of the line. Eleven, by throwing their guns overboard, escaped into
shallow water, the remainder reached safety at Rochefort. Two English
ships ran aground, otherwise little damage was sustained.[35]
Out of these happenings the French fleet--which, in this year alone,
lost thirty-one ships of the line--ceased to have any importance; while
to the general naval activity of the English must be attributed the
capture of Quebec, by Wolfe.
In 1760, the British ships of the line had sunk to 120 in number,
though the _personnel_ rose to 73,000. Naval operations were mainly
confined to the relief of Quebec and the consequent capture of the
whole of Canada, and the suppression of privateering--over a hundred
French corsairs being captured in 1760 alone.
The results of privateering have been put at 2,500 English merchant
vessels being captured in the four years ending 1760; the French
merchant-ship loss being little more than one-third. In 1761, when
French naval power had practically ceased to exist, 812 English
merchant ships were captured. It must, however, be borne in mind that
every year saw great increases in English shipping. Heavy as the
numerical losses were, they did not exceed ten per cent., and the bulk
of vessels captured were coasters.
French mercantile losses were considerably smaller, but simply for the
reason that France had fewer and fewer ships to lose, for her trade
was being swept from the sea. English trade on the other hand grew
and multiplied exceedingly. It may even be argued that so far from
really injuring our trade, the _guerre de course_ in this war actually
fostered it by the enhanced profits which safe arrival entailed, this
attracting the speculative. But for the speculative the loss of larger
vessels would have been smaller than it was. These were they, who, on
a convoy nearing home waters, sailed on ahead, chancing attack in the
hopes of the greatly increased profits to be made by early arrivals.
Ships which obeyed the orders of the escorting warships were very
rarely captured.
The following years saw the capture of Pondicherry, Dominica, a
successful attack on Belle Isle and also a general loss of French
colonial possessions. To quote Mahan, “At the end of seven years the
Kingdom of Great Britain has become the British Empire.”
In 1762, Spain declared war. She had a fleet consisting nominally of
eighty-nine sail, but joined in far too late to be of any assistance to
France. No naval battle of importance took place.
Peace was signed early in 1763. By it England secured Canada from
France, and Spain lost Florida.
During this war the usual complaints about ships’ bottoms were made,
especially from the West Indian Station; and in October, 1761, the
Admiralty ordered a frigate to be sheathed with thin sheets of copper
as an experiment. This was at first found extremely successful, but
after the lapse of a few years it was noted that chemical action had
set up between the copper and the iron bolts at the ships’ bottom--most
of these bolts being rusted away.
Experiments were, however, continued, since, though the life of a
copper bottom was but three to four years, its general advantages were
very great. Ultimately iron bolts were abandoned in favour of copper
ones. The cost of this came to £2,272 for a ship of the first-rate, and
was only relatively satisfactory.
Ever since the Treaty of Paris in 1763, friction had been growing
between the Home Country and the North American Colonies. The causes
which led to it concern the British Navy only in so far as it was used
for the harsh enforcement of the regulations entailed by the Treaty in
question--regulations which bore heavily on the Colonists. The rest of
the story is merely the tale of political incapacity at home.
The American Colonists, in addition to a few fast sailing frigates
which they handled with unexpected aptitude, possessed a so very
considerable mercantile fleet that it was estimated that 18,000 of
their seamen had served in the English ships in the late war with
France. Consequently, the Colonists were in a position to fit our
privateers, and with these, in the first eight years of the war, they
captured nearly 1,000 English merchant ships. Their own losses were,
however, greater, and it is probable that despite all the military
blunders which characterised English conduct of the war, the Colonists
would eventually have been worn down but for the active intervention of
France in 1778, and Spain a little later.
As regards naval operations against the Americans themselves, these
were mainly in the nature of sea transport. Where they were otherwise,
they were of an inglorious nature, owing to the total inability of the
Home Government to appreciate the position. The naval story of the war
is, in the main, the story of frigates attempting difficult channels,
and going aground in the attempt. It is of interest mainly because in
1776 one David Bushnell made the first submarine ever actually used in
war, and attempted to torpedo the English flagship, _Eagle_ (64). He
reached his quarry unsuspected, but the difficulties of attaching his
“infernal machine” were such that he had to rise to the surface for air
and abandon the enterprise. His subsequent fate was undramatic--he
and his boat were captured at sea on board a merchant ship, which was
carrying him elsewhere for further operations.
France, which had been rendering considerable secret assistance to
the revolted Colonists, had, ever since the Treaty of Paris, been
steadily building up her Navy, till she had eighty ships of the line
and 67,000 men. The efficiency of the _personnel_ had been increased
by the enrolment of a special corps of gunners, who practiced weekly.
Efforts--which, however, were only moderately successful--had also been
made to break down the serious class rivalries between those officers
who were of the _noblesse_ and those who were tarpaulin seamen. But
the majority of officers were skilled tactically, and special orders
were issued that to seek out and attack the enemy was an objective.[36]
Here, again, another weak point existed: d’Orvilliers, who commanded
the main fleet, also received orders to be cautious--orders very
similar in tenor to those by which his predecessors in previous wars
were hampered.
The fleet of Great Britain, spread over many quarters of the world,
including ships being fitted, consisted of about 150 ships of the line,
besides auxiliaries; but the actual available force of Home water fleet
with which Keppel sailed just before the opening of the war was twenty
ships only!
Capturing two French frigates and learning from them that thirty-two
ships were at Brest, Keppel got reinforcements of ten ships, and on
the 27th of July, 1778, met d’Orvilliers, also with thirty ships, off
Ushant. The battle lasted three hours, when the fleets drew apart
without any material result having been achieved. The tactical ability
lay with the French, and but for the inefficiency of the leader of one
French division, the Duc de Chartres (the future “Phillipe Egalité”),
would have done so still more. Yet, though Keppel had obviously done
his best, public opinion in England had expected a great naval victory,
and Keppel was the subject of a most violent controversy, which soon
developed on political lines.
At and about the time of the battle of Ushant, D’Estaing, with twelve
ships of the line and five frigates, reached the Delaware. The English
fleet under Howe, which consisted of only nine inferior ships of
the line, took refuge inside Sandy Hook. D’Estaing came outside and
remained ten days in July, but then sailed away.
His failure to operate has been put down to the advice of pilots,
but more probably, as pointed out by Admiral Mahan, he had secret
instructions not to assist the Colonists too actively. The destruction
of Hood’s fleet would have meant the capture of New York, peace between
England and America, and a considerable force released for operations
against France. Most of the subsequent movements of the year seem
to have been coloured by a similar policy. In 1779, the West Indian
islands of St. Vincent and Grenada fell into the hands of the French.
Subsequently D’Estaing returned to the North American Coast, but no
important operations took place there. Finally he returned with some
ships to France, sending the others to the West Indies.
Spain declared war against England in 1780. Her fleet then consisted
of nearly sixty ships of the line, which--like the French--were in a
more efficient state than in previous wars. Her prime object was the
recovery of Gibraltar.
A combined Franco-Spanish fleet of sixty-four ships of the line
appeared in the Channel, causing an immense panic in England. The
only available English fleet consisted of thirty-seven sail of the
line, under Sir Charles Hardy, and this wandered away to the westward,
leaving the Channel quite open to the allies, who, however, also
wandered about without accomplishing anything. As usual with allies,
there were divided councils, and in addition the French fleet, having
had to wait long for the unwilling Spaniards, was badly incapacitated
from sickness. Thus, and thus only, is their failure to invade to be
explained: they had 40,000 men ready to be transported over, also a
naval force ample to defeat any available English fleet, and able to
cover landing operations as well.
When the war first began, there was in France an English admiral--that
same Rodney who had destroyed the invading flotilla at Havre in the
previous war--who by reason of his debts was unable to return to his
own country. In private life he was a merry old soul of sixty or so,
and at a dinner one night boasted that if he could pay his debts and
go back to England, he would get a command and easily smash the French
fleet. Hearing this, a French nobleman promptly paid his debts for him,
and sarcastically told Rodney to go back and prove his words.
Rodney, who had the reputation of being an able officer, but nothing
more, got home in 1779. In 1780, having secured a command for the West
Indies, he left Portsmouth with twenty sail of the line and a convoy
for the relief of Gibraltar. Off Finisterre, he captured a Spanish
convoy carrying provisions to the besiegers. Off Cape St. Vincent
he fell in with eleven Spanish ships and attacked them at night, in
a gale, blowing up one, and capturing six. Thence he proceeded to
Gibraltar, relieved it from all immediate danger, Minorca also; and
then sailed for the West Indies. Here, on April 17th, some three weeks
after arrival, he met the French under Guichen, and made the first
attempt at that “breaking the line” associated with his name. The
attempt was not a success, as his orders were misunderstood by several
of his own captains and his intentions realised and foiled by his
opponents.[37]
This action was indecisive; as also were two more that followed.
In this year (1780), Captain Horatio Nelson, then only twenty-two
years old, made his first appearance in the _Hinchinbrook_ (28), in an
attack on San Juan, Nicaragua. He succeeded, after terrible loss of
_personnel_ from disease.
A Spanish squadron then joined the French, but an epidemic--that most
fruitful of all sources for the upsetting of naval plans--overtook
it. The Spaniards were incapacitated and the French returned home.
Rodney went to New York, where his operations delayed the cause of the
Colonists; then returning to the West Indies, operated against the
Dutch, who had by now joined the French and Spaniards.
The general position of Great Britain, in 1781 and 1782, was well nigh
desperate. Gibraltar was only held by a remarkable combination of
luck and resolution. To quote Mahan, “England stood everywhere on the
defensive.” She fought with her back to the wall. In the East Indies,
Suffren kept the French flag flying: and things were generally at a
very low ebb, when in 1782 Rodney “broke the line” in the victory of
the Battle of the Saints.
On April 9th, the fleets had come into contact without much result on
either side. On the 12th, De Grasse, being then in some disorder, with
thirty-four ships, encountered the English with thirty-six in good
order. Rodney and Hood broke the line in two places. Admiral Mahan has
been at pains to show us that this result was much a matter of luck
and change of wind, and that the victory was by no means followed up
as it might have been. One French ship was sunk and five were taken,
including De Grasse himself, whose losses in his flagship, the _Ville
de Paris_, were greater than those in the entire English fleet.
To the nation at this juncture, however, anything savouring of victory
was a thing to be made the utmost of, and Rodney has probably received
more than his meed of merit over what was mainly a matter of luck.
Two features of special interest in connection with this battle are
that, though up to it, British ships had recently, owing to coppering,
proved better sailers than the French; in the sequel to this fight, the
French proved equal to sail away. The rapid deterioration of coppering,
already mentioned, may account for some of this, but in this battle
there is also reason to believe that the French fleet instituted firing
at the rigging. Contemporary statements exist as to the French having
made a wonderful number of holes in English hulls without much material
result, but these may be dismissed as pardonable temporary bluster.
More germane is the fact that the English ships were supplied with
carronades[38]--harmless at long range and deadly at short--for which
reason the French tried to keep them at a distance, so that altogether
superior efficiency with men and weapons would seem to have played a
greater part than any tactical genius on the part of Rodney, in whom a
dogged insistence to get at the enemy was ever the main characteristic
rather than “thinking things out.” The Mahan estimate of him sorts
better with known facts than the estimate of his accomplishment at the
time.
As regards Rodney himself, it is interesting to record that Navy and
Party were so synonymous at the time that he, being a strong Tory, had
already been superseded by political influence when he won the battle
that broke French power in the West Indies. It lies to the credit
of the Whigs that both he and Hood, his second in command, received
peerages; but the most difficult thing of all to understand to-day is,
that in a life and death struggle such as this war was, the personal
political element should have managed to find expression.
In 1782, Gibraltar, which had been twice relieved, was once more in
grievous straits. The French had evolved floating batteries for the
attack, similar in principle to those which, some seventy years later,
were to figure so prominently in the Crimea.
Being merely armoured with heavy wood planks, however, they were easily
set on fire with red-hot shot, and the great bombardment failed long
before the relieving force, under Howe, arrived. The garrison, however,
were in great straits for supplies, and their real relief was Howe’s
fleet, which the combined Franco-Spanish squadrons did not dare to
attack.
The Treaty of Versailles, in 1783, followed soon afterwards. By it the
United States of America were recognised, Minorca was given up, but
most of the captured West Indian islands restored to Great Britain.
Just before the close of the war, the relative naval strengths were
assessed as follows:--[39]
==================+==========+=========+========+==========
Description of | Great | | |
Vessels. | Britain. | France. | Spain. | Holland.
------------------+----------+---------+--------+----------
Ships of the Line | 105 | 89 | 53 | 32
Fifty-gun Ships | 13 | 7 | 3 | 0
Large Frigates | 63 | 49 | 12 | { 28
Small Frigates | 69 | 54 | 36 | {
Sloops | 217 | 86 | 31 | 13
Cutters | 43 | 22 | 0 | 0
Armed Ships | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0
Bombs | 7 | 5 | 14 | 0
Fire-Ships | 9 | 7 | 11 | 6
Yachts | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0
+----------+---------+--------+----------
TOTAL | 555 | 319 | 160 | 79
==================+==========+=========+========+==========
In this list it is interesting to note the British inability to
maintain even a Two-Power Standard in ships of the line, whereas in
sloops and such like, an enormous preponderance prevailed. For the
suppression of privateering on the coastal trade, these small craft
proved very useful. Also worthy of note is the decline of the fire-ship
as a naval arm.[40]
The figures as a whole suggest with much clarity that had the Allies
been able to act together, Great Britain would never have emerged from
the war so well as she did.
The ten years’ peace that followed was little more than a breathing
space. War was constantly apprehended, and known improvement in French
ships were such that they had to be carefully watched. The frigates
built in England were made longer than before, with a view to keeping
pace with French sailing qualities.
Considerable interest was taken in how far the country was
self-supporting in the matter of timber for shipbuilding, a certain
reliance on foreign supplies having previously existed. At, and about
1775, the cost of shipbuilding for the East India Company had exactly
doubled in a few years. The home supply trouble arose, partly from the
increased size of shipping, partly from the tendency of owners to fell
trees as early as possible. Out of which special oak plantations were
set up in the New Forest and elsewhere, though oak happened to cease to
be of value for shipbuilding long before they had grown large enough
for the larger timbers.
The question of repairs also came in for consideration, an average of
twenty-five years’ repair totalling the cost of a new ship. At and
about this time also, the building of ships by contract in peace time
was first recommended on the grounds that thus the private yards would
be better available in case of war.
Regular stores for ships in the dockyards were also instituted, with
a view to the speedy equipment of ships in reserve.[41] It was mainly
owing to this last provision, introduced by Lord Barham in 1783, that,
though when the war of the French Revolution broke out in 1793 but
twelve ships of the line and thirty lesser vessels were in commission,
a few months later seventy-one ships of the line and 104 smaller craft
were in service. The number of men voted in 1793 was 45,000.
VI.
THE GREAT FRENCH WAR.
The first incident of the war was connected with Toulon, which was
partly Royalist and partly Republican. The story in full is to be found
most dramatically rendered in _Ships and Men_, by David Hannay. Here
it suffices to say that the Royalists and Moderates having coalesced
at the eleventh hour, surrendered the town to Admiral Hood; that the
British Government repudiated Hood’s arrangements, and that eventually
in December, 1793, he was compelled to evacuate the place after doing
such damage as he could and bringing away with him a few ships of the
French navy.[42] The incident little concerns our naval history, the
Navy being but a pawn in the political game of the moment. Indeed, it
is mostly of some naval interest only because two figures, destined
to bulk largely in future history, loomed up in it--Captain Horatio
Nelson, of the _Agamemnon_, who laughed when the Spanish fleet excused
its inaction by saying that it had been six weeks at sea and was
disabled accordingly; and Napoleon, who, as much as anyone, served to
hurry the English out.
Early in 1794 the British fleet had ninety-five ships of the line in
commission, besides 194 lesser vessels. The _personnel_ amounted to
85,000.
The centre of interest was the French Brest fleet. Under
Villaret-Joyeuse, a captain of the old Navy, made Admiral by the
Terrorists, whose cause he had espoused, this fleet was by no means
inefficient, like the undisciplined Toulon fleet had been. It carried
on board the flagship Jean Bon St. André, the deputy of the State, who,
whatever his faults, realised the meaning of “efficiency.” The bulk
of the crew were men who had done well in America. Howe, on the other
hand, commanded a somewhat raw fleet, hastily brought up to strength
and still by no means “shaken down.”
Howe’s orders were threefold--to convoy a British merchant fleet; to
destroy the French fleet; and to intercept a convoy of French grain
coming from America.
From the 5th to the 28th May, Howe was keeping an eye on Brest and
looking for the French convoy, the interception of which was more
important than anything else, as France was dependent on these grain
ships for the means to live.
On the 28th, the French fleet was sighted a long way out in the
Atlantic. Villaret-Joyeuse, who was out to protect the grain convoy
at all costs, drew still further out to sea, Howe following in
pursuit.[43] Towards evening, the last French ship _Revolutionnaire_
(100), was come up with and engaged by six British (seventy-four’s), of
which one, the _Audacious_, was badly crippled. The _Revolutionnaire_
herself was dismasted, but was towed away by a frigate in the night.
This particular incident is one of the most prominent examples of the
power of the “monster” ship as compared with the “moderate dimension”
ship[44] of the period. The six did not attack her simultaneously, and
some were never closely engaged. She was magnificently fought also; but
even when these elements are subtracted, the fact of the extraordinary
resisting power exhibited remains. As only the _Audacious_, which
attacked last, did much harm to the Frenchman, the explanation in this
particular case probably lies in the stouter scantlings required for a
ship of 110 guns, compared to smaller ships.
On the following day the action was renewed. Villaret-Joyeuse allowed
his tail ships to drop into range of the leading British vessels
with a view to crippling them. Howe cut the line, but being somewhat
outmanœuvred by the French admiral, obtained no special advantage
therefrom. Some of the French ships were, however, disabled, and had to
be towed in the general action that was to follow later.
Two days’ fog now interrupted operations, but on Sunday, June 1st,
battle was joined. The opposing fleets then consisted as follows:--
BRITISH. FRENCH.
3 of 100 guns. 1 of 120 guns.
4 of 98 guns. 2 of 100 guns.
2 of 80 guns. 4 of 80 guns.
16 of 74 guns. 19 of 74 guns.
-- --
25 26
-- --
This gives 2,036 British to 2,066 French guns, but as, at least, one
Frenchman was considerably disabled, there was probably a slight
British superiority.
Howe, more or less, arranged his heavy ships to correspond with
the heavy ships of the enemy, and having hove-to half-an-hour for
breakfast, flung the old fighting instructions[45] to the winds and
bore right down into the enemy. In the _melee_ that ensued, some of the
English failed to close, and seven of the French drifted to leeward out
of action.
Of the French fleet, two eighty-gun and four seventy-four’s were
badly mauled and eventually struck, while a seventh French ship, the
_Vengeur_ (seventy-four) was sunk.[46] Four were badly disabled, but
drifted to leeward out of the fight. On the British side a number of
ships were badly damaged.
The fleets, having drawn apart, Villaret-Joyeuse succeeded in getting a
portion of his fleet into some sort of order again, and threatened the
disabled English ships. Howe protected these, but did not renew action;
and the French, with the disabled ships in tow, made off.
Such was the battle of “the glorious First of June.” Howe has been
greatly blamed since then for not having followed up his victory, but
there are not wanting indications that the caution of Curtis, his
captain of the fleet, who pleaded with Howe not to re-engage lest the
advantage gained should be lost, was justified. Villaret-Joyeuse, the
captain, hastily placed in command of a large fleet, was one of the
most, if not the most, capable admirals France ever had against us. How
badly all the French ships had suffered we now know, but the means of
telling it were absent then. The all-important question of intercepting
the grain convoy was also possibly present in Howe’s mind.