“vogue,” and it carried moral effect accordingly. What to the
uninitiated landsmen merely spelt “waste of money on unnecessary
display” spelt something else to those who went across the seas.
Even in our own present utilitarian days a fresh coat of paint to a
warship has been found to have a political value; and fireworks and
illuminations (seemingly pure waste of money) have played their share
in helping to preserve the peace.
John Hampden, according to his lights, was a patriot, and according
to the purely political questions with which he was concerned he may
also have been; but on the naval issue of Ship Money he was little more
or less than the First Little Englander, and hampered by just that
same inability to see beyond his nose which characterised the modern
Little Englander who protested against “bloated naval expenditure.” The
intentions were excellent--the intelligence circumscribed.
A contemporary account of the _Royal Sovereign_ is as follows:--
“Her length by the keele is 128 foote or thereabout, within some
few inches; her mayne breadth or wideness from side to side, 48
foote; her utmost length from the fore-end to the stern, _a prova
ad pupin_, 232 foote. Shee is in height, from the bottom of her
keele to the top of her lanthorne, 76 foote; she beareth five
lanthornes, the biggest of which will hold ten persons to stand
upright, and without shouldering or pressing one on the other.
“Shee hath three flush deckes and a forecastle, an halfe decke,
a quarter-decke, and a round house. Her lower tyre hath thirty
ports, which are to be furnished with demi-cannon and whole
cannon, throughout being able to beare them; her middle tyre
hath also thirty ports for demi-culverin and whole culverin;
her third tyre hath twentie sixe ports for other ordnance; her
forecastle hath twelve ports, and her halfe decke hath fourteen
ports; she hath thirteene or fourteene ports more within board
for murdering-pieces, besides a great many loope-holes out of the
cabins for musket shot. Shee carrieth, moreover, ten pieces of
chase ordnance in her right forward, and ten right off, according
to lande service in the front and the reare. Shee carrieth eleven
anchores, one of them weighing foure thousand foure hundred pounds;
and according to these are her cables, mastes, sayles, cordage.”
[Illustration:
_Ex. Fincham._
THE _ROYAL SOVEREIGN_.
The dotted lines represent a ship of the time of 1850.]
It remains to add that the ship was extraordinarily well built. She
fought many a battle and survived some fifty years, and then only
perished because, when laid up for refit in 1696, she was accidentally
burned. And about sixty-three years ago (1852) naval architects still
alluded to her with respect, nor did their designs differ from her very
materially.
Wherever and however Charles I and the Duke of Buckingham failed, their
shipbuilding policy cannot but command both respect and admiration.
It is the curious irony of fate that--excepting King Alfred, and
also Queen Elizabeth--it is the Sovereigns of England with black
marks against them who ever did most for the Navy or understood its
importance. And understanding what the Navy meant, generally secured
these marks at the hands of some quite well meaning but intellectually
circumscribed prototype or successor of John Hampden, to whom “meeting
the enemy on the water” was an entirely indigestible theory, and a
waste of money into the bargain. There is no question whatever that
to them the sea appeared a natural rampart and ships upon it pure
superfluity, save in so far as inconvenience to the shore counties
might result. Later on, Cromwell, of course, acted on a different
principle--but Cromwell was an Imperialist. Hampden was merely the
“Insular Spirit” personified.
In 1639, a naval incident occurred which goes to discredit the popular
idea of the impotence of the British Navy under Charles I, whatever its
internal condition. Naval operations were in progress between Holland
and France on the one side, and Spain on the other. The British fleet
was fitted out under Sir John Pennington (that same Pennington who had
commanded the squadron which refused to attack La Rochelle) with orders
to maintain British neutrality.
The Spanish fleet took refuge from the Dutch in the Downs, whereupon
Pennington informed the rival admirals that he should attack whichever
of them violated the neutrality of an English harbour. The Spanish
having fired upon the Dutch, the Dutch Admiral Van Tromp applied to
Pennington for permission to attack the Downs. This was given, and the
bulk of the Spanish fleet destroyed. The incident suggests that the
English fleet was recognised as a neutral able to enforce its orders
against all and sundry.
In connection with this, it is interesting to record the existence of
a naval medal of the period, bearing the motto: “_Nec meta mihi quae
terminus orbi_”--a free translation of which would be, “Nothing limits
me but the size of the World.” However short practice may have fallen,
Charles and his advisers had undoubtedly grasped the theory of “Sea
Power.”
_THE CIVIL WAR._
When the Civil war began in 1642, the regular fleet consisted of
forty-two ships. It was seized by the Parliamentarians and put under
the Earl of Warwick, who held command for six years. With his fleet he
very effectually patrolled the Channel, rendering abortive all over-sea
attempts to assist the King with arms and ammunition.
On Warwick being superseded in 1648, the fleet mutinied, and seventeen
ships sailed for Holland to join Prince Charles; but upon Warwick being
reinstated the bulk of the fleet returned to its allegiance to the
Parliamentarians. That the Parliamentarians were fully alive to the
importance of naval power is evidenced by the fact that they seized
every opportunity to lay down new ships; and “Parliament” once in power
made it very clear indeed that the Sovereignty of the Seas would be
upheld at all costs.
_THE FIRST DUTCH WAR._
Some forty years before, Sir Walter Raleigh, discussing the rise of
the Dutch United Provinces, remarked: “But be their estate what it
will, let them not deceive themselves in believing that they can make
themselves masters of the sea.” He advised the Dutch to remember that
their inward and outward passages were through British seas. There were
but two courses open to the Dutch: amity with England or destruction of
English naval power.
Since both nations had large commercial fleets, rivalries were
inevitable; and for some long while previous to 1652, both sides were
ready enough for a quarrel. Minor acts of hostility occurred. The Dutch
failed to pay the annual tax for fishing in British waters. In May,
1652, a Dutch squadron refused to pay respect to the English flag. It
was fired on accordingly, and after some negotiations, war was declared
two months later.
The war is interesting because it saw an end to the old ideas of
cross-raiding with ships regarded primarily as transports in connection
with raids or to cover such. In this war fighting on the sea for the
command of the sea first made a distinct appearance. Its birth was
necessarily obscure and involved, both sides having the primary idea
of attacking the commerce of the enemy and defending their own, rather
than of attacking the enemy’s fleet. The earlier battles which took
place were brought about by the defence of merchant fleets.
None of the battles of 1652 were conclusive, and though marked with
extraordinary determination on both sides the damage done was,
relatively speaking, small. The general advantage for the year rested
slightly with the Dutch, mainly owing to Tromp’s victory over Blake,
who was found in considerably inferior force in the Downs.
In February of the following year Tromp, with a fleet of seventy
warships and a convoy of 250 merchant ships, some of which were armed,
met Blake with sixty-six sail in the famous Three Days’ Battle.
In the course of this fight the Dutch lost at least eight warships, and
a number of merchant-men variously estimated at from twenty-four to
forty. The English admitted to the loss of only one ship. At the end of
the third day, however, Blake drew off, and the Dutch admiral got what
was left of his convoy into harbour.
Oliver Cromwell being now in full power, naval preparations were
pressed forward with unexampled vigour, and on June 2nd an English
fleet of ninety-five sail under Monk and Deane met Van Tromp and forced
him to retreat. Reinforced by Blake with eighteen more ships the
English fleet renewed the battle, ultimately driving Van Tromp into
harbour with the loss of several ships.
On the 29th July the Dutch ran the blockade and came out. On the 31st a
battle began in which Van Tromp was killed, and the Dutch with the loss
of many ships driven into the Texel.
The English fleet, though it lost few ships, appears to have been badly
mauled in this final battle, on account of which the Dutch claimed a
victory.
[Illustration: BLAKE AND TROMP. PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS.]
In the following month the Dutch fleet again came out, and under De
Witt took one convoy to the Sound and brought another back without
interference. Just afterwards, however, their fleet was so severely
injured by a tremendous three days’ gale that further naval operations
were out of the question. Overtures for peace were therefore made, and
concluded.
The types of English warships in this first Dutch war are given in
Pepys’ Miscellany as follows:--
=====================================================================
| | Length |Breadth.|Depth. |Burthen|Highest No. of
Rate. | Name. |of Keel.| | | Tons. +--------------
| | ft. |ft. in. |ft. in.| | Men. | Guns.
------+-------------+--------+--------+-------+-------+-------+------
First |_Sovereign_ | 127 |46 6 |19 4 | 1141 | 600 | 100
Second|_Fairfax_ | 116 |34 9 |17 4½| 745 | 260 | 52
Third |_Worcester_ | 112 |32 8 |16 4 | 661 | 180 | 46
Fourth|_Ruby_ | 105½ |31 6 |15 9 | 556 | 150 | 40
Fifth |_Nightingale_| 88 |25 4 |12 8 | 300 | 90 | 24
Sixth |_Greyhound_ | 60 |20 3 |10 0 | 120 | 80 | 18
=====================================================================
The principal Dutch vessels were conspicuously inferior to the best of
these English ones, and the war may be said to have been considerably
decided by ship superiority. In the peace that followed--which was
really very little better than an armed truce--the Dutch set themselves
to build warships more on English lines. And, as we shall presently
see, they evolved from the war,[15] future strategies based on its
lessons.
Considering the number of battles and the desperate nature of them, it
is perhaps curious to note the relatively small amount of damage done.
With the advent of the porthole and the consequent multiplication of
guns a hundred and fifty years before, it had seemed that any naval
engagement must result in swift mutual destruction. Much the same kind
of idea obtained as when at the end of 1910 a squadron of Dreadnoughts
almost instantly obliterated a target five miles off. But as in the
Armada fights, so in this First Dutch War, an immense amount of
fighting was done with comparatively, and relatively to what might have
been anticipated, small harm on either side.
This result is partly to be attributed to the fact that defence
increased with offence. The warship proper was designed to stand
hammering, and every increase in size, involving increased gun-carrying
capacity, involved also increased strength of construction. Something
may also be put down to the very inferior artillery then in use, and
the great deal of boarding which took place.
There is some reason to believe that Cromwell, with his complete
recognition of the advantages of naval power, with his assiduous
energy in the creation of a strong fleet, recognised--as perhaps both
Buckingham and Phineas Pett had done before--the advantages of the “big
ship.” Yet under his rule no appreciable advance in size took place.
Nor, for that matter, did it take place any time within a hundred and
fifty years later on.
The reason is interesting. It was purely a matter of trees. The length
of a ship was circumscribed by the height of trees; other dimensions
by similar hard facts. The beam was dependent on the ship’s length;
while the draught was governed by the harbours and docking facilities.
It is doubtful whether any man ever sought to solve the problem of an
invincible navy with more energy than Oliver Cromwell; yet under his
rule nothing in the way of improvement was evolved at all comparable
with the step taken with the _Royal Sovereign_ under the weaker Charles
Stuart--Buckingham régime. The limitations of the tree proved the
limitations of the ship.
When Cromwell died, his record was left in numbers. The Navy at his
death consisted of 157 ships. His architectural improvements were but a
new form of bottoms.[16]
Oliver Cromwell had not been long dead when the Navy--then under
Monk--decided to restore the Monarchy. It sailed to Holland, embarked
Charles II and James, Duke of York, and established Charles on the
throne without opposition. Monk is popularly regarded as a political
time-server. But in his change of sides he made one very important
stipulation: that Charles was to pledge himself to the upkeep of the
fleet. The fleet accomplished the Restoration. The bulk of evidence is
that it did so with little regard for any issue other than the naval
one.
_THE SECOND DUTCH WAR._
The second Dutch War broke out in 1665. As usual a state of unofficial
war had preceded it. Both sides, having thought over the first war, had
come to the conclusion that protecting their own merchant ships and
attacking those of the enemy at one and the same time was an impossible
proposition.
Both officially ordered their merchant ships to keep inside harbour;
but in both nations there were traders who took their own risks at sea
and found warships handy to protect them. None the less, this war is
of much importance as the first in which the command of the sea, fleet
against fleet, received general recognition.
The battles themselves of this war are of little interest. They were
marked by that same equality of courage and determination which was an
outstanding feature of the First War. Slight early English successes
led to little but attacks on merchant shipping; then the Great Plague
paralysed English efforts. The Dutch got to the mouth of the Thames,
but a sudden sickness among their crews scared them off after a sixteen
days’ blockade.
Following this the French took side with the Dutch; but inconclusive
fighting still resulted, till the Dutch, imagining that they had done
better than they really had, found themselves engaged in the battle of
the North Foreland.
Defeated in this they retired to Ostend, and the English scored on
their trade by landing operations and harbour attacks, the result of
which Admiral Colomb has estimated as proportionately equivalent to
sixty-six million pounds’ worth of damage at the present day! But it
was conceded on the English side (_vide_ Pepys) that it was mainly a
matter of luck that this immense blow was struck.
Shortly after this event, the Insular spirit asserted itself with what
in these days is known as “Economy and Efficiency.” The Duke of York
(afterwards James II) opposed it, but it was generally carried that
the Dutch were defeated, and that a few economical fortifications
would save the country against any further Dutch danger. No one having
knowledge of the Dutch agreed. Indeed, the situation was precisely the
same as when a few years ago the British Government cut down the Naval
Programme. Charles II, peace talk being in the air, cut down expenses
probably for his own ends; British Governments of the 1906–1907 era cut
down with a view to expending the saving on “social reforms.” But the
practical results were identical. The Dutch in their era did what the
Germans did in our own--met the decrease by an increase. They omitted
to consider the ethics involved; they looked merely after their own
ends. The result was a great Dutch attack on the Thames, which, though
not so serious as the similar previous English attack on them, produced
an enormous amount of mischief.
That the Dutch did not bombard London itself was purely a matter of
contrary winds and luck. They did destroy numerous new warships on
the river, and Sheerness fell entirely into their hands. “Dutch guns
were heard in London”--to quote the popular histories. Actually luck
favoured the English, and diplomacy secured a peace which the reduced
fleet could never have achieved. The pen, for the moment, proved
mightier than the sword. England obtained thereby a peace favourable
to her, while the Dutch secured a breathing space to enable them to
prepare for the Third Dutch War, which, had the Second been carried to
its end against them, would never have occurred.
_THE THIRD DUTCH WAR._
This War also began in the usual way--irregular attacks on commerce,
without any declaration of war, and in March, 1672, an English Squadron
wrecked havoc on the Dutch Indiamen. As in the Second War, the Dutch
after this prohibited their merchant ships from proceeding to sea.
No such prohibition took effect in England, where the merchant navy
rapidly increased.
In the Second War the French were the allies of the Dutch. In the
Third, they joined in with the English. In both cases their underlying
political motive appears to have been to egg Great Britain and the
Dutch on to mutual destruction. The assistance actually obtained by
the Dutch from the French in the Second War was a minus quantity, and
though in the Third, French ships actually joined the English fleet,
the advantage therefrom ended there.
The allied fleet, under the command of the Duke of York, consisted
of sixty-five English and thirty-six French warships, twenty-two
fire ships, and a number of small craft. This fleet lay at Sole Bay
(Southwold on the Suffolk coast). Here they were surprised by De Ruyter
with ninety-one men of war, forty-four fire ships, and a number of
small craft.
The _Royal James_, flagship of the Earl of Sandwich, who commanded one
of the two divisions of the English Fleet, was attacked and destroyed
by fire-ships, and the Earl was drowned in attempting to escape. The
French Squadron under D’Estrées fell back and took little part in the
fight. None the less, however, victory rested with the English, and the
Dutch retreated to their own coasts, and were blockaded in the Texel.
On shore the Dutch were badly pressed by the French armies, their naval
energies being restricted accordingly.
With the approach of winter, the Allied fleet was broken up and
returned to its harbours. In the early part of the following year,
the Dutch conceived the project of blocking the English fleet in the
Thames, and prepared eight ships full of stones with that object in
view. This appears to have been the first instance of a device similar
to that more recently unsuccessfully undertaken by the Americans, at
Santiago de Cuba, in the Spanish-American War, and by the Japanese,
at Port Arthur, in the Russo-Japanese War. The Dutch attack was never
actually made; presumably circumstances did not admit of it. In the
view of Admiral Colomb, it was frustrated by the English fleet putting
to sea at an earlier date than had been expected.
The Allied fleet formed a junction off Rye, in May. It consisted
altogether of eighty-four men-of-war, twenty-six fire-ships and
auxiliaries. The English divisions were commanded by Prince Rupert and
Spragge. The third division was under D’Estrées as before, but in order
to avoid a repetition of what had happened at Sole Bay, the French
ships were distributed in all three divisions of the fleet, instead of
in a single division as they previously had been.
Having embarked a number of troops, the Allies sailed for Zealand,
and found the Dutch fleet concentrating at the mouth of the Scheldt.
It consisted of about seventy men-of-war, under De Ruyter, Tromp and
Bankert. For some days, owing to fog and bad weather, no fighting was
possible; but on the 28th of May, the Dutch weighed anchor and a battle
of the usual sort took place, both sides claiming victory. The loss
of life in the Allied fleet, crowded as it was with troops, was very
heavy, and no attempt was made to follow up the Dutch, who had retired
inside the mouth of the river.
On the 4th of June, the Dutch fleet again came out. The English retired
before it. An entirely inconclusive action eventually resulted, after
which each fleet returned to harbour.
Having embarked a number of fresh troops at Sheerness, the Allies again
put to sea and appeared on the Dutch coast. No landing was, however,
attempted; and on the 10th of August the final battle took place. The
French fleet on this occasion was allowed to act by itself, and, as
before, drew off and left the English to shift for themselves. Spragge,
having had two flagships disabled, was drowned in moving to a third,
and victory, such as it was, went to the Dutch. No further battles took
place, and in 1664 peace was concluded.
The net result of these three wars was in favour of the English, but
mainly on the trade issue.
At the beginning of the First, the Dutch had by far the larger merchant
shipping. At the end of the Third, the proportion was reversed.
Although tactics, as we understand them, cannot be said to have been
employed, certain definite war lessons were undoubtedly learned. It
came to be thoroughly believed that the principal use of a fleet was to
attack the fleet of the enemy; and on that account these wars are an
important feature of English naval history.
Following the conclusion of peace, the English Navy was entirely
neglected, and the condition of the ships became so bad that in 1679 a
Commission was appointed and thirty new ships were laid down. But the
majority of these ships, having been launched, were allowed to decay;
Charles II’s early interest in the fleet having become a dead letter in
his later years.
When James II came to the throne in 1685, he appointed another Special
Commission, and the repair of the Navy was systematically undertaken.
The _personnel_, however, was neglected. It remained in a very
dissatisfied state, and tacitly agreed to his deposition.
At the abdication of James II, in December, 1688, the Navy consisted
of 173 ships, manned by 42,003 men, and carrying 6,930 guns. Of these
ships, nine were first-rate, 11 second, 39 third, 41 fourth, 3 fifth,
and 6 sixth. There were 26 fire-ships and 39 small craft. The best of
the first-rates in those days was the _Britannia_. She was of 1,739
tons, carried 100 guns and a crew of 780 men. Her length was 146 feet,
her beam 47 feet 4 inches, and her draught 20 feet. The second-rate
ships were 90 gun-vessels, third-rate 70 guns, and fourth-rate 54.
During James II’s reign, bomb vessels were first introduced and regular
establishments of stores were instituted. It is somewhat difficult to
assess how far naval progress was actually indebted to this, the first
King of England who was a naval officer, and how far to the efforts
of a determined few who realised the absolute importance of naval
power. Probably of James I, as of all the Stuarts,[17] it may be said
that they realised the principle, but required pressing to act upon
it. To thus acting may be traced the unpopularity of at least some of
the Stuarts--there are practically no signs that the nation generally
understood the importance of a powerful Navy. All the indications are
in a contrary direction.
V.
THE EARLY FRENCH WARS.
The accession of William of Orange and the French support of James
soon brought about a war. Early in 1689 James invaded Ireland with
French ships and men. He did sufficiently well there for a considerable
English army to be employed against him, and in the summer of 1690,
William himself went over to take command, leaving Queen Mary as Regent
with little save the militia as military defence and a more or less
unprepared fleet.