There has to be the conviction that foreign troops are going to enter

Germany itself, and that if the German people overthrow Hitler they

will receive milder treatment at the hands of their liberated victims.

The danger of going on with Hitler has to be very imminent and great

to move the German people to revolt, because the crimes of the Nazis

have been so atrocious that the Nazis know they will be killed if they

are overthrown. There must be ten thousand Nazis who anticipate death

if they lose their power either by revolt or by loss of the war. They

will meet any attempt at revolt with the utmost mercilessness. In the

last war there were no Germans who expected to be killed if Germany

lost. The Nazi gang whose life and death hang on the outcome of the

war is larger than the clique of the German ruling class which had an

urgent, though not life-and-death interest, in seeing the last war to

a successful conclusion. Any hopes that a German revolt would end the

war if the deadlock lasts long enough are based on wishful thinking.

Q. _What makes you think Hitler would want to destroy us?_

A. First, because he could not afford to allow any democracy, any free

state, to exist in his totalitarian world. In his world there would be

only one kind of freedom, the freedom of the German to do as he likes

with all other varieties of men. If Hitler is not interfered with and

has time to accustom his slaves to slavery, his dynasty of tyrants

might last far beyond our lifetime, but not if a single democracy

persists to tempt and challenge his slaves to revolt. Witness today how

for a long time the subjugated peoples of Europe seemed sunk in abject

apathy, but awakened to demonstrate against their despot the moment

Russia’s resistance awakened the hope of eventual victory. If Hitler

wins over the rest of the world, he must destroy us in order to be safe

in his own Empire.

As long as a democracy exists on earth it will hold out before the eyes

of hundreds of millions of Hitler’s subjects the vision of a place on

earth where the body and soul of a man belong to himself and there

are no masters and slaves. Especially dangerous to his rule would be

a democracy which not only offered this vision but was potentially

powerful enough to be a positive threat, as the United States. For this

reason alone Hitler could not allow us to continue to exist, a free

oasis in his vast helot Reich.

Second, Hitler could not afford to give us time to translate our

potential into real strength. He professes two opinions of America.

One is that we are negligible; the other is that as the last war was

decided by America, this one may be. He once told a diplomatic official

of his who still occupies a high post in this country: “The United

States is a degenerate democracy in the backwash of civilization

and too demoralized by pacifism to play any important role in the

war to come.” He is truly contemptuous of our democracy, as of all

democracies, which he judges on the basis of those he has overthrown or

conquered, from the German to the French. He concludes that we must be

weak, since our democratic system dispenses justice, as far as humanly

possible, to the weak as well as to the strong, and because since the

conquest of the continental United States we have shown little or no

interest in building an empire. To the Nazi heart justice to the weak

is a proof of weakness; and to the Nazi mind only one thing prevents

a human being from seizing the property of a neighbor, weakness.

So Hitler on the one hand thinks us weak, but on the other hand he

recognizes that we could become strong.

As he once told me that he admitted the entry of the United States into

the last war had decided the struggle, so now when America is preparing

to throw its whole weight against him, he shows signs of wishing to

keep us out. By now Britain has taught him that even a democracy can

become tough if it has time. Would Hitler, after he had crushed the

British, willingly give us time to become morally strong enough to

fight him as the British fought him? Could he afford to let us have the

two years or more still necessary for the physical job of creating the

cannon, tanks, airplanes, and naval vessels and for the training of the

officers and men for an armed force strong enough to face his?

The third simple reason for his wishing to subjugate the United States

is that he wants the loot of America, richest on earth, and wants us

to pay tribute to the Greater German Reich as France and the other

conquered countries are doing now.

Fourth, and not the least, important reason to believe that Hitler

wishes to destroy the United States, is because he has said so. You

remember his speech in the second year of the war when he said, “We

shall destroy Britain and every country which has fed Britain.” To whom

do you suppose he referred if not to the United States? And do you

not think now that it is high time to pay attention to this no longer

funny little man when he announces what he intends to do? He is unique

among conquerors, because he always, by one means or another, warned

his victims of what he intended to do to them, and in most cases, the

Lindberghs of the world have looked up appeasingly and archly inquired,

“Oh no, Mr. Hitler, you surely don’t mean that, do you?”

As someone expressed it, Hitler has never kept a promise but never

failed to carry out, or at least try to carry out, a threat. His threat

to destroy us has been documented scores of times. Hermann Rauschning

quotes Hitler as declaring privately to friends that he would conquer

the United States first from within, with his Fifth Column, and

Walther Darre, his Minister of Agriculture, has developed the topic

thus: “I have been asked about my opinion of America, especially the

United States, and the danger of this pseudo-democratic Republic’s

possible attempts to hinder us in our historical development. There

is no fear that this demoralized country will mix in this German war.

In the first place, as in France and other countries, also in the

United States, we have many of our compatriots and even more friends

among the citizens of the United States. Many of the latter hold the

most important positions in political and economic life and will not

permit public opinion to allow something so senseless and insane as war

against Germany.... The United States is at present so demoralized and

so corrupted that, like England and France, it need not be taken into

consideration as a military adversary.... The United States will also

be forced by Germany to complete and final capitulation.”

Finally, as we discussed before, Hitler as every conqueror, cannot stop

trying to conquer, and after he had finished with the Old World, his

momentum would force him to attack the New.

Q. _Haven’t we plenty to do at home, without getting into a foreign

war? Why don’t we try to make a real democracy in America before we go

out to try to improve the rest of the world?_

A. This argument that we should pay no attention to the fire in the

house next door because we are busy cleaning the windows of our house,

polishing the floor, and cleaning up the kitchen has the same amount

of logic and common sense as the doctrine that we ought not to fight

on our enemy’s territory but only on our own. President Hutchins of

the University of Chicago has put this argument of perfectionism in

scholarly form. He maintains that we are going to war to establish

throughout the world the Four Freedoms--of speech, of worship, from

want, and from fear--but he says we have no right to crusade for them

until we have established them at home. But we are not going to war to

crusade for the Four Freedoms; as we have pointed out before, we are

going to war to make the world safe for the United States, and at the

same time or thereafter do what we can to establish the Four Freedoms

elsewhere as well as in America. If we do not go to war, we risk losing

even what we have of the Four Freedoms, even the small quantities of

them measured by Dr. Hutchins.

Something of what he says about the failure of the Four Freedoms in

this country to reach perfection is true; not all of it. He says we

have freedom of speech to say only what everybody else is saying, but

Dr. Hutchins will admit we have more of this kind of freedom than any

other country at this moment. He will also admit that everyone else is

not saying the things Dr. Hutchins is saying and yet he may say them

without let or hindrance. He says we have “freedom of worship if we

don’t take our religion too seriously,” but one must ask oneself what

examples of religious intolerance have given rise to such a statement?

Where are the persecuted religionists and to what country would they

flee to escape from the alleged deficiency of freedom of worship in

America?

Dr. Hutchins says that as for freedom from want and freedom from

fear, so long as one-third of the nation is ill-fed, ill-clothed,

and ill-housed, as Roosevelt says it is, we have no right to try to

establish these freedoms in other countries. Again, we can admit that

the matter is precisely as President Roosevelt has stated it, and yet

assert that the people of the United States have as a whole better

food, clothing, and living conditions than those of any other country

with comparable climatic conditions. He says that as for democracy, “we

know that millions of men and women are disfranchised in this country

because of their race, color, or condition of economic servitude.”

But if by reason of the passive attitude toward the war advocated by

Dr. Hutchins, this country should fall under Hitler’s power, whether

directly, with der Fuehrer in Washington, or indirectly with der

Fuehrer’s Gauleiter, chosen from the America First Committee as our

President, all of America’s 133,000,000 men and women would be wholly

disfranchised.

Dr. Hutchins says that we must abandon the Four Freedoms if we go

to war, and that “We cannot suppose, because civil liberties were

restricted in the last war and expanded after it, that we can rely

on their revival after the next one.” Why not? If we cannot rely on

experience, what can we rely on? In every war the United States has

ever fought we have delegated to the executive the powers necessary

to win victory and afterward we have always taken them back, but

without even an argument, much less any forcible attempt to prevent

such action. Dr. Hutchins says, “If we go to war we cast away our

opportunity and cancel our gains. For a generation, perhaps for

hundreds of years, we shall not be able to struggle back to where we

were. In fact, the changes that total war will bring may mean that

we shall never be able to struggle back. Education will cease. Its

place will be taken by vocational and military training. The effort to

establish a democratic community will stop. We shall think no more of

justice, of the moral order and the supremacy of human rights. We shall

have hope no longer.”

Why should these things happen to us if they have never happened in

past wars? Because, says Dr. Hutchins, “this war, if we enter it,

will make the last one look like a stroll in the park.” But has the

war done any of these things to Britain? On the contrary it is the

unanimous judgment of observers of Britain in wartime that the British

are more just, humane, democratic, and obedient to a higher moral

regime than ever before in their history. The British are nearer their

enemy and more deeply immersed in total war than we can ever be. Why

should we be expected to fare worse than the British?

Dr. Hutchins expresses concern for “suffering humanity” and declares

we could best serve it by staying out of war, and extending aid to

Britain and China “on the basis most likely to keep us at peace

and least likely to involve us in war.” Is it really helpful to

suffering humanity in Britain, China, France, Russia, Norway, Poland,

Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Holland, Belgium, Austria, yes and in Italy

and Germany itself, to practice a policy directed solely to avoiding

conflict with the author of the misery of half the world?

Aside from that, there is only one choice before America now and the

choice is not between going to war or not going to war. The choice

today is between going to war in time to win it, and going to war too

late to win it. We can best serve “suffering humanity” by attempting

with all the strength of our bodies and souls to destroy the prime,

immediate mundane cause of humanity’s suffering. Finally, Dr. Hutchins

declares that the argument that we should go to war now when we have

Britain to help us, to avoid having to go to war later, when we should

have to face the whole world alone, rests on the improvable assumptions

that Britain must fall and that the totalitarian powers will wish to,

and be able to, and will attack us. We could debate on these grounds

and make a strong case for even this simplest, most direct form of

possible events. But the argument for war now does not rest alone on

this succession of possible events.

Germany may not be able to conquer Britain, but Britain may become so

weary and so convinced that she cannot defeat Germany without us,

and so persuaded that we shall never come into the war, that Britain

might make a negotiated peace. Such a peace would be as disastrous to

us as a lost war; to prevent it is as strong a motive for our going

to war now as is the motive of preventing the actual fall of Britain.

Again, unless Britain falls or makes a negotiated peace, how is any

kind of peace to come to the world? By Britain’s defeating Germany?

No, if Russia falls or defects, Britain alone certainly cannot conquer

Germany; no informed person thinks it possible. Does Dr. Hutchins think

Britain could? Does he think it would be desirable to allow Bolshevik

Russia the credit and opportunity of the land conquest of Germany,

which by now is Europe?

Failing to enter the war, we have to face the alternatives; First: Fall

of Britain followed by Axis economic, political, and military attack

on the Western Hemisphere and probable American defeat by Nazis within

as well as without. Second: A negotiated peace between Britain and

Germany; followed by Nazi attack on the Western Hemisphere as before.

Third: Defeat of Germany by Britain at sea and in the air, and by

Russia on land; followed by Russian Communism throughout Europe. Does

Dr. Hutchins believe this a desirable end, or that the United States

would remain immune from its effects? Fourth: An interminable deadlock

in Europe with the entire world from year to year slipping backward

politically, economically, and morally with no prospect of anything

except more ruined cities, more starving people, more dead from battle

and bombardment, famine and pestilence. Is it helping suffering

humanity to remain aloof and permit any of these alternatives to come

to pass?

Q. _Why do you think we ought to go to war with Germany today?_

A. Because until Nazi Germany is defeated the world will never be safe

for us to live in; because it will require the total war effort of the

United States and Britain and Russia to defeat Germany; and because our

formal declaration of war would be worth more in the struggle against

Germany than all the material aid we shall be able to send the Allies

for the next year or more.

Q. _But wouldn’t it be better to wait and let Hitler declare war on us?_

A. It would best serve our interests if Hitler would declare war,

but since he knows this is true, he is not likely to do so under any

provocation. I should think he would hesitate to declare war even if

we were to have a pitched naval battle and sink his ships and announce

it. He knows that even if our Navy is fighting his, there is still a

body of American public opinion which is opposed to the participation

of our Army in an A.E.F. He knows that if he declared war it would help

immensely to unify the American people. He might go into a fury and

declare war, but it would be unlike him. Behind all his tantrums there

is usually calculation.

Q. _But isn’t our present state of “undeclared war” just as effective

as being formally at war? Why would our declaration of war be worth so

much immediately?_

A. Because of its moral effect upon ourselves, our enemies, and our

friends. We can talk all we like about being in a state of undeclared

war, but until we are formally at war we will continue to behave

as though we were at peace. Only by going to war can we discipline

ourselves, our workingmen, and our employers to defeat the Axis in

the battle of production. At this moment when Britain and Germany are

devoting four hours of each working day to making arms, we are devoting

thirty minutes to making arms. Only by going to war can our citizens’

army get the morale to be a fighting force.

On the Germans the effect of our declaration of war would be

catastrophic. Every German would say to himself, “Now we can’t win;

we can hold on for a long time, perhaps, but we can’t win.” On the

Italians the effect would be to depress their feeble efforts still

further toward zero.

On the British the effect would be to give them what they lack and what

they most need: the assurance of victory. The British are convinced

that they cannot be defeated, but how are they going to defeat the

Germans without the United States actively in the war?

Upon the Soviet Union the effect would be to strengthen the resolution

of Stalin and the Russian people not to make a compromise peace nor

succumb to any of the temptations Hitler may offer; and the longer the

Red Army fights the Germans the fewer sacrifices will have to be made

by the United States to help win the war.

To France our declaration of war would bring the will to live again.

Belief in eventual German victory over Britain was the basis upon which

the French surrendered. It was the foundation of Vichy’s policy. Our

declaration of war might not change Pétain and his men of Vichy, for

they are prisoners of their own deeds, and probably cannot withdraw

from their fatal collaboration with the Germans, but it would move

the people of France profoundly. Pétain does not represent the people

of France. I believe far more in the spirit of my French friend who

wrote me: “Soon we shall all be starving, but send no food. When we are

starving will be a good moment to throw by parachute on every French

farm and on the suburbs of Paris thousands of small machine guns,

with the necessary bullets. Then the German Army will be in France

as Napoleon’s Army was in Spain in 1813.” America’s entry into the

war would be worth to Frenchmen like this more than machine guns. It

would give them the certainty that France will live again. General de

Gaulle’s army would swell by the tens of thousands.

We could reckon on the possibility of being able to occupy the

strategic positions we need in North Africa and on any other

advantages within the power of the French to give us. We could for the

first time anticipate serious revolt by the peoples of all the occupied

territories when the time came; and help for the Allied Expeditionary

Force which some day must invade the continent. All the enslaved

peoples would be equally affected. The Nazi Terror works perfectly so

long as its victims feel that it is hopeless to revolt. Revolt becomes

possible only when the victims feel that they can afford to risk all,

since freedom will eventually be the reward.

A very important effect of our declaration of war upon Germany would

be the effect upon Japan. The Japanese mental processes are difficult

indeed to understand but I venture to guess that if they saw us

formally aligned with the British for the duration, they would be

likely to take a milder rather than stronger attitude toward us.

Needing principally smaller vessels in the Atlantic, we could base our

main Battle Fleet on Singapore and confidently await any move Japan

might make. Our declaration of war might well force Japan out of the

Axis.

China, like Britain, would be given the most precious possession in

warfare, the assurance of final victory. For even if Japan continued

to fight China, once the Allies’ main task was performed and Germany

defeated, the combined British and American navies could be counted

on to bring Japan back to reason without much difficulty. On all the

other countries, as neutral Portugal, non-belligerent Spain, encapsuled

Sweden and Switzerland, the effect of our going to war would be

revolutionary. Our South American friends would become even better

neighbors. All over the world the conviction that now Germany will

be defeated would become the decisive element in the policy of every

government.

Q. _But would we really go to work if we did declare war? Britain

didn’t at first and neither did France. What makes you think we would?_

A. You are right. It took Dunkirk to wake Britain up and France never

did awake; she passed without regaining consciousness from deep sleep

to death. Perhaps we too would not awaken even if we went to war, but

we will never awaken until we do go to war. Most nations in this war

have remained curiously apathetic until their first battle experience;

this may be true of us. But the fact of our being actively belligerent

would be bound to improve our spirit since it would put our moral

position right. Ever since the beginning of the war we Americans

have suffered from a divided personality. Half of our minds clung

to the idea that we could keep at peace if we wished for peace hard

enough, and this half declared: “It is not our war.” This half of our

minds made the Neutrality Act. The other half of our minds realized

all along that we should have been in the war from the beginning,

that Hitler was fighting to conquer the world, that it was for us a

matter of life or death to keep him from succeeding and that every

consideration of self-interest, as of honor, urged us to take our full

part in the world-wide struggle against the new Barbarism. This half

was responsible for the Lease-Lend Bill, a half-measure, condemned by

the very definition: “All aid to Britain _short of war_!” Our souls

remained divided, and this division has made us an ailing nation,

hypochondriac, complaining of low morale, nervous, and subject to fits

of depression alternating with elation. We are unreasonably discouraged

or cheered as the tide of battle ebbs and flows, and always we try to

interpret whatever happens as a sign at last that we do not have to do

our duty, that after all we can get out of this task, so onerous, so

painful, and so unavoidable.

Completely opposite arguments are employed to prove that we may escape

our obligation. If the British suffer a setback, up goes the cry: “The

British are already beaten; there’s no use trying to save them now;

let’s not throw good money after bad.” If the British win a victory,

there is a rousing cheer: “The British are winning without us; thank

God now we will not have to fight.” When I came home from the Battle

of Britain, it struck me as it had struck many others who have come to

America from the war zone, that we were far more nervous and agitated

than the peoples at war, even and especially more than those under

actual heavy bombardment. Eve Curie, that admirable French patriot and

gallant fighter for civilization, who was one of our group when we

escaped from France, put it perfectly when she said: “There is no fear

in the countries which are fighting. Extraordinarily enough, fear has

gone somewhere else, to the countries which are not menaced, to the

countries ‘at peace.’”

Is there any reason to suppose that our reactions would be

substantially different from those of the peoples at war? Once we

take a bold stand for the position we know to be just, right, and

inevitable, we shall for the first time since this war began, lose our

fear and become well, strong, hopeful, and proud. The sense of guilt

which has made us nationally unhappy will leave us and we shall rejoice

in a clear conscience.

Q. _What effect would our declaring war have upon the morale of the

Army, particularly on that of the selectees, which has been criticized

so much?_

A. Going to war would unquestionably cure all the troubles of the Army

sooner or later. It is not our soldiers’ fault if today in peacetime

they are restless and discontented at being compelled to do what must

seem to them very like playing at being soldiers. Would the spirit of a

football team be good if the team did nothing but practice football all

day long, month in and month out, and never played a game, and had no

games scheduled? What would be the spirit of a cast of players if they

had rehearsals every day for months and never staged a performance to

an audience, and had no performances scheduled?

Q. _From your travel throughout the country have you formed any

impression of what the morale of the Army actually is?_

Is Tomorrow Hitler's? 200 Questions on the Battle of Mankind · 第 25 / 31 段