Transcriber’s Notes:
This is Volume I of a two-volume set. Volume II is available at Project
Gutenberg: https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/75617.
Italics are enclosed in _underscores_. Boldface text is enclosed in
=equals signs=. Additional notes will be found near the end of this
ebook.
THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET
[Illustration: SUBMARINES IN THE CHANNEL.]
THE
BRITISH BATTLE
FLEET
ITS INCEPTION AND GROWTH
THROUGHOUT THE CENTURIES
TO THE PRESENT DAY
BY
FRED T. JANE
AUTHOR OF “FIGHTING SHIPS,” “ALL THE WORLD’S AIRCRAFT,”
“HERESIES OF SEA POWER,” ETC., ETC.
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS IN COLOUR
FROM ORIGINAL WATER-COLOUR DRAWINGS BY
W. L. WYLLIE, R.A.
AND NUMEROUS PLANS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
VOL. I.
London
The Library Press, Limited
26 Portugal St., W.C.
1915
TO THOSE
WHO IN ALL AGES BUILT THE SHIPS OF
THE BRITISH NAVY
AND TO THE UNKNOWN MEN
WHO HAVE WORKED THOSE SHIPS
AND SO MADE POSSIBLE THE
FAME OF MANY ADMIRALS.
PREFACE
This book is not intended to be a “history” of the British Navy in the
generally accepted sense of the term. For this reason small space is
devoted to various strategical and tactical matters of the past which
generally bulk largely in more regular “naval histories”--of which a
sufficiency already exist.
In such histories primary interest naturally attaches to what the
admirals did with the ships provided for them. Here I have sought
rather to deal with how the ships came to be provided, and how they
were developed from the crude warships of the past to the intricate
and complicated machines of to-day; and the strictly “history” part
of the book is compressed with that idea principally in view. The
“live end” of naval construction is necessarily that which directly or
indirectly concerns the ships of our own time. The warships of the past
are of special interest in so far as they were steps to the warships of
to-day; but, outside that, practical interest seems confined to what
led to these “steps” being what they were.
Thus regarded, Trafalgar becomes of somewhat secondary interest as
regards the tremendous strategical questions involved, but of profound
importance by reason of the side-issue that the _Victory’s_ forward
bulkhead was so slightly built that she sustained an immense number
of casualties which would never have occurred had she been designed
for the particular purpose that Nelson used her for at Trafalgar. The
tactics of Trafalgar have merely a literary and sentimental interest
now, and even the strategies which led to the battle are probably of
little utility to the strategists of our own times. But the _Victory’s_
thin forward bulkhead profoundly affected, and to some extent still
affects, modern British naval construction. Trafalgar, of course,
sanctified for many a year “end-on approach,” and so eventually
concentrated special attention on bulkheads. But previous to Trafalgar,
the return of the _Victory_ after it for refit, and Seppings’
inspection of her, the subject of end-on protection had been ignored.
The cogitations of Seppings helped to make what would have very much
influenced history had any similar battle occurred in the years that
followed his constructional innovations.
Again, at an earlier period much naval history turned upon the
ventilation of bilges. Improvements in this respect (devised by men
never heard of to-day) enabled British ships to keep the seas without
their crews being totally disabled by diseases which often overmastered
their foes. The skill of the admirals, the courage of the crews, both
form more exciting reading. Yet there is every indication to prove that
this commonplace matter of bilges was the secret of victory more than
once!
Coming back to more recent times, the loss of the _Vanguard_, which
cost no lives, involved greater subsequent constructional problems than
did the infinitely more terrible loss of the _Captain_ a few years
before. Who shall say on how many seeming constructional failures of
the past, successes of the yet unborn future may not rest?
A number of other things might be cited, but these suffice to indicate
the particular perspective of this book, and to show why, if regarded
as an orthodox “history” of the British Navy, it is occasionally in
seemingly distorted perspective.
To say that in the scheme of this book the ship-builder is put in
the limelight instead of the ship-user, would in no way be precisely
correct, though as a vague generalisation it may serve well enough.
In exact fact each, of course, is and ever has been dependent on the
other. Nelson himself was curtailed by the limitations of the tools
provided for him. Had he had the same problems one or two hundred years
before he would have been still more limited. Had he had them fifty or
a hundred years later--who shall say?
With Seppings’ improvements, Trafalgar would have been a well-nigh
bloodless victory for the British Fleet. It took Trafalgar, however, to
inspire and teach Seppings. Of every great sea-fight something of the
same kind may be said. The lead had to be given.
Yet those who best laboured to remove the worst disabilities of “the
means” of Blake, contributed in that measure to Nelson’s successes
years and years later on. Their efforts may surely be deemed worthy of
record, for all that between the unknown designer of the _Great Harry_
in the sixteenth century and the designers of Super-Dreadnoughts of
to-day there may have been lapses and defects in details. There was
never a lapse on account of which the user was unable to defeat any
hostile user with whom he came into conflict. The “means” provided
served. The creators of warships consistently improved their creations:
but they were not improved without care and thought on the part of
those who produced them.
To those who provided the means and to the rank and file it fell that
many an admiral was able to do what he did. These admirals “made
history.” But ever there were “those others” who made that “history
making” possible, and who so made it also.
In dealing with the warships of other eras, I have been fortunate in
securing the co-operation of Mr. W. L. Wyllie, R.A., who has translated
into vivid pictorial obviousness a number of details which old prints
of an architectural nature entirely fail to convey. With a view to
uniformity, this scheme, though reinforced by diagrams and photographs,
has been carried right into our own times.
Some things which I might have written I have on that account left
unrecorded. There are some things that cold print and the English
language cannot describe. These things must be sought for in Mr.
Wyllie’s pictures.
In conclusion, I would leave the dedication page to explain the rest of
what I have striven for in this book.
F. T. J.
PREFACE TO NEW EDITION
This book was originally written three years ago. Since it was first
published the greatest war ever known has broken out. To meet that
circumstance this particular edition has been revised and brought to
date in order to present to the reader the exact state of our Navy when
the fighting began.
Modern naval warfare differs much from the warfare of the past; at any
rate from the warfare of the Nelson era. But if men and _matériel_ have
altered, the general principles of naval war have remained unchanged.
Indeed, there is some reason to believe that the wheel of fortune has
brought us back to some similitude of those early days when to kill the
enemy was the sole idea that obtained, when there were no “rules of
civilised war,” when it was simply kill and go on killing.
To these principles Germany has reverted. The early history of the
British Navy indicates that we were able to render a good account of
ourselves under such conditions. For that matter we made our Navy under
such training. It is hard to imagine that by adopting old time methods
the Germans will take from us the Sea Empire which we thus earned in
the past.
F. T. J.
_18th June, 1915._
CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. THE BIRTH OF BRITISH NAVAL POWER 1
II. THE NORMAN AND PLANTAGENET ERAS 10
III. THE TUDOR PERIOD AND BIRTH OF A REGULAR NAVY 35
IV. THE PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS 59
V. THE EARLY FRENCH WARS 88
VI. THE GREAT FRENCH WAR 133
VII. FROM THE PEACE OF AMIENS TO THE FINAL FALL OF NAPOLEON 165
VIII. GENERAL MATTERS IN THE PERIOD OF THE FRENCH WARS 194
IX. THE BIRTH OF MODERN WARSHIP IDEAS 211
X. THE COMING OF THE IRONCLAD 229
XI. THE REED ERA 264
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
IN COLOUR
FROM PICTURES BY W. L. WYLLIE, R.A.
PAGE
SUBMARINES IN THE CHANNEL _Frontispiece_
WARSHIP OF THE TIME OF KING ALFRED 3
RICHARD I. IN ACTION WITH THE SARACEN SHIP 13
BATTLE OF SLUYS 25
PORTSMOUTH HARBOUR, 1912 31
THE “GRACE DE DIEU,” 1515 39
THE SPANISH ARMADA, 1588 51
THE END OF A “GENTLEMAN ADVENTURER” 55
BLAKE AND TROMP--PERIOD OF THE DUTCH WARS 77
BATTLESHIPS OF THE WHITE ERA AT SEA 117
THE “FOUDROYANT,” ONE OF NELSON’S OLD SHIPS 143
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, 1805 173
THE END OF AN OLD WARSHIP 191
A TRAFALGAR ANNIVERSARY 205
THE OLD “INVINCIBLE,” 1872 293
SHIP PHOTOGRAPHS
“SALAMANDER,” PADDLE WARSHIP 217
OLD SCREW WOODEN LINE-OF-BATTLESHIP “LONDON” 221
“WARRIOR” 251
“ACHILLES” (WITH FOUR MASTS) 259
“MINOTAUR” (AS A FIVE-MASTER) 261
“BELLEROPHON” 269
“ROYAL SOVEREIGN” 273
“WATERWITCH” 277
“CAPTAIN” 289
“VANGUARD” 297
“HOTSPUR” AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED 309
“DEVASTATION” AS ORIGINALLY COMPLETED 313
PORTRAITS
PHINEAS PETT 67
SIR ANTHONY DEANE 93
GENERAL BENTHAM 155
JOHN SCOTT RUSSELL 245
SIR E. J. REED 265
PLANS, DIAGRAMS, ETC.
PHINEAS PETT’S “ROYAL SOVEREIGN” 71
POSITIONS OF THE FLEETS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 167
EARLY BROADSIDE IRONCLADS 255
REED ERA BROADSIDE SHIPS 281
REED ERA TURRET SHIPS 285
RAMS OF THE REED ERA 301
BREASTWORK MONITORS 305
THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET.
I.
THE BIRTH OF BRITISH NAVAL POWER.
The birth of British naval power is involved in considerable obscurity
and a good deal of legend. The Phœnicians and the Romans have both been
credited with introducing nautical ideas to these islands, but of the
Phœnicians there is nothing but legend so far as any “British Navy” is
concerned. That the Phœnicians voyaged here we know well enough, and
a “British fleet” of the B.C. era _may_ have existed, a fleet due to
possible Phœnicians who, having visited these shores, remained in the
land. Equally well it may be mythical.
Whatever share the ancient Britons may have had in the supposed
commercial relations with Gaul, it is clear that no fleet as we
understand a fleet existed in the days of Julius Cæsar. Later, while
England was a Roman province, Roman fleets occasionally fought
upon British waters against pirates and in connection with Roman
revolutions, but they were ships of the ruling power.
Roman power passed away. Saxons invaded and remained; but having
landed they became people of the land--not of the sea. Danes and other
seafarers pilaged English shores much as they listed till Alfred the
Great came to the throne.
Alfred has been called the “Father and Founder of the British Fleet.”
It is customary and dramatic to suppose that Alfred was seized with the
whole modern theory of “Sea Power” as a sudden inspiration--that “he
recognised that invaders could only be kept off by defeating them on
the sea.”
This is infinitely more pretty than accurate. To begin with, even at
the beginning of the present Twentieth Century it was officially put on
record that “while the British fleet could prevent invasion, _it could
not guarantee immunity from small raids_ on our great length of coast
line.” In Alfred’s day, one mile was more than what twenty are now;
messages took as many days to deliver as they now do minutes, and the
“raid” was the only kind of over-sea war to be waged. It is altogether
chimerical to imagine that Alfred “thought things out” on the lines of
a modern naval theorist.
In actual fact,[1] what happened was that Alfred engaged in a naval
fight in the year 875, somewhere on the South Coast. There is little
or no evidence to show where, though near Wareham is the most likely
locality.
In 877 something perhaps happened to the Danes at Swanage, but the
account in Asser is an interpolated one, and even so suggests shipwreck
rather than a battle.
In 882 (possibly 881) two Danish ships sank: “the rest” (number not
recorded) surrendered later on.
[Illustration: WARSHIP OF THE TIME OF KING ALFRED.]
In 884 occurred the battle of the Stour. Here the Saxon fleet secured a
preliminary success, in which thirteen Danish ships were captured. This
may or may not have been part of an ambush--at any rate the final
result was the annihilation of King Alfred’s fleet.
In 896 occurred the alleged naval reform so often alluded to as the
“birth of the British Navy”--those ships supposed to have been designed
by Alfred, which according to Asser[2] were “full nigh twice as long as
the others ... shapen neither like Frisian nor the Danish, but so as it
seemed to him that they would be most efficient.”
Around these “early Dreadnoughts” much has been weaved, but there is no
evidence acceptable to the best modern historians that Alfred really
built any such ships--they tend to reject the entire theory.
The actual facts of that “naval battle of the Solent” in 897 from which
the history of our navy is popularly alleged to date, appear to be as
follows:
There were nine of King Alfred’s ships, manned by Frisian pirates, who
were practically Danes. These nine encountered three Danish vessels in
a land-locked harbour--probably Brading--and all of them ran aground,
the Danish ships being in the middle between two Saxon divisions. A
land fight ensued, till, the tide rising, the Danish ships, which were
of lighter draught than the Saxon vessels, floated. The Danes then
sailed away, but in doing so two of them were wrecked.
All the rest of the story seems to be purely legendary. Our real
“island story”--as events during the next few hundred years following
Alfred clearly indicate--is not that of a people born to the sea; but
the story of a people forced thereto by circumstances and the need of
self-preservation.
It is a very unromantic beginning. There is a strange analogy between
it and the beginning in later days of the Sea Power of the other
“Island Empire”--Japan. Japan to-day seeks--as we for centuries have
sought--for an historical sequence of the “sea spirit” and all such
things as an ideal islander should possess. Neither we nor they have
ever understood or ever properly realised that it was the Continentals
who long ago first saw that it was necessary to command the sea to
attack the islanders. The more obvious contrary has always been
assumed. It has never been held, or even suggested, that the Little
Englander protesting against “bloated naval armaments,” so far from
being a modern anachronism, an ultra-Radical or Socialist exotic, may
really claim to be the true exponent of “the spirit of the Islanders”
for all time. That is one reason why (excluding the mythical Minos
of Crete) only two island-groups have ever loomed big in the world’s
history.
When Wilhelm II of Germany said: “_Unsere Zukunft liegt auf dem
Wasser_,” he uttered a far more profound truth than has ever been fully
realised. Fleets came into being to attack Islanders with.
The Islanders saw the sea primarily as a protection existing between
them and the enemy. To the Continental the sea was a road to, or
obstacle between him and the enemy, only if the enemy filled it with
ships. The Islanders have ever tended to trust to the existence of the
sea itself as a defence, except in so far as they have been taught
otherwise by individuals who realised the value of shipping. Those
millions of British citizens who to-day are more or less torpid on the
subject of naval defence are every whit as normal as those Germans
who, in season and out, preach naval expansion.
The explanation of all this is probably to be found in the fact that
the earliest warfare known either to Continentals or to Islanders was
_military warfare_. The ship as at first employed was used entirely as
a means of transport for reaching the enemy--first, presumably, against
outlying islands near the coast, later for more over-sea expeditions.
Ideas of attack are earlier than ideas of defence, and the primary idea
of defence went no further than the passive defensive. King Alfred,
merely in realising the offensive defensive, did a far greater thing
than any of the legendary exploits associated with his history. The
idea was submerged many a time in the years that followed, but from
time to time it appeared and found its ultimate fruition in the Royal
Navy.
Yet still, the wonder is not that only two Island Empires have ever
come into existence, but that any should have come into existence at
all. The real history of King Alfred’s times is that the Continental
Danes did much as they listed against the insular Saxons of England,
till the need was demonstrated for an endeavour to meet the enemy on
his own element.
In the subsequent reigns of Athelstan and Edmund, some naval
expeditions took place. Under Edgar, the fleet reached its largest.
Although the reputed number of 3,600 vessels is, of course, an
exaggerated one, there was enough naval power at that time to secure
peace.
This “navy” had, however, a very transient existence, because in the
reign of Ethelred, who succeeded to the throne, it had practically
ceased to exist, and an attempt was made to revive it. This attempt
was so little successful that Danish ships had to be hired for naval
purposes.
A charter of the time of Ethelred II exists which is considered by many
to be the origin of that Ship Money which, hundreds of years later, was
to cause so much trouble to England. Under this, the maintenance of
the Navy was made a State charge on landowners, the whole of whom were
assessed at the rate of producing one galley for every three hundred
and ten hides of land that they possessed.
This view is disputed by some historians, who maintain that the charter
is possibly a forgery, and that it is not very clear in any case.
However, it does not appear to have produced any useful naval power.
That naval power was insufficient is abundantly clear from the ever
increasing number of Danish settlements. In the St. Bride’s Day
massacre, which was an attempt to kill off the leading Danes amongst
the recent arrivals, further trouble arose; and in the year 1013,
Swain, King of Denmark, made a large invasion of England, and in the
year 1017, his son Canute ascended to the throne.
Under Canute, the need of a navy to protect the coast against Danish
raids passed away. The bulk of the Danish ships were sent back to
Denmark, forty vessels only being retained.
Once or twice during the reign of Canute successful naval expeditions
were undertaken, but at the time of the King’s death the regular fleet
consisted of only sixteen ships. Five years later, an establishment was
fixed at thirty-two, and remained more or less at about that figure,
till, in the reign of Edward the Confessor trouble was caused by Earl
Godwin, who had created a species of fleet of his own. With a view to
suppressing these a number of King’s ships were fitted out; but as the
King and Godwin came to terms the fleet was not made use of.
Close following upon this came the Norman invasion, which of all the
foolhardy enterprises ever embarked on by man was theoretically one
of the most foolish. William’s intentions were perfectly well known.
A certain “English fleet” existed, and there was nothing to prevent
its expansion into a force easily able to annihilate the heterogeneous
Norman flotilla.
How many ships and men William actually got together is a matter upon
which the old chroniclers vary considerably. But he is supposed to have
had with him some 696 ships[3]; and since his largest ships were not
over twenty tons and most of them a great deal smaller, it is clear
that they must have been crowded to excess and in poor condition to
give battle against anything of the nature of a determined attack from
an organised fleet.
No English fleet put in appearance, however. Harold had collected a
large fleet at Sandwich, but after a while, for some unknown reason,
it was dispersed, probably owing to the lateness of the season. The
strength of the fleet collected, or why it was dispersed, are, however,
immaterial issues; the fact of importance is that the fleet was
“inadequate” because it failed to prevent the invasion. A neglected
fleet entailed the destruction of the Saxon dominion.
II.
THE NORMAN AND PLANTAGENET ERAS.
William the Conqueror’s first act on landing was to burn all his
ships--a proceeding useful enough in the way of preventing any of his
followers retiring with their spoils, but inconvenient to him shortly
after he became King of England. Fleets from Denmark and Norway raided
the coasts, and, though the raiders were easily defeated on shore,
the pressure from them was sufficient to cause William to set about
recreating a navy, of which he made some use in the year 1071. In 1078
the Cinque Ports were established, five ports being granted certain
rights in return for policing the Channel and supplying ships to the
King as required. But the amount of naval power maintained was very
small, both in the reign of William the First and his successors.
Not until the reign of Henry II was any appreciable attention paid to
nautical matters. Larger ships than heretofore were built, as we assume
from records of the loss of one alleged to carry 300 men. It was Henry
II who first claimed the “Sovereignty of the British Seas” and enacted
the Assize of Arms whereby no ship or timber for shipbuilding might be
sold out of England.
When Richard I came to the throne in 1189, fired with ambition to
proceed to the Crusades, he ordered all ports in his dominions to
supply him with ships in proportion to their population. The majority
of these ships came, however, from Acquitaine. The fleet thus collected
is said to have consisted of nine large ships, 150 small vessels,
thirty galleys, and a number of transports. The large ships, which
have also been given as thirteen in number, were known at the time as
“busses.” They appear to have been three-masters. The fleet sailed
in eight divisions. This expedition to the Holy Land was the first
important over-sea voyage ever participated in by English ships, the
greatest distance heretofore traversed having been to Norway in the
time of Canute. This making of a voyage into the unknown was, however,
not quite so difficult as it might at first sight be supposed to
be, because there is no doubt whatever that the compass was by then
well-known and used. Records from 1150 and onwards exist which describe
the compass of that period. A contemporary chronicler[4] wrote of it:--
“This [polar] star does not move. They [the seamen] have an art
which cannot deceive, by virtue of the _manite_, an ill brownish
stone to which iron spontaneously adheres. They search for the
right point, and when they have touched a needle on it, and fixed
it to a bit of straw, they lay it on water, and the straw keeps it
afloat. Then the point infallibly turns towards the star; and when
the night is dark and gloomy, and neither star nor moon is visible,
they set a light beside the needle, and they can be assured that
the star is opposite to the point, and thereby the mariner is
directed in his course. This is an art which cannot deceive.”
The compass would seem to have existed, so far as northern nations were
concerned, about the time of William the Conqueror. Not till early in
the Fourteenth Century did it assume the form in which we now know it,
but its actual antiquity is considerably more.
In connection with this expedition to the Holy Land, Richard issued
a Code of Naval Discipline, which has been described as the germ of
our Articles of War. Under this Code if a man killed another on board
ship, he was to be tied to the corpse and thrown into the sea. If the
murder took place on shore, he was to be buried alive with the corpse.
The penalty for drawing a knife on another man, or drawing blood from
him in any manner was the loss of a hand. For “striking another,”
the offender was plunged three times into the sea. For reviling or
insulting another man, compensation of an ounce of silver to the
aggrieved one was awarded. The punishment for theft was to shave the
head of the thief, pour boiling pitch upon it and then feather him.
This was done as a mark of recognition. The subsequent punishment was
to maroon a man upon the first land touched. Severe penalties were
imposed on the mariners and servants for gambling.
Of these punishments the two most interesting are those for theft and
the punishment of “ducking.” This last was presumably keel-hauling,
a punishment which survived well into the Nelson era. It is to be
found described in the pages of Marryat. It consisted in drawing the
offender by ropes underneath the bottom of the ship. As his body was
thus scraped along the ship’s hull, the punishment was at all times
severe; but in later days, as ships grew larger and of deeper draught,
it became infinitely more cruel and heavy than in the days when it was
first instituted.
The severe penalty for theft is to be noted on account of the fact
that, even in the early times, theft, as now, was and is recognised
as a far more serious offence on ship board than it is on shore--the
reason being the greater facilities that a ship affords for theft.
[Illustration: RICHARD 1ST IN ACTION WITH THE SARACEN SHIP.]
On his way to the Holy Land, Richard had a dispute at Sicily with the
King of France, out of which he increased his fleet somewhat. Leaving
Sicily, somewhere between Cyprus and Acre he encountered a very large
Saracen ship, of the battle with which very picturesque and highly
coloured accounts exist. There is no doubt that the ship was something
a great deal larger than anything the English had ever seen heretofore,
although the crew of 1,500 men with which she is credited by the
chroniclers is undoubtedly an exaggeration.
The ship carried an armament of Greek fire and “serpents.” The
exact composition of Greek fire is unknown. It was invented by the
Byzantines, who by means of it succeeded in keeping their enemies at
bay for a very long time. It was a mixture of chemicals which, upon
being squirted at the enemy from tubes, took fire, and could only be
put out by sand or vinegar. “Serpents” were apparently some variation
of Greek fire of a minor order, discharged by catapults.
In the first part of the attack the English fleet was able to make
no impression upon the enemy, as her high sides and the Greek fire
rendered boarding impossible. Not until King Richard had exhilarated
his fleet by informing them that if the galley escaped they “should
be crucified or put to extreme torture,” was any progress made. After
that, according to the contemporary account, some of the English jumped
overboard and succeeded in fastening ropes to the rudder of the Saracen
ship, “steering her as they pleased.” They then obtained a footing
on board, but were subsequently driven back. As a last resource
King Richard formed his galleys into line and rammed the ship, which
afterwards sank.
The relation of Richard’s successor, King John, to the British Navy, is
one of some peculiar interest. More than any king before him he appears
to have appreciated the importance of naval power, and naval matters
received more attention than heretofore. In the days of King John
the crews of ships appropriated for the King’s service were properly
provisioned with wine and food, and there are also records of pensions
for wounds, one of the earliest being that of Alan le Walleis, who
received a pension of sixpence a day for the loss of his hand.[5]
King John is popularly credited with having made the first claim to
the “Sovereignty of the Seas” and of having enacted that all foreign
vessels upon sighting an English one were to strike their flags to
her, and that if they did not that it was lawful to destroy them.
The authenticity of this is, however, very doubtful; and it is more
probable that, on account of various naval regulations which first
appeared in the reign of King John, this particular regulation was
fathered upon him at a later date with the view to giving it an
historical precedent.
In the reign of King John the “Laws of Oleron” seem to have first
appeared, but it is not at all clear that they had any specific
connection with England. They appear rather to have been of a general
European nature. The gist of the forty-seven articles of the “Laws
of Oleron,” of which the precise date of promulgation cannot be
ascertained, is as follows:--[5]
“By the first article, if a vessel arrived at Bordeaux, Rouen, or
any other similar place, and was there freighted for Scotland, or
any other foreign country, and was in want of stores or provisions,
the master was not permitted to sell the vessel, but he might with
the advice of his crew raise money by pledging any part of her
tackle or furniture.
“If a vessel was wind or weather bound, the master, when a change
occurred, was to consult his crew, saying to them, “Gentlemen, what
think you of this wind?” and to be guided by the majority whether
he should put to sea. If he did not do this, and any misfortune
happened, he was to make good the damage.
“If a seaman sustained any hurt through drunkenness or quarrelling,
the master was not bound to provide for his cure, but might
turn him out of his ship; if, however, the injury occurred in
the service of his ship, he was to be cured at the cost of the
said ship. A sick sailor was to be sent on shore, and a lodging,
candles, and one of the ship’s boys, or a nurse provided for him,
with the same allowance of provisions as he would have received on
board. In case of danger in a storm, the master might, with the
consent of the merchants on board, lighten the ship by throwing
part of the cargo overboard; and if they did not consent, or
objected to his doing so, he was not to risk the vessel but to
act as he thought proper; on their arrival in port, he and the
third part of the crew were to make oath that it was done for the
preservation of the vessel; and the loss was to be borne equally by
the merchants. A similar proceeding was to be adopted before the
mast or cables were cut away.
“Before goods were shipped the master was to satisfy the merchants
of the strength of his ropes and slings; but if he did not do so,
or they requested him to repair them and a cask were stove, the
master was to make it good.
“In cases of difference between a master and one of his crew, the
man was to be denied his mess allowance thrice, before he was
turned out of the ship, or discharged; and if the man offered
reasonable satisfaction in the presence of the crew, and the master
persisted in discharging him, the sailor might follow the ship to
her place of destination, and demand the same wages as if he had
not been sent ashore.
“In case of a collision by a ship undersail running on board one at
anchor, owing to bad steering, if the former were damaged, the cost
was to be equally divided; the master and crew of the latter making
oath that the collision was accidental. The reason for this law
was, it is said, ‘that an old decayed vessel might not purposely
be put in the way of a better.’ It was specially provided that all
anchors ought to be indicated by buoys or ‘anchor-marks.’
“Mariners of Brittany were entitled only to one meal a day,
because they had beverage going and coming; but those of Normandy
were to have two meals, because they had only water as the ship’s
allowance. As soon as the ship arrived in a wine country, the
master was, however, to procure them wine.
“Several regulations occur respecting the seamen’s wages, which
show that they were sometimes paid by a share of the freight. On
arriving at Bordeaux or any other place, two of the crew might go
on shore and take with them one meal of such victuals as were on
board, and a proportion of bread, but no drink; and they were to
return in sufficient time to prevent their master losing the tide.
If a pilot from ignorance or otherwise failed to conduct a ship
in safety, and the merchants sustained any damage, he was to make
full satisfaction if he had the means to; if not, he was to lose
his head; and, if the master or any one of the mariners cut off
his head, they were not bound to answer for it; but, before they
had recourse to so strong a measure, ‘they must be sure he had not
wherewith to make satisfaction.’
“Two articles of the code prove, that from an ‘accursed custom’ in
some places, by which the third or fourth part of ships that were
lost belonged to the lord of the place--the pilots, to ingratiate
themselves with these nobles, ‘like faithless and treacherous
villains,’ purposely ran the vessel on the rocks. It was therefore
enacted that the said lords, and all others assisting in plundering
the wreck, shall be accursed and excommunicated, and punished as
robbers and thieves; that ‘all false and treacherous pilots should
suffer a most rigorous and merciless death,’ and be suspended to
high gibbets near the spot, which gibbets were to remain as an
example in succeeding ages. The barbarous lords were to be tied to
a post in the middle of their own houses, and, being set on fire
at the four corners, all were to be burned together; the walls
demolished, its site converted into a marketplace for the sale only
of hogs and swine, and all their goods to be confiscated to the use
of the aggrieved parties.
“Such of the cargoes as floated ashore were to be taken care of
for a year or more; and, if not then claimed, they were to be
sold by the lord, and the proceeds distributed among the poor, in
marriage portions to poor maids and other charitable uses. If, as
often happened, ‘people more barbarous, cruel, and inhuman than mad
dogs,’ murdered shipwrecked persons, they were to be plunged into
the sea till they were half-dead, and then drawn out and stoned to
death.”
Those laws, unconnected though they appear to be with strictly naval
matters, are none the less of extreme interest as indicating the
establishment of “customs of the sea,” and the consequent segregation
of a “sailor class.” It has ever to be kept very clearly in mind that
there was no such thing as a “Navy” as we understand it in these days.
When ships were required for war purposes they were hired, just as
waggons may be hired by the Army to-day; nor did the mariners count
for much more than horses. The “Laws of Oleron,” however, gave them a
certain general status which they had not possessed before; and the
regulations of John as to providing for those engaged upon the King’s
service--though they in no way constituted a Royal Navy--played their
part many years later in making a Royal Navy possible, or, perhaps, it
may be said, “necessary.” Necessity has ever been the principal driving
force in the naval history of England.
To resume. The limitations of the powers of the master (_i.e._ captain)
in these “Laws of Oleron” deserve special attention. “Gentlemen,
what think you of this wind?” from the captain to his crew would be
considered “democracy” carried to extreme and extravagant limits in
the present day; in the days when it was promulgated as “the rule” it
was surely stranger still! Little wonder that seamen at an early stage
segregated from the ordinary body of citizens and became, as described
by Clarendon in his “History of the Rebellion” a few hundred years
later, when he wrote:--
“The seamen are a nation by themselves, a humorous and fantastic
people, fierce and rude and resolute in whatsoever they resolve or
are inclined to, but unsteady and inconstant in pursuing it, and
jealous of those to-morrow by whom they are governed to-day.”
To this, to the earlier things that produced it, those who will may
trace the extreme rigour of naval discipline and naval punishments,
as compared with contemporaneous shore punishments at any given time,
and the extraordinary difference at present existing between the
American and European navies. The difference is usually explained on
the circumstance that “Europe is Europe, and America, America.” But
“differences” having their origin in the “Laws of Oleron” may play a
greater part than is generally allowed.
The year 1213 saw the Battle of Damme. This was the first real naval
battle between the French and English. The King of France had collected
a fleet of some “seventeen hundred ships” for the invasion of England,
but having been forbidden to do so by the Pope’s Legate, he decided to
use his force against Flanders. This Armada was surprised and totally
destroyed by King John’s fleet.
After the death of John the nautical element in England declared for
Henry III, son of John, and against Prince Louis of France, who had
been invited to the throne of England by the barons. Out of this came
the battle of Sandwich, 1217, where Hubert de Burgh put into practice,
though in different form, those principles first said to have been
evolved by Alfred the Great--namely, to attack with an assured and
complete superiority.
Every English ship took on board a large quantity of quick-lime and
sailed to meet the French, who were commanded by Eustace the Monk. De
Burgh manœuvred for the weather gauge. Having gained it, the English
ships came down upon the French with the wind, the quick-lime blowing
before them, and so secured a complete victory over the tortured and
blinded French. This is the first recorded instance of anything that
may be described as “tactics” in Northern waters.
The long reign of Henry III saw little of interest in connection with
nautical matters. But towards the end of Henry’s reign a private
quarrel between English and Norman ships, both seeking fresh water off
the Coast of Bayonne, had momentous consequences. The Normans, incensed
over the quarrel, captured a couple of English ships and hanged the
crew on the yards interspersed with an equal number of dead dogs. Some
English retaliated in a similar fashion on such Normans as they could
lay hands on, and, retaliation succeeding retaliation, it came about
that in the reign of Edward I, though England and France were still
nominally at peace, the entire mercantile fleets of both were engaged
in hanging each other, over what was originally a private quarrel as to
who should be first to draw water at a well.
Ultimately the decision appears to have been come by “to fight it out.”
Irish and Dutch ships assisted the English. Flemish and Genoese ships
assisted the Normans and French. The English to the number of 60 were
under Sir Robert Tiptoft. The number of the enemy is placed at 200,
though it was probably considerably less. In the battle that ensued the
Norman and French fleets were annihilated.
This battle, even more than others of the period, cannot be considered
as one of the battles of “the British fleet.” It is merely a conflict
between one clique of pirates and traders against another clique. But
it is important on account of the light that it sheds on a good deal of
subsequent history; for the fashion thus started lasted in one way and
another for two or three hundred years.
Nor were these disputes always international. Four years later than
the fight recorded above, in 1297, the King wished to invade Flanders
with an army of 50,000 men. The Cinque Ports being unable to supply the
requisite number of ships to transport this army, requisitions were
also made at Yarmouth. Bad blood soon arose between the two divisions,
with the result that they attacked each other. Thirty of the Yarmouth
ships with their crews were destroyed and the expedition greatly
hampered thereby.
Two events of importance in British naval history happened in the reign
of Edward I. The first of these, which took place about the year 1300,
arose out of acts of piracy on foreigners, to which English ships were
greatly addicted at that time. In an appeal made to Edward by those
Continentals who had suffered most from these depredations, the King
was addressed as “Lord of the Sea.” This was a definite recognition of
that sea claim first formulated by Henry II and which was afterwards
to lead to so much fighting and bloodshed.
The second event was the granting of the first recorded “Letters of
Marque” in the year 1295. These were granted to a French merchant who
had been taking a cargo of fruit from Spain to England and had been
robbed by the Portuguese. He was granted a five year license to attack
the Portuguese in order to recoup his loss.
In the reign of Edward II the only naval event of interest is, that
when the Queen came from abroad and joined those who were fighting
against the King, the nautical element sided with her.
The reign of Edward III saw some stirring phases in English history.
With a view to carrying on his war against France, Edward bestowed
considerable attention on naval matters, and in the year 1338, he got
together a fleet stated to have consisted of 500 vessels. These were
used as transports to convey the Army to France, and are estimated to
have carried on the average about eighty men each.
Meanwhile, the French had also got together a fleet of about equal
size, and no sooner had the English expedition reached the shores of
France than the whole of the south coast of England was subjected to
a series of French raids. Southampton, Plymouth and the Cinque Ports
were sacked and burned with practical impunity. These raids continued
during 1338 and 1339; the bulk of the English fleet still lying idle
on transport service at Edward’s base in Flanders. A certain number of
ships had been sent back, but most of these had been as hastily sent on
to Scotland, where their services had been urgently needed. Matters
in the Channel culminated with the capture of the two largest English
ships of the time. A fleet of small vessels hastily fitted out at the
Cinque Ports succeeded in destroying Boulogne and a number of ships
that lay there, but generally speaking the French had matters very much
their own way on the sea.
Towards the end of 1339, Edward and his expedition returned to England
to refit, with a view to preparing for a fresh invasion of France
during the following summer.
As Edward was about to embark, he learned that the French King had got
together an enormous fleet at Sluys. After collecting some additional
vessels, bringing the total number of ships up to 250 or thereabouts,
Edward took command and sailed for Sluys, at which port he found the
French fleet. He localised the French on Friday, July 3rd, but it was
not until the next day that the battle took place.
The recorded number of the enemy in all these early sea fights requires
to be accepted with caution. For what it is worth the number of French
ships has been given at 400 vessels, each carrying 100 men. The French,
as on a later occasion they did on the Nile, lay on the defensive at
the mouth of the harbour, the ships being lashed together by cables.
Their boats, filled with stones, had been hoisted to the mast-heads.
In the van of their fleet lay the _Christopher_, _Edward_, and various
other “King’s ships,” which they captured in the previous year.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF SLUYS--1340.]
The English took the offensive, and in doing so manœuvred to have the
sun behind them. Then, with their leading ships crowded with archers
they bore down upon the main French division and grappled with them.
The battle, which lasted right throughout the night, was fought with
unexampled fury, and for a long time remained undecisive, considerable
havoc being wrought by the French with the then novel idea of dropping
large stones from aloft. The combatants, however, were so mixed up
that it is doubtful whether the French did not kill as many of their
own number as of the enemy; whereas, on the other side, the use of
English archers who were noted marksmen told only against those at whom
the arrows were directed. Furthermore, the English had the tactical
advantage of throwing the whole of their force on a portion of the
enemy, whom they ultimately totally destroyed.
This Battle of Sluys took place in 1340. In 1346, after various truces,
the English again attacked France in force, and the result was the
Battle of Cressy. A side issue of this was the historic siege of
Calais, which held out for about twelve months. 738 ships and 14,956
men are said to have been employed in the sea blockade.
Up to this time the principal English ship had been a galley, _i.e._,
essentially a row boat. About the year 1350 the galley began to
disappear as a capital ship, and the galleon, with sail as its main
motive power, took its place. Also a new enemy appeared; for at that
time England first came into serious conflict with Spain.
To a certain extent the galleon was to the fleets of the Mid-Fourteenth
Century much what the ironclad was to the last quarter of the
Nineteenth Century, or “Dreadnoughts” at the end of the first decade of
the Twentieth Century.
The introduction of this type of vessel came about as follows:--
A fleet of Castillian galleons, bound for Flanders, whiled away the
monotony of its trip by acts of piracy against all English ships that
it met. It reached Sluys without interference. Here it loaded up with
rich cargoes and prepared to return to Spain. The English meanwhile
collected a fleet to intercept it, this fleet being in command of King
Edward himself, who selected the “cog _Thomas_” as his flagship.
The English tactics would seem to have been carefully thought out
beforehand. The Castillian ships were known to be of relatively vast
size and more or less unassailable except by boarding. The result was
that when at length they appeared, the English charged their ships into
them, sinking most of their own ships in the impact, sprang aboard and
carried the enemy by boarding. The leading figure on the English side
was a German body-servant of the name of Hannekin, who distinguished
himself just at the crisis of the battle by leaping on board a
Castillian ship and cutting the halyards. Otherwise the result of the
battle might have been different, because the Castillians, when about
half only of the English ships were grappled with them, hoisted their
sails, with the object of sailing away and destroying the enemy in
detail. Hannekin’s perception of this intention frustrated the attempt.
The advantages of the galleons (or carracks as they were then
called), must have been rendered obvious in this battle of “Les
Espagnols-sur-Mer,” as immediately afterwards ships on the models of
those captured began to be hired for English purposes.
Concurrent, however, with this building of a larger type of ship, a
decline of naval power began; and ten years later, English shipping
was in such a parlous state that orders were issued to the effect that
should any of the Cinque Ports be attacked from the sea, any ships
there were to be hauled up on land, as far away from the water as
possible, in order to preserve them.
In the French War of 1369, almost the first act of the French fleet was
to sack and burn Portsmouth without encountering any naval opposition.
In 1372 some sort of English fleet was collected, and under the Earl
of Pembroke sent to relieve La Rochelle, which was then besieged by
the French and Spanish. The Spanish ships of that period had improved
on those of twenty years before, to the extent that (according to
Froissart), some carried guns. In any case they proved completely
superior to the English, whose entire fleet was captured or sunk.
This remarkable and startling difference is only to be accounted for
by the difference in the naval policy of the two periods. In the early
years of Edward III’s reign, when a fleet was required it was in an
efficient state, and when it encountered the enemy, it was used by
those who had obviously thought out the best means of making the most
of the material available. In the latter stage, there was neither
efficiency nor purpose. The result was annihilation.