NAPOLEON’S CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST
The Appeal of Bonaparte to the Jews of Asia and Africa――Haim
Mu’allim Farhi――The Fortress of Acre――Jewish opinion in
Palestine――El-Arish――_Gaza_――_Jerusalem_――Moses Mordecai
Joseph Meyuchas――“A Letter addressed by a French Jew to his
Brethren”――France and England――The real motives of Bonaparte’s
Appeal.
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (1769‒1821) issued in 1799 a summons to the Asiatic
and African Jews to march under his banner, promising “to give them
the Holy Land,” and “to restore ancient _Jerusalem_ to its pristine
splendour” (Appendix xl). One hardly knows whether this was to be
taken quite seriously. The Jews in _Jerusalem_ appear either not to
have put much trust in Bonaparte’s flattering words, or to have been
utterly ignorant of the proclamation. The question was so important,
and so much confusion prevailed regarding it, that the appeal,
being vague in its terms, could not lead to any practical action.
Some historians suppose that this proclamation was only a trick
which Bonaparte played with the intention of winning over to his
cause the Jewish minister of the Pasha of Acre, Haim Mu’allim Farhi
(1750?‒1820), the soul of the defence of that important sea-fortress.
This supposition, however, is based on no evidence. It is pure
speculation, and is highly improbable.
No Jew seriously believed in the success of Bonaparte’s ambitious
design or in the possibility of his victory, and no attention was paid
to his promises. On the other hand, it would not have been impossible
to suppose that Bonaparte’s plan might succeed after he had conquered
Syria and carried the war into the heart of Turkey. He would then
perhaps have assigned a share in his government to members of the
Jewish nation upon whom the French could rely.
Bonaparte’s idea was simple and his intentions were sincere. He
regarded the Jews――particularly those living in Asia and Africa――as
a nation, and as having indisputable historical claims on the Holy
Land and _Jerusalem_. He was sure that they would help him and hail
his victory as a happy triumph¹ if they knew that their national ideal
was to be realized and “ancient _Jerusalem_” to be restored to its
“pristine splendour.” Was this not the same policy which he applied in
later years in his relations with the small nationalities in Europe?
¹ In an Order, in which he confirms the prerogatives of the
Monks of the Mount _Sinai_ convent, he refers to the Jews.
AU CAIRE, le 29 frimaire au 7 (19 décembre, 1798).
Bonaparte, général en chef, voulant favoriser le convent du
mont _Sinai_: ... 2º Par respect pour _Moise_ et le nation
juive, dont la cosmogonie nous retrace les âgres les plus
reculés; ... Bonaparte.
(_Correspondance inédite officielle et confidentielle de
Napoléon Bonaparte_ ... Egypte. Tome Deuxième. Paris ...
M.DCCC.XIX. _p._ 179.)
In another Appeal, Bonaparte ordered his troops to treat
the natives with tolerance: “Agissez avec eux comme vous
avez agi avec les Juifs, les Italiens; ayez des égards
pour leur mufti et leurs imams, comme vous en avez eu pour
les rabbins et les evêques; ayez pour les cérémonies que
prescrit l’Alcoran, pour les mosquées, la même tolérance
que vous avez eu pour les convents, pour les synagogues,
pour la religion de _Moise_ et de Jésus Christ”
(Proclamation of General Bonaparte of the 22nd June, 1798).
Colonel Sebastiani wrote concerning the Jews in his report
on his mission to Constantinople in 1802 in a somewhat
anti-Semitic spirit: “Les Juifs sont, comme partout ailleurs,
indifférents sur tout changement de gouvernement qui ne
leur offre pas la matière à de nouvelles spéculations”
(_Bibliothèque Diplomatique――Recueil des Traités de la
Porte Ottomane_ ... Par le Baron J. _de_ Testa ... Tome
Premier France. Paris ... MDCCCLXIV. _p._ 513).
Jewish opinion in the East was reserved and somewhat pessimistic,
not with regard to the purpose, but concerning the opportunity and
the means. The Jews were willing to make any sacrifices in order to
restore “ancient _Jerusalem_” in a peaceful way, but not to revolt
against the rulers of the country. Moreover, they knew that this
campaign was bound to be a failure.
The Turks followed the plan of allowing the inadequate forces of
Bonaparte to advance as far as possible from their Egyptian base,
while they massed heavy forces in Syria. El-Arish and _Gaza_ in the
south-west of Palestine fell into the hands of Bonaparte’s army on the
17th and 25th February, 1799. The Jewish community of _Gaza_ had fled.
In _Jerusalem_ the news of victories and atrocities created a general
panic. It was rumoured that Bonaparte was about to enter the Holy
City. At the command of the deputy Governor the inhabitants began to
throw up ramparts, the Jews also taking part in the work. One of the
_Rabbis_, Moses Mordecai Joseph Meyuchas, encouraged and even assisted
them in their operations. After these occurrences the success of
Bonaparte in Egypt and Syria was arrested, chiefly by the arms of
Great Britain, and his schemes in the East were frustrated.
The appearance of Bonaparte in Palestine was like the passing of a
meteor, which, after causing much perturbance, disappears. His dream
of becoming Emperor of the East faded away quickly. Still the fact
remains that the idea of the Restoration of _Israel_ had occupied the
mind of this great conqueror in the prime of his youth, at the very
beginning of his unexampled career. He and his adherents seemed, even
after this failure, to persist in gazing with a wistful eye towards
the same quarter, and their ambitious plans evidently involved the
future fortunes of those Eastern countries which have so long been
the monotonous scenes of isolation and ignorance.
Whatever judgment we may form as to the practical value of Bonaparte’s
scheme in those days, the suggestion of restoring Palestine to the
Jews remains highly significant. It is obvious that had there not
been Jewish aspirations of this kind in France such a suggestion could
not have arisen even as a fantastic plan or as a caprice of military
headquarters in a distant country. Bonaparte had too much political
foresight even in his younger years to run the risk of engaging
himself in an undertaking before he had sounded the competent circles
in his own country. As a matter of fact these aspirations were
expressed, and, imaginary as they were, seem to have been very popular
among French Jews. There is, consequently, reason to conclude that
Bonaparte’s scheme was, in reality, more serious than it might have
seemed at first sight.
A most curious document, almost entirely overlooked or underestimated
by French historians, throws some light on the real tendencies of that
time among French Jews. This is a “Letter addressed to his brethren by
a Jew” in 1798¹――one year before the Bonaparte Proclamation (Appendix
xli). This letter is a sort of Zionist programme. It is a mixture
of different elements, partly Jewish, partly pan-French Imperialist,
expounded in a manner that only a deep Jewish national feeling could
have inspired. The impenetrable political speculations of those days
already contain the germs of some ideas which are developed to full
consciousness and clearness a hundred years later in modern Zionist
speeches, pamphlets and programmes.
¹ Restoration of the Jews ... Second Edition ... By J. Bicheno.
1807. _pp._ 60‒62.
The author of this “Letter” rightly proclaims in the first place the
pre-eminent interest of his theme, “the greatest theme of Jewish
history.” “It is at last time to shake off this insupportable yoke――it
is time to resume our rank among the other nations of the universe.”
The nations of the world――he now hopes――will support the Jewish claim
that the Jewish nation should be treated on the lines of the national
idea. The design of the author, then, is to suggest a solution of
no less a problem than the Jewish Tragedy. He begins with a review
“of the Jewish situation during many ages under the weight of the
cruellest persecutions,” and this review is not less tragic than the
Jewish elegies of the Middle Ages, though it was written a few years
after the great Revolution. He then addresses himself to his main task,
the exposition, based, as far as he is able to base it, on lessons
learnt from contemporary events, of that system of Restoration which
he regards as the most practical.
This author was, no doubt, the agent and mouthpiece of the people
behind him. The fact that this “Letter” was published at the
suggestion of those then in power in France shows that the scheme
suggested in it was in accordance with the views of the Government.
This being the tendency of the Government, the appeal addressed
by Bonaparte to the Jews of Asia and Africa one year after the
publication of the “Letter,” in 1798, appears to be a logical
consequence of prevailing opinions. Moreover, the fact that schemes
of this kind had gained great currency in England, and that the
Restoration of _Israel_ was a favourite idea of the English, could
not be unknown in France. It is scarcely necessary to point out what
was the fundamental idea of the Egyptian and Syrian campaign. The idea
of the Restoration of _Israel_, as suggested in the “Letter of the
French Jew” in 1798 and in Bonaparte’s Appeal of 1799, was merely a
link in the same chain.
To sum up, the situation of affairs, in view of the possibility of
great changes in the East, seemed to afford an opportunity for the
solution of the Jewish problem on national lines. Bonaparte may also
have been anxious to avail himself of the services of the Jews of
Asia and Africa. But the essential point is that many influential
Christians as well as Jews considered the Jewish problem from a
national point of view at the end of the eighteenth century.