechoslovakia, 27-28
personal bravery, 30-33
physical appearance, 1-3, 43-44
plans for invasion of Britain, 300-305
principal interests, 167
as a public speaker, 37-41
relation to German people, 35-36, 60
reoccupation of Rhineland, 24-26, 148, 226
responsibility for war, 12-14
successors to, 14-17
seizure of Austria, 8-10, 27
treatment if beaten, 58-60
and the United States, 306-309
as war lord, 17-19
and women, 36-37
and world conquest, 37, 190-199, 202-209, 213-214, 323-325
Homosexuality, 33-35
Hoover, Herbert, 344-345
Huntziger, General Charles, 235-238
Hutchins’ Four Freedoms, 309-313
Imro, 77-78
Irish neutrality, 144, 305-306
Jankowsky, Frau Marie, 81-83
Japan, 112, 316
publishes Axis peace terms, 199, 202-207
_Je Suis Partout_, 243, 251-258
Jews, persecution of, 64-65, 82, 360, 362-364
John of Leyden, 56
Jung, Dr. Carl G., analysis of Hitler and Nazism, 45-51, 54-55
Keynes, John Maynard, 286-287
Kirov, Sergei, assassination of, 69-71
Korff, resigns from Ullstein Verlag, 41-42
Labor party in England, 141-142
La Guardia, F. H., 345
Laval, Pierre, 239, 269-273
League of Nations, 143, 287, 334, 336-337
proposed, 223, 230
Lenin, Nikolai, 69, 98-99, 123
on morality, 103
Lewis, Sinclair, 353
Lindbergh, Anne Morrow, 81-83, 350, 355-356
Lindbergh, Charles A., 339-361, 364-376
admiration for Nazi Germany, 358-360
anti-Semitism, 361-362
character and personality, 347, 348, 351-353
classed as Copperhead, 339-341
and free speech, 343-344
ingratitude to France and England, 349-351
isolationist arguments answered, 368-376
kidnaping and murder of child, 356-357
“Letter to America,” 367-368
and newspaper publicity, 352-354
as one-time national hero, 346-348
political philosophy, 273-274, 350-351, 359, 361
praised by President Coolidge, 346-347
propagandist for Hitler, 198-200, 214
supporters of, 341, 343, 346, 367
visit to Soviet Union, 358-359
von Lossow, General, 11-12, 39
Ludendorff, General, 11, 32, 67, 327
Maginot line complex, 234, 240, 274-275, 296, 375
Mandel, Georges, 253-255
Masaryk, Thomas G., 51-52
Master race doctrine, 37, 191-192
_Mein Kampf_, 1, 31, 37, 41-42, 85, 283-284
Hackett’s index to, 44-45
Miller, Douglas, 111, 213
Morrow, Mrs. Dwight, 353
Mowrer, Edgar, 20, 60
Mosley, Oswald, 361
Munich Beer Hall, bombing attempt, 67-69
Munich Beer Hall Putsch, 1, 32
Munich pact, 28, 61, 360-361
Mussolini, Benito, 4-5, 49, 173
and Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10
first meeting with Hitler, 3-7
and political assassinations, 72-74
and yes-staff, 18
Napoleon, and Hitler, 17, 30
and Mussolini, 4-5
National Socialist German Workers Party, 13-14
Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg, 9-10, 61-63
Nazi propaganda, 79-83, 239, 243, 248-262, 275-276
Nazism, 51-53, 83, 360
compared with Communism, 84-87
Nelson, Donald M., 294
Newspapers, American and French, 279-281
Nicolson, Harold, 174, 357
NKVD defined, 119-120
Norris, Kathleen, 345
Norway, invasion of, 30, 157-160
Nye, Senator Gerald P., 149, 214, 344-345
Okhrana, 75-76
von der Osten, Major, 25-26
_Out of the Night_, 68, 83-84, 163
Pax Anglo-Americana, 146, 229-230
Peace conference, 191-192, 214-231
Atlantic Charter, 200-202, 221, 334
Axis terms, 198-199, 202-208
Pétain, Marshal, character of, 262-265, 272
dupe of German propaganda, 239, 255-262
as head of Vichy government, 265-266, 292, 315
Hitler’s promise to, 284-285
request for armistice, 243-245
_Petit Journal_, 250-251
Poison gas, 302
Poland, attack on planned, 18
conquest by Nazis, 29-30, 191-193, 195, 322, 365
fate of, 184-185
and Russia, 100, 174-175
Prioux, General, 241-242
Raleigh, John McCutcheon, 45
Rauschning, Hermann, 160, 309
Reichstag fire, 68
Rhineland, reoccupation of, 24-26, 148, 226
von Ribbentrop, Joachim, 15, 29, 243, 251
Roehm, Ernst, 32-34, 39
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 145-147, 296
meeting with Churchill, 184-185
re-election and German morale, 330
verdict on Lindbergh, 339-341, 344
Rosenberg, Alfred, 15, 163
Royal Air Force, 22-23, 301, 303, 304, 332, 374
Churchill’s tribute to, 166
Russell, Bertrand, 323
Russia, 88-139
approval of Atlantic Charter, 227-228
and defeat of Germany, 101-103
development of Red Army, 92-94, 134-137
failure of Planned National Economy, 116, 121-123, 130-131
Five-Year Plans, 107-108, 116, 122
freedom of worship, 99-100
monetary system, 129-130
morale of people, 95-99
political assassinations in, 67-79
reasons for resistance to Nazi attack, 90-99
as refuge for Jews, 363-364
standard of living, 92, 118-123, 129
Terror under political police, 115-120, 125-128, 131-134
U. S. help for, 88-90, 100-104, 137-138
weaknesses of Soviet system, 115-134
Russo-German pact, 29, 100, 112
Schieffer, Colonel, 242, 277-278, 326
Schuman, Frederick L., defines dictatorship, 146
Selassie, Haile, 76
Shipbuilding capacities, 155-156
Siegfried line, 26, 28
Socialism, in wartime England, 231-233
South America, and the Nazis, 49, 191, 205, 208, 370-371
Soviet Union, _see_ Russia
Spanish Civil War, 25-26, 52-53, 97-98, 356