“It is well known that both in the _Captain_ and in the _Mon_The British battle fleet, Vol. 1 (of 2)

the turrets have been deprived of their primary and supreme

advantage, that of providing an all-round fire for the guns, and

more especially a head fire. This deprivation is consequent upon

the adoption of forecastles, which are intended to keep the ships

dry in steaming against a head sea, and to enable the head-sails

to be worked. When it first became known that the _Monarch_

was designed with a forecastle (by order of the then Board of

Admiralty) there were not wanting persons who considered the plan

extremely objectionable, and who took it for granted that as a

turret-ship the new vessel would be fatally defective. The design

of the _Captain_ shortly afterwards, under the direction of Captain

Coles, with a similar but much larger forecastle, was an admission,

however, that the Board of Admiralty did not stand alone in the

belief that this feature was a necessity, however objectionable.

Both these ships, therefore, are without a right-ahead fire

from the turrets, the _Monarch_ having this deficiency partly

compensated by two forecastle (6½-ton) guns protected with armour,

while the _Captain_ has no protected head-fire at all, but merely

one gun (6½-ton) standing exposed on the top of the forecastle.”

Time has shown that he was quite correct in his views; but in 1866 and

the years that followed he was regarded as unduly conservative and

non-progressive.

[Illustration:

ROYAL SOVEREIGN.

TYPICAL U.S. MONITOR.

SCORPION.

CAPTAIN.

MONARCH.

REED IDEAL OF A MASTED TURRET SHIP.

TURRET-SHIPS OF THE REED ERA.]

Captain Coles objected to the _Monarch_ altogether. He insisted with

vehemence that she did not in the least express his ideas. She had a

high forecastle, also a poop; these features depriving her of end-on

fire, except in so far as a couple of 6½-ton guns in an armoured

forecastle supplied the deficiency. The Admiralty replied that a

forecastle was essential for sea-worthiness; but Coles was so insistent

that eventually he was allowed to design a sea-going turret-ship on

his own ideas, in conjunction with Messrs. Laird, of Birkenhead,

who had already had considerable experience in producing masted

turret-ships.[98] Coles was given a free hand. As a naval officer his

form of turret displays the practical mind; as a ship designer he was

simply the raw amateur. The _Captain_, which he produced, accentuated

every fault of the _Monarch_, except in the purely technical matter

of rigging being in the way of the guns. Coles got over this by

fitting tripod masts (which Laird’s had evolved before him[99]); but

for the light flying bridges of the _Monarch_ he substituted a very

considerable superstructure erection. For the _Monarch’s_ armoured

two-gun forecastle, which he had so violently condemned, he substituted

a much larger unarmoured, one-gun structure. Owing to an error in

design, his intended 8-ft. freeboard was actually only 6ft., and his

ideal ship resulted in nothing but a _Monarch_ of less gun power, and

of 8ft. less freeboard. Her fate is dealt with later. Details of the

two ships are:--

================+===========================+=========================

| _Captain._ | _Monarch._

----------------+---------------------------+-------------------------

Displacement | 6900 tons. | 8320 tons.

Length (_p.p._) | 320 feet. | 330 feet.

Beam | 53 feet. | 57½ feet.

Draught | 25ft. 9½in. (_mean_). | 26ft. 7in. (_max._)

Guns | Four 25 ton M.L.R., | Four 25 ton M.L.R.,

| two 6½ ton, do. | three 6½ ton, do.[100]

Coal | 500 tons.[101] | 630 tons.

Speed | 14.25 kts. (twin screws). | 14.94 (single screw).

Waterline Belt | 8.6 inches. | 7.6 inches.

Turrets | 13.8 inches. | 10.8 inches.

Completed | 1869. | 1869.

================+===========================+=========================

It has been said that Captain Coles was tied down by Admiralty ideas

that a sea-going ship must have auxiliary sail power. All the

evidence is, however, to the effect that not only did he recognise

this limitation from the first, but that he concurred with it and

believed his design to fill the conditions best. It failed to do so,

the _Monarch_ under all conditions doing far better than the _Captain_

on trial (except occasionally under sail).

Sir E. J. Reed’s objections to the _Captain_ design have already been

mentioned. He was not the only critic, since Laird’s, of Birkenhead,

who built the ship, were so suspicious of the design that they

requested the Admiralty to submit her to severe tests for stability.

The ship, however, came through these tests very well, and the public

were more convinced than ever that she was the finest warship ever

built. One or two naval officers who had criticised her also modified

their opinions after she had done a couple of very successful cruises

across the Bay of Biscay. Her crew had the utmost confidence in her.

She was commanded by Captain Burgoyne, and Captain Coles was also on

board her when she made her third cruise in September, 1871.

On the 6th September she was off Cape Finisterre in company with

the Channel Fleet, consisting of the _Lord Warden_, _Minotaur_,

_Agincourt_, _Northumberland_, _Monarch_, _Hercules_, _Bellerophon_,

and the unarmoured ships _Inconstant_ and _Bristol_. Admiral Milne

came on board her from the _Lord Warden_, and drew attention to the

fact that she was rolling a great deal,[102] but nobody on board the

_Captain_ agreed with him that this was dangerous. During the night

a heavy gale suddenly arose, and in the morning the _Captain_ was

missing. Eighteen survivors reached the land with the story of what had

happened.

[Illustration: THE _CAPTAIN_.]

From this it appears that about midnight the ship was under her

topsails, double reefed. She had steam up, but was not using her screw.

The ship gave a heavy lurch, righted herself, and the captain gave

the order, “Let go the topsail halyards,” and immediately afterwards,

“Let go fore and main topsail sheets.” The ship, however, continued to

heel, and “18 degrees” was called out. This increased until 28 degrees

was arrived at. With the ship lying over on her side some of the crew

succeeded in walking over her bottom, and these were practically the

only survivors. Immediately afterwards the ship went down stern first.

There were at this time some five and twenty survivors, including

Captain Burgoyne and Mr. May, the gunner. Some of these were in the

launch, others clinging to the pinnace, which was floating bottom

upwards. Captain Burgoyne was amongst those who were clinging to the

pinnace, and that was the last seen of him. A few of the men in the

pinnace succeeded in jumping into the launch and so escaped. The rest

were never seen again.

The subsequent court-martial placed it on record that “the _Captain_

was built in deference to public opinion and in opposition to the views

and opinions of the Controller of the Navy and his Department.” The

instability of the ship and the incompetence of Captain Coles to design

her were emphasised.

After the loss of the _Captain_ considerable panic on the subject of

turret-ships arose. The _Monarch_ was submitted to a number of tests

which, however, generally proved satisfactory, and there was never

anything to be said against her except that the forecastle and the poop

necessitated by her being a rigged ship, negatived one of the principal

advantages of the turret system.

To the loss of the _Captain_ is to be traced some of the extraordinary

opposition which the _Devastation_ idea subsequently encountered.

The various writings of Sir E. J. Reed make it abundantly clear

that just as in the _Bellerophon_ he had realised that an ironclad

battleship must be something more than an old-type vessel with some

armour on her, so he realised from the first that the ordinary

sea-going warship with turrets on deck, instead of guns in the battery,

was no true solution of the turret problem. There is ample evidence

that he studied the monitors of the American Civil War with a balanced

intelligence far ahead of his day, taking into consideration every

_pro_ and _con_ with absolute impartiality, and applying the knowledge

thus gained to the different conditions required for the British Fleet.

It is no exaggeration to say that he was the only man who really kept

his head while the turret-ship controversy reigned; the one man who

thought while others argued.

He swiftly recognised the tremendous limitations of the American

low-freeboard monitors, and at an early date evolved his own idea of

the “breastwork monitor,” which began with the Australian _Cerberus_,

and ended with the predecessor of the present _Dreadnought_. The ships

of this type varied considerably from each other in detail; but the

general principle of all was identical. All, whether coast-defence

or sea-going, were “mastless”; all, while of low freeboard fore and

aft, carried their turrets fairly high up on a heavily armed redoubt

amidships. Side by side with them he developed the central battery

ironclads of this particular era. He ceased to be Chief Constructor

before either type reached its apotheosis; but all may be deemed

lineal descendants of his original creations.

[Illustration: THE OLD “INVINCIBLE.” 1872.]

First, however, it is desirable to revert to the Reed broadside and

central battery-ships.

The _Audacious_ class, which followed closely upon the _Hercules_, and

were contemporary in the matter of design, were avowedly “second-class

ships,” intended for service in distant seas. The ships of this class,

of which the first was completed in 1869 and the last in 1873, were the

_Audacious_, _Invincible_, _Iron Duke_, _Vanguard_, _Swiftsure_, and

_Triumph_. As the sketch plan illustrations indicate, the main deck

battery in them was more centralised than in the _Hercules_, while

instead of the bow battery they carried on their upper decks four

6½-ton guns capable of firing directly ahead or astern.

Excluding the converted ships, the _Audacious_ was the eleventh British

ironclad to be designed in point of date of laying down, but in the

matter of design she followed directly on the eighth ship--_Hercules_.

Her weights, as compared with the _Bellerophon_, were:--

==============+=================+=================

Name. | Weight of hull. | Weight carried.

--------------+-----------------+-----------------

_Bellerophon_ | 3652 tons. | 3798 tons.

_Audacious_ | 2675 tons. | 3234 tons.

==============+=================+=================

In some of these ships the principle of wood-copper sheathing was

re-introduced; the iron ships having been found to foul their hulls

more quickly than wooden hulled ships. The _Swiftsure_ and _Triumph_

(the two latest) were the ones so treated. Sir E. J. Reed was not

responsible for the experiment, which was entirely an Admiralty one. It

proved successful enough, the loss of speed being trifling.

Details of the _Audacious_ class:--[103]

Displacement--6,010.

Length--280ft.

Beam--54ft.

H.P.--4,830.

Mean Draught--23ft. 8ins.

Guns--Ten 12-ton M.L.R.

Coal--500 tons.

Belt Armour--8ins. to 6ins.

===========+===========+===========+============+==========+===========+=========

-----------+-----------+-----------+------------+----------+-----------+---------

Speed | 13.2 | 13.64 | 14.09 | 13.64 | 13.75 | 13.75

Launched | 1869 | 1870 | 1869 | 1869 | 1870 | 1870

Completed | 1869 | 1871 | 1870 | 1871 | 1872 | 1873

& Machin’y| £246,482 | £196,479 | £239,441 | | £257,081 | £258,322

===========+===========+===========+============+==========+===========+=========

The sheathing increased the displacement of the two latest ships by

about 900 tons in the _Swiftsure_, and some 600 tons in the _Triumph_.

These two were single-screw ships only, whereas all the others were

twin-screw.

In September, 1875, the _Vanguard_ was rammed and sunk by the _Iron

Duke_.

[Illustration: THE _VANGUARD_, COMPLETED 1874.]

The finding of the Court Martial was as follows:--

“The court having heard the evidence which had been adduced in this

inquiry and trial, is of opinion that the loss of Her Majesty’s

ship _Vanguard_ was occasioned by Her Majesty’s ship _Iron Duke_

coming into collision with her off the Kisbank, the Irish Channel,

at about 12-50 on the 1st September, from the effects of which

she foundered; that such collision was caused--First, by the high

rate of speed at which the squadron, of which these vessels formed

a part, was proceeding whilst in a fog; secondly, by Captain

Dawkins, when leader of his division, leaving the deck of the ship

before the evolution which was being performed was completed, as

there were indications of foggy weather at the time; thirdly, by

the unnecessary reduction of speed of H.M.S. _Vanguard_ without

a signal from the vice-admiral in command of the squadron, and

without H.M.S. _Vanguard_ making the proper signals to the _Iron

Duke_; fourthly, by the increase of speed of H.M.S. _Iron Duke_

during a dense fog, the speed being already high; fifthly, by

H.M.S. _Iron Duke_ improperly shearing out of the line; sixthly,

for want of any fog signals on the part of H.M.S. _Iron Duke_.

“The court is further of opinion that the cause of the loss of

H.M.S. _Vanguard_ by foundering was a breach being made in her

side by the prow of H.M.S. _Iron Duke_ in the neighbourhood of

the most important transverse bulkhead--namely, that between the

engine and boiler rooms, causing a great rush of water into the

engine-room, shaft-alley, and stoke-hole, extinguishing the fires

in a few minutes, the water eventually finding its way into the

provision room flat, and provision rooms through imperfectly

fastened watertight doors, and owing to leakage of 99 bulkhead.

The court is of opinion that the foundering of H.M.S. _Vanguard_

might have been delayed, if not averted, by Captain Dawkins giving

instructions for immediate action being taken to get all available

pumps worked, instead of employing his crew in hoisting out boats,

and if Captain Dawkins, Commander Tandy, Navigating-Lieutenant

Thomas, and Mr. David Tiddy, carpenter, had shown more resource

and energy in endeavouring to stop the breach from the outside by

means at their command, such as hammocks and sails--and the court

is of opinion that Captain Dawkins should have ordered Captain

Hickley, of H.M.S. _Iron Duke_, to tow H.M.S. _Vanguard_ into

shallow water. The court is of opinion that blame is imputable to

Captain Dawkins for exhibiting want of judgment and for neglect of

duty in handling his ship, and that he showed a want of resource,

promptitude, and decision in the means be adopted for saving

H.M.S. _Vanguard_ after the collision. The court is further of

opinion that blame is imputable to Navigating-Lieutenant Thomas for

neglect of duty in not pointing out to his captain that there was

shallower water within a short distance, and in not having offered

any suggestion as to the stopping of the leak on the outside. The

court is further of opinion that Commander Tandy showed great

want of energy as second in command under the circumstances. The

court is further of opinion that Mr. Brown, the chief engineer,

showed want of promptitude in not applying the means at his command

to relieve the ship of water. The court is further of opinion

that blame is imputable to Mr. David Tiddy, of H.M.S. _Vanguard_,

for not offering any suggestions to his captain as to the most

efficient mode of stopping the leak, and for not taking immediate

steps for sounding the compartments and reporting from time to

time the progress of the water. The court adjudges Captain Richard

Dawkins to be severely reprimanded and dismissed from H.M.S.

_Vanguard_ and he is hereby severely reprimanded and so sentenced

accordingly. The court adjudges Commander Lashwood Goldie Tandy

and Navigating-Lieutenant James Cambridge Thomas to be severely

reprimanded, and they hereby are severely reprimanded accordingly.

The court imputes no blame to the other officers and ship’s company

of H.M.S. _Vanguard_ in reference to the loss of the ship, and they

are hereby acquitted accordingly.”

[Illustration:

HOTSPUR

FRENCH RAM TAUREAU (1865)

GLATTON

RUPERT

RAMS OF THE REED ERA.]

This disaster drew attention to the ram, the more so when it became

known that the _Iron Duke_ was uninjured. Ram tactics had, of course,

been heard of before, and had been discussed at great length by

Sir Edward Reed in 1868. At that date, although one or two special

ram-ships had been built, Sir E. J. Reed had expressed a certain

amount of scepticism as to whether the ram could be successfully used

in connection with a ship in motion, and pointed out that in the

historical instance of the _Re d’Italia_ at the battle of Lissa, the

ship was stationary. He further had written:--[104]

“Even if the side were thus broken through, any one of our

iron-built ships would most probably remain afloat, although her

efficiency would be considerably impaired, the water which would

enter being confined to the watertight compartment of the hold,

enclosed by bulkheads crossing the ship at a moderate distance

before and abaft the part broken through. In fact, under these

circumstances the ship struck would be in exactly the same

condition as an ordinary iron ship which by any accident has

had the bottom plating broken, and one of the hold-compartments

filled with water, so that we have good reason to believe that

her safety need not be despaired of, unless, by the blow being

delivered at, or very near, a bulkhead, more than one compartment

should be injured and filled. All iron ships can thus be protected

to some extent against being sunk by a single blow of a ram, and

our own vessels have the further and important protection of the

watertight wings just described; but wood ships are not similarly

safe. One hole in the side of the _Re d’Italia_ sufficed to sink

her; but this would scarcely have been possible in an iron ship

with properly arranged watertight compartments. The French, in

their latest ironclads, have become alive to this danger, and have

fitted transverse iron bulkheads in the holds of wood-built ships

in order to add to their safety. No doubt this is an improvement,

but our experience with wood ships leads us to have grave doubts

whether these bulkheads can be made efficient watertight divisions

in the hold, on account of the working that is sure to take place

in a wood hull. This fact adds another to the arguments previously

advanced in favour of iron hulls for armoured ships; for it appears

that an iron-built ship, constructed on the system of our recent

ironclads, is comparatively safe against destruction by a ram,

unless she is repeatedly attacked when in a disabled state, while

a wood-built ship may, and most likely will, be totally lost in

consequence of one well-delivered heavy blow.”

This is in strange contrast to the fate of the _Vanguard_, but the

finding of the court-martial indicates that the precautions taken were

hardly such as were contemplated by the ship’s designer! Furthermore,

she appears to have been struck immediately on one of the watertight

bulkheads, and so, instead of being left with seven of her eight

compartments unfilled, she had only six unfilled. The shock, also, was

such that most of the other bulkheads started leaking; and in addition

to this the double bottom is said to have been filled with bricks

and cement,[105] and so less operative than it might otherwise have

been, since any shock on the outer bottom would thus be immediately

communicated to the inner one.

The actual successor of the _Hercules_, in the matter of first-class

ships, was the _Sultan_. She differed from the _Hercules_ merely in a

somewhat increased draught and displacement, and increased provision

for end-on bow fire--four 12½-ton guns able to fire ahead being

substituted for the one smaller gun in the _Hercules_.

This end-on fire was given because ram-tactics were then coming greatly

into favour. Particulars of the _Sultan_,[106] which was the last of

the central battery ironclads to be designed and built by Sir E. J.

Reed, are as follows:--

Displacement--9,290 tons.

Length--325ft.

Beam--59ft. ½-in.

H.P.--7,720.

Mean Draught--26ft. 5ins.

Guns--Eight 18-ton M.L.R., four 12½-ton M.L.R.

Coal--810 tons.

Armour (iron)--9ins., 8ins., and 6ins.

Speed--14.13 knots (single screw).

Builder of Ship--Chatham.

Builder of Machinery--Penn.

Cost--Hull and machinery, £357,415.

Launched--1870; completed for sea in 1871.

[Illustration:

CERBERUS.

DEVASTATION.

FURY.

DREADNOUGHT.

BREASTWORK MONITORS.]

Sir E. J. Reed’s “breastwork monitors” have already been referred to.

They were received with little enthusiasm by the Admiralty, and the

first of them were merely Colonial coast defence vessels. These were:--

============+==========+======+=======+=======+==========

------------+----------+------+-------+-------+----------

_Cerberus_ | 3480 | 9.75 | 8 | 10 | 1870

_Abyssinia_ | 2900 | 9.59 | 7 | 10 | 1870

_Magdala_ | 3340 |10.67 | 8 | 10 | 1870

============+==========+======+=======+=======+==========

In general design all were identical, a redoubt amidships carrying

two centre line turrets and a small oval superstructure between. Twin

screws were employed.

The belief in the ram already alluded to had by now attained such

proportions that a ship specially designed for ramming was called for,

and the _Hotspur_ was the result. Nothing written by Sir E. J. Reed

(and he wrote a great deal) indicates that he was in sympathy with

her design, though nominally responsible. The _Hotspur_ was not even

a turret-ship. She carried a fixed armoured structure of considerable

size,[107] inside of which a single 25-ton gun revolved, firing through

the most convenient of several ports. She was fitted with two masts

with fore and aft sails. Particulars of her were:--

Displacement--4,010 tons.

Length--235ft.

Beam--50ft.

H.P.--3,060.

Mean Draught--21ft. 10ins.

Guns--One 25-ton M.L.R., two 6½-ton.

Belt Armour--11in. to 8in.; complete belt.

Turret Armour--10in.

Coal--300 tons.

Speed--12.8 knots (twin-screw).

Builder--Napier, Glasgow.

Launched--1870; completed, 1871.

Cost--Hull and machinery, £171,528.

She was built solely and simply as an “answer” to a series of “rams”

projected for the French Navy, apparently more with an Admiralty idea

of not being caught napping “in case,” than from any belief in her

efficacy.

[Illustration: THE _HOTSPUR_, AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED, 1871.]

Sir E. J. Reed’s ideas in the matter of turret-ships now found

expression in four ships of the _Cerberus_ type enlarged. These were

the _Cyclops_, _Gorgon_, _Hecate_, and _Hydra_. Like their prototype,

they were of the breastwork type, and differed only in having an inch

more belt armour and a displacement of 3,560 tons. Differing from them,

and perhaps more on Reed lines, was the _Glatton_. Her special feature

was the introduction of water to reduce her freeboard in action. She

had a single turret only, but her belt was 12ins. thick, and she

represented the, then, “last word” in coast defence ships, so far as

the British Navy was concerned. Details of her are as follows:--

Displacement--4,910 tons.

Length--245ft.

Beam--54ft.

H.P.--2,870.

Mean Draught--19ft. 5ins.

Guns--Two 25-ton M.L.R.

Armour (iron)--12-10in. Belt Turret, 14in.

Coal--540 tons.

Speed--12.11 knots (twin screw).

Builder of Ship--Chatham Dockyard.

Builder of Machinery--Laird.

Floated out of Dock--1871; completed, 1871.

Cost--Hull and Machinery, £219,529.

“It is well known that both in the _Captain_ and in the _Monarch_