THE CIVIC REFORM BILL.
The Commission of Inquiry--The New Wards--Aldermen and Common
Councilmen--City Expenditure--City Receipts and Removal of
Restrictions.
The Commission of Inquiry.
In the year 1834 a commission was appointed "to inquire into the
existing state of the municipal corporations, and to collect
information respecting their defects." These commissioners applied
themselves to the discharge of their somewhat invidious duties with
both earnestness and impartiality, and in their Report, published in
1837, acknowledged the superior excellence of the London Corporation
as compared with other corporate bodies. They readily admitted that
the Common Council possessed the necessary powers to effect whatever
reforms might have become necessary through the lapse of time. They
also bore witness that the Corporation had already of itself corrected
much that was amiss in its constitution, and that its history
furnished "honourable testimonials to the vigilance, good sense, and
justice of its legislative body." On these grounds the Imperial
Legislature expressly exempted the City of London from the action of
the Municipal Corporations Act, and left it in the undisputed
enjoyment of its ancient franchises--which, moreover, are declared by
2 William & Mary not to be liable to confiscation. A period of twenty
years then passed away without any cause of complaint having occurred
to justify the interference of Government, until some disputes arose
on the subject of the City markets, and the conservancy of the Thames.
Sir George Grey at once availed himself of this pretext to appoint a
commission to investigate "the existing state of the Corporation of
the City of London, and to collect information respecting its
constitution, order, and government." These commissioners, unlike
their predecessors, exhibited from the commencement of their
proceedings a strong bias and feeling of hostility against the
Corporation. The witnesses they called before them were, with scarcely
an exception, the avowed enemies of the existing state of things, and
prepared to convert trifling blemishes into radical and monstrous
defects. And yet even these did not agree among themselves, or assign
any sound reasons to render compulsory innovations expedient or
justifiable. The general tenor of their evidence, indeed, was actually
in favour of the Corporation, when due allowance is made for the
spirit by which they were actuated. Nevertheless, it was upon the
report of this one-sided and unconstitutional commission that the late
ministry founded their Bill for "the better Regulation of the
Corporation of the City of London." They had arrived at a foregone
conclusion, and asked for only the shadow of an excuse to mask their
preconcerted designs against the chief and last stronghold of
self-government. The fate of the Corporation was clearly doomed from
the hour the House of Commons sanctioned the appointment of a
prejudiced and illegal tribunal.
The New Wards.
The first clause of the proposed Bill directs a new division of the
City, and recommends that it be redistributed into sixteen wards,
instead of twenty-five as heretofore. No reason is assigned for this
innovation, beyond an allusion to the fact that no other city--not
even Liverpool--possesses more than that number of divisions or
departments. The object of the Government was evidently to abase and
humiliate the City of London, and to reduce it to the level of the
provincial municipalities. It is alleged, that while the metropolis
has extended far and wide in every direction, the boundaries of the
City have remained unchanged, so that they now inclose barely 1/108th
part of the entire metropolitan area. The population also does not
embrace 1/20th part of the inhabitants of the aggregate of villages
and boroughs collectively known as London. An undue importance,
therefore, has been ascribed to that small portion which constitutes
the City proper, to the prejudice of the more populous districts,
which inclose it on every side. This overrated influence is now to be
diminished in good earnest, and henceforth the sole criterion of
importance is to be the number of men, women, and children existing
within a certain area. Intelligence, wealth, enterprise, industry,
commercial reputation, and ancient rights are to be regarded as of
little value when compared with the register of births and marriages.
So, the City of London is to be divided into sixteen wards, that it
may learn not to lift up its head above other corporations. The
division is, of course, to be effected by the inevitable barrister of
seven years' standing--the modern type of all that is wise, good,
intelligent, and incorruptible. It matters not that these gentlemen
may and must be totally unacquainted with local peculiarities and
requirements. There may be ward charities, and ward bequests, which
will create confusion and perplexity under any new arrangement.
The inhabitants, too, of one ward may have strong personal objections
to be transferred to another. They may dislike the disrupture of old
family ties and connections, and cling fondly to the traditions and
associations of their youth. Such considerations as these, however,
have no weight with red-tapists, who believe in the infallibility of
precedents, and apply one measure and one standard to all things.
The only plausible objection that can be urged against the existing
distribution of the wards is their inequality as to extent and
population; but even if like portions of territory were set apart for
each ward, the number of the inhabitants and their influence will vary
according to circumstances far beyond the control of any barrister, be
he of twice seven years' standing. Besides, though unequal as to area
and inmates, the wards are fairly enough represented; for, while the
Lime Street Ward returns only four members to the Common Council,
Bishopsgate sends fourteen, and Farringdon Without sixteen. This,
after all, is surely the point most worthy of attention. The object is
not so much to obtain an equality of districts as an equality of
representation. It is of no consequence that Cornhill be twice as
populous as Bassishaw, if it return twice the number of
representatives, for in that case the disparity at once ceases to
exist. Sir George Grey, however, is partial to arithmetical equality.
There must be sixteen wards and ninety-six Common-Councilmen, or six
to each ward. Not that there is anything novel or original in this
suggestion. Sir George merely purposes to revert to the arrangements
which prevailed in the reign of Richard II.--a period few students of
history would select as an illustration of the happiest and most
constitutional balance of power throughout all departments of the
commonwealth. No proof is adduced that this parcelment of the City was
attended with the best possible results, to justify its restoration in
the present century, after so long an interval and such elemental
changes of the social and commercial system. It is quite possible, and
not at all unlikely, that in the time of the second Richard ninety-six
Common-Councilmen may have been amply sufficient to discharge all the
duties that devolved upon them. But it does not thence follow that
that same number will now suffice. If it is proposed by Sir George
Grey to establish the civic administration on the broadest, safest,
and least assailable foundation, it is scarcely consistent to begin by
narrowing that basis. It is generally believed that it is more
difficult to corrupt or influence a large number of persons than a
small one. In the multitude of counsellors there is strength of will,
integrity of purpose, and variety of knowledge. There is less
opportunity for jobbing among two hundred than among one hundred
individuals, The smaller number is certainly more likely to come to a
mutual understanding among themselves, and to apportion to each member
his share of the loaves and fishes. On this head no better evidence
need be adduced than the report of the commissioners of 1855, by no
means too favourably disposed towards the Corporation. It is in the
following terms that they speak of the City, and of the advantages
incidental to a large representation:-"The antiquity, extent, and
importance of its privileges, the long series of its charters, the
large amount of its revenues, its metropolitan position, and its
historical associations, combine to give it a character different from
that of any other municipal borough. It may be added, that the
continued predominance of the popular element in the formation of its
governing body furnished a reason in 1835 for excepting it from the
Municipal Corporations Act; seeing that one of the principal defects
which that Act was intended to remedy was the practical exclusion of
the principle of popular election from the government of the borough,
and the accumulation of power in the hands of a small body of persons.
The commissioners state, in their general report of 1835:--'The most
common and most striking defect in the constitution of the municipal
corporations of England and Wales is, that the corporate bodies exist
independently of the communities among which they are found. The
corporations look upon themselves, and are considered by the
inhabitants, as separate and exclusive bodies; they have powers and
privileges within towns and cities from which they are named, but in
most places all identity of interest between the corporation and the
inhabitants has disappeared.' From the defect described in this
passage, the Corporation of London has for many years been exempt.
The manner in which the Common Council is elected has produced, to a
great extent, an identity of interests between the governing municipal
body and the existing municipal community, and has secured to the
latter a council representing their general opinions and feelings.
The Municipal Commissioners particularly advert to the Common Council
of London, as distinguishing that corporation from the close
corporations which then prevailed throughout the country."
It is difficult to imagine a better reason for upholding the existing
order of things than this very report of the commissioners. They admit
that there is an identity of interests between the governing and the
governed, between the representatives and their constituents, between
the stewards and those for whom they act. No higher commendation can
be desired. The system is described as giving satisfaction to all
concerned in its operation, and as being free from the great defect
which vitiated the municipal arrangements of other cities. The
administrative power is not accumulated in the hands of a few, but is
freely intrusted to an ample number of representatives chosen by
popular election, and liable to removal at the expiration of a year.
The fact that the votes of the citizens are usually given to their
representatives of many years' standing, is an indisputable proof that
the latter do not neglect their duty, or overlook the identity of
interests that exists between the governing body and the municipal
community. And yet, in the teeth of this report, and in defiance of
this good accord, the very defect is to be introduced which was
reprobated in other corporations. The administrative power is to be
vested in the hands of a comparatively small governing body, and an
opportunity afforded for those practices which were considered so
objectionable elsewhere.
It is perhaps hardly worthy of remark that the selection of the
persons to be appointed to set out the new wards should rest with the
Secretary of State. Were it not for the constant augmentation of
patronage afforded by each innovation, very little would ever be heard
about reform of any kind. But every change, every act of abolition,
affords am irresistible opportunity for providing for poor relations
and importunate constituents. The Secretary of State, therefore,
reserves to himself the choice of the "fit person or persons," which
might more decently have been left to the citizens themselves. It is
true the latter have not been altogether forgotten, and will not be
altogether passed over. To them is to be assigned the privilege of
paying five guineas a day to each of these "fit persons," as a
recompense for their exertions in introducing confusion and perplexity
where order and contentment now prevail.
Aldermen and Common-Councilmen.
The contemplated reduction of the governing body of the City is based
upon a specious theory, which will soon be found to be utterly
untenable. It is pretended that if the Courts of Aldermen and of
Common Council were rendered more exclusive, it would be considered a
greater distinction to belong to them, and that consequently a more
wealthy and influential class of individuals would seek to be elected.
In the first place, the exclusiveness sought to be established in the
Corporation of London is the very blot which the Municipal Act was
intended to remove from other corporate bodies. What was in them a
blemish, is to be engrafted as a beauty into the City of London.
But granting that a certain degree of exclusiveness may be not only
unobjectionable, but even desirable, is it so very certain that
opulent bankers and men of high standing in the commercial world will
be thereby induced to offer themselves as candidates for civic
offices? Have they themselves offered any suggestion to this effect,
or asked for any such motive to do their duty as free-born citizens?
Nothing of the kind. It is pure assumption to assert that when the
honour is more difficult of attainment it will become an object of
ambition to the mighty men on 'Change. The witnesses who gave evidence
on this head before the commissioners were unanimous as to the cause
that keeps our princely merchants aloof from the civic arena: it is
want of time. One and all declared that they could not spare the time
from their own pursuits and engagements. Private interests have more
weight with them than those of a public nature; they wish no harm to
their fellow-citizens, but will not sacrifice their own comfort or
profits to toil for their benefit. Indeed, it is by no means manifest
that bankers and merchants are the fittest persons to administer the
affairs of the City. As a rule, their homes are as remote as possible
from the scene of their daily labours. They know nothing whatever of
their neighbours, and care no more for one ward than for another, all
being equally indifferent to them. They are bound together by no
common ties, nor have they any local or traditional sympathies. It is,
therefore, very doubtful that their presence among the aldermen, or in
the Court of Common Council, would prove at all beneficial to the
City, or likely to enhance their own personal reputation. And if, as
they themselves allege, they have hitherto been deterred from
undertaking civic duties by the pressure of private affairs, there is
no ground for the hypothesis that they will henceforth have more
leisure to devote themselves to promoting the welfare of their
neighbours. In truth, the office of alderman is no sinecure. He is not
merely a very stout gentleman, wearing a blue gown, and guzzling
enormous quantities of turtle-soup. That caricature is of a piece with
the old fable of the lean Frenchman, starving upon frogs, and capable
only of dancing and grimacing. An alderman of the City of London has
most onerous duties to discharge, for which he expects no other
remuneration than the approval of his own conscience and the respect
of his fellow-citizens.
It is matter of public notoriety, that in the year 1834 the
Corporation cheerfully complied with the requisitions of the
Government with regard to the business of the Central Criminal Court.
The number of sessions and of courts was increased, prison
accommodation considerably enlarged, and other arrangements made with
the utmost liberality in order to facilitate the administration of
justice. By the Act passed in that year, it was specially provided
that the aldermen of London should be members of the commission, which
should be presided over by the Lord Mayor. The local knowledge
possessed by these magistrates has enabled them on very many occasions
to render important service to the judges in apportioning the
punishment due to offenders. At the same time they acquired, on their
part, a practical knowledge of the administration of law. The result
of this training displayed itself in the soundness of their
magisterial decisions, and the correctness of their application of
criminal law. Six aldermen are placed on the rota for each month, and
compelled to attend at the Old Bailey, unless they can furnish a
sufficient excuse for their absence. If the number of aldermen be
reduced to sixteen, it is not easy to perceive how this important
branch of their duties is to be adequately discharged. In addition to
their compulsory attendance at the Central Criminal Court, the
aldermen are called upon to exercise various other magisterial
functions, including the inspection and management of prisons. They
have likewise to attend at the London Quarter Sessions; the special
sessions for hearing appeals; the special sessions for licenses; the
petty sessions; the special sessions; the Southwark Quarter Sessions,
and the annual meetings and adjournments. Even this enumeration of
duties, however, is no equivalent indication of the work to be gone
through, the whole of which is done gratuitously and without
expectation of reward. It is proposed, indeed, that the Court of Mayor
and Aldermen of the City of London in the Inner Chamber shall retain
the power of appointing the Recorder and certain other officers, and
of exercising a supervision over the internal discipline of prisons,
and in relation to charities and other trusts, but in most other
respects their privileges and jurisdiction are to terminate.
On some points the Common Council are to be exalted at the expense of
the Court of Aldermen. They are to administer the money and funds of
the City, subject to the audit of three persons annually elected, an
abstract of whose statement is to be laid before Parliament. The
Corporation are therefore deemed unworthy or incompetent to manage
their own finances. Men of business are told that their ignorance is
so crass, or their honesty so doubtful, that the Legislature is
compelled to keep a watchful eye on their expenditure. The proposition
is as absurd as it is insulting and uncalled for. The Corporation are
further to have no power to sell, mortgage, or lease their own
estates. It may, perchance, be true, that in former times less regard
was paid to the discovery of secure and profitable investments than
suits the more grasping spirit of the present times. It may also be
that greater extravagance was occasionally exhibited than would now be
either justifiable or tolerable. But on neither of these grounds was
it fitting to affix such a stigma, to pass such a vote of censure, on
the existing governing body. Many economical reforms have of late
years been spontaneously introduced, and an unmistakable tendency
shown to make such further retrenchments as might be consistent with
the efficiency of the public service. No doubt the expenses attendant
on the collection of the City's income are susceptible of reduction,
nor would it be amiss if the heavy outlay connected with the civic
government were lightened of some of its items. Still, these are mere
questions of detail, and might fairly be left to the good taste,
judgment, and discretion of the municipal magistrates. The steps
already taken by the Common Council clearly evince their desire to
keep pace with the liberalism of the age. Since the year 1835,
the sum of at least 100,000 pounds has been offered on the altar of
public opinion by the gradual abolition of the fines and fees which
restricted the freedom of the City. In the same spirit they sacrificed
the street tolls, which annually produced upwards of 5,000 pounds,
as soon as they had redeemed the mortgage which enabled them to lay out
the new street running north from Farringdon Street. They have also
courted publicity, by admitting to their deliberations the reporters
of the public press, and by publishing minutes of their proceedings
and detailed statements of the receipt and expenditure of public
moneys. In these and many similar ways they have manifested their
anxiety to act in strict good faith towards their constituents,
and to do the utmost in their power to promote the welfare of the
City of London. No allegations, indeed, have been made against their
scrupulously honourable administration of the funds intrusted to
their stewardship. Their integrity has never been impugned by their
bitterest enemies--the charges that have been brought forward reflect
only upon their judgment. They are accused of lavishing untold sums
upon idle pageantry and luxurious entertainments, while they have
neglected to improve the great thoroughfares, to cleanse the river,
and generally to embellish the metropolis and ameliorate the sanitary
condition of its inhabitants. It is worth while to consider how much
of truth lies in these accusations.
City Expenditure.
There is no denying that at the first blush it does appear that an
unnecessarily large amount of money is laid out annually on festivities.
For instance, in the year 1855 upwards of 14,000 pounds were expended
on the entertainments given to the Emperor of the French, the King of
Sardinia, and the Prefect of the Seine. On minor occasions also very
considerable sums are lost in like manner to the City treasury.
But this apparent extravagance is not without its advantages.
This generous hospitality has rendered the Corporation of London
famous throughout the civilized world, and given it a fabulous
influence among the nations of the Continent. The chief magistrate
of the City is looked upon as only inferior to the sovereign, and far
above all other princes and potentates. Thus, in a popular French
play the principal personage is made to exclaim in an enthusiasm of
ambition --"Yes, I will make myself great; I shall yet be count,
marquis, duke, perhaps lord mayor." The credit acquired by the City
has been reflected upon the whole nation, and there are none so mean
as not to have heard of the wealth, magnificence, and genial hospitality
of the free-born citizens of the metropolis of the British empire.
With regard to thoroughfares, it has already been stated that the
street tolls were mortgaged for some years, in order to raise the
requisite funds for carrying out Farringdon Street to the northern
boundary of the City. More recently an enormous debt has been incurred
in the construction of Cannon Street. Half a million sterling has been
sunk in the attempt to erect a handsome street, which should take off
from Cheapside a portion of the exodus to London Bridge, and at the
same time furnish a noble example of street architecture. In a
pecuniary point of view the experiment has not thus far proved
successful, but the very errors of the Corporation are on a grand and
magnificent scale. Upwards of another half-million has gone to the
construction of the new cattle-market at Islington and the model prison
at Holloway. Newgate, also, is being enlarged and improved, and it is
proposed to build a lunatic asylum on some lands recently purchased
for the purpose in the neighbourhood of Croydon. A very large sum is
annually expended in street improvements, besides a contribution of
nearly 12,000 pounds a year to a metropolitan fund for objects not
comprised within the liberties of the City. The Corporation also pays
11,000 pounds per annum towards the maintenance of the police force,
though in other metropolitan districts this proportion of the expenses
is debited to the Consolidated Fund. Of the charitable donations and
subscriptions of the Corporation it is needless to speak, for their
fame has gone forth throughout the world. The City of London School
was built at a cost of 20,000 pounds, and year by year receives
substantial support and encouragement. The education and maintenance
of a hundred orphan children are provided for at another establishment;
nor is there any charitable institution worthy of support that is not
assisted with ungrudging liberality.
The conservancy of the Thames is another of the responsible duties of
the Corporation. For all purposes of navigation the river is admirably
adapted by nature, and improved by the thoughtful vigilance of its
conservators. As a navigable river the Thames is actually in a better
condition at the present day than at any period of its past history, a
remark that cannot be applied to any other tidal river in the world.
As for the filthy and polluted character of its waters, that at least
cannot be laid to the charge of the Corporation. So far back as the
year 1842 the City authorities issued a commission to survey and
report upon the state of the Thames, and in accordance with the report
of those gentlemen proceeded to take measures for embanking the river
so as to prevent the deposit of mud on the banks, to deepen the
channel, and to improve the wharfage. Strange to say, these spirited
proceedings in the interest of the entire metropolis drew down upon
the Corporation the wrath of the "Woods and Forests." The foul
fermenting accumulations of putrescent matter which send forth the
pestilential exhalations that engender so much disease, are declared
to be the property of the Crown, as "seised of the ground and soil of
the coasts and shores of the sea, and of all the navigable rivers
within the flux and reflux of the tide throughout the kingdom."
Thanks, therefore, to this precious prerogative of the Crown, her
Majesty's lieges have for the last fifteen years continued to be
poisoned "by virtue of the common law," while the Corporation have
been punished by the infliction of a suit in Chancery for seeking to
cleanse the river and purify the atmosphere, without first invoking
the wisdom of the "Woods and Forests."
If the crown lawyers be correct, it will follow that the entire
seaboard of Great Britain and Ireland is the actual property of the
Crown, as well as all lands reclaimed from the sea, and that all other
manorial rights are purely imaginary and unfounded.
Hitherto the tonnage rates levied on vessels in the port of London
are admitted to have been as moderate as was consistent with the due
maintenance of the port. The citizens, being themselves engaged in
trade, have always been interested in holding out inducements for the
shipping of all nations to frequent their port, and have thus
systematically reduced the tonnage dues to the lowest possible scale.
The Government, however, looking only to the actual amount of revenue
to be obtained, intimate the probability of a future augmentation of
these dues. The effect of even a trifling increase will naturally be
to divert a portion of the trade to other ports, and to inflict a
proportionate amount of injury on the port of London. Such will be the
first fruits of Government interference, such the inevitable result of
superseding customs and usages which have grown out of the character
of the Anglo-Saxon race.
City Receipts.
It has already been stated that in order to carry out street
improvements and the construction of public buildings, the Corporation
has incurred a very considerable amount of debt. These pecuniary
obligations, however, were not rashly undertaken. There was excellent
security to offer for their gradual but certain redemption; nor is it
anywhere affirmed that the governing body exceeded their powers, or
evinced a want of proper caution and foresight. The money raised was
applied to just and legitimate purposes, and secured on revenues
enjoyed from time immemorial, the usufruct of which might fairly be
deemed perpetual. Prescriptive right, however, is no barrier to
reformers greedy of patronage, whose only thought is to buy cheap
popularity by yielding to vulgar prejudices at the expense of their
neighbours. It is thus proposed to abolish all metage dues, to deprive
the Corporation of their portion of the coal duties, to remove all
restrictions upon brokers, and to sanction the establishment of
additional markets within the prescribed distance of seven miles.
Nothing is more easy than to pull down and destroy, but to fill up the
vacancy thus created is a very different matter. It requires no great
amount of moral courage, or of power, to dry up the sources whence the
corporate funds are derived, but far less easy will it be to obviate
the consequences of a step so ill-judged. It is one thing to demand
the usual tale of bricks when the supply of straw is cut off, and
another to obtain it. In vain will the Government call upon the City
to construct prisons and asylums, to widen the thoroughfares, to
cleanse the river, to embellish the streets. Such work as this can
only be accomplished through the employment of large funds, and these
will no longer be at the disposal of the Corporation. In the first
place it is proposed to take away "all such right of metage of any
grain, fruit, wares, or merchandise as the Corporation is entitled to
by custom, charter, or otherwise." In other words, 11,000 pounds a
year of the income of the City is to be confiscated for nobody's
benefit, but simply out of deference to a senseless clamour. The
officers employed in the collection of this revenue are to receive
compensation out of a fund provided for the purpose by a duty of three
farthings on every quarter of grain, seed, and pulse brought into the
port of London. But nothing is said about compensating the Corporation
by remitting their annual contribution to the expenses of the police
force, and by defraying the same out of the Consolidated Fund.
However, there is cause for gratitude that a still more serious loss
is not yet to be inflicted upon the ways and means of the City. The
metage duty on coals which may belong to the Corporation after the
year 1862, under 1 & 2 William IV., and 8 & 9 Victoria, is not to be
affected by the present Bill; but he must be a confiding and
unsuspecting individual who can trust to a long enjoyment of that
source of income. It is now commonly supposed that the Corporation
receive the entire duty of thirteen pence per ton, whereas their
actual share of the impost is only fourpence. The remaining
nine-pence are taken by the Metropolitan Board of Works, for the
general benefit of the capital of the British empire. Against this
arrangement no valid objection can be urged, but it is at least unfair
to throw the odium of the tax upon those who derive the smallest
benefit from its proceeds. It was upon the security of this revenue
that the Corporation were enabled to raise the 580,000 pounds required
for the construction of Cannon Street. From the same hitherto secure
source of income, two millions and a half sterling have been expended
on City improvements since the reign of William and Mary. But whence
are means to be obtained for carrying out any enterprise of large
utility if this revenue be confiscated? It is, besides, not a little
characteristic of the late, perhaps of every ministry, that not a word
has been said about the surrender of the nine-pence per ton received
by the Government. The City alone is to be made the scape-goat--the
least offending party is to be sacrificed to screen the real
delinquents,--the Corporation is to be thrown overboard, that the
ministerial vessel may be the more easily righted. Equally silent was
Sir George Grey on the subject of compensation. And yet, when it
pleased the Legislature to take from the Duke of Richmond the duty of
one shilling per chaldron on coals shipped in the Tyne for home
consumption, which had been granted to the family by Charles II., it
was deemed only just and equitable to make a reasonable compensation
to his grace. The duty at that time (1799) yielded some 21,000 pounds
a year, and was commuted for a perpetual annuity of 19,000 pounds,
payable out of the Consolidated Fund. In like manner the Duke of Grafton
was indemnified in 1806 for loss incurred through the resumption of
the "prisage and butlerage" of wines; nor was Lord Gwydir permitted to
suffer by the compulsory surrender of his lease in the mooring-chains.
In the reign of William IV. the Crown claimed and received a
compensation of 300,000 pounds for giving up the passing tolls, and
the Corporation itself was awarded upwards of 160,000 pounds on the
abolition of the "package and scavage" dues. But if such zeal for
retrenchment and economical reform fills the breasts of modern
statesmen, how comes it that they have no qualms about retaining the
duty of four shillings on every ton of tin extracted from Cornwall,
and which swells the revenues of the duchy? In what respect, in short,
is the tenure by which the duchy is held more sacred and inviolable
than that which entitles the Corporation to the permanent possession
of its various sources of income? It were well that the advisers of
the Crown first cleared away all obstructions and nuisances front
their own precincts, before undertaking to cleanse the premises of
their neighbours. But it is far easier to preach than to practise,
and to detect the failings of others than to correct one's own.
Another "liberal" clause repeals any charter or grant which prevents
the holding any new market within seven miles of the city. The framers
of the Bill appear to have overlooked, or laughed to scorn, the
ancient common law of the land which prohibits the establishment of
any fair or market within "a third part of twenty miles" from one
already in existence. This common-law right has been further specially
confirmed, so far as the City of London is concerned, by an Act of
Parliament in the reign of the third Edward. But considerations of
mere law cannot be expected to have much weight with those who have
resolved upon setting at naught the eternal principles of justice and
equity. Little did the wolf care which way the stream ran, when once
he had made up his mind to dine upon lamb.
Yet one other proof of "liberality" before we close these desultory
observations. At present the Corporation exercises a watchful
surveillance over all persons acting as brokers within the City of
London. No one, indeed, is permitted to carry on that highly
responsible business without the previous sanction of the Court of
Aldermen. This restriction is admitted to have been most beneficial to
the public, and the brokers themselves are fully sensible of its
advantage to themselves by inspiring a reasonable confidence in their
honour and respectability. All this, however, is to be done away with.
Government care for none of these things. They prefer punishment to
prevention. Let every man do as seemeth good in his own eyes, provided
only that he escape conviction for evildoing. In that case the
"majesty of the law" will be vindicated by the house of correction or
the gallows. Why then take any thought to check the downward step?
That is the province of parents, masters, and pastors. The wisdom of
the Legislature cannot stoop to such elemental questions. It is
unworthy of the wise and illustrious senators of this great empire to
take heed of such a vulgar consideration as commercial morality.
This is a free country, wherein every man may freely live, providing
for himself, and warring upon his kind. Such throughout is the tone
and the spirit of the proposed measure for the "better regulation"
of the City of London. If this is better, it is devoutly to be
hoped that no future ministry will bring forward a Bill for the
"best regulation." Every additional step in this direction can only be
worse than its predecessor, for the goal to be attained is not only
the ruin of civic influence, but the subversion of self-government
throughout the realm.
For the present, indeed, this precious Bill has been withdrawn; but
let not a suspension of hostilities be construed into a conclusion of
peace. The question will certainly be brought before Parliament under
a modified form in the ensuing Session, and it is then that the fate
of the Corporation will be decided.
Are the citizens of London--are the people of Great Britain--prepared
to resign without a struggle the last of the glorious rights and
privileges bequeathed to them by their Saxon ancestors? Are they
willing to exchange their old ancestral customs and usages for the
dogmatic theories and arbitrary practices of continental systems?
In short, will they consent to barter freedom for absolutism, the
happiness and independence of the many for the aggrandizement of the
few? For that is the real question at issue, and one the answer to
which cannot be much longer deferred.