incorporation of the red cross of St. Patrick. This flag, the Union
Jack, was used for flying on the bowsprit,[79] and at the main masthead
by an Admiral of the Fleet. To hoist it correctly, _i.e._, right side
up, was a special point of importance in the Fleet of Nelson’s day, and
many a foreigner seeking to use British colours got bowled out from
hoisting the flag incorrectly, _i.e._, without the greater width of
white being uppermost in the inner canton nearest the staff. To this
day many people on shore do the same.
The ensign was coloured according as to whether the Admiral was “of the
white,” “blue,” or “red.” It was flown, as till quite recently, from
the mizzen peak.
For battle purposes this variety ensign died out after Trafalgar,
where, in order to avoid confusion, Nelson ordered all ships to fly
the white ensign--he himself being a Vice-Admiral of the white, while
Collingwood was Vice-Admiral of the blue. Trafalgar was thus the first
battle to be fought deliberately under the white ensign.
IX.
THE BIRTH OF MODERN WARSHIP IDEAS.
In 1816 took place the bombardment of Algiers, whereby 1,200 Europeans
who were in slavery were released. None of these, however, proved to be
British subjects. A noticeable feature of the bombardment was the heavy
damage done by the large ships engaged.
For the year 1817 the _personnel_ stood at 21,000 only. Ships in
commission were fourteen of the line and 100 lesser craft. Two hundred
and sixty-three (of which eighty-four were of the line) were laid up
“in ordinary” and the remaining ships were condemned.
In this year a new rating of ships was introduced. Up till now the
carronades had not been included in the armament of ships. Under
the new rating they were included, and so the thirty-eight gun ship
actually carrying fifty-two guns appeared for the first time with her
proper armament.
Although the Navy was so reduced, considerable attention was paid to
shipbuilding and improvement of construction. Trussed frames were
introduced, and a variety of other inventions which had long been in
use in France. Much attention was paid to the strong construction of
the bow, with a view to resisting raking fire.[80] Sterns were also
made circular to enable more guns to bear aft. A curious objection
to this was made on the grounds that in time of war it was the enemy
who would be in retreat and most in need of stern fire, and that by
the introduction of this into the British Navy the enemy would copy
and so have the advantage of being better able to defend himself than
heretofore! It was, however, pointed out that perhaps war vessels
propelled by steam might be met with in blockades, and that it would be
extremely important to sail away from these and be able to destroy them
while so doing!
The years 1818 and 1819 passed uneventfully. The _personnel_ was
20,000, and the estimates averaged between six and seven million
pounds. They remained at about this figure for several years, and
beyond some slight operations in Burmah, in 1824, the British
Navy performed no war services till the year 1827. In the Burmese
operations, the _Diana_, a small steam paddle vessel took part. It
is also of some interest to record that Captain Marryat, the naval
novelist, commanded the _Lorne_ (twenty) in these operations.
In 1827, the combined fleets of England, France and Russia met those of
the Turks and Egyptians at Navarino, in connection with the war between
Turkey and Greece. The allied fleet consisted as follows:--
{ Three ships of the line.
BRITISH { Four frigates.
{ Several other vessels.
{ Three ships of the line.
FRENCH { Two lesser vessels.
{ Two schooners.
RUSSIAN { Four ships of the line.
{ Four frigates.
The combined Turko-Egyptian fleet consisted of three ships of the line,
fifteen large frigates, eighteen corvettes, and a number of gunboats,
etc.
The Turkish fleet was anchored in the harbour. The combined fleet
sailed into the harbour and anchored to leeward of the Turks. These
fired upon some English boats and a general action ensued, in which the
greater part of the Turko-Egyptian fleet was destroyed with the loss
of somewhere about 4,000 men. The Allies lost 650, and the principal
English ships were so damaged that they had to be sent home for repairs.
At and about this time, and right on for some years, an enormous
number of experiments were carried out between ship and ship with a
view to improving the sailing qualities, and side by side with this,
the question of propulsion other than by sail was first seriously
considered. A certain number of small steam tugs had been added to the
Navy, there being no less than twenty-two such built in the reign of
George IV. Of these the largest was built in 1835. Very little reliance
was placed on steam at first for any possibilities outside towing and
harbour work, and a great deal of energy was expended in devices to
enable ships to be moved by manual labour. In place of the “sweeps”
of ancient history, paddles were fitted, and in 1829 the _Galatea_
(forty-two) frigate was thus moved at a speed of three knots in a dead
calm.
The _Galatea_ was commanded by Captain, afterwards Admiral Sir Charles,
Napier, who so long ago as 1819 had been concerned in financing an
unsuccessful attempt to run iron steamers on the Seine. The first ship
in which hand paddles were tried was the _Active_, frigate. No success
was met with, but Napier evolved a different system for the _Galatea_.
Those of the _Active_ were worked by the capstan; Napier installed
a series of winches along each side of the main deck. It took about
two-thirds of the ship’s company to work them.
The earliest known use of steam was as long ago as in the year 1543.
The account of it was in the original records which had been preserved
in the Royal Archives of Simancas, among the State Papers of the city
of Catalonia, and those of the Naval Secretary of War, in the year
1543, and was extracted on the 27th August, 1825, by the keeper, who
signed his name “Tomas Gonzalez.”
The inventor, a naval officer named Garay, never revealed the secret
of his invention, but mention is made of a “cauldron of boiling water”
and “wheels of complicated movement on each side of the vessel.” He
succeeded in obtaining a speed of “two leagues in three hours,” also
“at least a league an hour” with his device, fitted to a 200-ton
vessel named _Trinidad_.[81] Honours were bestowed on Garay, but the
monarch who had patronised him, being busy with other matters, did not
follow up the invention. Otherwise much naval history might have been
different from what it is.
In 1736, Jonathan Hulls took out a patent in England for a stern wheel.
It should be remembered that at this time the question of means of
propulsion other than by sail was eagerly considered, and that paddles
came to be tried in the place of oars, with a view to more continuity
of action. Steam ideas somewhat trended to the idea of sucking water
in forward and ejecting it aft. The screw propeller also was known
certainly at as early a date as the paddle.
In 1789, a sixty-feet boat was driven for nearly seven miles an hour
with a twelve horse-power engine, but for a very long time nothing was
expected except canal work and towing. Even as steam progressed, it did
so in the merchant service first.
By the year 1818, however, the Americans had built a sea-going steamer,
_Savannah_, which crossed the Atlantic to Russia. On her return voyage
the United States was reached twenty-five days after leaving Norway.
In England, in the year 1821, a steam mail service, between Holyhead
and Dublin, was established, and in 1823 a steam mail service between
England and India was seriously asked for, and in 1829 the subject
again came upon the _tapis_.
In 1839, the steam liner _Great Britain_, was laid down. She was 322
feet long overall and a beam of fifty-one feet, and a displacement
of 2,984 tons, with 1,000 horse-power. It was originally intended to
make her a paddle-vessel. Instead of that, however, she was made a
screw-steamer, and made her first trip in December, 1844, when she
succeeded in exceeding her anticipated speed.
This serious attention to steam in the mercantile marine naturally
attracted considerable interest in the Navy, the more so as two naval
officers, Captains Chappel and Claxton, were the principal promoters
of the mercantile enterprises. It was, however, generally pointed out
that useful as steam might be for such purposes, it was unsuitable
for warships proper, on account of the liability of the machinery to
damage, and the practical impossibility of combining paddles with
sailing. It was laid down that the first essential of a warship was to
be able to sail, that if steam power could be usefully applied as an
auxiliary it might be “desirable.”
After considerable experiments and investigations, it was found
possible to place the machinery under the water-line, but the
paddle-wheels were still exposed, and the armament space available was
so slight that steam did not gain much favour.
The first steam vessel actually brought into the British service was
the _Monkey_, built about the year 1821. She was bought into the
service and used as a tug.
In the following year, the _Comet_ was specially built for the packet
service,[82] but none of these were steam warships.
In 1843, the success of the _Great Britain_ influenced the Admiralty,
and the _Penelope_ (forty-six) was cut apart and lengthened by
sixty-five feet, and had engines of 650 horse-power fitted to her.
In 1844, the Earl of Dundonald (Cochrane) submitted plans to the
Admiralty for a steamer of 760 tons, called the _Janus_. This vessel
was built with an engine of his own design, but as this was a failure,
ordinary engines were fitted.
In all these steamers the gun-fire was chiefly end-on, but in 1845 the
_Odin_ and the _Sidon_, especially designed for broadside fire, were
put in hand.
So long ago as the year 1825, the paddle was recognised as a source of
danger for warships, and in that year a two-blade propeller, designed
by Commander Samuel Brown, was accepted.
In 1836, Ericsson (subsequently to be of _Monitor_ fame) patented some
propellers in England, but as he met with very little sympathy from
the authorities, he retired to America. The main objections to the
propeller appears not to have been due to any lack of appreciation
so much as opposition from those who had invested heavily in
paddle-propulsion plant.
[Illustration: _SALAMANDER_ PADDLE WARSHIP.]
In 1842, however, the Admiralty seriously took the question up. The
_Rattler_, of 777 tons, and 200-horse-power, was lashed stern-to-stern
with the paddle-yacht _Electro_ of the same displacement and
horse-power. Both ships were driven away from each other at full speed,
and the _Rattler_ succeeded in towing the _Electro_ after her. After
this, in 1844, a screw frigate, the _Dauntless_, was ordered to be
constructed; but as late as the year 1850, steam was merely regarded as
an auxiliary, and received little or no consideration outside that.
The use of iron instead of oak as a material for shipbuilding was first
seriously considered about the year 1800. In 1821, an iron steamer
was in existence, and in 1839 the _Dover_ was ordered to be built for
Government service as a steam packet. In 1841, the _Mohawk_ was ordered
by the Admiralty for service on Lake Huron, but the first iron warship
for the Royal Navy proper was the _Trident_, of 1850 tons and 300
horse-power, built at Blackwall, by Admiralty orders, in 1843.
Iron, as a material for warship construction, was looked on with
considerable suspicion, both in England and in France. Experiments
were conducted at Woolwich with some plates rivetted together like the
sides of an iron ship, these plates being lined inside with cork and
india-rubber (the first idea of a cofferdam). It was expected that this
preparation, which was known as “kamptulicon,” would close up after
shot had passed through and prevent ingress of water. This was found to
be quite correct, but the egress of shot on the other side had quite
the opposite result. The plates were sometimes packed with wood and
sometimes cased with it, but the general result of the experiments was
held prejudicial to the use of iron, which was supposed to splinter
unduly compared to wood.
The importance of deciding whether warships should be built of iron or
wood was accentuated by the necessity of replacing those heavy warships
which had been converted to auxiliary steam vessels. All such proved to
be cramped in stowage and bad sea boats.
So long ago as 1822 shell-guns had been adopted. Consequently, in
the experiments as regards iron, shell-fire had to be taken into
consideration.
In 1842, experiments were made with iron plates three-eighths of an
inch thick, rivetted together to make a total thickness of six inches.
It was, however, reported that at 400 yards these were not proof
against eight-inch guns or heavy thirty-two pounders. These matters
were taken into consideration by Captain Chads, whose official report
was as follows:--
“The shot going through the exposed or near side generally makes a
clean smooth hole of its own size, which might be readily stopped;
and even where it strikes a rib it has much the same effect; but on
the opposite side all the mischief occurs; the shot meets with so
little resistance that it must inevitably go through the vessel,
and should it strike on a rib on the opposite side the effect
is terrific, tearing off the iron sheets to a very considerable
extent; and even those shot that go clean through the fracture
being on the off side, the rough edges are outside the vessel,
precluding the possibility almost of stopping them.
“As it is most probable that steam vessels will engage directly
end-on I have thought it desirable to try to-day what the effect of
shot would be on this vessel[83] so placed, and it has been such as
might be expected, each shot cutting aways the ribs, and tearing
the iron plates away sufficient to sink the vessel in an instant.”
[Illustration: THE _LONDON_--TWO DECKER WOODEN CONVERTED SCREW SHIP OF
THE LINE.
Designed by Sir William Symonds. Launched 1840. Damaged at the
bombardment of Fort Constantine, Sevastopol, 1854. Turned into hulk at
Zanzibar, 1874.]
In 1849 an official report stated that:--
“Shot of every description in passing through iron makes such large
holes that the material is improper for the bottom of ships.
“Iron and oak of equal weight offering equal resistance to shot,
iron for the topsides affords better protection for the men than
oak, as the splinters from it are not so destructive.
“Iron offering no lodgment for shells in passing through the side,
if made with single plates it will be free from the destructive
effects that would occur by a shell exploding in a side of timber.”
Certain modifications were then introduced and tried in the year 1850,
and Captain Chad’s report was that:--
“With high charges the splinters from the shot were as numerous and
as severe as before, with the addition in this, and in the former
case, of the evils that other vessels are subject to, that of the
splinters from the timber.
“From these circumstances I am confirmed in the opinion that iron
cannot be beneficially employed as a material for the construction
of vessels of war.”
As a result of this report, seventeen iron ships which were building,
the largest being the _Simoon_, of nearly 2,000 tons, were condemned;
and it was definitely decided that ships must be built of wood, and
that iron in any form was disadvantageous.
The advantages of the shell were fully understood, and at least half
of the guns of the ships of the line of the period were sixty-five
cwt. shell guns. Experiments had fully taught what shell-fire might be
expected to accomplish. General Paixham, the inventor of the shell gun,
had long ago stated that armour was the only antidote to shell, and the
fact that armour up to six inches had been experimented with indicates
that this also was understood. Between the appreciation of the fact
and acting upon it, there was, however, a decided gulf. In the British
Navy, as in others also, the natural conservatism of the sea held its
usual sway.
Matters were at about this stage when, in the year 1853, the Russian
Admiral Nachimoff, with a fleet consisting of six ships of the line,
entered the harbour of Sinope, on the 30th November, 1853, and
absolutely annihilated, by shell fire, a Turkish squadron of seven
frigates which were lying there. The damage wrought by this shell-fire
was terrific. “For God’s sake keep out the shells!” is generally
believed to have been the cry of most naval officers about that period,
though there is some lack of evidence as to whether this demand was
ever actually made, except by the Press. The terrible effect of
shell-fire was, however, obvious enough; but as stated above it was
really well-known before the war test that so impressed the world.
When the Crimean War broke out in 1854, the British _personnel_ stood
at 45,500, and the Estimates were £7,197,804. On the 28th March, war
was formally declared. Naval operations in the Crimean war were almost
entirely of secondary note. Some frigates bombarded Odessa, in April,
and a certain amount of damage was done along the Caucasian coast.
In September, the British fleet, consisting of ten ships of the line,
two frigates and thirteen armed steamers, convoyed an enormous fleet
of Turkish and French warships crammed with troops for an attack on
Sebastopol. The Russian fleet lay inside that harbour and made no
attempt whatever to destroy the invading flotilla, though it might
easily have done considerable mischief, if not more. Instead of that,
the ships were sunk at the entrance of the harbour, and the siege of
Sebastopol presently commenced. On October 17th, the Allied fleet
attempted to bombard Fort Constantine, but the ships were soon defeated
by the shore defences and many of them badly injured.
The French, who had formed somewhat more favourable opinions of
iron armour than we had, had, after Sinope, already commenced the
construction of five floating batteries which were to carry armour.
They were wooden ships of 1,400 tons displacement, with four-inch
armour over their hulls. They carried eighteen fifty-pounder guns and
a crew of 320. As originally designed they were intended to sail,
although they were fitted with slight auxiliary steam power. When
completed they were found unable to sail, so pole masts were fitted to
them. Artificial ventilation was also supplied and their funnels were
made telescopic. The designs of these vessels were sent to the British
Admiralty, who, after considerable delay, built four copies, the
_Glatton_, _Meteor_, _Thunder_, and _Trusty_. These, however, were not
completed in time to take any part in the war.
So soon as the French armoured batteries were ready they were sent out
to the Crimea, where they joined a large fleet which had been prepared
to attack Kinburn, which was bombarded in October, 1855. In a very
short while the forts were totally destroyed, and with very small loss
to the armoured batteries. The effect created by this was so great
that four more armoured batteries were ordered in England, the _Etna_,
_Erebus_, _Terror_, and _Thunderbolt_.
In the Baltic, to which a British fleet, under Admiral Napier, had been
sent, the Russians kept behind the fortifications at Kronstadt, and
nothing was accomplished beyond the bombardment of Sveaborg, and the
destruction of the town and dockyard. Some small bombardments also took
place in the White Sea and on the Siberian coast, where Petropavlovsk
was attacked and the attack was defeated, and such other actions as
took place were generally unsuccessful. It had become abundantly clear
that against fortifications wooden ships had very small chance of
success.
Incidental items of naval interest are that in this particular war
Captain Cowper Coles mounted a sixty-eight-pounder gun upon a raft
named the _Lady Nancy_. This attracted so much attention from the small
target, light draft and steady platform, that Coles was sent home to
develop his ideas. In this war, also, mines appeared, the Russians
dropping a good many off Kronstadt. Those used by the Russians were
filled with seventy pounds of powder, and exploded on contact by the
familiar means of a glass tube of sulphuric acid being broken and the
acid falling into chlorate of potash.
No material damage was done to ships by this means, but a considerable
number of those who had picked them up and investigated them were
injured.
The ingenuity and new means of offence were, however, by no means
confined to the Russians, for a Mr. Macintosh, after the failure of
the first bombardment of Sebastopol, evolved a system of attacking
fortifications with a long hose supported by floats, through which
naptha was to be pumped. Being set alight with some potassium, the fort
attacked would be immediately smoked out.
Experiments at Portsmouth having proved that this system was “simple,
certain and cheap,” Mr. Macintosh proceeded to the Crimea with his
invention at his own expense. He was eventually given £1000 towards his
expenses, but no attempt was made to employ the system. It is by no
means clear how the necessary potassium was to be got into the water at
the requisite spot.
The same war also produced the fire-shell of the British Captain
Norton. This appears to have been a resurrection of the old idea of
Greek fire. It could be used from a rifle or from a shell-gun, and
like the previous invention “rendered war impossible,” and again like
the previous invention does not appear to have ever materialised into
practice.
On the practical side more results were achieved. The Lancaster gun
which fired an oval shot was actually used with success in the war.
From it the rifled gun presently emerged. There also emerged the then
amateur invention of one Warry, who invented a new type of gun capable
of firing sixteen to eighteen rounds per minute. The idea of wire
wound guns was also apparent, and Mr. Armstrong[84] (as he then was),
suggested the idea of percussion shell. It is interesting to note that
these last were received with extreme dissatisfaction in the Navy on
the grounds that they might go off at the wrong time.
Of the Crimean War, however, it may be said that though it was not
noted for naval actions, it was probably the most important war in its
indirect results on the Navy that ever took place. It brought in the
armoured ship, the rifled gun, and what was ultimately to develop into
the torpedo. It saw the crude birth of “blockade mines” and rapid fire
guns; everyone of them inventions that, judging by the slow progress of
steam, would--failing war to necessitate swift development--have been
still in the experimental stage even to-day.
In our own times war having ever been a nearer possibility than in the
1850 era, peace progress has always been more rapid, and no invention
of practical value ever failed to secure full tests. Yet there were not
wanting those who prophesied that the Dreadnoughts of to-day merely
reproduced in another form the 120 screw ships of the line of sixty
years ago; and that the next great naval war might well bring about
changes every whit as drastic as any that the Crimean War caused to
come into being.
The torpedo had become fully as great a menace to the modern ship of
the line as the shell gun was to the big ship of 1853. The submarine
was an infinitely greater menace to it than the crude Russian mines of
the Crimean War ever were. Endless potentialities resided in aircraft.
Wherefrom it was well argued that out of the next great naval war
(despite whatever lesser wars in between may have taught), the
battleship was likely to be profoundly modified.
That it will be swept out of existence was improbable. The whole lesson
of history is that the “capital ship” will ever adjust itself to the
needs of the hour. It has always been the essential rallying point of
lesser craft--the mobile base to meet the mobile base of the enemy.